

The

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Ukrainian Quarterly

A JOURNAL OF EAST EUROPEAN AND ASIAN AFFAIRS

International Human Rights Year

By Michael Sosnowsky and Walter Dushnyck

CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN 1968!

UKRAINE IN 1918-1920!

Fifty years have not changed the aggressive character of Russia. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 is an exact replica of the Soviet Russian invasion of Ukraine in 1917-1918. Then and now Soviet Russian totalitarians brought "freedom" and "liberation" to the peoples of these countries, on the blades of their bayonets! To understand the essence of Russian imperialism and colonialism, and to comprehend the tragic events happening in Czechoslovakia,

r e a d

UKRAINE AND RUSSIA

**AN OUTLINE OF HISTORY OF POLITICAL
AND MILITARY RELATIONS
(December 1917 — April 1918)**

By

MATTHEW STACHIW, L. L. D.

TRANSLATED FROM UKRAINIAN AND EDITED

By

WALTER DUSHNYCK

Preface by

PROF. CLARENCE A. MANNING

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

INTRODUCTION — By Author;

PREFACE — By Clarence A. Manning;

CHAPTER ONE: "Preparation of Soviet Russia for Military Aggression Against Ukraine";

CHAPTER TWO: "The War of Soviet Russia Against Ukraine";

CHAPTER THREE: "The System of Soviet Authority During the First Russian Invasion of Ukraine";

CHAPTER FOUR: "The Brest Litovsk Treaty Negotiations and Soviet Russia's Stand on the Nationalities of Eastern Europe";

CHAPTER FIVE: "Russia and the Nationality Problem in Brest Litovsk"

CHAPTER SIX: "The Effective Offensive of the Ukrainian Armies and Their Allies";

CHAPTER SEVEN: "Bolshevik Policy with Respect to Peace and Ukraine"

CHAPTER EIGHT: "Proclamation of Independence of Soviet Power in Ukraine";

CHAPTER NINE: "The End of the First 'Ukrainian Soviet Republic'";

CHAPTER TEN: "Review of the Development of Soviet Power in the Occupied Parts of Ukraine and the First Soviet Ukrainian Government."

APPENDIX: "Text of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk."

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
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CONTENTS

"Socialist Commonwealth" — Alias Russian Prison House of Nations <i>Editorial</i> -----	293
International Human Rights Year <i>By Michael Sosnowsky and Walter Dushnyck</i> -----	301
Some Basic Thoughts for the New Nixon Administration <i>By Lev E. Dobriansky</i> -----	321
The "Sophistication" of Soviet Nationality Policy in Ukraine <i>By Roman Solchanyk</i> -----	332
Destruction of Ukrainian Historical Monuments by Moscow <i>Leonid Poltava</i> -----	346
Memorandum to the International Conference On Human Rights in Teheran <i>By the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America</i> -----	351
Russian Linguistic Policies toward the Uzbek People And Other Muslims of the U.S.S.R. <i>By Wasyl Shimoniak</i> -----	361
BOOK REVIEWS	
<i>Education in Soviet Ukraine.</i> By John Kolasky <i>Frank Sysyn</i> -----	369
<i>Fifty Years of Communism in Russia.</i> Milorad M. Drachkovitch, Ed. <i>Lev E. Dobriansky</i> -----	371
<i>Along the Roads of the New Russia.</i> By Hans Koningsberger <i>Walter Dushnyck</i> -----	373
<i>Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union.</i> Erich Goldhagen, Ed. <i>Alexander Sokolyszyn</i> -----	375
<i>The Slavic Community on Strike: Immigrant Labor In Pennsylvania Anthracite.</i> By Victor E. Greene -----	376
<i>The Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe: An Introduction.</i> By Richard F. Staar -----	377
<i>The Russians.</i> By Leonid Vladimirov -----	378
<i>Three above reviews by Joseph S. Roucek</i> -----	379
UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS -----	379

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"SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH" — ALIAS RUSSIAN PRISON HOUSE OF NATIONS

Editorial

"...The contention of the Soviet leadership that there exists a right of intervention in the affairs of other states deemed to be within a so-called 'socialist commonwealth' runs counter to the basic principles of the United Nations Charter, is dangerous to European security and has inevitably aroused grave anxieties. It gives rise to fear of a further use of force in other cases.

"The use of force and the stationing in Czechoslovakia of Soviet forces not hitherto deployed there have aroused grave uncertainty, and demand great vigilance on the part of the allies..."

(From a NATO communique, *The New York Times*,
November 17, 1968)

"...There are only differences in ideas and forms. In the earlier period, we had Pan-Slavism and (Russian) Orthodoxy as instruments. Today we have Leninism. But in essence this is a continuation of Russian imperialism, Russian tendencies, Czarist imperialism... Russia is going back to the classical form of Russian military imperialism..."

(Milovan Djilas, *The New York Times*, November 27, 1968)

What with the Soviet Russian seizure of Czechoslovakia and the task of setting all Eastern Europe in arms against the alleged "revanchism" of West Germany, Soviet Russian ideologists have been exceedingly busy these past three months inventing plausible justifications, especially for the naked aggression against the small and "brotherly" country of Czechoslovakia.

Immediately after that hapless country's occupation by Soviet Russian, Polish, East German, Hungarian, and Bulgarian troops, Moscow hastened to assure the world that these "allied forces had come at the invitation of the Czechoslovak government and Communist party leaders" (neglecting to add that Alexander Dubcek had been abducted and brought to Moscow in *chains* to "negotiate" a

settlement!). Subsequently *Pravda* enunciated what seems to be a new Russian doctrine, the "Brezhnev Doctrine," whereby the Kremlin claims the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of all so-called "socialist states." The core of this new doctrine is that the so-called "socialist states" enjoy neither genuine sovereignty nor genuine rights of territorial integrity and political independence, the USSR claiming the right to send troops at any time into any such state in order to maintain the Kremlin's control and domination.

In assessing critically the "Brezhnev Doctrine," a *New York Times* editorial was pointedly correct when it stated:

... But logic has as little to do with the Brezhnev doctrine as has law. What the world is faced with is notice that the Soviet Union intends to preserve its empire regardless of the wishes of the people living therein. Moscow is now telling the world that the Czechs, the Poles, the East Germans and other supposedly independent Communist people have as little right to determine their own political system as the Ukrainians, the Uzbeks, the Georgians and the other subject peoples of the Soviet Union itself. . . .¹

This new turn in Soviet Russian foreign policy poses the West with the greatest and most pernicious threat since the Hungarian uprising in 1956. The influential London newspaper, *The Economist* (mid-October, 1968), authoritatively asserted:

The invasion of Czechoslovakia served notice and reminded all of us that the real and basic division of the world continues to exist. . . . The central problem for the next twenty years will not be from what continent one comes or of what color of skin one is. The question of today is in which of the two rivaling systems will the next generation live: in the system of Leninist centralism or Western pluralism. Events have led us again to the core of the problem. . .

"SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH" DOCTRINE EXPOUNDED

The Russian viewpoint of the "socialist commonwealth" has been defined in a number of official pronouncements and Communist editorials. None of these arguments musters any logical justification, none admits that the "doctrine" violates all existing principles of international law and the U.N. Charter. All indicate, however, that the root cause of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" is fear for the integrity of the Russian empire.

In an article, entitled, "Lessons of Events, Necessary for the

¹ *The New York Times*, editorial, September 28, 1968.

Future," which appeared in a leading Soviet Russian review,² we read:

The events in Czechoslovakia and around it had been ripening for some time in thousands of various phenomena and developments. It is possible that some people who found themselves in the very center of the clash did not realize — as is usually the case — the full implications of what was going on. *But this time the events touched the most important and key problem of our times — the problem of inviolability, security and unity of socialist states* (italics added — Ed.)...

The Communist organ candidly admitted that the new doctrine has evoked some resentment and a divergency of views within the "socialist camp," when it grudgingly added:

Divergencies have appeared here and there among the labor movement, partially even in the ranks of the Communist parties, and also in certain socialist countries...

Further on, in order to confuse the issue again, the favorite of foreign conspiracy was brought in by the Communist editor:

Understandably, the plot of internal and external counterrevolutionary forces against socialist Czechoslovakia directly touched upon the vital interests of the Soviet Union and the other socialist states, the basic interests of their security and the inviolability of the western frontiers of socialist friendship... Even one look at the geographic map of Europe suffices to see that a victory of the counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia would exactly mean a violation of the balance of forces on the European continent in favor of capitalism, which would exceedingly enhance the war danger and at the same time create a serious threat to the foundations of European peace and international security...³

It is still unclear whether Moscow took into account all the risks which its invasion of Czechoslovakia entailed. In any event, the Russians demonstrated to all the world that they are bent on keeping their territorial empire intact, at the same time that they are agitating and supporting "wars of national liberation" among the former colonial peoples of Africa and Asia.

CZECH SCIENTISTS DERIDE MOSCOW'S DOCTRINE

Even while the Soviet tanks and Soviet security police were reducing Prague to an occupied city, the Czechoslovak Academy of

² *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn* (International Life), October, 1968, Moscow.

³ *Ibid.*

Sciences issued a declaration denouncing the Soviet occupation and characterizing Moscow's explanations as "lies," "inventions" and "distortions." The document consisted of separate sections that expressed the views of the academy's institutes of philosophy, history, economics, sociology, and public opinion. Overall, the Academy accused the Russians of usurping and making exclusively theirs the right of "interpreting" socialism.⁴

COMMUNIST PRESS IN UKRAINE PREDICTED "U.S. INVASION"
OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Typical of Soviet techniques, the Communist-controlled press in Ukraine prepared the ground by disseminating "alarming news" regarding "American designs" upon Czechoslovakia three weeks before the Soviet Russian aggression against that country. Here is what some of the Communist organs wrote:

Realizing the futility of direct attack on the socialist family of nations, the imperialists are seeking indirect routes and resorting to different, more resourceful tactics, concentrating their attack today in the fields of ideology, psychology and economics. Thus the American doctrine of a "differentiated policy" toward the socialist countries has been conceived...

Without giving up the attempt to restore capitalism, the new doctrine, in addition to purely military methods, indicates a more extensive utilization of "peacefully" influencing socialist countries. U.S. President Johnson calls it "building bridges" to socialist countries...

However, this new U.S. doctrine, despite its cover of "peace-loving" phraseology, is no less dangerous and reactionary, especially since its main objectives are directed toward the separation of socialist countries and their "peaceful regeneration..."⁵

The article assailed Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski of Columbia University, Prof. Kurt Glaser of South Illinois University (who is a member of the Editorial Advisory Board of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*) and a number of West German industrialists who visited Czechoslovakia before the Russian takeover. The article concluded:

At the same time the imperialists are strengthening their espionage and subversive activities. The Pentagon and the CIA have already worked out a plan of subversive activities directed against Czechoslovakia and other social-

⁴ "Czech Scholars Denounce Soviet," *The New York Times*, Oct. 24, 1968.

⁵ "Old Intentions in Up-Dated Packaging," by P. Hrynyuk, *Robitnycha Hazeta* (Workers' Gazette), Kiev, July 31, 1968, as reported by the *Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press*, No. 9, September, 1968, Munich Germany.

ist countries. It provides for the ideological adoption of unstable elements, recruitment and distribution of its own agents and, under "suitable circumstances," the bringing in of subversive forces, paratroopers, etc. . .

All this was and is still being turned out to justify the naked invasion of a country like Czechoslovakia, hardly a threat to the USSR. What Moscow was afraid of was the fresh winds of freedom which could bring about a collapse of the stifling, unstable and enslaved "socialist commonwealth."

"FAMILY OF BROTHERLY PEOPLES"

The present Soviet Russian empire consists of the Soviet Union, a "family of brotherly peoples," encompassing 15 different Union Republics, and the peripheral satellite ring, composed of Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria in Europe, and North Korea, North Vietnam and Tibet in Asia. Cuba, in the Western Hemisphere, is also a part of the Soviet Russian imperial real estate.

The USSR, established on January 30, 1924, is supposed to be a "union of free and sovereign republics," a confederation of equal and independent states. These are: the Russian SFSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the Byelorussian SSR — all three are Slavic nations, numbering 127 million, 46 million, and 9 million, respectively; the Moldavian SSR — 3.5 million; the Georgian SSR — 4.6 million, the Armenian SSR — 2.3 million and the Azerbaijan SSR — 4.9 million; the Lithuanian SSR — 2.1 million; the Latvian SSR — 2.3 million and the Estonian SSR — 1.3 million. In Asia: the Uzbekistan SSR — 11 million; the Kazakhstan SSR — 12.4 million; the Kirghiz SSR — 2.7 million, the Tadzhikistan SSR — 2.8 million, the Turkmenistan SSR — 2 million people (estimates based on Soviet statistics of 1966).

Of these republics, Ukraine and Byelorussia are charter members of the United Nations and participate in UNESCO and ILO, prime U.N. agencies.

Theoretically, these republics are said to be sovereign, but actually Moscow rules over them with the help of hand-picked *quislings* and Russian stooges. Also, according to the Soviet constitution and the constitutions of every individual republic, each Union Republic has the right to secede from the USSR and manage its own affairs. But none of these republics has its own national army, police force, independent currency or foreign policy. Each capital contains handfuls of native puppets, but the real power rests with

the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the powerful KGB and the armed forces dominated by Russian imperialist-minded officer cadres. Any thought of secession is considered to be treason and is punished accordingly.

In the last few years Moscow has stepped up the Russification of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR. In 1965-66 some 200 Ukrainian intellectuals were arrested and tried for demanding more freedom for the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian culture in general.⁶ None of the arrested Ukrainian intellectuals was a "spy" or even "subversive"; indeed, most of them had been reared under the Soviet system and, by all accepted standards, were true Marxists.

But they could not tolerate the relentless and overbearing Russian chauvinism and imperialism, underlaid by the notion of Russian racial superiority, which the Soviet Russian elite display in Ukraine and in all other non-Russian nations.

One of the Ukrainian intellectuals, Ivan Dzyuba, who was arrested in 1966 but released because of his poor health, in a recent book described the blatant and rampant Russification in Ukraine, illustrating most eloquently what the Russians mean by their use of the term "socialist commonwealth."

Author Dzyuba charges that the independence of the Ukrainian SSR is hollow, a mere sham concealing a woeful reality: Ukraine is a Russian colony.

He further contends that in a supposedly independent republic the following is taking place:

a) *Official life and official relations* are conducted in the Russian language, despite the fact that over 78 percent of Ukraine's population are Ukrainians;

b) *Activities of the Party, Communist Youth League, Trade Unions and other social and civic organizations* are likewise conducted in Russian;

c) *Economic life and economic relations*, too, are characterized by use of the Russian;

d) *Business administration*, chiefly in Russian;

⁶ Cf. "A Voice from the Soviet Prison Camp," by Vyacheslav M. Chornovil, No. 1, 1968, *The Ukrainian Quarterly*; "A Petition to the Council of Nationalities of the USSR," by Svyatoslav Y. Karavansky, No. 2, 1968, *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, and "'Soviet Legality' in the Light of Trials and Detention of Ukrainians" by Yuri Shukhevych-Berezynsky and Volodymyr Horbovy, No. 3, 1968, *The Ukrainian Quarterly*.

e) *The army* has been an instrument of Russification of the non-Russian nations in the USSR;

f) *Higher, secondary technical and professional education* — all for the most part carried on in Russian;

g) *Factory, trade and similar schools*, as well as *secondary schools*, predominantly employ Russian.

This is the actuality of the Russian view of "socialist commonwealth," as opposed to what the Kremlin always blares forth: the Soviet Union is a "model of free peoples, united together under the benign leadership of the older brother Russians."

PRISON OF NATIONS, NOT A COMMONWEALTH

By all standards and definitions the Soviet Union and its territorial empire is a prison wherein millions of non-Russian people are kept in captivity. The Czechs and Slovaks, under the spirited leadership of Alexander Dubcek, recently tried to wriggle out of the bonds of the suffocating and stifling "socialist commonwealth" of Moscow. As the world watches, these bonds are now being made tighter than ever.

The puppet governments of Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria were forced to become accomplices to this fresh strangulation of Czechoslovakia. Ironically, although under the Russian boot themselves, they not only had to applaud but also to abet the international crimes of their masters.

As a result of the seizure of Czechoslovakia, the precarious balance of power in Europe has been gravely disturbed. In East Europe there are expectations of new Soviet Russian pressures and more invasions. Possible targets are Communist Rumania and Communist Yugoslavia; and, not altogether unlikely, non-Communist Austria and non-Communist West Germany.

For years Ukrainians have been charging that naked imperialism rules the USSR. At long last many Western observers are realizing this basic truth.

Western Communists, by and large, are still speaking out against Russia's grab of Czechoslovakia, but Moscow pays scant attention to these Communists. As in the days when the Soviet Union attacked Finland and when Stalin made a pact with Hitler,

¹ *Internationalism or Russification?* By Ivan Dzyuba. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1968, pp. 156-157.

the Kremlin expects trusted and reliable Communists to follow the Moscow line, however reluctantly.

What alone could impress Moscow is a show of U.S. power. Recent U.S. arms shipments to Greece, the invigoration of NATO, the naval manuevers in the Mediterranean, and the like, have elicited sharp reactions from Moscow.

Only in this way do the Kremlin leaders get to know that any move against West Berlin and West Germany would provoke immediate action on the part of NATO.

The days ahead promise no relaxation. International observers see a progressively hardening Soviet stand vis-a-vis the U.S. and the inexorably increasing American influence on West Europe's economy. More and more, as in Czechoslovakia, the Kremlin must resort to force.

Nobody as yet can accurately foretell the foreign policy fundamentals that will be established by President-elect Nixon, but advance signs indicate a harder line.

The cold war, which in our view has never ceased to be a major preoccupation on Moscow's part, is now entering a new and perhaps decisive phase.

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS YEAR

By MICHAEL SOSNOWSKY and WALTER DUSHNYCK

"...States should reaffirm their determination effectively to enforce the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and in other international instruments that concern human rights and fundamental freedoms..."

(International Conference on Human Rights
Proclamation, Teheran)

"...There is ...a strong feeling of disappointment at the slowness and in many respects the inadequacy of the United Nations progress in regard to human rights, which is seen in the gulf between the texts adopted and their effective application ... Many conventions remain inoperative, sometimes for years on end, because they have not been ratified — often by the very states which adopted them in the General Assembly. Whether this attitude is due to inertia, delay or opposition, the resulting position is most discouraging..."

(Non-Governmental Organizations on Human Rights
Conference, Geneva)

"...Few tasks facing the international community today are of more vital importance to it than the promotion and protection of human rights. The problems of peace are intimately connected with problems of human rights. A permanent peace cannot be achieved without creating conditions that assure men everywhere the highest stake in building a world in which their lives and their human dignity are safeguarded, and in which freedom from fear is secured..."

(Statement of the Assembly for Human
Rights, Montreal)

On December 10, 1968, came to an end the International Human Rights Year, during which, in accordance with the decision of the General Assembly of the United Nations of December 20, 1965 (*Resolution 2081, XX*), individual states and peoples, as well as international organizations observed the 20th anniversary of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, proclaimed by the United Nations.

The above-mentioned Resolution read:

To promote further the principles contained in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, to develop and guarantee political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights and to end all discrimination and denial of human rights and fundamental freedoms on grounds of race, color, sex, language or religion, and in particular to permit the elimination of *apartheid*, an International Conference on Human Rights should be convened during 1968 in order to:

- a) Review the progress which has been made in the field of human rights since the adoption of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*;
- b) Evaluate the effectiveness of the methods used by the United Nations in the field of human rights, especially with respect to the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination and the practice of the policy of *apartheid*;
- c) Formulate and prepare a program of further measures to be taken subsequent to the celebrations of the International Year for Human Rights.¹

As we know, the International Year for Human Rights was observed throughout the world as outlined by the U.N. resolution. Practically every country marked this important anniversary of the 20th anniversary of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* by organizing their own commissions and committees, which prepared extensive reports on the status of human rights within their respective states. A similar action was conducted in the international arena at the initiative of various international institutions and organizations, which culminated in the International Conference on Human Rights, held April 22 to May 13, 1968, in Teheran, Iran. Among other international gatherings mention should be made of the NGO Conference on Human Rights, held on January 29-31, 1968, in Geneva, Switzerland, the Assembly for Human Rights, held March 22-27, 1968, in Montreal, Canada, and the Conference for Human Rights, held September 15-19, 1968, in Paris under the auspices of UNESCO.

STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE

The struggle for human rights has its ancient, long and, at times bloody history. This struggle has been conducted under various slogans and for different objectives, depending on a concrete political, social or economic situation in one or another period of human history. It was a struggle against tyrants for democratic rights in the Greek states-cities of ancient history and in the rebellions of slaves in the Roman empire. There were the efforts of the Christian Church to change the basic view of man as such and to teach that man should be looked upon as a creation of God, as a

¹ *Resolution 2081 (XX)*, adopted by the General Assembly on December 20, 1965, United Nations, N.Y.

value in himself, which spurred the struggle against institutionalized slavery (at least, inasmuch as Christians were concerned), and which militated against the suing of man by man (for instance, Christians were forbidden to take interest on loans). It was the struggle for political rights in England, which gave humanity the *Magna Charta* in 1215. Subsequently, we had the Hussite war, the Reformation and the peasant wars which devastated all central Europe. In Eastern Europe, especially in Ukraine, this struggle manifested itself in the powerful Kozak movement, which inflicted a crippling blow on the Polish Kingdom in the struggle for the national, social and religious rights of the Ukrainian people, who were then enslaved by Poland.

In the XVIIIth century these aspirations of man for his dignity and his rights, in the atmosphere of political oppression and economic exploitation which were characteristic of the era of absolutism, found an exceedingly important and far-reaching solution. In 1776 English colonies in North America asserted their independence, and in their Declaration of Independence inscribed the basic rights of the citizens of the new republic which no foreign government could abrogate or destroy. The authors of the American Declaration of Independence established, as its foundation, the principle of equality of all men. "All men are equal at their birth," they declared, and contended that for all men to be assured of their basic rights these rights must be guaranteed by the state.

The next step was taken in France, where the monarchic government was abolished and where, by revolutionary process, a republic was established. The French Revolution of 1789 gave us the *Declaration of the Rights of Man*, which subsequently became an integral part not only of the French constitution, but of the constitutions of other states of the world with their progressive democratization and with the gradual recognition of the necessity of proclaiming and safeguarding the basic rights of citizens.

But, as we know, this process was by no means a smooth and easy one. It required further efforts, and further struggle and additional sacrifices. The problem of human rights was brought to the fore at the time of World War I: in the international arena there appeared new independent nations whose struggle for national independence ran parallel with a struggle for basic human rights. Whereas the problem of human rights heretofore had been only a subject of interest of particular states and confined to their internal situation, at the end of World War I it became the concern

of the entire international community, entering even the sphere of international law. Some steps were taken prior to and during World War I in order to safeguard human rights during the course of the war.

Because of the developments between World War I and II, especially during World War II, a time when human rights were trampled upon and when entire social groups and peoples were subjected to the heinous practice of genocide, the problem of basic human rights emerged as one of the principal postwar questions. It was reflected in the international arena with the establishment of an International Military Tribunal to bring to justice those political and state leaders of individual states who had committed crimes against humanity.

This was something new in international jurisprudence. In the words of British international jurist Sir Hersch-Lauterpacht, "it affirmed the existence of fundamental Human Rights superior to the law of the State and protected by international criminal sanctions, even if violated in pursuance of the law of the State."²

The statutes of the International Military Tribunal identified the various types of crimes against peace and humanity: murders committed during the war, torture or deportation of the civilian population from the occupied territories for slave labor; inhuman treatment of prisoners of war; killing of hostages, destruction of cities and villages not necessitated by war requirements, deportation and persecution for political, racial or religious reasons. Gen. Telford Taylor, American member of the International Military Tribunal and one of the prosecutors at the Nuremberg war crimes trial, defined crimes against humanity as follows:

Crimes against humanity are acts which are committed in a systematic and absolute destruction of life and freedom. . ."³

He also underscored that these crimes were within the province of the International Military Tribunal because the state, from which the war criminals came, "because of its indifference, incapability or lack of cooperation could not or did not want to prevent these crimes, or to punish for them. . ."⁴

Thus were laid the foundations for a wider international action

² *International Law*. By L. Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, 7th ed., 1949.

³ *Die Nuernberger Prozesse*, Zurich, 1951, p. 124.

⁴ *Ibid.*,

by the United Nations which would make the problem of basic human rights an international one and which would accord it a definite position in international agreements. For that purpose a Commission on Human Rights was established under the auspices of the United Nations in 1946; it was empowered to draft a declaration of human rights on the basis of the general principles of the U.N. Charter. Such a project was prepared and, after a discussion on it by the U.N. General Assembly, was formally adopted on December 10, 1948. Entitled, *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, it was supported by 48 members of the United Nations, 8 abstaining from voting. Not a single member-state voted against the declaration. Among those abstaining were the so-called "socialist states," i. e. the USSR and its satellites, including the Ukrainian SSR and the Byelorussian SSR.

Rene Cassin, the French representative in the United Nations, who composed the first draft of the declaration, remarked that "the Socialist countries... explained that they found the Declaration 'inadequate,' and one even termed it 'old-fashioned.'"

The real reasons were entirely different. For example, the Kremlin's genocidal treatment of such subject peoples as the Chechen-Ingush was all too fresh in Stalin's mind. When the Kremlin did pay attention to the declaration, as during the International Human Rights Year of 1968, *it was interested not in the substance of the matter, that is, the safeguard of human rights, but only in utilization of an opportunity to promote its own imperialistic designs.*

French jurist Rene Cassin further stated:

The dominant feature that characterizes the universality of the *Declaration* is its broad scope and content. The *Declaration* embraces all the rights and freedoms essential for the dignity and development of the human personality: the right to life and to physical and juridical freedom; to spiritual and political freedom, such as freedom of conscience, opinion and information; the right to work, to own property, to education, to leisure, to the benefits of culture, and to engage in intellectual and artistic creation...

The *Universal Declaration* applies to all states and territories regardless of the political, juridical, economic or international status of the country, or whether or not it is a member of the United Nations. The birth of the *Universal Declaration* marks a turning point in world history. No longer can we allow the cries of the oppressed to be stifled by brutality or be lost in a maze of red tape...⁵

⁵ *UNESCO Courier*, January, 1968, Paris.

Sir Sean MacBride, former foreign minister of Ireland and now general secretary of the International Commission of Jurists, in his article "New Frontiers of International Law," writes:

One of the factors that influenced the adoption of the *Universal Declaration* was the determination of world leaders in 1948 to ensure that the world should never again witness the genocide, the destruction of human rights and the brutality that engulfed humanity in the neo-barbarism that accompanied World War II. . .

The *Universal Declaration* is no abstract document of general principles; it is specific and detailed. Many of its provisions have now been embodied in national constitutions and have been used for purposes of judicial interpretation in different jurisdictions. It has received repeated confirmation in numerous international conventions.⁶

Nevertheless, Sir MacBride contended, the crucial matter continues to be the problem of universal application of the decisions of the *Universal Declaration* and its means, such as would assure the preservation of these decisions in every-day practical life. In individual states, he writes, the decisions of the *Universal Declaration* are being violated; these states, basing their stand on the principle of sovereignty, refuse to recognize any agency as possessing authority to take measures against these violations. Taking into consideration the reality of international life at this time, Sir MacBride points toward world opinion as a factor militating against such transgressions:

The advent of higher standards of literacy and the availability of mass media of communication have given a new dimension to the important role of world public opinion. No dictator or authoritarian regime can now remain immune from the impact of world public opinion. There is no center of power, be it in a democratic state or in a totalitarian regime, which now can ignore world public opinion for long. Indeed, it can be said that a shift is taking place in the center of power — a shift that makes governments more subject to world public opinion than ever before. The importance of this new factor is not yet fully appreciated — even by governments. . .⁷

To be noted is that the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, regardless of its validity, is not a document which is binding upon governments. It is more an "expression of opinion" of the international community, for although the document was adopted by the official representatives of member-states of the U.N., it has not as

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 28-30.

⁷ *Ibid.*,

yet been ratified by the states. Here the "neutral" attitude of the USSR proved weighty.

In a Soviet review, *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn* (International Life), for April, 1948, the importance of the *Universal Declaration* is acknowledged, but we also read:

At the same time, it must be stressed that the significance of this document is very often strongly exaggerated. In the United States and in other countries of the West, analyses of the *Declaration* contain some unfounded attempts to create an impression to the effect that the acceptance of the *Declaration* is of gigantic historic significance. . . It (the *Declaration*) is a very limited result of cooperation on the part of member-states of the U.N. in the sphere of safeguarding and developing basic freedoms and human rights (p. 12).

For the past twenty years efforts have been exerted to make the *Declaration* a more effective instrument in achieving recognition of human rights. Additional declarations have been made and a series of conventions have met and approved the right of peoples to self-determination and political independence, and their social and cultural rights, as well. Foremost among these conventions and measures are the Convention on the Crime of Genocide, which also dealt with punishment for the same; Convention No. 87 on the freedom of associations and safeguard of the right of organization; a Declaration of the U.N. General Assembly on granting independence to colonial countries and peoples, a Declaration of the United Nations regarding the liquidation of all forms of racial discrimination, and a Convention regarding the struggle against discrimination in the sphere of education.

Effective, too, have been other conventions, dealing with the abolition of slavery and the slave trade, the rights of women and children, protection of wage-earnings, and discrimination in work and occupation, as well as reiterations of previous declarations, especially those governing prisoners of war, the sick and the civilian population in wartime.

But by the far the most important achievement to date is undoubtedly the understanding on the part of the Western states to curtail their sovereign rights in the matter of protection of human rights and to create such forms of international cooperation that would enable a maximal protection of human rights. Examples for the whole world to follow are the signing of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms and the establishment of a European Court for Human Rights. These strides forward were made only because in the preparation and reali-

zation of these projects no part was taken by the "socialist countries," headed by the USSR. Otherwise, as indicated by the proceedings of the United Nations where the USSR has a decisive voice, these efforts would certainly have met with failure.

This short historic survey of efforts for the rights of man and peoples and the attainments to date indicates the significant progress made by humanity in this field. At the same time, it is clear that much remains to be done. The rights of man and people must be observed not only in constitutions and declarations but in everyday life all over the world as well.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND RESULTS OF THEIR WORK

We have already mentioned that within the framework of the International Human Rights Declaration four international conferences were held dealing with the problem. But only one conference — the International Conference on Human Rights, which was held under the auspices of the United Nations in Teheran, had an official character. The three others, held in Geneva, Montreal, and Paris, were sponsored by international non-governmental organizations. Each of these conferences dealt with the various aspects of human rights and issued appropriate decisions and general declarations (examples: "The Teheran Proclamation," "The Montreal Statement," and so forth).

Unquestionably, most important was the Teheran Conference on Human Rights, in which the official delegations of the member-states of the United Nations took part. Yet a substantial contribution was also made by the non-official conferences, which enjoyed a greater freedom of discussion of the various problems. At the Teheran Conference pressure was exerted by various states, notably the Soviet bloc, to the end that a series of problems and matters remained taboo at the conference.

Basically, the deliberations of all conferences were conducted along two directions: a) along the line of a fundamental review of the accomplishments in the field of human rights; b) along the line of activities and projections for the future.

It must stressed time and again that there was not a single conference at which the participants did not feel that at present humanity finds itself in a particularly important era of great change. Affected are practically all fields of human endeavor and the life of entire nations. It is impossible, they felt, to discuss the problem

of human rights without taking into consideration the changes in the spheres of international relations, economics, social and cultural relations, technology and science, as well as in the field of the struggle of nations for their liberation from colonial and other dependence. At the same time participants at all the conferences confirmed the facts that "in the world there exists in great measure the denial of human rights and freedoms" and methods and means applied for their protection are inadequate.

In condemning the violation of human rights in individual countries, especially discrimination of all kinds, political aggression and colonialism, the conferences called on the United Nations and the governments of all states to adhere to the decision of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and the decisions of the conventions. In that respect the decisions and recommendations of the Teheran Conference have an especially important significance, despite the fact that under the pressure of the USSR and its satellites the conference failed to adopt a decision providing for international means of inspection and control of the application by individual states of the decision in the field of human rights. The Teheran Conference proclaimed:

It is imperative that the members of the international community fulfill their solemn obligations to promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions of any kind such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinions.

The *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* states a common understanding of the peoples of the world concerning the inalienable and inviolable rights of all members of the human family and constitutes an obligation for the members of the international community.

States should reaffirm their determination effectively to enforce the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and in other international instruments that concern human rights and fundamental freedoms.⁸

The Teheran Proclamation enumerates 19 areas which were the subject of discussion at the conference and which relate directly to human rights. A series of them had a direct bearing upon Ukraine and other enslaved countries. These are the decisions on colonialism, including a declaration of support for the "liberation movements of peoples" in their struggle for freedom and independence, and on the proper recognition of persons who take part in the struggle of their people — the "freedom fighters" — entailing their treatment as prisoners of war in the event of their capture with arms in hand.

⁸ *International Conference on Human Rights. Proceedings. Teheran, April 25-May 13, 1968* (mimeograph).

Important decisions also were adopted in such matters as discrimination, the rights of women and children, behavior in occupied territories, illegal detention in prisons; in the matters of economic and social rights, economic and social development, the rights of man and technological progress, legal protection and assistance, the planning of families, illiteracy, education of youth, human rights in the event of armed conflict, and so forth.

But the basic shortcoming of the Teheran Conference derived from the fact that the delegation of the USSR succeeded in preventing the establishment of any controlling instrument at the United Nations, that is, a High Commissioner for Human Rights who would be empowered to judge and investigate all the violations of the binding conventions, declarations and the like, in the sphere of human rights and who would report these violations to the General Assembly and to the General Secretary of the United Nations. Understandably, it was impossible to find any workable solution; the USSR balked at the right of individual citizens of states to appeal to some supra-state organ in the event the said state violated the basic rights of citizens and denied them the possibility of receiving any indemnification or rectification of the wrong.

The delegates of the USSR and of the satellite countries — with the exception of the Rumanian and Czechoslovak delegations in Teheran, which as yet were able to maintain semi-independent positions — most vehemently opposed any and all attempts to put on the agenda any discussion of the concrete facts of violation of human rights. This, however, did not prevent them from attacking the United States for its racial disorders, or West Germany for neo-Nazism. And the Soviet delegates gave their unqualified support to the Arabs when the latter raised “concrete facts” (in their interpretation) of genocidal practices on the part of the Israelis in Palestine, as well as to the individual delegates of the African countries who condemned “Western imperialism” and *apartheid* in South Africa and Rhodesia. This, of course, was allowable and desirable: “concrete facts” served Soviet purposes. When it appeared that this weapon might be turned against the USSR, such charges were qualified as being “against the procedure” or “the violation of treaties,” the United Nations Charter, and so forth.

Typical of this behavior at the Teheran Conference were the remarks of Prof. Peter E. Nedbailo,* head of the delegation of the

* On December 2, 1968 the U.N. announced that Prof. Nedbailo was the winner of a U.N. ward “for outstanding achievements in human rights.”

Ukrainian SSR, who was ordered by the Russian masters of the "All-Union delegation" to speak on this matter.

Nedbailo stated:

In recent times one hears proposals, in addition to recommendations of a general sort, to work on concrete problems of human rights in one or another country, especially on the violation of rights of individual persons. It must be stated that if the United Nations and its organs should preoccupy themselves with these problems, they would cease to be what they are, that is, they would not be able to perform these tasks that they were called on to perform.

The U.N. Charter provides for the direct investigation of human rights and freedoms of man in one or another country only in those cases where the situation threatens international peace and security (Art. VII of the U.N. Charter). Such a situation came into being in the South African Republic and in South Rhodesia, where *apartheid* is on a level with government policy, is being practiced in legislative and other official forms and is by itself a "serious threat to international peace and security," and as such it falls under the action of Art. VII of the U.N. Charter. The General Assembly has characterized the policy and practice of *apartheid* in a series of resolutions as a "crime against humanity."⁹

Having established such "premises," Prof. Nedbailo went on to deal with "concrete cases" of human rights violations "in the sphere of influence of Western imperialism, especially the United States of America," raising the problem of the Middle East and Vietnam, where at "the one corner of the continent the rights and freedoms of man are being brutally violated by the aggressive war of the United States against the Vietnamese people who are striving for self-determination, and at the other corner being violated are the rights of the Arab peoples as a result of the aggression of Israel."

Clearly, in the opinion of Prof. Nedbailo and his Russian masters the violation of human rights and human freedoms in the areas under the control and domination of Moscow "do not constitute a threat to the peace and security in the world." Ruthless intervention in the internal affairs of individual nations (as was the case of Czechoslovakia subsequently) and arrests of hundreds upon thousands of persons in the USSR for their courage in expressing their own opin-

In a telegram to the U.N. Secretary General, U Thant, the Executive Board of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America denounced the move as "a mockery of justice for which the U.N. should not stand..."

⁹ *Vystuplenie ot imeni delegatsii Ukrainsskoi SSR na Mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii po pravam cheloveka* (Address of the Delegation of the Ukrainian SSR at the International Conference on Human Rights), Teheran, 1968, 20 p., (typewritten copy).

ions (which happened to be contrary to that of the Soviet government), the trials *in camera* and deportations to slave labor camps — all this, according to Nedbailo and other Soviet delegates, “is an internal matter of the state” and “does not flow from the political line of the state.”

Prof. Nedbailo also categorically rejected a plan for international inspection control, stating that the problem of the rights of man is *an exclusive and only* an internal problem of one or another state:

We proceed from the premise that legislation and the protection of the realization by man of his rights and freedoms are matters founded in the state. . .

The Ukrainian SSR appreciates the international endeavors for the protection of human rights within the system of means provided for its realization. But the decisive role in this is played by the state. This refers not only to the economic and social rights; traditional political and civil rights demand even greater state protection and safeguards, as for instance, the principle of equality of all before the law requires the full and final liquidation of discrimination involving race, sex, color, language, religion, social origin and position, and so forth. The attainment of such equality is impossible without state and governmental efforts, including legislative efforts.

Exceptionally important is the significance of the state and its efforts for the problem of the rights and freedoms of man in that not only should there be laws for man to avail himself of the material and spiritual benefits of society, but also there actually be possible a *utilization of the same* (Italics added).¹⁰

In this last statement of Prof. Nedbailo is visible the whole crux of the problem which was the subject of discussion at conferences and in individual commissions. Neither he nor anyone else of the Soviet and pro-Soviet delegations, however, dared to propose a workable solution in practice.

Instead, Prof. Nedbailo perverted the example of the Ukrainian SSR, saying that all the rights of man not only are inscribed in the state constitution, but that the state has insured the existence of all conditions for the full utilization of these rights. Of course, Prof. Nedbailo, hailing from Ukraine, knew better than anyone else how these rights look in practice. He was fully aware of this when he addressed the plenary session of the Teheran Conference and when later he had to defend the position of the head of the delegation of the USSR in rejecting a High Commissioner for Human Rights. He knew he was making but sheer propaganda, and he concluded in the same vein:

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

All said above is based on the fact that by its basis and original provenance the problem of human rights is fully and wholly an internal problem of the state. International protection of the rights and freedoms of man — as any other international law — is based on the principles of sovereignty, a sovereign equality of states, and non-intervention in their internal affairs. It is being realized in the form of international cooperation of states... International law derives, thus, from the fact that the legislative measures and the practical realization and protection of the rights and freedoms of man — their material, political, juridical and organizational protection — is the sovereign problem of the state. International legal documents in this sphere are formulated by taking into consideration this activity of states, which is based on internal legislation, and this includes the norms of international law. Such a principled and original position determines also our relation to the problem of application of the rights and freedoms of man...

On the other hand, some states, instead of applying the necessary means in their own countries, as for instance, signing and ratifying the international documents relating to human rights, stubbornly raise the problem of human rights, stubbornly raise the problem of establishing international organs of inspection and control to ascertain the realization of human rights, including an International Court with supra-state functions, with a right to receive complaints against a state not only from another state, a signatory to the convention, but also from private persons and groups, from non-governmental organizations, with a right of entering a state for the purpose of investigation, and so forth, that is, with a right of overt or covert intervention in the internal affairs of the state. Such organs are not foreseen by the Charter of the United Nations. Moreover, such organs as the High Commissioner for Human Rights are directed toward the weakening of international cooperation in the field of human rights...¹¹

These lengthy quotations from Prof. Nedbailo's statements are reproduced in order to leave no doubt as to the stand of the entire Soviet bloc in all matters pertaining to the rights and freedoms of man, especially as regards their implementation.

In this connection, it is worthwhile to register the remarks of Prof. Rudolf Bystrycky, the head of the Czechoslovak delegation at the Teheran Conference, in explicating the position of the Czechoslovak government:

It is obvious that we do not consider socialism as a rigid social system. On the contrary. We see it as an open society, capable of changes and development, one which cannot even successfully exist without such development...

¹¹ *Ibid.*; also *Problemy pravoznaustva* (Problems of Jurisprudence), of which Prof. Nedbailo is Editor-in-chief, dedicated its No. 9, 1968 issue to the problem of human rights in the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR. The review is published by the T. Shevchenko University in Kiev.

If we look upon the activities of the U.N. in the field of human rights we consider the adoption of the Covenant on Human Rights as a success and as a great step forward in the international protection of human rights. . . The Czechoslovak delegation takes no negative position, in principle with respect to either the existing or the newly proposed organs. . . The authority and competence of the existing organs can be, where appropriate, extended to the limits set by the Charter. This should be our first line of approach.

The second line of approach is the question of establishment of new institutions. In principle we are not opposed to it. As far as the institution of a High Commissioner for Human Rights is concerned, we believe that its usefulness should not be *a limine* excluded. Such an institution, however, could be useful only after sufficient guarantees are given that its competence would not go beyond the Charter and that its establishment would **take place in an atmosphere of mutual confidence.** . .¹²

Evidently, at that time (the end of April, 1968) the Czechoslovak delegate could still allow himself to express his own thoughts and not those of Moscow, as was the case with the delegate from the Ukrainian SSR. Today, when the USSR has again brutally violated its own declarations and solemn assurances on non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries by its military aggression against Czechoslovakia (suppressing the endeavors of the Czechs and Slovaks to establish a free and open society as was stressed at the International Conference in Teheran by the Czechoslovak delegate), the Czechoslovak delegates would be forced to toe the Moscow line, like it or not.

Not pertinent is any discussion about the results of the International Conference on Human Rights, as well as the results of other conferences, without taking into account the example of Czechoslovakia. Here all are able to see *how far apart is theory and practice in the matter of protection and safeguard of the rights and freedoms of man, and of the rights of peoples.*

Let us compare the statement of Prof. Bystrycky of April, 1968, with what is now going on in Czechoslovakia, where the Czechoslovak government is being compelled by the USSR to liquidate all the reforms made under the leadership of Alexander Dubcek and to return the country to the former despicable rule of oppression suffered by the Czechs and Slovaks from 1948 to January, 1968.

This process of gradual emancipation in Czechoslovakia was eloquently described by Prof. Bystrycky:

¹² *Speech Delivered by the Head of the Czechoslovak Delegation in Plenary Session, April 29, 1968.* By Rudolf Bystrycky. Teheran, 1968, 7 p. (mimeograph).

While our meeting deals here with problems of human rights the world over, we in our country are witnessing a remarkable social process of direct relevance to our agenda, a process which could well be called a Czechoslovak conference on human rights and fundamental freedoms *sui generis*. We are witnessing a national and free discussion, a fervent activity, the central aim of which is the achievement of a higher, qualitatively new standard of human rights and civil liberties. . . The road we followed up to now was not an easy one. In a divided world struck by cold war, our development in the last twenty years was rather contradictory. . . The events taking place in our country do not challenge the socialist character of our system. On the contrary: they are directed at its *renaissance*. . .¹³

This process was in full swing in Czechoslovakia but a few months ago. But what is happening there today? The Czechoslovak lesson, which is being studied by the entire world, is far from over for it will continue until all remnants of the nascent freedoms the Czechs and Slovaks had achieved are wholly and ruthlessly eradicated.

This lesson cannot be forgotten when we discuss the International Year of Human Rights. This commemorating year has been concluded to the accompaniment of Soviet armor rolling into Czechoslovakia and the Soviet air force occupying the principal military airfields in the country. The freedoms and rights of man have been brutally suppressed by the same people who have spoken so loudly at international conferences and international forums denouncing the violations of the sovereign rights of other states and condemning intervention in the internal affairs of the sovereign states.

THE PROBLEM WHICH WAS LEFT UNDISCUSSED

We would not be providing a full review of all the efforts made during the International Year of Human Rights if we did not register publicly the problem of hundreds upon thousands of Ukrainians whose human rights are being mercilessly suppressed by the Soviet regime. At the very time the delegate of the "sovereign" and "independent" Ukrainian SSR was telling the international conference tales about the alleged attainments in the field of human rights in the republic (and he spoke specifically about political, social, cultural and economic rights), numerous trials were being held behind closed doors at which hundreds of Ukrainian intellectuals were indicted solely because they had demanded the application of the principle of human rights to the Ukrainian people.

¹³ *Ibid.*

Through the efforts of Ukrainian organizations, united in the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, almost all governments of the world, the various non-governmental international organizations and the General Secretariat of the United Nations have been informed of the crass violations of human rights and personal and national freedoms in Ukraine and in other countries under the domination of the USSR. The delegation of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, which stayed in Teheran for the entire period of the International Conference on Human Rights, warned the conference against placing excessive trust in the declarations of the Soviet delegations and its puppets. At that time no one knew what was in store for Czechoslovakia. Many delegations, therefore, acted in the spirit of the so-called "peaceful coexistence," and refused to believe that in this new atmosphere the Soviet Union would dare to unleash shortly an armed aggression which would suppress the independent and legitimate development of a small country.

If we recall this fact it is hardly because we want to say "we told you so." We do so because the head of the Soviet delegation, in summing up the Teheran Conference, accused these organizations which warned against Russian duplicity of "slandering" the so-called socialist countries and, furthermore, charged that they were doing so on the "orders of responsible imperialist circles of the United States of America."

In the above-cited Soviet organ B. Tchikvadze and Ya. Ostrovsky, the former the head and the latter a member of the Soviet delegation in Teheran, published an article on "The International Conference on Human Rights," in which they stated:

The delegations of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries conducted at the conference an activity along the lines of unmasking imperialist aggression, colonialism, racism and Nazism as the most dangerous forms of harsh denial of the basic rights and freedoms of man. The Soviet delegates declared with full clarity that they could not discuss the actual problems connected with securing peace and the freedoms of man by abstaining from discussing the present international circumstances. . .¹⁴

Subsequently these authors dwelt at length on the problem of Vietnam, *apartheid* and the situation in West Germany, and concluded that "the decisions of the Teheran Conference. . . create new

¹⁴ *Mezhdunarodnaia konferentsiia po pravam tcheloveka* (The International Conference on Human Rights). By B. Tchikvadze and Ya. Ostrovsky, No. 8 (August), 1968, Moscow, pp. 22-29.

possibilities for strengthening the struggle in the U.N. and in other international organizations against the imperialist violations of human rights, against the policy of aggression, neo-Nazism, *apartheid* and racism. . .”

We may safely assume that at the time this article was being printed the Soviet armed forces already were moving into Czechoslovakia. But it would be rather difficult to guess under which article of the decisions of the Teheran Conference this aggression would be qualified. Perhaps Comrade Tchikvadze will enlighten us in his next article.

In the same article the Soviet authors could not let pass by in silence the informational activities conducted at the Teheran Conference by such organizations as the World Congress of Free Ukrainians and the representation of the government-in-exile of Armenia. According to the accepted Soviet practice, everything and all that bears an anti-Soviet character is immediately labeled as the work of the “American intelligence service”:

The work of the conference was followed by numerous observers from non-governmental organizations. . . Many of them are maintained by appropriate organs of the United States of America which take advantage of them against the USSR and other socialist countries. Long before the conference these organizations were given the assignment to exert every effort, mainly through the dissemination of slandering materials so that the conference be given an anti-Soviet and anti-Socialist direction. Drawn into this ungrateful campaign were those nationals of Poland, Hungary and other socialist countries who had escaped abroad to save themselves from the just punishment of their own people for their treason to the fatherland. . . (*In point of fact, the only representatives from the captive nations were the Ukrainian delegation and that of Armenia — there were no representatives of free Polish or Hungarian organizations — the authors*).

The organizers of this infamous campaign understandably were not without means. Their slandering materials, published in great quantity, contained mendacious accusations against the socialist countries (*reference is made here to materials containing reports on the secret arrests and trials of Ukrainian intellectuals in Ukraine — the authors*); a series of preparatory conferences were held, and finally these so-called freedom fighters were brought to Teheran. But as soon as they arrived, it became apparent that the participants of the conference not only failed to show interest in their filthy falsifications, but categorically opposed that materials of that kind be disseminated at a conference of the United Nations (*again, only the delegations of the USSR and the so-called Socialist countries protested. Incidentally, they even threatened representatives of the free Ukrainian delegation with such warnings as “our hands are longer,” and the like — the authors*). The paid lackeys of imperialism

had no choice but to secretly slip these materials into the hotel rooms in which the participants of the conference were staying. . .¹⁵

These statements of the Soviet delegates at the Teheran Conference serve not only to corroborate the fact that the informational activities of the Ukrainian organizations were essential and necessary, *but that they evidently created serious difficulties for the Soviet delegations*. Especially, the latter were embarrassed by the materials and documents which arrived from the USSR during the conference and which revealed in full dimension the crass and systematic violation of the rights and freedoms of man in the USSR, not even mentioning the national oppression of the non-Russian peoples. These contained the information about the protests of Ukrainian writers in Ukraine against the arrests and trials of Ukrainian intellectuals and also about the protests of the Crimean Tartars in connection with the persecution of a large group of Crimean Tartars in Tashkent. But the Soviet delegates in Teheran steadfastly refused to comment on these arrests, saying that "officially they knew nothing," although they now write that these materials were "prepared on orders of well-known American circles" which allegedly supported the anti-Soviet informational activities in Teheran. Needless to say, this charge is wholly false.

Soviet hacks (as well as government and party officials) cannot think of any action on the anti-Soviet sector behind which do not lurk "well-known American circles." They cannot and do not want to understand that outside the USSR there exist active and well-established organizations of the captive nations, which on their own initiative and with their own resources alone conduct effective programs toward the liberation of their lands. By linking these organizations with American agencies the Soviet propagandists seek to discredit them in the eyes of the captive nations under Soviet Rus-

¹⁵ Among these materials were a) *Statement of the Delegation of Free Ukrainians to the International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 1968*. Pp. 4 (mimeograph). World Congress of Free Ukrainians; b) *Violations of Human Rights in Ukraine: A Memorandum to the Hon. U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, Winnipeg, 1968*, 15 p; c) *Violation and Destruction of Human Rights in Ukraine*. Memorandum to the International Conference on Human Rights, April 22-May 13, 1968, Teheran. Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, New York, N.Y., 1968; d) *Appeal to the United Nations International Conference on Human Rights*, Delegation of the Armenian Republic, Paris, 1968. (See the Memorandum of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America appearing elsewhere in this issue of *The Ukrainian Quarterly* — Ed.)

sian domination. But, as with many other Soviet propaganda attempts, this one remains very ineffective.

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In summing up these comments on International Human Rights Year, we should like to stress that this year much was accomplished in the field of realization of the problem of human rights and liberties in the whole world. We have indicated the difficulties on the path toward the full realization of the principles of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and of subsequent various conventions. These obstacles have been extensively discussed at all conferences held in 1968. But there exist still other difficulties which, in our opinion, are far more substantial and dangerous. These latter difficulties, because of their sheer weight, *were not mentioned a single time* at any of the conferences held on the subject.

What we have in mind is the practice which denies the rights and freedom of man in the USSR and the so-called socialist countries, although the constitutions of these countries contain all the existing rights. We have made a number of references to Czechoslovakia, because it provides the latest and the most timely example of such denial. We must emphasize that Czechoslovakia is not the only country in which the process of liberalization has been suppressed. The same power, that is, Moscow, oppresses in similar and worse fashion, the so-called Union Republics of the USSR.

To be lamented is that not a single government or community in the world has dared to call things in the USSR by proper names. Even those states (including the United States) which have been the target of direct and violent attacks on the part of the USSR and its minions, have not mustered any counterattack, although they know that Soviet attacks are based on half-truths, propaganda and outright lies. These attacks have been accepted by the representatives of Western states with a semblance of philosophical calm and much humility — all so as not to upset the “peaceful coexistence.”

We firmly believe that the application of the double moral standard and the avoidance of calling evil by its proper name will not help in the realization of the noble principles enounced in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*.

When despotic and arbitrary arrests, detention in slave labor camps, deportations and political assassination are all crimes against humanity in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, we

believe that despotic and arbitrary arrests, secret trials, deportations, the persecution of culture, religion and the denial of all human and civic rights are crimes against humanity when they are committed in the USSR and its subservient satellites.

So long as double morality exists and there persists the refusal to see human rights as *a universal principle* obligating all countries, all governments in the world, the practical realization of this principle is removed from the realm of possibility.

The universal principle, if its universality not be pure fiction, must be universal for all and in all relations. The Soviet Union and its subject satellites in this respect cannot constitute exceptions, now or in the future.

SOME BASIC THOUGHTS FOR THE NEW NIXON ADMINISTRATION

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

Regardless of the closeness of the 1968 presidential election, the unmistakable fact is that the new Nixon administration is to represent the need for change both in our foreign and domestic policies. The combined vote for the new President and for George C. Wallace definitely registered a substantial, majority dissatisfaction with the way things have been going here and abroad. This fact alone is a determinative guideline for the new Nixon administration. To ignore or minimize it in deference to other legitimate but scarcely equal political considerations would mean to court disaster for the administration four years hence.

The need for a change is multiple in character and ramifications. Nowhere perhaps is it more glowing and pressing than in the field of our foreign policy, which bears primarily on our national security and indirectly affects and shapes our internal directions and activities. All the fundamental ingredients to satisfy this need for change in our foreign policy have been put forth by President Nixon in his fight for election. It now remains for them to be developed and realized in the course of this administration.

If one followed carefully the statements made by the President, he would have discerned the following ingredients that now call for implementation and methodical cultivation if the need for change is to be adequately met. First, for a diplomacy of truth, the President declared clearly and unequivocally in his acceptance speech, "let us begin by committing ourselves to the truth, to see it like it is and tell it like it is. To find the truth, to seek the truth and to live the truth, that's what we will do."¹ When this declaration is applied to the Soviet Union, our knowledge with regard to it, and our policy toward it, it is, indeed, a large order, and one that can

¹ Acceptance Speech, Republican National Convention, *The Washington Post*, August 9, 1968.

and must be fulfilled. Truly, in no area are the finding, seeking, living, and telling the truths, which for too long we have failed to recognize and brushed aside, more urgent and more challenging than in this one. The project is immense, but it is vital and achievable.

The second ingredient for a diplomacy of courageous independence is the concept of America's real permanent revolution. The President expressed this concept in these words: "My friends, we live in an age of revolution in America and in the world and to find the answers to our problems, let us turn to a revolution, a revolution that will never grow old. The world's greatest continuing revolution, the American revolution. The American revolution was and is dedicated to progress."² And, as everyone knows, this progress is cast in expansive independence — national independence, institutional independence, and personal independence. The supreme essence of the American Revolution is freedom and independence from imperio-colonialist rule, from tyrannical government, from socio-economic bondage of whatever form. There is no more fitting area in the world today for the methodical application of this essence than the Soviet Union itself, and for those afflicted by congenital nuclearitis, without precipitating any global war.

Significantly, the third major ingredient for a diplomacy of realism is the recognition of the nature of the real threat facing us and the Free World. We have for too long been chasing the red cloth and have virtually ignored the matador behind it. In an address during the campaign the President pointed his finger accurately at the real threat when he stated, "What do we find as far as the Soviet Union is concerned — and I do not state this belligerently but only as a matter of observation and fact: We find that not Soviet or communist but Russian imperialism is finally realizing one of its long-term objectives. It has now diplomatic and economic power all the way from Iran to Morocco, and it has a naval presence in the Mediterranean, not as great as ours but significant and growing."³ The fact is that, in the last analysis, Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism and all that it implies in terms of power is the sustaining force of the entire Red Empire, including mainland China, and to the degree that this force is weakened chiefly by reinforced nationalism in the USSR, to that extent the Red Empire is weakened and the prospects of peace and security for the Free World will be en-

² *Ibid.* p. A 14.

³ Address before the American Legion, *Congressional Record*, October 28, 1968, p. E 9521.

hanced. A far-seeing program toward this consummate end is practicable, sane, and winning in the type of conflict we're engaged, but its predication necessarily rests and depends on this fundamental recognition of the nature of the real threat facing us. The mythology of communism does not partake of this basic reality.

The fourth ingredient for a diplomacy of fearless objectivity is a vivid awareness of the existing captive nations not only in Central Europe but more so within the Soviet Union itself. Here, too, the President alludes to this by observing, "And as far as the western half of the communist world is concerned, there are rumblings — more than that — of discontent, not only in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, but you see it as you visit Poland and all the other Eastern European countries. And within the Soviet Union it is in areas like the Ukraine." ⁴ Plainly, the pursuit of this insight would form a whole new dimension in our foreign policy, one that for a variety of invalid reasons has been thwarted for over a decade. A discreet and tactful concentration on the captive non-Russian nations, as well as the Russian one, in the Soviet Union would veritably constitute a fresh and genuinely new change in our foreign policy. Too often, what is hailed as "new," such as bolstering NATO, is in reality of old vintage.

Interwoven with all the preceding ideas is the fifth ingredient for a diplomacy of open discussion, and this is an unprecedented open review of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. This writer has strongly advocated such a review.⁵ Following the lesson of Czechoslovakia, the President intimated this when he said, "And a realistic appraisal of the assumptions and premises that underlie American policy toward the Soviet Union, a policy of realism toward the Soviet today, will be a policy that is directed toward their prudence and not just toward their good will." ⁶ In a self-declared, open administration, the reappraisal implied here must of necessity be open to our people if credibility is to be reestablished between the Government and the governed. And there is no more effective and convincing way for this than the initiation of a review of our policy toward the USSR before both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. The recent experience of Czechoslovakia alone justifies this action.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. E 9521.

⁵ See "Review of U.S. Policy Toward the USSR," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Spring, 1967, pp. 27-42.

⁶ Address to American Legion, p. E9522.

Finally, for these ingredients to jell in combination requires an environmental ingredient for an open-door policy on ideas and dissent. The President has placed himself on record for such a policy when he promised "an open administration — open to ideas from the people, and open in its communication with the people — an administration of open doors, open eyes and open minds." This means, he continued to say, "that we should bring dissenters into policy discussions. . . we need a new unity — a unity within which a diversity of view and expression is welcome." The above ideas, suggested by the President himself, will require much critical discussion, analysis, and presentation. In fact, considering the general tenor of thought concerning the Soviet Union, they definitely fit into the order of dissent. It will augur well for our Nation if the full measure of such dissenting views will be given the opportunity of full expression and legitimation indicated by the President's promise. That is, with competence, conviction, and foresight.

THE SAME, BASIC REAL ISSUES

A careful and sober survey of our foreign policy over the past 15 years leads to only one indisputable conclusion, namely that the real basic issues are the same today as they were then. No amount of confetti diplomacy pursued in this decade can obfuscate the real issues of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, Moscow's Cold War aggression, the essential captivity of nations in the vast Red Empire, the space and armaments race, the targeting of the United States as the number one enemy of the Red world. The President was then the Vice-President in the Eisenhower administration and, despite the accidental changes of over a decade in political scenery, frictions and rearrangements, would be in the best position to sense the basic continuity of these real issues.

Considering here some basic thoughts for the new Nixon administration, the writer cannot but recall a significant exchange of views with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in that earlier period. We were most grateful to him for the opportunity to discuss with him foreign policy issues that are related to the fundamental subjects of Soviet Russian colonialism and imperialism and of the many captive nations both within and outside the Soviet Union. At the time, we expressed some satisfaction with several accomplish-

¹ Lee M. Cohn, "A Nixon 'Coalition' Regime?," *The Evening Star*, Washington, D. C., November 6, 1968.

ments achieved by the Administration in its policy of peaceful liberation. Its record was to some extent encouraging, and at least verbally it kept alive the hope of eventual freedom in all the captive nations, including the 45 million Ukrainian nation.

For one thing, Dulles' emphatic observation, also made before the American Legion Convention — "The Soviet bloc represents an amalgamation of about 900,000,000 people, normally, constituting more than twenty distinct national groups" — was at the time most gratifying. It indicated a vital recognition of an abiding interest in the captive nations. This development of vital recognition regarding this pivotal fact was seen also in the 1956 Platform of the Republican Party which unmistakably pointed to Ukraine and the other captive nations in the Soviet Union in its marked reference to the liberation of "...other once-free countries now behind the Iron Curtain."

In subsequent years, the 1964 Republican Party Platform capped this development of thought with a supreme note under the caption of "Communism's Captives." It read: "Republicans reaffirm their long-standing commitment to a course leading to eventual liberation of the Communist-dominated nations of Eastern Europe, Asia and Latin America, including the peoples of Hungary, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Albania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Armenia, Ukraine, Yugoslavia, and its Serbian, Croatian and Slovene peoples, Cuba, mainland China and many others."⁸ This was the first time in the history of any American political party that mention was made of Ukraine and the other captive non-Russian nations in the USSR. In further contrast to the Democratic Party Platforms, the 1968 Republican Platform makes specific mention of the captive nations: "The peoples of the captive nations of Eastern Europe will one day regain their freedom and independence. We will strive to speed this day by encouraging the greater political freedom actively sought by several of these nations."⁹

All Americans who in knowledge and understanding have come to appreciate the strategic importance of Ukraine and the other captive non-Russian nations in the USSR to the national interest of our country in its struggle against Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, cannot but appreciate also the advances reflected in this development of American political thought. We may look forward to fur-

⁸ Republican Platform 1964, San Francisco, California.

⁹ Republican Platform 1968, Miami Beach, Florida, p. 27.

ther advances by way of forthright specification of these many captive nations in the Soviet prison of nations without fear of any baseless recriminations from Moscow which spuriously, but incessantly, claims that they are free and independent.

It should also be indicated that, at the time, we were not unmindful of the wholesome changes undertaken by the administration in the reorganization of the Voice of America, particularly in respect to the area concerned with the nations in the Soviet Union. The appointment of an American-born chief over the entire area, in order to insure fairness and equality among the various desks, was a salutary step for which we fought for many years.

Of course, in that period a number of memoranda had been submitted on these basic issues. One for example, was delivered to President Eisenhower in July, 1955, on the eve of the Four Power Conference in Geneva, and another to Secretary Dulles on the occasion of the Big Four Foreign Ministers' Conference in October. In each, an adequate elaboration of the essential facts substantiating the strategic importance of Ukraine and the other non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union to our national interests was provided. From every viewpoint, geographical, economic, political and cultural, the crucial importance of this largest and richest non-Russian nation behind the Iron Curtain was amply shown. Its critical significance to the global plans of imperialist Moscow was likewise demonstrated. In the findings and reports of the Select House Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression — the first official documentation anywhere, undertaken by the leadership of a Republican legislator, Charles J. Kersten — all of these conclusive facts on the invincible Ukrainian will for freedom and national independence, on the unbroken resistance of Ukrainian patriots to Russian Communist domination, on the natural alliance of Ukraine with America and its ideals were spelled out in concrete detail. To further this development of innovative thought and also the remarkable, initial achievements of the Kersten Committee, it is most important for the new administration to support congressional efforts for a Special House Committee on the Captive Nations.¹⁰

¹⁰ For a full discussion on this project, see Chapter XIII, "A People's Captive Nations Committee" in *The Vulnerable Russians* authored by the writer, New York, pp. 237-253.

SEVERAL FUNDAMENTAL THOUGHTS

Based on this mass of authoritative material, we can advance here certain points of American policy in relation to the Soviet Russian colonial empire which should, at long last, receive careful study and be appropriately applied as guideposts in the field of foreign policy operation. One fundamental thought is the firm maintenance of the cause of peaceful and eventual liberation of all the captive nations with repeated repudiation of the immoral notion that there is any seeming finality about this captivity. *The words of Secretary Dulles, stated in April, 1953, apply today as they did then: "It is of the utmost importance that we should make clear to the captive peoples that we do not accept their captivity as a permanent fact of history."* Among these captive peoples are the 45 million Ukrainian nation and the other captive non-Russian nations in the USSR which surely fall within the obvious meaning of *President Eisenhower's classic declaration: "Under God, we espouse the cause of freedom and justice and peace for all peoples."*

To realize these goals for all peoples — the newly created nations, the colonial nations and particularly the captive nations in the Soviet Russian Empire — and to capture the imagination of people the world over, our policy should be progressively founded on the winning formula: independence and federation. This formula, grounded in fixed moral and political principles, would enable us to meet any exigency or problem, whether economic or political, in any quarter of the world. It provides us with a forward vision beyond emancipation from the tyranny of Russian totalitarian imperialism in the guise of communism. It furnishes us with the clearest sense of inspired direction beyond the dissolution of this tyranny.

Logically and morally, the association of states, followed after the pattern of our own United States, to be free must obviously be based on the equality of all free nations. Thus, of necessity, any free federation of sovereign states, any federation entered into freely by equal nations — equal among equals — presupposes the condition of national self-determination and independence to insure the freedom of choice of any people. Freedom, therefore, assumes contextual meaning and tremendous moral force in the broader framework of its necessary sequels, independence and free federation. Federation without the pre-conditional step of national independence, which alone guarantees the condition of equal among equals, would be nothing more than a wasteful reversion to colonialism and imperialism.

Perhaps nowhere is this working formula more applicable than to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe generally. It is a formula that renders fulfillment to the peaceful policy of expansive independence. It is one to which Dulles clearly alluded, in 1952, when he wrote: "*We could seek to bring other free nations to unite with us in proclaiming, in a great new Declaration of Independence, our policies toward the captive nations.*" We heartily agreed with him on this, and hoped that in relation to all the captive nations, including Ukraine, a universalized Declaration of Independence would not be too long in the offing.

If one sincerely subscribes to the American Revolution, he cannot but espouse a firm opposition to all forms of imperialism, colonialism and empire in keeping with the unblemished traditions of our own country. It is recognized that the principle of such opposition must be flexible enough to allow for an orderly development of certain peoples to the point of self-determination. However, in relation to the Soviet Union, which is the most tyrannical of all colonial empires in recorded history — an empire within an empire, incorporating civilized and many Western-oriented peoples who, in recent history, have already determined themselves as independent states — such principled opposition should continually receive the strongest expression in our policy in favor of all patriotic forces at work in this empire. If the Russians, from Brezhnev down, can talk about an "interventionist doctrine," which is really nothing but a verbally cloaked version of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, there is no reason why we cannot continually talk about this imperialism and very discreetly and tactfully implement our talk with challenging actions.¹¹ The trouble with much of the talk in the 50's, concerning peaceful liberation and the like, was that there was a fear or incompetence to put words into action.

Also, if we're to be conceptually correct and know what we are doing, additional thought should be given to a scrupulous avoidance of the Moscow term "Soviet people" in our policy statements. This term is a favorite expression of the Moscow dictatorship, employed chiefly for foreign consumption in the hope of conveying the thought of a Soviet monolith. Actually, the centrifugal forces at work in the Soviet Union as represented notably by non-Russian nationalism, belie the existence at any time of any such monolith. Indeed, the

¹¹ On this, see R. Waring Herrick, "The Soviet Military Intervention in Czechoslovakia: The USSR's Interventionist Doctrine' Extended and Reaffirmed," *Radio Liberty Dispatch*, New York, October 28, 1968.

composition of the Soviet Union squared entirely with Dulles' well-founded statement of April, 1953, that "This present status involves the captivity of hundreds of millions of persons of distinctive nationality, race, religion and culture. . ." This statement applies today. By nationality, religion and culture, the Ukrainian people, as well as the Armenian, Georgian, White Ruthenian and others, are different from the Russian, and can always be depended upon to resist the Russifying and de-culturalizing influences imposed by Moscow. Thus, when the President immediately after his election replied to the congratulatory telegram sent by Nikolai Podgorny, chairman of the Soviet Presidium, in this form, "It is now more essential than ever that our two peoples work together. . .," he incurred this error.¹² The plain fact is that there are more than one people in the USSR.

It is also necessary to cope realistically with the Soviet Russian concept of "peaceful coexistence" and by competitive action contrast it with what a true peaceful coexistence involves. So long as the Iron Curtain exists, whether at present borders or the naively hoped-for borders of 1939, no genuine coexistence is possible. Truths have a gnawing way of endurance, and Pope Pius XII's statements on the "mirage of coexistence," on the fact that no compromise is possible between Christianity and atheistic Communism, deserve studied reconsideration to the extent that the united sentiment of all Christians in our Nation may be amply reflected in the foreign policy of our Government.

Finally, Czecho-Slovakia should teach us anew the permissible erosion of the unreal concept of satellite or even "independent" nations so to allow for a realistic conformity of our ideas and conceptions with the stark actualities of central and Eastern Europe. All important studies of the situation there show beyond question of doubt that Hungarians, Poles, Slovaks, etc. are as captive politically and economically as the Lithuanians, Ukrainians and others in the Soviet Union. All constitute the captive nations; all are subject to the dictatorial directives of Moscow; all are integral parts of an enlarged colonial empire that was first established in 1920. The satellite notion blurs and conceals these facts, and on the basis of a legal fiction serves to assist Moscow in its colossal pretense that "the People's Democracies" are independent, native products. Again, we need have no fear of viewing all of these nations, both

¹² *The Washington Post*, November 16, 1968, p. A2.

within and outside the Soviet Union, as equally captive, for Moscow, in general falsehood, consistently views them all as being equally "free and independent."

WHAT TO DO

Turning to the field of operation, chiefly with regard to Ukraine, it has always been our considered judgment that Moscow in pursuing its de-Stalinization program had been operating mainly from a position of weakness created by internal empire troubles. These troubles range from underground resistance to bureaucratic mismanagement. We have always maintained that the so-called liberalization measures enacted by the oligarchical dictatorship could not go beyond certain points of danger to totalitarian control. Now from hindsight, we were right that it appeared to us that there was a period of glorious opportunity to advance the liberation policy in its true and full meaning. The time then, as indeed now, was most ripe for the intensification and increase of these internal pressures, for us to press forward with bold initiative and imagination in bringing about substantial and irreversible changes in the Soviet Union and thus in the expanded empire itself.

As concerns strategic Ukraine and the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR, thought should be given to the following points of operational endeavor, completely attuned to the spirit of our peaceful policy of independence as applied to all captive nations. One is the publication and distribution of *Amerika* in the Ukrainian language as well as in those of other non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union. A second is the maximum use in the United Nations of historic documents recently received, via underground channels, from Ukrainian political prisoners in Russian slave labor camps. This is not the first time that such striking appeals for freedom have been funneled through the Iron Curtain from any forced labor camps. Third, in many ways we can advance the call for free elections in all captive countries and suggestively generalize the idea of a vote in Ukraine and in other non-Russian nations under the alleged guarantee provided in Article 17 of the Soviet Constitution which reads: "The right freely to secede from the USSR is reserved to every Union Republic." Also, in the wave of posthumous rehabilitations of persons and institutions purged and genocided under Stalin, the advancement of a concrete proposal to reestablish out of their present catacombs the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church would not at

all be fanciful. Though his behavior in the United Nations was found wanting in these respects, former Ambassador Goldberg is partially correct when he states in his mini-memoir that "the price of understandings even in these vital areas never can be the silencing of American public opinion from speaking out against Soviet use of force or intimidation to repress liberalization of Communist systems in Eastern Europe. . . Nor need we feel restrained in the slightest measure in condemning Soviet violations of human rights."¹³

Moreover, in the light of Khrushchev's confession of Stalin's terror and mass murder, not to mention overwhelming evidence on this score, steps toward the ratification of the Genocide Convention should be taken in the Congress in order to press for a full inquiry and judicial action in regard to these admitted acts of genocide. One cannot but wonder about the splendid opportunities provided us by Khrushchev's admissions had we ratified this Convention 18 years ago. Only under an imaginative leadership, there is, too, the need for the further expansion of the United States Information Services with concentration on the imperialist and colonial character of the Soviet Union. Also, long overdue is a studied capitalization of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian representation in the United Nations, much in the vein of Edward Weintal's observation on the subject many years ago.¹⁴ "To encourage their independence and to strive for the decentralization of the Soviet Union into its separate though not necessarily unfriendly components is likely to become one of the chief U.S. objectives."

And, as mentioned above, the administration should inspire in the Congress the necessary continuation of the work of the Select House Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression, especially in view of Khrushchev's manifest admissions at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party and more recent evidence, and to distribute the findings and reports on Russian terror and genocide, prefaced by these admissions, through U.S.I.S. throughout the world.

To be sure, these are only several basic thoughts for the new Nixon administration. There are many more and in time will be dwelt upon as the administration progresses. The significant fact is that these and other thoughts conform neatly with the pattern of suggested ideas and action enunciated by the President in recent months.

¹³ Arthur J. Goldberg, "A New Foreign Policy for America," *The Washington Post*, September 10, 1968.

¹⁴ *Newsweek*, August 29, 1955.

THE "SOPHISTICATION" OF SOVIET NATIONALITY POLICY IN UKRAINE

By ROMAN SOLCHANYK

The Soviet Union today is the product of nearly six centuries of gradual territorial expansion and, as such, it is perhaps the greatest multi-national state in modern history. Inherent in any such political entity is the so-called national question. Generally speaking, the national question or nationality problem is the problem of the relationships which exist between the various nationalities and their relative positions vis-a-vis the state. It has usually been "solved," as in the Austrian Empire and in Czarist Russia, by policies designed to stifle and ultimately preclude manifestations of nationalism on the part of the component nationalities.

Writing in 1847, Marx, although not specifically concerned with the national question, posits a totally different solution. Anticipating bourgeois criticism that Communists seek to abolish countries and nationality, he answers: "National differences and antagonisms between peoples are vanishing more and more daily. . . The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster."¹ There is a double implication in Marx's diagnosis. In the first place, there is a strong implication that this is to be a spontaneous process resulting from the growing class consciousness of the proletariat. Secondly, the substitution of identification with one's class for identification with one's nation implies the emergence of a new type of man whose orientation is much broader than mere national interest. At any rate, the establishment of the Soviet regime in what was formerly Czarist Russia has provided the Marxist solution to the national question an opportunity to prove itself. The "supremacy of the proletariat" in the USSR has existed since 1917. What have been its results? Perhaps the question is best answered by a survey of Soviet nationality policy in Ukraine.

¹ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (New York: International Publishers, 1948), p. 28.

FROM KORENIZATSIA TO YEZHOVSHCHINA

Early in 1913, Lenin dispatched an obscure Georgian, known to his fellow conspirators in Transcaucasia as Stalin, to Vienna to prepare a Bolshevik program on the nationality question. The result was *Marxism and the National Question*, in which Stalin enumerated the three "essentials" necessary in solving the nationality problem in what was soon to become the Soviet Union: (1) the right of self-determination, (2) regional autonomy, and (3) equal rights of nations in all forms (language, schools, etc.).² The following summer, Lenin clearly stated that self-determination must be interpreted as "political self-determination, that is, as the right to separation and creation of an independent government."³

The true meaning of "political self-determination," however, became apparent in the policy toward Ukraine shortly after the Bolshevik takeover. One month after the Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities was issued (November 2, 1917), the Ukrainian Central *Rada* was presented with an ultimatum and shortly thereafter Bolshevik troops invaded Ukraine.

After the formation of the USSR, Soviet policy in Ukraine underwent several major shifts as a result of problems facing the Kremlin. During the NEP period (1921-28), the Soviet regime embarked upon the so-called *korenizatsia* policy. It was representative of the general liberal attitude of the twenties and manifested itself mainly in the form of permitting the development of non-Russian languages and cultures.⁴ During this period, the Soviet press continually denounced "great-Russian chauvinism" as the "main danger on the national front."⁵ In Ukraine, this "Ukrainization," as it was termed, resulted in the return of M. Hrushevsky to Kiev in 1924 to assume direction of the historical section of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.⁶

The early 1930's witnessed a complete reversal in Soviet nation-

² J. V. Stalin, "Marxism and the National Question," Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953), II, 374-376.

³ V. I. Lenin, *Sochinenia* (third ed.; Moscow, 1935), XVI, p. 507, cited by Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 43.

⁴ Yaroslav Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1964), p. 6.

⁵ Walter Kolarz, *Russia and Her Colonies* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1952), pp. 16-17.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

ality policy. Instead of Russian chauvinism, the new danger was "local nationalism." A joint Party and government decree of May, 1934 sharply criticized the Marxist historian Pokrovsky. His crime? He did not sufficiently stress the Russian heroes of the past who defended Russia against foreign invaders.⁷ Throughout this entire period, official policy consistently attempted to link the Soviet present with the Russian past; the focus was on Russia and Russian national traditions. One of the forms which this assumed was the revival of hero-worship. Thus, Czarist history was slowly being rehabilitated when complimentary films of Ivan the Terrible and Alexander Nevsky began to appear. Likewise, in July 1934, the term *rodina*, unheard of since the days of the Russian autocrats, was revived in the Soviet press.⁸ This familiar policy of stressing Russian national traditions and at the same time suppressing all non-Russian nationalistic expressions was anticipated in Ukraine as early as 1926. In that year two prominent Ukrainians, M. Khvylovy and A. Shumsky, were accused of "nationalist deviations." In the meantime, L. M. Kaganovich, a Russified Jew, was appointed General Secretary of the Ukrainian Party organization, seemingly for the purpose of conducting a purge.⁹ The first phase of the campaign culminated in the great famine of 1932-33 and the suicides of M. Skrypnyk, the foremost "Ukrainian Marxist," and Khvylovy in 1933.¹⁰

The second phase opened in Ukraine in October 1935 when the NKVD reported the discovery of a Trotskyite "wrecking group" in Kharkiv. It reached its climax in the summer and fall of 1937 when Molotov, Yezhov and Khrushchev arrived in Kiev accompanied by a force of NKVD agents.¹¹ In anticipation of arrest, Ukrainian Prime Minister P. Liubchenko committed suicide. His successor, Bondarenko, survived two months. He, in turn, was succeeded by V. Y. Chubar who was purged in the spring of 1938. The general results were that by June 1938 only one of the Ukrainian Central Committee members of 1937 survived the purge. The process was completed when Khrushchev was appointed First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party in 1938¹² and when on March 13, 1938 a decree on the obliga-

⁷ John A. Armstrong, *The Politics of Totalitarianism* (New York: Random House, 1961), pp. 81-82.

⁸ Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Soviet Russian Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 16.

⁹ Kolarz, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-131.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Armstrong, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 68-69.

tory teaching of the Russian language in all non-Russian schools was issued.¹³

WORLD WAR II AND ZHDANOVSHCHINA

Throughout 1941-43 there was renewed emphasis on "Soviet patriotism," in reality, Russian nationalism. Eventually, as news of the Russian defeats at the front poured into the Kremlin, the idea of "Soviet patriotism," heretofore an exclusively Russian concept, was modified so as to include the non-Russian nationalities. The objective was to placate the anti-Soviet feelings of these peoples, especially the Ukrainians. In line with this new policy, a series of perfunctory concessions, such as the establishment of the Order of Bohdan Khmelnytsky for Ukrainians and the right to establish "supplementary" defense and foreign ministries for the constituent republics, were granted.¹⁴

As the tide of war changed in Russia's favor, concessions to Ukrainian nationalism were halted. The predominance of the Russian element was now formally sanctioned in Stalin's famous toast to the health of the Russian people on May 24, 1945.¹⁵ It seems that this was both a culminating and initiatory gesture. In the former sense, it was the climax of "Soviet patriotism" and, in the latter sense, it ushered in the so-called period of *Zhdanovshchina* or strict ideological conformity. Henceforth, Russian nationalism was to be cultivated while non-Russian sentiments were to be suppressed. Thus, the pattern of the 1920's and 1930's was recreated during the war years and in the postwar era.

BERIA AND THE NATIONALITIES

Shortly after Stalin's death, it became apparent that Beria, MVD chief and co-director of the Great Purge, was making a bid for power. In the attempt to succeed his former master, Beria chose to enlist the support of the non-Russian nationalities! Thus, if one scans the Soviet press during this period, one notices that many of the topics under discussion are either directly or indirectly concerned with the nationality policy. One of the feature articles of the April 17, 1953 issue of *Pravda*, for example, emphasized the various aspects

¹³ Kolarz, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-11.

¹⁴ Bilinsky, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

of Soviet law supposedly guaranteeing the rights of its citizens. The author's tone is suggestive, to say the least:

Any direct or indirect limitation whatever of rights... of citizens on the basis of their race or nationality, just as any advocacy of racial or national exclusiveness or hatred and scorn, are punishable by law.¹⁶

A few days later *Literaturnaya Gazeta* carried an article which not only stressed "equal rights among nations" and "complete destruction of national oppression," but also reinterpreted Stalin as having placed the dangers of "deviation toward Great Russian nationalism" on an equal footing with the dangers of "deviation toward local nationalism."¹⁷ The most spectacular change, however, was the demotion on June 12, 1953 of L. G. Melnikov from his post as First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party, ostensibly "for failing to provide leadership and for committing gross errors in the selection of personnel and carrying out the Party's nationality policy."¹⁸ Melnikov's successor was for the first time a native Ukrainian, A. I. Kirichenko.

Beria's machinations did not pass unnoticed. By the end of June 1953, his position had become seriously undermined. The decisive factor resulting in his downfall seems to have been the East Berlin uprisings of June 16-17. Within two weeks of the uprising, he was arrested and shortly thereafter executed.

THE KHRUSHCHEV METHOD

One of the most serious charges leveled against Beria involved his "subversive" activities among the non-Russian nationalities. The Soviet press exposed his activities as follows:

By various cunning methods, Beria sought to undermine the friendship of the peoples of the USSR — the foundation of foundations of the multi-national socialist state... to sow friction among the peoples of the USSR, and to activate bourgeois-nationalist elements in the Union republics.¹⁹

¹⁶ K. Gorshenin, "Socialist Law on Guard over the People's Interests," *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, IV, No. 15 (May 23, 1953), p. 16.

¹⁷ N. Matyushkin, "Great Principles of Internationalism," *CDSP*, V, No. 16 (May 30, 1953), pp. 18-19.

¹⁸ "Plenary Session of Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine *CDSP*, V, No. 21 (July 4, 1953), p. 3.

¹⁹ "Indestructible Unity of Party, Government, and Soviet People," *CDSP*, V, No. 24 (July 25, 1953), p. 10.

Yet, judging by the pronouncements made by Malenkov and Khrushchev shortly after Beria's demise, there is little to suggest that the former were intent on reversing the trend initiated by Beria. How then does one reconcile the denunciations of a seemingly liberal policy on the national question with the continuation of that same policy? It would seem that this curious form of "doublethink," that is, the maintenance of two contradictory positions, can be traced to Khrushchev's adroit implementation of the "new" Soviet policy on the national question. Its distinguishing characteristic was not in the striking of a balance between Russian and non-Russian nationalism, but rather in the subtle manner in which the latter was subjugated to the former. Two classic examples of the "Khrushchev method" are to be found in Soviet policy toward Ukrainian historiography and education.

HISTORY AND SOVIET NATIONALITY POLICY

One of the truly spectacular propaganda campaigns to have been staged in the Soviet Union resulted from the celebrations of the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav (1654). In early December 1953, the Central Committee of the CPSU, the USSR Council of Ministers, and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet issued a decree calling for the "widespread observance of the 300th anniversary of Ukraine's *reunification* with Russia, as an outstanding historical event and a great national holiday."²⁰ On January 12, 1954 *Pravda* and *Izvestia* published twenty-one theses, approved by the Central Committee, which set the tone for the ensuing festivities. Among other things, the theses stressed the progressive nature of Ukraine's "reunification with the Russian people in a single Russian state."²¹ The following month, the Ukrainian SSR was presented with the Crimean *oblast* (heretofore a part of the RSFSR) which was, as Voroshilov noted, "evidence of the further strengthening of the unity and indissoluble friendship between the Russian and Ukrainian people. . ."²²

Two aspects of the tercentenary celebrations are especially rel-

²⁰ "On 300th Anniversary of Ukraine's Reunification with Russia," *CDSP*, V, No. 49 (January 20, 1954), p. 10.

²¹ "Theses on the 300th Anniversary of the Reunification of the Ukraine and Russia (1654-1954)," *CDSP*, V, No. 51 (February 3, 1954), pp. 3-8.

²² "In the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet," *CDSP*, VI, No. 9 (April 14, 1954), p. 24.

evant as far as nationality policy is concerned. The first was the rehabilitation of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the reinterpretation of Ukrainian history. Whereas in the early Stalin period Khmelnytsky was portrayed as a "traitor and sworn enemy of the rebellious Ukrainian peasantry,"²³ the theses emphasized the political foresight of this "outstanding statesman and soldier" who realized "that the Ukrainian people's salvation lay only in unity with the great Russian people. . ." ²⁴ The rehabilitation of Khmelnytsky was a by-product of the reinterpretation of both Ukrainian and Russian history. Prior to 1937, Russo-Ukrainian relations in the period before the Bolshevik Revolution were depicted as those of exploiter and exploited. Thus, Pokrovsky was able to write in 1935 that "Khmelnysky was in the service of Polish and Russian feudal lords. . ." ²⁵ Two years later, with the demand that Soviet historians take into consideration "concrete historical conditions," the "lesser evil" theory was formulated.²⁶ By 1954, however, the absolute evil, which had evolved into a relative one, was now a positive good! ²⁷

The second aspect of the 1954 celebrations was the elevation of the Ukrainians to the status of "Junior elder brothers." ²⁸ In other words, the Ukrainians were now pictured as partners to the Russians in a curious combination which was to personify Slav brotherhood. Of course, the partnership was not completely equal since the Ukrainians "were the first *after* their Russian brothers to take the path of the October socialist revolution. . ." ²⁹ Nevertheless, the partnership was there. Furthermore, according to the theses, it had been there since 1654!

²³ *Bolshaya sovetskaya entsyklopediya* (Moscow: Ogyz RSFSR, 1935), LIX, 816-818, cited by B. Krupnytsky, "Bohdan Khmelnytsky i sovetska istoriografia," *Ukrainskii zbirnyk*, III (1955), 94-95.

²⁴ "Theses on the 300th Anniversary. . ." *op. cit.*, p. 4.

²⁵ M. N. Pokrovsky, *Ob Ukraine: sbornik statei i materialov*, ed. N. N. Popov (Kiev: 1935), p. 165, cited by Andriy Moskalenko, *Khmelnitsky and the Treaty of Pereyaslav in Soviet Historiography*, trans. and ed. John A. Armstrong (New York: Research Program on the USSR, 1955), p. 7.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

²⁷ Barghoorn, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

²⁸ "Theses on the 300th Anniversary. . ." *op. cit.*, p. 6.

²⁹ Vasyl Markus, "Current Trends of the Nationalities Policy in the USSR." *Prologue*, V, No. 1-2 (Spring-Summer, 1961), 90.

EDUCATION AND LANGUAGE IN SOVIET NATIONALITY POLICY

In the five years between the tercentenary celebrations and the opening of the Twenty-First Party Congress in early 1959, certain developments, both external and internal, resulted in still another shift in the regime's nationality policy. The theory most frequently advanced is that the Hungarian uprising and Polish upheaval in the fall of 1956 served to remind the Kremlin of the possible consequences of pursuing an "unwise" nationality policy. Furthermore, Khrushchev's strengthened position after his victory over the "Anti-Party Group" in 1957 may also have been a contributing factor. Whatever the exact reasons, suffice it to say that by 1957-58, the conciliatory mood which predominated throughout 1954-56 was no longer in evidence. Yet, it must be emphasized that this did not mean that Khrushchev envisioned a return to Stalinism. Among other things, this would have been impolitic so soon after the anti-Stalin speech. On the contrary, the "Khrushchev method" was continued, albeit highly intensified. As one author has so aptly put it, this was the period of the "frozen thaw."³⁰

The formal initiation of the new trend can be traced to an article appearing in the August, 1958 issue of *Kommunist*, authored by the Tadzhik scholar, B. Gafurov. The article's main theme is the forthcoming "fusion of nations." For our purposes, what is most interesting are Gafurov's ideas on the "development of a single language":

The future fusion of nations presupposes the development of a single language for all the nations. Already at the present time the languages of the peoples of the USSR mutually enrich each other, resulting in a firm interchange of linguistic, cultural values, thereby forming preconditions for the amalgamation of grammatical structures and lexicographical composition of the languages of the peoples of the USSR.³¹

Gafurov then goes on to say that some comrades are mistaken in thinking that this will be a quick and straightforward process. On the contrary, he emphasizes that it can be achieved only through the formation of zonal languages and, after that, the formation of one international language which will be neither English, Russian, nor any other, but will draw upon the finest points of each of those.³²

³⁰ B. Gafurov, "Uspekhi natsionalnoi polityki KPSS i nekotorye voprosy internatsionalnogo vospytania," *Kommunist*, No. 11 (August, 1958), 16.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 17.

³² *Ibid.*

Gafurov's allegations to the Russian language as the "mighty vehicle of communication among the peoples of the USSR" and the "second native language of all of the nationalities inhabiting the land of socialism" ³³ made toward the end of the article cast some doubt as to the egalitarian and scientific method in which the development of a single language is to be brought about.

That the article was not merely so much verbiage soon became evident when on November 12, 1958 the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers approved 48 theses embodying a radical reform of the Soviet ten-year school system.³⁴ As far as nationality policy is concerned, by far the most significant proposal was Thesis 19 which suggested that parents be given the right to choose the language of instruction to be used in the schools of their republic. The idea was that if a child attended a school where the native language of the republic was to be the language of instruction, "he may, if he wishes, take up the Russian language" and vice versa. The qualification was also added that "this step could only be taken if there is a sufficient number of children to form classes for instruction in a given language."³⁵ At first sight, this would seem to be a great boon for the non-Russian nationalities. Whereas previously children in the nationality schools were required to study three languages (native, Russian, and one foreign),³⁶ it was now possible to exclude both the Russian and the foreign, concentrating on one's own native language. There is only one drawback, however. Most Soviet higher educational institutions require that candidates for admission pass comprehensive examinations in both Russian language and literature.³⁷ Of course, one could still choose Russian as an optional language while receiving instruction in one's own language. Yet, Soviet schools are in the habit of slighting optional subjects even though Russian may be one of them.³⁸ Thus, in either case, precisely because such a high premium is placed on the Russian language, the concerned parent would be ill-advised

³³ *Ibid.*, 23.

³⁴ George S. Counts, *Khrushchev and the Central Committee Speak on Education* (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1959), pp. 1-2.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Jacob Ornstein, "Soviet Language Policy: Theory and Practice," *The Slavic and East European Journal*, XVII, No. 1 (Spring, 1958), 10-11.

³⁸ Volodymyr Derzhavyn, "School and Russification," *The Ukrainian Review* (London), VI, No. 3 (Autumn, 1959), 18.

in sending his child to a school where a non-Russian language is the language of instruction.

That the inherent dangers to the status of the non-Russian languages posed by Thesis 19 were recognized by the non-Russian nationalities became evident in the numerous discussions reported by the Soviet press in the period between November 12 and December 24. The results of the discussions showed that a majority of the republics favored the retention of the status quo.³⁹ On December 24, the USSR Supreme Soviet enacted the proposed reform into law without, however, making any specific reference to Thesis 19.⁴⁰ Thus, it would seem that the republics prevailed in ensuring the continued obligatory study of the native languages. Curiously enough, in the spring of 1959, every republic except Azerbaijan and Latvia incorporated Thesis 19 in one form or another into its own body of republican law.⁴¹ The result was that the continued existence of the non-Russian languages in the curricula was, at best, precarious.

Viewing Soviet nationality policy in retrospect, it becomes evident that socialism or communism has a long way to go before it succeeds in effacing national differences without, at the same time, infringing upon basic human rights. Stalin attempted to beat "proletarian internationalism" into the people of the Soviet Union — especially the non-Russian nations. It is somewhat paradoxical that in attempting to obliterate nationalism, he resorted to Russian nationalism as his basis for support.

Stalin's successors implemented more sophisticated methods. Soviet nationality policy after Stalin was stripped of its "rudeness" and characterized by its tactful diplomacy. Yet, in spite of the changes in means, the ends still remained the same. The Soviet leaders have never challenged the basic tenets of their nationality policy. The worst that can happen is a "distortion" — a distortion of a basically "correct" policy.⁴²

³⁹ Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Soviet Education Laws of 1958-1959 and Soviet Nationality Policy," *Soviet Studies*, XIV, No. 2 (October, 1961), 140-143.

⁴⁰ Derzhavyn, *op. cit.*, 17.

⁴¹ Bilinsky, "The Soviet Education Laws..." *op. cit.*, 138. These two republics ultimately followed suit after having undergone a purge of both Party and government.

⁴² Walter Kolarz, "The Soviet Nationality Policy under Khrushchev: Gains and Losses," *Soviet Survey*, No. 24 (April-June, 1958), 57.

"SOCIALIST LEGALITY" AND "BOURGEOIS NATIONALISM"

A recent publication by two Soviet "experts" on nationalities in the USSR maintains that "the problem of nationalities has been solved in the Soviet Union."⁴³ In fact, the rather steady flow of protest documents emanating from Ukraine indicates the degree to which the above statement fails to correspond with reality. The authors of these documents — Ukrainian writers, literary critics, artist, and jurists — have amassed a corpus of incriminatory evidence which suggests that the Soviet leadership has, in recent years, intensified its attempts at Russification and national persecution.

Most of the protest literature has been a direct result of the arrests in 1961 and 1965-67 of Ukrainian intellectuals conducted by the KGB throughout the country. Thus, in January 1961 the Lviv KGB arrested seven Ukrainians, for the most part jurists, on charges of treason and attempting to bring about the secession of Ukraine from the USSR.⁴⁴ From the letters and petitions written by Lev Lukianenko and Stepan Virun, the leaders of this so-called Lawyers' Group, it becomes evident that the term "socialist legality" has been rendered meaningless by the illegal search, arrest, and detention conducted by Chekist authorities. The following excerpt from Lukianenko's letter to R. Rudenko, General Procurator of the USSR, is highly revealing in this regard:

During a four-month period (from the day of my arrest to the day of my trial) an agent of the Ukrainian KGB of the Lviv *oblast* was ever present. In relating to me the various horrors of the activities of the Chekists, he tried to impress upon my mind that all of my civil rights had been left on the other side of the door, that here — in interrogative isolation — Chekists may do what they please; and that, to that extent, my best course of action under these circumstances... would be to sign some sort of confession formulated by my interrogators.⁴⁵

Police action in contravention of the basic law — namely, the Soviet Constitution — and the various articles of the Criminal and Criminal Procedural Code is by now a familiar pattern in the USSR. This is especially true with respect to Soviet nationality policy. In

⁴³ I. P. Tsamerian and S. L. Ronin, *Equality of Rights between Races and Nationalities in the USSR* ("Race and Society"; Paris: UNESCO, 1962), p. 9.

⁴⁴ Ivan Majstrenko, "Vstupne slovo," *Yurysty pid sudom KGB* ("Suspilno-Politychna Biblioteka," No. 1 (20), Dokumenty No. 1; Munich: *Suchasnist*, 1968), pp. 5-6.

⁴⁵ Lev H. Lukianenko, "Generalnomu Prokurorovi Soluzu RSR Rudenkovi" *Yurysty*... , p. 58.

recent months, however, "socialist legality" has once again been "defined," this time in connection with the invasion of Czechoslovakia, in a manner which clearly attests to its total irrelevance. A little over a month after the invasion, an article appearing in *Pravda* sought to draw a distinction between "socialist legality" and, presumably, "bourgeois legality."⁴⁶ The author was at great pains to point out "that in a class society there is not and there cannot be non-class laws," and that "laws and legal norms are subjected to the laws of the class struggle, the laws of social development."⁴⁷ In the final analysis, one must conclude that the concept of "socialist legality" serves no purpose other than to "justify" the various and sundry excesses committed by Soviet police and military authorities whether in the USSR or in Eastern Europe.

The events leading up to the arrest of the Lawyers' Group give us further insight into contemporary Russo-Ukrainian relations. Especially interesting are the conditions in Ukraine which moved Virun and his colleagues to consider the establishment of a Ukrainian Workers-Peasants Union. He says:

Working as we did in party and judicial organs, we could not remain indifferent to that which obstructed our social development, to that which moved the nation to tears. We wrote to newspapers and journals, to the higher party and government organs about all of this. The fact that our protests were ignored and that an indifferent attitude was adopted impelled us (Lukianenko and Virun) to write a brochure which examined the existing regime in our country from a Marxist-Leninist position.⁴⁸

Virun goes on to criticize not only the "years of hunger and groundless repression," but also the post-Stalin period which witnessed

a ban on the publishing of certain classics of Ukrainian literature and the "unperson" status of many cultural workers of Ukraine. The Ukrainian language has not been established as the national language. It is squeezed out of the organs of the government, banished from scientific endeavor, universities, technicals, schools, in general from industrial production and the cultural life of the nation.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Henry Kamm, "Soviet Denies It Violated Sovereignty of the Czechs," *The New York Times*, September 27, 1968, pp. 1, 3.

⁴⁷ S. Kovalev, "Sovereignty and International Duties of Socialist Countries," *Pravda*, September 25, 1968; full text in *The New York Times*, September 27, 1968, p. 3.

⁴⁸ Stepan M. Virun "Deputatu Verkhovnoi Rady SRSR i Pysmennyku Olesu Honcharu" *Yurysty* . . . , p. 90.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 90-91.

Another member of the group, Ivan Kandyba, likewise indicts the Soviet regime for its stifling of Ukrainian national development. In a letter addressed to the First Secretary of the Ukrainian party, he writes from his prison in Yavas in the Mordovian ASSR:

Thus, on the basis of Ukraine's situation, one was forced to arrive at the conclusion that Ukraine in union with the USSR does not have the possibility of normal development, either economically or culturally, and that in some cases her position is far worse than that which obtained during the Czarist regime, and, in fact, functions as a colony of Moscow. . . .⁵⁰

The conditions portrayed by Lukianenko, Virun, Kandyba and their associates are corroborated by more recent documents which have their origin in the arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals in Kiev, Lviv, Ternopil, Lutsk, Zhytomyr, and Ivano-Frankivsk during the Summer of 1965.⁵¹ At least 20 of those arrested were secretly tried in early 1966 on charges of "disseminating anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation" and sentenced to terms ranging from six months to six years of hard labor.⁵² It was this breach of "socialist legality" which in turn motivated Vyacheslav M. Chornovil, a young Ukrainian journalist and critic, to begin gathering transcripts of the secret trials, letters, and petitions concerning those arrested in 1965.⁵³ Called by the prosecution to testify, Chornovil refused, proclaiming the illegality of closed trials — for which he was arrested but later released. After having sent letters of protest to various Soviet officials, he was rearrested on August 3, 1967.⁵⁴

Svyatoslav Karavansky, a writer arrested in 1965 for protesting against what he termed "the violation of Leninist norms of nationality policy in Ukraine,"⁵⁵ analyzed the situation as follows:

Marxist dialectics teaches that all phenomena have causes, and in order to liquidate negative social phenomena, their causes must also be liquidated. The trend toward so-called "nationalism" undoubtedly has its objective causes,

⁵⁰ Ivan O. Kandyba, "Pershomu Sekretarovi Ts. K. KPU Shelestovi Petrovi Yuchymovychu," *Yurysty* . . . , p. 32.

⁵¹ Robert S. Sullivant, "The Ukrainians," *Problems of Communism*, XVI, No. 5 (September-October, 1967), 51.

⁵² George Luckyj, "Turmoil in the Ukraine," *Problems of Communism*, XVII, No. 4 (July-August, 1968), 17.

⁵³ Vyacheslav M. Chornovil, "A Voice from the Soviet Prison Camp," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, XXIV, No. 1 (1968), 13.

⁵⁴ Vyacheslav M. Chornovil (ed.). *Lycho z rozumu: portrety dvatsiat zlochynciv* (3rd ed. rev.; Paris: P.I.U.F., 1968) p. 6.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

and these objective causes are to be found in the implementation in Ukraine for the past 30 years of an anti-Leninist nationality policy. It consists of the Russification of the population and the massive resettling of Ukrainians from Ukraine in Siberia, Kazakhstan, and other remote *raions* while simultaneously settling non-Ukrainians, mainly Russians, among Ukrainians. Usually, this type of policy is anti-Leninist and one which has nothing to do with Marxism and which is harmful to the international Communist movement.⁵⁶

Perhaps the most trenchant analysis — likewise from the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint — is that of Ivan Dzyuba. Relying almost entirely on Soviet sources, this 37-year-old Ukrainian literary critic has produced a penetrating study which reveals the deep gulf between theory and practice in Soviet nationality policy, chiefly in its application to Ukraine. What follows is his description of what he calls the "mechanics" of Russification.

Ukrainization was replaced by Russification. To be more exact: the fly-wheel of Russification, which had been braked somewhat, has again accelerated with renewed force.

Even in conditions of formal equality, actual inequality cannot fail to lead to Russification and to become its powerful driving force. At the same time the mechanics of this inequality are the "material" mechanics of Russification.

The second, psychological and ideological force of Russification is Russian Great-Power chauvinism. It constitutes the "psychological" mechanics of Russification, its "soul."⁵⁷

Dzyuba's historical and sociological analysis has recently been reinforced by the findings of John Kolasky, a Canadian-born scholar who lived and studied in Kiev in 1963-65. Using the techniques of comparative analysis of, among other factors, budget allocation, library holdings, administrative jurisdiction over schools, and allocation of personnel,⁵⁸ Kolasky has arrived at the same conclusion, namely, that Soviet nationality policy has in recent years assumed all the characteristics of a concerted effort to obliterate existing national cultural distinctions in the USSR.

⁵⁶ Svyatoslav Y. Karavansky, *Pershomu Sekretariu Ts.K. PORP tov. V. Gomultsi*, "Yurysty...", p. 123.

⁵⁷ Ivan Dzyuba, *Internationalism or Russification? A Study in the Soviet Nationalities Problem* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), p. 134.

⁵⁸ John Kolasky, *Education in Soviet Ukraine: A Study in Discrimination and Russification* (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1968), pp. 59-60, 111, 150-151.

DESTRUCTION OF UKRAINIAN HISTORICAL MONUMENTS BY MOSCOW

By LEONID POLTAVA

The year of 1968 was designated by the United Nations as Human Rights Year in commemoration of the signing of the Human Rights Declaration by the U.N. in 1948. Among the signatories to this important document was the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. That this so-called "government of the Ukrainian SSR" is not a Ukrainian government at all is to be seen in the fact that it allows Moscow to destroy Ukrainian historical monuments in Ukraine. All genuine governments in the world are striving to preserve their historical monuments.

It would take a volume to describe the barbaric destruction of Ukrainian historical treasures, such as churches, monasteries, monuments, museums, and so forth. We shall limit ourselves here to the year of 1967, in the course of which the Ukr.SSR observed the "50th anniversary of the Soviet power in Ukraine." (In actuality this "power" was forced upon Ukraine only in 1920.)

Information concerning the indiscriminate destruction and neglect of Ukrainian historical monuments comes from private letters originating in Ukraine and also from the Soviet press in Ukraine, which is compelled from time to time to publish letters from its readers complaining about the gradual disappearance of Ukraine's historical treasures.

On the basis of several issues of *Ukraina* and *Ranok* (Morning) which appeared in Kiev in 1967, the following disturbing facts have come to light:

The grave of the famous Ukrainian *Hetman*, Peter Konashevych Sahaidachny, has been buried under a gigantic pile of coal in Kiev! Sahaidachny is known for his sea campaigns against the Turks at the end of the XVIth and the beginning of the XVIIth centuries. The well-known Ukrainian historian, Dmytro Yavornytsky, called him a "great leader." Sahaidachny defeated a great Turkish army near Khotyn in 1621; for his defense of Europe against the invading Turks

he was named a "prince" and made a member of the "European Anti-Turkish League." Now the grave of this great military leader and defender of Christianity lies under a heap of coal!

The grave of another prominent Ukrainian, Vasyl Hryhorovych-Barsky (1701-1747), located in the courtyard of the famed Peter Mohyla Academy in Kiev, has simply disappeared. In a *Guide* to Kiev, published in 1930, we read:

When we pass through the halls of the former Academy, on the right-hand side near the altar of the great church we notice a curious gravestone of the well-known educator and professor of the Academy, Vasyl Hryhorovych-Barsky, who over a span of 24 years travelled on foot through Europe and the East, visiting Poland, Austria, Italy, Turkey, the many islands of the Archipelagos, Cyprus, Palestine, Sinai and others, and left not only a wonderful description of his travels but also beautiful drawings of various buildings and curious landscapes. Over the grave there is a board with verses dedicated to Barsky by Ruban...

The author of an account appearing in *Ranok* (No. 8, 1967) wrote that "no traces are left of the grave of Barsky."

Gone without a trace is the grave of another famous Ukrainian traveler, Mykola Myklukha-Maklai, who in the last century visited the islands of Polynesia, near Australia. In his scientific works, printed in the Ukrainian, Russian, French, and German languages, he contended that from an anthropological point of view the Papuan people of New Guinea did not differ from the white race. Since he was Ukrainian, it would seem that his grave was unimportant.

If you would ask the "Minister of Culture of the Ukrainian SSR" in Kiev where the graves of famous Ukrainian cultural leaders of the past are — as for instance that of Peter Mohyla, who founded the famous Academy bearing his name and which cooperated with the Sorbonne in Paris, or those of Meletiy Smotrytsky, Laurentiy Zyzaniy or others of the XVIIth century — he would have no reply.

The above-mentioned journal *Ranok*, in its August 1967 issue, read:

It is necessary to find the graves of the first builders of Ukrainian cultural education: P. Mohyla, L. Zyzaniy, M. Smotrytsky, the famed educator and scholar Agatanhel Krymsky and other... (Academician A. Krymsky was a philologist, author of several dozen works on linguistics and the history of Ukraine who knew some 30 languages, including those of Asian peoples. Although he died in Kiev in 1930, his grave cannot be found today!)

In Ukraine there exists the "Society for the Preservation of

Monuments of History and Culture," but its hands are tied by Russian rope.

We know that the great composer Chopin is buried in Paris, but his heart was transported to his native Warsaw. Everyone in Ukraine knows that the outstanding Ukrainian poet, P. Hrabovsky, is buried in Tobolsk, Siberia, where he was exiled by the Russian Czarist government. No one, however, would dare to suggest that his remains be transported to Ukraine, his native land.

The same may be said of Prof. Michael Drahomaniv (his grave is in Sofia, Bulgaria, where he was exiled); noted poet Alexander Oles (who died in Prague, Czechoslovakia); and outstanding theatrical director, Les Kurbas, who died during the Stalinist terror and is buried somewhere in the Archangelsk *Oblast*. To be noted is that although the Soviet government has "rehabilitated" some of these Ukrainian writers and poets, their works are still not allowed to be published.

From the city of Buchach, Western Ukraine, came a letter in which the writer states that the Soviet government is razing the remnants of the ancient walls which were built in the XIIth century, a time when Buchach was a trade center and a fortress defending Eastern Galicia against raids by the Crimean Tartars and Turks.

In the ancient city of Lubech, in the Chernihiv *oblast*, the local communist leader Pashko ordered the leveling of the wall to the entrance of the cave of St. Anthony, historical founder of the Pecherska Lavra in Kiev, which the Communists turned into an anti-religious museum; the Lavra played an important part in the religious and cultural life of Ukraine. A group of Russian specialists arrived in Lubech (which is mentioned in the Kiev chronicles of the XIth century) and dug out the remnants of the "Mazepa Castle" (here were artillery pieces placed by *Hetman* Ivan Mazepa, but all findings were taken to Moscow.

Literaturna Ukraina (Nov. 17, 1968) of Kiev reported that "the graves of famous Ukrainian *kobzars* and *minstrels* whose names have long appeared in encyclopedias and in scientific literature" are forgotten and neglected. They bear no gravestones and no identification. The organ continued:

Ukraine was made famous by its *dumas* and *kobzars* throughout the world. But, regrettably, they are not in evidence in places where these national traditions are known and revered. The districts of Chernihiv, Kiev, Cherkassy, Poltava and Sumy can be proud of these masters. Yet in visiting these districts one can hardly find a monument dedicated to the *kobzars*. Instead, one can see some sculptured bears totally inappropriate to the fauna of these lands. . .

The author calls upon the youth to visit the burial places of the *kobzars* and *bandurists* and, if possible, to erect monuments to such as *kobzar* Andriy Shuta (who died in the village of Oleksandrivka in 1875), Peter Tkachenko (who died in the village of Syniavka in 1918); *lirnyk* A. Hreben and *bandurist* Evdokia Parkhomenko.

To be found in the Dnieper River is the island of Khortytsia, some 13 km. long, which was the center of the Zaporozhian *Sich* at the end of the XVth and during the XVIth and XVIIth centuries — the center of a democratic *Hetmanite* Ukraine. During World War II remnants of the Kozak fortifications were still in evidence; today everything has been leveled to the ground. Under the pressure of public opinion it was announced that a historical memorial would be erected on Khortytsia in the absence of actual remains and relics.

Mrs. Natalia Danylenko, a Ukrainian American tourist who visited the area in 1967, wrote in the November 1967 issue of *Nashe Zhyttia* (Philadelphia, Pa.):

...The name (of Khortytsia) derived most probably from the pagan god Khors. There are no ruins of the ancient *Sich* fortification... The job of destruction was begun by the Russian Czars, starting with Catherine II. Then Stalin took it up, and it was finished by the present rulers...

Even the site of the Poltava Battle of 1709, where Russian troops defeated the army of King Charles XII of Sweden and his ally, the Ukrainian *Hetman* Ivan Mazepa, has been cleared of all historical relics so that the people should not be reminded of the past. True, there is a great obelisk, dedicated to the glory of the Russians, and in Poltava there exists a "Museum of the Poltava Battle," where some 3,000 historic relics are slanted to bear witness against Ukraine, its *hetman* and its history. Mazepa and his army are depicted as "traitors" and "sell-outs" to Sweden.

The famous Samsoniv Church is slated for destruction. Even the Kiev journal *Kultura i Zhyttia* (Culture and Life) of March 16, 1967 proposed that the church be transformed into a planetarium in order to "preserve priceless inscriptions on the walls." The same journal wrote that the field of the Poltava battle is now being planted with trees... Understandably, all monuments dedicated to the Russians are well preserved; others, depicting Ukrainian history, are indiscriminately destroyed.

Throughout the whole of Ukraine the Soviet government builds numerous obelisks and memorials, all of which are dedicated to the Russian masters or to their local puppets. By destroying the Ukrain-

ian historic monuments the Russian occupiers seek to destroy the historical record and replace it with "Communist documentation." This process was much in evidence in 1967 alone.

Another Ukrainian journal, *Molod Ukrainy* (Youth of Ukraine), reported on October 29, 1967, that in the town of Turka (district of Ivano-Frankivsk, formerly Stanyslaviv) the principal street has been named after Fedor Ulanov, a Russian NKVD sadist who was slain in February, 1945, by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). In the city council headquarters hangs his portrait with the following inscription: "He died the death of a hero in the struggle against OUN bandits in February, 1945."

The same journal also reported that in Poltava a monument has been erected in honor of Soviet Partisans; in the town of Voznesenk — another monument to Nikolai Ostrovsky, Russian Communist writer. The first secretary of the Comsomol organization of the Ukrainian SSR, Yu. Yelchenko, stated (in the same journal) that "many names of Communist heroes will be honored by obelisks and commemorative plaques," and that some 12,000 reading rooms, "corners of glory" and museums will be named after these heroes — oppressors of the Ukrainian people.

Literaturna Ukraina (January 26, 1968) reported that the ancient village of Andrushi on the Dnieper will be flooded by an artificial lake. In that village stands an old church of Kozak times (1768), which, among others, was depicted in verse by Taras Shevchenko. The same journal reported that several Ukrainian writers, collective farmers and even the "Ukrainian Society for the Preservation of Historical Monuments" have appealed to the Soviet Ukrainian government to preserve the historical church.

It is incumbent upon the United Nations and UNESCO to take a closer look at what Moscow is doing in Ukraine. It not only persecutes Ukrainian intellectuals, but is destroying the priceless monuments of Ukrainian history as well.

MEMORANDUM TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN TEHERAN

(*Editor's Note:* Following is the Memorandum of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, submitted to all participants at the International Conference on Human Rights, which met on April 22 to May 13, 1968, in Teheran, Iran.)

INTRODUCTION

The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America is an organization of American citizens of Ukrainian descent and background which is vitally interested in the movement of human rights in the United States, Ukraine, the country of origin of many of its members, and in the world at large.

The International Conference on Human Rights is an important world gathering called for the purpose of surveying and assessing the status of human rights everywhere. In step with the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, adopted and proclaimed by the U.N. General Assembly on December 10, 1948, it will seek to promote and extend the application of the principles of human rights whenever they are obstructed, obscured or denied in everyday life.

The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, as an organization of free American citizens operating in the free country of the United States, has always supported those lofty principles which provide the basic foundation of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, the 20th anniversary of which is being commemorated throughout the entire civilized world as "International Human Rights Year — 1968." Consequently, it has stood behind all the international movements combatting racial discrimination, social and economic injustice, national and cultural oppression and the practice of genocide. The grossest violators have been certain totalitarian powers with regard to both their own citizens and the ethnically foreign populations which have fallen under their domination.

Of specific interest to the Ukrainian Congress Committee is Ukraine, the ancestral country of some two million American citizens.

Although the United Nations numbers among its members the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as an "equal" charter member of this illustrious international body, in reality this equality is non-existent. The Ukrainian SSR is not a free and independent state of the Ukrainian people. It is an artificial creation of Moscow designed to meet two purposes: to provide for the benefit of the world at large the semblance of a free and sovereign Ukrainian nation and to offer the Ukrainian people a sop, in the hope that this paper state would allay their desire for genuine independence and thus keep them in subservience.

Therefore, it is incumbent upon Americans of Ukrainian descent to present

a true picture of Ukraine, where violation and destruction of human rights have been and are being committed by the Soviet government on a breadth and depth of awesome dimensions.

I. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The Soviet government is a signatory to the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, and it makes much of this fact in its massive propaganda drives outside the Soviet Union.

Recently an article marking "International Human Rights Year" appeared in *Izvestia*, official organ of the Soviet government. It stated that the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights had become the generally accepted basis for man's political, social and economic rights. It further stated:

But in the conditions of capitalism the Declaration's basic tenets remain unfulfilled to this day. The bourgeois democracies, which serve the interests of imperialist monopolies, have turned the rights and freedoms assured by their constitutions into a farce. Thanks to the unstinted efforts of the Soviet Union... the U.N. has taken a series of measures aimed at restoring the independence of colonial people, the ending of all forms of racial discrimination, and (has) signed conventions condemning racialism and genocide. However, much remains to be done...

("The Chornovil Papers," by Gabriel Lorince, *New Statesman*, Feb. 23, 1968, London)

This self-serving boast of the official Soviet organ can in no way be substantiated by evidence. On the contrary, the Soviet Union has been and continues to be a crass violator and destroyer of human rights on a scale unprecedented in mankind's history.

Its Marxism, grafted onto Russian Messianism, has led to this lamentable result: every single article of all 30 articles contained in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* has been transgressed, violated, or deliberately broken by the Soviet government.

II. VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN UKRAINE

Article 18 of the Declaration reads:

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

But how does the Soviet government observe this right in practice? In such fashion:

a) The Soviet government destroyed the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church in the 1930's by murdering over 30 archbishops and bishops, and over 20,000 clergy and monks;

b) In 1945-46 it ruthlessly destroyed the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western Ukraine by arresting 11 bishops and over 2,000 priests, monks and nuns; it forced the Ukrainian Catholics into the fold of the Communist-controlled Russian Orthodox Church, against their will and conviction;

c) The Soviet government persistently harasses and persecutes other Chris-

tian adherents in Ukraine — the Baptists, Evangelics, Seventh-Day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, and others, by imposing heavy taxation, arresting pastors and preachers for alleged "crimes" against the state, and other repressive means;

d) The Soviet government is relentlessly persecuting over 1,000,000 Ukrainian Jews by closing down synagogues, molesting religious leaders and terrorizing worshippers;

e) The same policy of intolerance and open persecution is being applied by the Soviet government to the Moslems in Ukraine, who are hounded by the secret police and effectively prevented from practicing their traditional religion.

Article 19 of the Declaration reads:

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

This vital aspect of the Human Rights Declaration has been cynically and ruthlessly violated by the Soviet government, especially in Ukraine, up to the present. Beginning in August, 1965, a wave of arrests swept through Ukraine, ensnaring over 200 *Ukrainian intellectuals* in such cities as Kiev, Lviv, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lutsk, Zhytomyr and Ternopil. This veritable intellectual pogrom in scope and intensity far surpassed the arrest and trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel. Most of these victims were young men reared under the Soviet system in Ukraine. They were charged with "anti-Soviet" nationalist writings, glorification of the Ukrainian past, and disseminating speeches by Western leaders, such as an encyclical of Pope John XXIII and the address by former President Dwight D. Eisenhower which was delivered on June 27, 1964, at the unveiling of the Taras Shevchenko statue in Washington, D.C.

Most of these men were tried *in camera* and sentenced to long terms at hard labor under Article 62 of the Penal Code of the Ukrainian SSR, which is in direct contradiction to Art. 19 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. Article 62 of the Penal Code of the Ukrainian SSR reads:

Any agitation or propaganda with the intent to undermine or subvert the Soviet regime, the participation in certain specific and particularly dangerous crimes against the state, the dissemination with the same intent of slanderous inventions against the Soviet state and its social system, as well as distribution, preparation or possession to the above end of literature with such content, are punishable by loss of freedom for terms from six months to seven years or banishment for terms from two to five years. The above actions, if committed by persons previously convicted for serious crimes against the state or of crimes committed in time of war, are punishable by imprisonment for terms of three to ten years.

This Soviet criminal code which is overworked as the legal justification for extreme repression, is contradicted by the Soviet constitution itself, which specifies as follows:

In accordance with the worker's interest and with the aim of strengthening the Socialist system, the citizens of the USSR are guaranteed by Law: a) Freedom of speech; b) Freedom of the press; c) Freedom of gatherings and meetings; d) Freedom of processions and demonstrations on the street.

(Soviet Constitution, Chapter X, Article 125)

It was these trials to which U.S. Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg referred in his debate in the U.N. Human Rights Commission on March 6, 1968, when he said:

What has been completely overlooked is the particular concern of this Commission in light of the Declaration of Human Rights with the aspects of the trials to which I referred in the Soviet Union... And the prosecutions which have occurred in the Soviet Union and the convictions are specifically in violation of that provision of the Declaration of Human Rights, and the covenants which have been drafted to implement it...

The breakthrough as to information on the Ukrainian trials and convictions was provided by a Ukrainian journalist, *Vyacheslav M. Chornovil*. As a TV newsman and a member of the Comsomol organization, Mr. Chornovil attended the trials of several Ukrainian intellectuals. He found intolerable the flagrant violation of "Soviet justice" and the coercion and terror of the KGB. His protests to the Soviet authorities and party leaders in Ukraine came to no avail. He was finally arrested, tried and sentenced on November 15, 1967 to 3 years at hard labor. His manuscript, *Portraits of 20 'Criminals,'* was smuggled out of Ukraine in 1967 and published in Ukrainian by *Ukrainske Slovo* in Paris.

On the basis of his white book the international press carried a series of articles on the suppression of freedom and human rights in Ukraine: *The Times* of London, February 7, 1968; *The New York Times* on Feb. 8, 9 and 10, 1968; *New Statesman*, Feb. 23, 1968, also of London; *The Toronto Telegram*, January 11, 1968, and *The New Leader*, January 15, 1968.

Articles on the persecution of Ukrainian intellectuals also appeared in *Die Welt* of Hamburg, *Die Sued-Deutsche Zeitung* of Munich; *Le Monde* of Paris, and *L'Osservatore Romano* of Rome.

EXAMPLES OF INHUMAN PERSECUTION

Some of the Ukrainian cases merit special mention:

1) *Svyatoslav Y. Karavansky*, poet and journalist. In 1944 he was tried and sentenced to 25 years at hard labor. He was amnestied in 1960 after 17 years in an Arctic slave labor camp; the maximum prison sentence in the USSR was then reduced from 25 to 15 years. He returned to Odessa, enrolling at the university there and working on translations of Shakespeare and Byron. He also wrote well-documented petitions to the government of the Ukrainian SSR protesting practices by the Russians conducted against the Ukrainians and Jews. In 1965 he was arrested on an Odessa street and sentenced, without benefit of jury, to 8 years and 7 months. In prison he has gone on a hunger strike 5 times. At present he is incarcerated in Camp 11, Yavas, Mordovia.

2) *Yuriy Shukhevych*, son of General Roman Shukhevych (Taras Chuprynka), commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). Arrested in 1948 at the age of 15, he was sentenced to 10 years at hard labor. In 1958 he was released, only shortly to be rearrested; on December 1, 1958 he was sentenced again to 10 years at hard labor. In 1963 he was brought from Mordovia to Kiev, where KGB Major Kalash and KGB Captains Lytvyn and Markatzenko proposed that he denounce Ukrainian nationalism and the activities of his father, General Shukhevych, in return for prompt release. He refused, stating

that he had been sentenced twice without having committed any crime against the Soviet state. His second sentence is up this year.

3) *Mykhailo Soroka*, Ukrainian patriot. Arrested in 1940, he was sentenced to 8 years at hard labor; released in 1948, he returned to Lviv (Western Ukraine), but again was arrested and sent to Krasnoyarsk for the same "crime." Upon his return to Lviv in 1951 he was vindicated, only again to be arrested in 1952 and sentenced to 25 years at hard labor. He is now in Yavas, in the Mordovian ASSR. Altogether, he has spent 31 years in Polish and Soviet jails. As late as 1966 he was reported suffering from coronary thrombosis. He was refused medical treatment in a camp, where the so-called camp hospital contained only 7 beds to accommodate 225 invalid and sick prisoners. It was reported that Yuliy Daniel protested to the camp authorities against the "shocking and inhuman treatment" of this prisoner.

4) Three Ukrainian women-martyrs, *Katherina Zarytska*, *Odarka Husiak* and *Halyna Didyk*, members of the Ukrainian Red Cross organization. Each was sentenced to 25 years at hard labor, although none committed any crime against the Soviet state. All three are at Vladimir Prison, northeast of Moscow.

On these mass trials of Ukrainian intellectuals, Edward Crankshaw, a leading British authority on Soviet affairs, commented (*The Observer* of London, Feb. 11, 1968) :

What had these men done? They had discussed among themselves and among their friends, ways and means of legally resisting the forcible Russification of Ukraine and the continued destruction of its culture. They possessed books dealing with this problem, some of them written in Czarist times. They possessed notebooks with quotations from the great Ukrainian patriots.

No evidence whatsoever was produced to show that they agreed with these opinions or were contemplating subversive action. Unlike some who had gone before (and others still active) they were not advocating secession in any form and even had they done so, there would have been no violation of the constitution. They were deeply concerned because the Moscow government was still persisting in its efforts to blot out Ukrainian consciousness, which even Stalin with his massive deportations and brutal killings had failed to do...

III. DESTRUCTION OF THE NON-RUSSIAN NATIONS IN THE USSR

Article 2 of the Declaration reads:

Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Article 15 of the Declaration reads:

(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.

(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

I. GENOCIDE OF ENTIRE ETHNIC ENTITIES

Despite these provisions of the *Declaration*, the Soviet government has been engaged in a systematic destruction of the non-Russian nations and ethnic entities.

After World War II, Stalin ordered the wholesale deportations and destruction of such non-Russian peoples as the *Crimean Tartars*, *Volga Germans*, *Chechen-Ingushes*, *Kalmyks* and *Karachais*. All were uprooted from their ancestral homes and dispersed throughout the Soviet Union on thinly-substantiated charges of having been "pro-German" during World War II. These people were collectively found guilty — many men and women were executed without trial or even a hearing, to which they were entitled under the Soviet constitution. In 1958 the Soviet government restored statehood to some of these peoples, and some survivors were allowed to return, only to find their homes occupied by Russian settlers sent in by Moscow. For instance, when a number of Chechens and Ingushes returned to their city of Grozny in the Caucasus, they were greeted by hostile Russians brandishing posters, which read: "Long Live Stalin's Nationality Policy," and "Chechens and Ingushes, Get Out of the Caucasus!"

The genocidal treatment of the non-Russian ethnic entities by the Soviet government is a crime of the first magnitude under the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*.

2. PERSECUTION OF THE JEWISH MINORITY

There are still about 3 million Jews in the USSR, of which at least a million are living in Ukraine. Their treatment by the Soviet government was deplored by Svyatoslav Karavansky, one of the outstanding Ukrainian intellectuals persecuted by the Soviet Russian regime, in his "Petition to the Council of Nationalities of the USSR." In it he stated:

I call your attention to the discrimination against the Jewish population. I state this problem first because the attitude of a society towards its Jewish population is the litmus paper indicating that society's level of international consciousness. The closing down of Jewish cultural institutions (newspapers, schools, theaters, publishing houses); the execution of Jewish cultural workers; discrimination in admitting Jews to institutions of higher and secondary learning — these are all practices that flourished in the era of the personality cult... To appease public opinion abroad, Nikita Khrushchev (who paid little attention to public opinion in the Soviet Union itself) was forced to "rehabilitate" the innocent Jewish cultural leaders executed under Stalin. But he went no further...

3. DEPORTATIONS OF ESTONIANS, LATVIANS AND LITHUANIANS

The brutal uprooting of the Baltic peoples by the Soviet government in 1940 is a matter of historical record. Karavansky underscores these large-scale deportations of the Baltic nations in his cited petition. Thousands upon thousands of the hapless Baltic nationals were deported for the usual offenses: they happened to live near the western Soviet frontiers, they opposed Russian Communism and its totalitarian system and, above all, they wanted to be free and independent of Soviet Russian control. Entire towns and villages — for example, the town of Silamaye in Estonia — were deported to Siberia. The societal fabrics of the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians vanished under the genocidal onslaught. In his petition Karavansky asks a penetrating question:

Today in Komi ASSR (Vorkuta, Inta, Pechora), in Siberia (Irkutsk Oblast, Kemerovo Oblast, Krasnoyarsky Krai), in Kazakhstan, and in Kolyma, are

large numbers of *Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians* who were deported on the suspicion of opposing the personality cult in the years 1942-49. One can only presume that it is precisely because it intends to prevent the release of these persons that the USSR continues to maintain its barbaric 25-year prison term. For at this time 25-year sentences are being served primarily by *Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Byelorussians and Moldavians*. Why is there no pardon for them? We have generously pardoned those who contributed to the mass extermination of Soviet citizens in 1937-39, excusing them on the ground that they were not responsible for the conditions of those times and were only obeying orders... ?

4. RESTRICTION UPON MOVEMENT OF CITIZENS

Article 13 of the Declaration reads:

(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave the country, including his own, and to return to his country.

This provision of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* is violated daily by the Soviet government by its practice of the so-called *system of passport registration*. According to this practice, articulated into law, *a person may live only where the militia allows him to live*. One does not have the right to move about freely in the country, more precisely, he has the right only to go East: to Siberia, to the Urals, to Kazakhstan; he does not have the right to live in the so-called "regime" cities. Thus, an inhabitant of Ukraine may *not* settle in Kiev, Odessa or Lviv; an inhabitant of Lithuania, in Vilnius or Kaunas; or an inhabitant of Latvia, in Riga. And why, we may ask, is he not? Why should not Ukrainians be allowed to live in their own capital city of Kiev?

Because it is the intent to Russify Kiev and all other important urban centers. The discriminatory system of passport registration presently in force in the USSR allows only Russians to settle in these cities. Here is the other side of the genocidal coin: a slow extirpation as compared with swift Stalinist deportations and mass killings. In a technological era, wherein the city has become all-important, this insidious form of genocide is perhaps most heinous of all. Inevitably, such a practice provokes deep resentment and bristling antagonism between the non-Russian and Russian populations not only in Ukraine, the Baltic states, Byelorussia, and Moldavia, but also in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and in the Moslem countries of Central Asia.

IV. RUSSIFICATION AND CULTURAL OPPRESSION IN UKRAINE.

The Soviet government's linguistic and cultural policies are in direct violation of two articles of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, namely, Art. 2 (*freedom of language, and so forth*) and Art. 15 (*the right to a nationality*).

In theory the Ukrainian SSR is an independent and sovereign state, and a charter member of the United Nations. In practice, however, it is a puppet creation of Communist Russia.

The Soviet Union, following hard on the footsteps of the Russian Czars, relentlessly pursues a policy of cultural and linguistic *Russification* aimed at the creation of a "Soviet man," who in essence and ideally would be a Russian.

In his petition Svyatoslav Karavansky fixes the crux of the matter:

The *Russification* of Ukrainian institutions of higher learning introduced after 1937 has been condemned and partially corrected in Western Ukraine, but in Eastern Ukraine these institutions remain completely *Russified*. This discriminatory policy is explained by the supposed difference between the two regions; but if this is the case, why did the Ukrainian nation unite into one Ukrainian Soviet state in the first place?

The ongoing Russification of Ukraine by Moscow was described recently by a Canadian Marxist who had spent two years in Ukraine (1963-65) attending the "Higher Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine" in Kiev. In his book, *Education in Soviet Ukraine* (published by Peter Martin Associates in Toronto), John Kolasky says:

The aim of Russian policy is to maintain a tight control over education in Ukraine and other national republics, to restrict Ukrainians and other nationals from progressing beyond the elementary and general secondary level... to denationalize them... to increase... the continuous influx of Russians to occupy posts in government, education, science and other fields...

Everywhere in Kiev there was evidence of pressure to impose the Russian language... Many Russians with whom I came in contact displayed open contempt because I spoke Ukrainian... Russians were everywhere with their arrogant, overbearing attitude; their contempt, sometimes veiled, but often overt, for the Ukrainian language; their open display of a feeling of Russian superiority...

Anyone who insists on the right to speak a language other than the Russian "runs a risk of being denounced as a bourgeois nationalist," he contends. There is no instruction in the Ukrainian language at the universities of Odessa, Kharkiv and Dnepropetrovsk, all in Ukraine. Only 20 to 25 percent of the instruction at the University of Kiev is given in Ukrainian.

In every Union Republic the percentage of students studying in the Russian language is higher than the percentage of Russians living in the Republic.

In Ukrainian School No. 178 in Kiev, there are 1,400 pupils with a library of 3,323 books — of which a scant 14 are in Ukrainian. There are no non-Russian schools in the Russian Republic, despite its millions of non-Russians, including some 8 million Ukrainians, who are forced to send their children to Russian schools.

In Ukraine, for instance, about 17 percent of the population is Russian; students studying only in Russian constitute nearly 30 percent.

Among certain ethnic groups Russification has progressed to the point where the national language has all but been throttled. This fate has befallen such languages as the Yiddish, Tartar, Ossetin, Kalmyk, Chechen, Ingush and Karelian-Finnish. In Armenia, Russian is the language of instruction beginning with the first grade of primary school.

PRISON CAMPS — STILL A PERENNIAL FEATURE OF SOVIET RUSSIAN LANDSCAPE

The persistent claims of the Soviet Russian leaders, from Khrushchev to Brezhnev and Kosygin, that the slave labor and prison camps are things of the past in the USSR, are but hollow propaganda pronouncements for foreign consumption:

There are some 36 prison camps in the Potma area of the Mordovian ASSR (east of Moscow) alone. Each holds 2 to 3 thousand prisoners. Some have more,

as, for instance, the Yavas Camp, which holds 6 thousand prisoners... Altogether there are up to 100,000 prisoners in the Potma area alone...

The great majority of prisoners are on semi-starvation rations. Theoretically they receive 2,300 to 2,400 calories daily, but they are lucky if they get 1,500, because the products are of low quality, especially in spring and summer, before the new crop. The herring is rotten and smelly; the dried potatoes, macaroni, barley and meat are infested with worms...

There is no medicine, nor do the prisoners have the right to receive any from their relatives — even vitamins. Prisoners who work on construction have no warm clothing...

(From reports by Ukrainian political prisoners in Mordovia)

The Soviet government does not observe the canons of elementary decency, much less the dignity and liberty of man envisioned by the U.N. *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*.

APPEAL TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS

In view of the flagrant and systematic violations by the Soviet government of Articles 2, 13, 15, 18 and 19, as substantiated by mounting irrefutable evidence;

In view of the open violations of other Articles of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, specifically Arts. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and especially Arts. 9 and 10, which protect all persons from arbitrary arrest and assure all of an impartial tribunal; Art. 14, guaranteeing the right of political asylum; Art. 26, assuring that each person is entitled to free education, as well as Arts. 27 and 29, assuring everyone the right of protection of moral and material interests, as well as a social and international order in which all the freedoms set forth in this *Declaration* can be fully realized, WE ENTREAT THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS:

1) To establish a *Special U.N. Committee to Investigate the Violations of the U.N. 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights' in Ukraine* and in other Union Republics of the USSR; especially, to investigate the religious persecution involving Orthodoxy, Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism and Islamism; the unbridled Russification of the non-Russian nations, now ruled by Moscow; the relentless persecution of the intellectual elite in Ukraine and in Russia proper, and the willful destruction of ethnic minorities in the USSR, such as the Jews, the Crimean Tartars, Volga Germans, Chechens, Ingushes, Kalmyks and the Karachai peoples.

2) To prevail upon the *Soviet government to release some 200 Ukrainian intellectuals* arrested in 1965-67, and all Ukrainian political prisoners who are languishing for long years in Soviet Russian prison camps without benefit of amnesty and leniency on the part of the Soviet government; to release also those Russian writers who have been convicted for not conforming to the official policy of the regime by advocating more freedom for intellectual life in the USSR.

3) To prevail upon the *Soviet government to return all deportees to their native countries, such as Ukraine, Byelorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldavia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia*, and to repatriate Russian nationals brought as settlers to become the dominant element in the non-Russian Republics of the USSR.

4) To prevail upon the *government of the Soviet Union to adhere to the basic principles espoused in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights*.

We recall that the United Nations, in a resolution adopted in 1952 on "The Right of Peoples and Nations to Self-Determination," called for the implementation of this fundamental right of all peoples — freedom and national independence. Although a number of African and Asian nations, once subject to the rule of colonial empires, have been granted the right to rule themselves, no such implementation has occurred in the Soviet Union, a great empire based on conquest and domination of captive nations.

The full and unqualified liberation of these captive nations languishing in the USSR is a prerequisite to the enjoyment of all human rights and to the attainment of a lasting peace in the world.

UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA

RUSSIAN LINGUISTIC POLICIES TOWARD THE UZBEK PEOPLE AND OTHER MUSLIMS OF THE U.S.S.R.

By WASYL SHIMONIAK

Lenin's characteristic of opportunistic, *zig-zag* tactics was fully expressed in the Soviet Government's linguistic policy toward the non-Russian nationalities. As was true of other areas of Soviet life, the linguistic strategy of the Russian communist government was based upon a slow but eventual assimilation of all the nationalities with the "older brother."

A good example of the Russian cultural offensive is that of the Muslims of the Soviet Union who number about 30 million. Like other Slavic nationalities under Russian rule, they were forced to accept the Russian script, and, in doing so, "came closer to the Russian culture." The following short account will illustrate how this was done.

Problems of Alphabet. Historically, Central Asia for centuries was subject to several political and linguistic influences which prevented the formation of a sound unity among the many Central Asian peoples. As political forms altered, the linguistic development of many Central Asian peoples likewise changed.

First traces of a script used by the peoples of Central Asia date back to the seventh century; at the time the Mongolian alphabet was used. This type of script, however, was based on the Syriac alphabet, which had been used by early Christians in the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire. Subsequently, the Syriac script was adopted by the Sogdians, and Iranian people, then by the Turkic Ujgurs, who made some adjustments suitable for Turkic languages and used it until the end of the thirteenth century.

When Timur began his campaign for world domination, the

¹ Malov, *Pamiatniki drevnetjurkskoi pismennosti*, Moscow, 1951; Malov, *Yeniseiskaia pismennost Tiurkov*, Moscow, 1952; Wurm, *Turkic Peoples of the USSR*, Central Asian Research Center, London, 1954, p. 12; cited by Paul B. Henze, "Politics and Alphabets in Inner Asia," in *Royal Central Asian Journal*, vol. XLIII, January, 1956, p. 29-32.

Ujgur alphabet began to lose its significance. The Arabic script now became more popular since it represented the symbolic attachment to the Islamic religion, whereas the Mongolian script represented the Buddhist religion at that time.

But there was another peculiar feature common to many ethnic groups of Central Asia. The Uzbeks, for example, regarded themselves as town or rural dwellers, and only lastly saw themselves in terms of their ethnic affiliation.² Although there are linguistic differences between the Persian-speaking Tadjiks and the Turkic-speaking Uzbeks, this factor did not seem to play an important role in their historical and cultural intercourse. Historical data indicate that some Iranians became Turkified, while some of the Turkic elements, in particular the Sarts, became Iranized. Still others used both languages, Iranian and Turkic, such individuals maintaining that they were very close to each other, "but different from other Uzbeks."³

The main inhabitants of present-day Uzbekistan, Uzbeks, Tadjiks and Kara-Kalpaks, historically did not achieve the creation of a common literary language. There were, however, three different trends towards the establishment of a unified language for all the ethnic groups inhabiting the region. The first trend was represented by the nomadic tribe, the Shabanids (after the Shaibani Khan who invaded the region of Uzbekistan in the sixteenth century); the second by the sedentary peoples, the Sarts, who used both languages — Iranian (Tadjik) and Turkic; the third by a pre-Shabanid Turkic nomadic people who called themselves Chagatais, or who were identified by the names of their tribes (Kurluks, Kipchaks, Turks, Kurams, etc.).⁴ During all these centuries, however, Tadjik dominated the urban culture.

When in the nineteenth century the Russians occupied the area, they saw the lack of linguistic unity among the many native ethnic groups and began to propagate a Russian-Latin script, hoping at the same time to convert some of these peoples to Christianity. For example, Ilminskii's Institute in Kazan worked on linguistic matters dealing with the Muslim nationalities. But the central purpose of Ilminskii's Institute was the propagation of Orthodoxy. Although

² Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Quelquejay, *The Revolution of the Muslim Nationalities of the USSR and Their Linguistic Problems*, Issued by the Central Asian Research Centre in association with St. Anthony's College (Oxford: Soviet Affairs Study Group, 1961), p. 35.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁴ Henze, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31.

provisions were made to educate Muslims on the same level as Russians, the Muslims were not too eager to accept the Russia-Latin script, since they regarded the Arabic script as the script of Islam, the holy script in which the Koran had been written.

In the second half of the nineteenth century the natives themselves began to work on a unified script. The major impetus, however, came not from the Uzbek intellectuals but from the Muslim social and literary people of Kazan (Tatars). The leading personalities of that time were men like F. F. Arkhundov (1871), Mikumi, Furkat and, most of all, Gasprinskii, the founder of the Jadid movement in the Russian Empire.⁵

After the Revolution of 1917, the Kazan-Tatars, who had a substantial influence over the peoples of Uzbekistan, proposed changing the Arabic script into Latin letters. But here again a variety of opinions and ideas in regard to the new alphabet hindered process. Many of the leading Muslim reformers wanted to retain the Arabic alphabet, allowing for some modifications suitable for the Uzbek language. This group prevailed to the extent that in 1923 the modified Arabic alphabet became the official script of the region.⁶ A second group, the Chagatais, wanted to reform the Uzbek language on the basis of the classical Chagatai language (influenced by Iranian). Others thought that a modern Uzbek language should be based on the Turkish language, (the program of the *Singarmonists*).⁷ Still others maintained that a modern Uzbek language should be a composite of local dialects, permitting, however, a dialect to dominate which would prove useful and play a leading role in the formation of the Uzbek language.⁸

All these linguistic theories, then, were centered mainly around two factors: a modified Arabic, the language of Islam; a modified

⁵ Kary-Nyiazov, *Ocherki kultury sovetskogo Uzbekistana* (Moskva: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1955), pp. 71-74.

⁶ Walter Kolarz, p. 36; cited by Henze, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

⁷ M. A. Shcherbak, "'K istorii obrazovaniia uzbeskogo narodnogo iazyka,'" in *Voprosy Iazykoznaniiia*, Moskva, No. 6, 1954, p. 114.

⁸ Shcherbak, *op. cit.*, p. 114; See also Olaf Caroe, *Soviet Empire — the Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism* (London: MacMillan Press, 1953), p. 156; A. K. Borokov, "Ocherki istorii uzbekskogo iazyka, in *Sovetskoye Vostokovedenie* (Moskva: Institut Vostokovedeniia, 1949), p. 51; Ak. Borokov, *Uzbekskii literaturnyi iazyk v period 1905-1917 goda* (Tashkent: 1940); A. Yu. Yakubovskii, *K voprosu ob etnogeneze uzbekskogo naroda* (Tashkent, 1941); Institut Marksa, Engelsa, Lenina i Stalina, *Kommunisticheskaia Partia SSSR v rezolutsiakh i resheniakh zvezdov i plenumov Tsk, 1898-1952*, Vol. II (Moscow: Gozpolitizdat, 1953), p. 716.

Turkic, the language of pan-Turkism. The Russians were not in favor of either. They began to elaborate a linguistic approach which would eliminate both Islam and pan-Turkism by Latinizing the many local languages.

Their move to change the Arabic script into Latin began in 1920 when the first Oriental Congress met in Baku.⁹ The important issue before this congress was not the imposition of the Cyrillic script upon the Muslim peoples, but adoption of the Latin one, which was favored by many Muslims themselves. Here, then, the Soviet authorities sought to reduce the Islamic influence, on the one hand, and to demonstrate to the Muslims of Russia that they, too, had rejected the Czarist imperialistic policy of Russification (imposition of Cyrillic), on the other.

In 1921 J. Stalin advocated (as part of the nationality policy) that the Communist Party take the lead in the linguistic controversy. The Party was to promote local languages, establish a local press in a language understandable to the people, and promote and organize educational, cultural and other institutions for this cause, one he saw as of prime importance.¹⁰ In 1922 the Twelfth Party Congress stressed the need for bringing into the Soviet administration local people who knew the native languages, customs, life and habits of the minority peoples; and also the need to pass laws guaranteeing (*obespechivaiushchie zakony*) the use of native languages in "all organs and enterprises serving the local native population."¹¹

In 1925, Stalin further outlined the following main goals in his speech to the Fifteenth Party Congress:

- a) Establishment of non-Party clubs and educational institutions in local languages;
- b) Attracting "loyal" teachers of local origin to teach in Soviet schools;
- c) Creation of a network of informational agencies to provide literacy instruction in local languages;
- d) Providing means to set up publishing facilities in local languages.¹²

Thus the use of the Arabic alphabet by many Muslim ethnic groups of the Soviet Union had become a focal point of interest not

⁹ Theodor Menzel, "Turkologische Kongress in Baku," in *Der Islam Jahrbuch*, 1927, pp. 1-60.

¹⁰ V. Stalin, *Sochineniia* (Moskva: 1947), vol. 5, p. 24; cited by Thomas G. Winner, "Problems of Alphabetic Reforms among the Turkic Peoples of Soviet Central Asia, 1920-1941," in *The Slavonic and East European Review*, vol. XXXI, No. 76, December, 1952, p. 136.

¹¹ *KPSS v rezoliutsiakh*, vol. 11, pp. 716-717.

¹² Stalin, *Sochineniia*, vol. 5, p. 298; cited by Winner, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

only for Muslim reformers but for the communist authorities of the Union as well. Up to 1925 many foreign materials were still sent to Muslims of the Soviet Union by other Islamic countries. The law of August, 1925, however, prohibited any further imported materials printed in the Arabic alphabet regardless of the fact that the official policy of 1923 had permitted the use of Arabic.¹³

As the linguistic controversy was going on, the Soviets labored to persuade the Muslim population to favor the change. They emphasized the idea that the Arabic script had limited possibilities in expressing scientific terms, especially those relating to the technical sciences, and that the Arabic alphabet was not suitable for all the Turkic dialects. The leading Muslim reformers also favored the change. Criticism of the Arabic was as follows:

The Latinizers held that the very nature of the Arabic script was so contrary to the needs of the Turkic language that reform of the old script would be insufficient. Thus the Azerbaijani journalist named Aga Shakhtatinsky, who as the editor of the newspaper *Shardh Rus* had advocated latinization even before the revolution, argued in the official organ of the People's Commissariat of Nationality Affairs (Narkomnats) that the Arabic script must be discarded because 'there are almost no vowels in it... and letters have special forms depending on their position in the word. Words are written from right to left, while figures are written from left to right, making their simultaneous use very difficult.'¹⁴

Similar critiques of the Arabic alphabet were brought forward by other Muslims of the USSR. The result was that Azerbaijan, the first Soviet Muslim country, accepted the Latin alphabet. In 1922 they established a journal in Latin script known as *Jeni Jol* (*Iangi Iul* in the Uzbek version), or "New Road," which had the following circulation: September, 1922, 200 copies (weekly); 1924, 1800 copies (becoming then a daily); in 1926, 6,000.¹⁵

Other Muslim ethnic groups began to convert their respective journals to the Latin script. By 1926 all necessary steps had been taken to prepare the Muslim population to favor the new script. Thus when the Congress of Orientalists (initiated by the Soviet government) met in Baku, the Muslims of the USSR generally were in favor of the new reforms. Contributing to this general acceptance was the fact that similar reforms were in various stages of development in Turkey, also an Islamic country. But the Russians surpassed

¹³ Henze, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

¹⁴ Winner, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

the Turks in this "linguistic race," and when the Baku decision was reached, accepting the Latin script, *Pravda* candidly commented that the decision of the Baku Congress (1926) had not only a great linguistic significance but also a weighty political one.¹⁶

The Russians now began to implement the decision. In 1926, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR established a state body to supervise the introduction of the Latin alphabet into Turkic tongues. This legal Committee was labeled the "All-Union Central Committee on the New Turkic Alphabet" (*Vse-Soiuznyi Tsentralnyi Komitet Novogo Tiurskogo Alfavita-VTsKNTA*), with headquarters in Baku. It had its first meeting in June, 1927, its second in Tashkent, January, 1928. On August 7, 1929, the VTsKNTA and the USSR Sovnarkom decreed that the Latin-type alphabet be introduced in all Turkic institutions and ordered the seizure of the Arabic script as well as prohibition of any imported materials printed in Arabic.¹⁷ In November, 1930, the Sovnarkom of the Uzbek SSR officially ordered all cultural and educational establishments of the republic to use the Latin script as the alphabet of the state.¹⁸ By 1930, thirty-six minority languages were using the Latin script, serving about thirty million Muslims of the Soviet Union.¹⁹

This Soviet policy was approved by the majority of the Muslim intelligentsia since it promised the educational and cultural improvement of the Muslim peoples. By using the Latin script they could use the scientific sources that the Western world had developed, and at the same time avoid a possible Russification of the Muslim population. But what the intelligentsia did not realize, as did the Russians, was that Latinization of local languages hindered a unification of the peoples.

*Rationale of the Soviet Linguistic Reforms.*²⁰ The basic issue underlying the linguistic controversies was the unification of the Turkic peoples. By the end of the nineteenth century Turkish nationalists already had been planning to establish a great state unifying all Turkic peoples, or even all the Muslims of the world, into a big em-

¹⁶ *Pravda*, March 3, 1926.

¹⁷ Winner, *op. cit.*, pp. 139, 141.

¹⁸ Kary-Nyiazov, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

¹⁹ Winner, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

²⁰ For further information see: *Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Institut istorii materialnoi kulture*, No. 15, 1947, p. 86; I. D. Deshiev, "Razvitie malopisemnykh iazykov narodov SSSR v sovetskuiu epokhu," in *Voprosy Iazykoznaniiia*, No. 5, 1957, pp. 18-31; *Central Asian Review*, vol. 9, 1961, p. 230.

pire. In 1920, Enver Pasha espoused a similar idea. The Jadids, also, were optimistic about the possible creation of a huge Islamic state, hoping to see Kazan as the capital of the Muslim communist world.²¹

As mentioned heretofore, Soviet leaders opposed new pan-Turkic influences as well as Islamic influences in the sprawling area. Thus the Soviets promoted the local languages of the many ethnic groups of Turko-Tatar origin, for in so doing they reduced the chances of Turkish unification. The linguistic wall separating the many elements working for Turkish political unity seriously hampered the mutual effort.

Time was on the side of the Kremlin. During the 1920's and 1930's the Russian language came to exercise considerable influence, particularly in the literary field. For example, in the period 1923-1940, the quantity of Russian words in use in the area increased from 2.0% (in 1923) to 15% (in 1940), while Persian-Arabic words decreased from 37.4% to 25%.²²

Another development was (and still is) the tendency of one ethnic group to absorb another. For example, the Uzbek-Tadzhik peoples, who for centuries had been allied culturally but had differed linguistically and economically were approaching a stage of assimilation. As one investigator indicated, the Tadzhiks living in Uzbekistan "are condemned to absorption by the Turks among whom they live."²³ Such a trend could be detected especially in the rural areas, where the Tadzhik language began to disappear; the old Tadzhik linguistic and cultural habits fared far better in the large cities.

Similarly, a like fate confronted the Turkic speaking peoples of Tadzhikistan who came under the predominant influence of the Tadzhik language. Both the territorial demarcations and the opposition to Islamic influences in the area certainly helped the Soviet policy favoring local languages. The policy effectively forestalled an unexpected spread of Turanianism or other pan-Islamic or pan-Turkic idea. Moreover, it obliged the native population to look upon Russian more and more as the major modern language.

In general, a change in alphabet to Latin meant that school children began learning a "new" language, thereby opening a gap between parents and children. As far as schools were concerned, they had few materials in either alphabet; but changing to Latin meant that the existing Persian-Arabic literature tended to become

²¹ Bennigsen, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

²² Shcherbak, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

²³ Bennigsen, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

“foreign” to the youth — hence the erosion of tradition and cultural heritage.

The Russians prudently did not impose the Cyrillic alphabet at first. Such a move would have elicited negative reactions. Since Turkey was also working in the direction of replacing the Arabic alphabet with the Latin, the Soviet administration was content to follow the lead of the Turkish reforms, since many Uzbeks were under the direct cultural influence of the Turkish people. Also, educational materials were scarce, and Turkey could supply some of the “acceptable” materials.

In 1940, however, the Muslims of Central Asia were cut off from any Turkish-Islamic influences; the Russians abolished the Latin script and imposed the Cyrillic one upon the Muslims of the Soviet Union. By 1964 not only the Muslims were undergoing Russification. Many other nationalities of the Soviet Union either had been entirely Russified or had “accepted” the Russian language as the language for use in the schools. For example, in that year the *Teacher's Gazette* stated:

Upon the request of parents, all schools of Karelia, many Tatar schools in twenty-three regions of the RSFSR, as well as a great majority of the national schools of Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkarian and Kalmyks — have adopted the Russian language as the language of education, maintaining the native language as a separate subject.²⁴

The same source added that more and more schools in the territory of the Soviet Union are adopting the Russian language as their own. It is within such a framework of Russian policies that national cultures are “flourishing,” policies which are aimed at complete destruction of national cultures. In the process, the Russian population increased some 12% in the period from before the revolution to 1959. In the same period the Kazakhs decreased by 21%, and the Ukrainians by 10%.

Evidently, when the Russian communists speak about self-determination, freedom and development of national cultures, what they really mean is acceptance of the Russian language and culture by all and the giving up of independent cultural development by all.

²⁴ *Uchitel'skaya Gazeta* (Moscow) March 12, 1964.

BOOK REVIEWS

EDUCATION IN SOVIET UKRAINE. By John Kolasky, Toronto, Canada: Peter Martin Associates, 1968, pp. 238.

John Kolasky's *Education in Soviet Ukraine* provides the Western reader with an outline of the educational system in Ukraine, and of Ukrainians and their language within this system. Given the important role of education in shaping linguistic patterns and national consciousness, study of the educational apparatus in non-Russian republics is crucial to an understanding of Soviet nationality policy.

Mr. Kolasky, a Canadian of Ukrainian descent, recently spent two years in attendance at Taras Shevchenko University in Kiev. In the preface he states that until his stay in Kiev, he believed that Ukraine was "a free republic in a voluntary union enjoying the widest freedom for development of its language, culture, and customs." His disenchantment due to what he sees as the vast divergence between this view and reality is one of his primary reasons for his writing this study. Certainly his opportunity to do research in Ukraine and to experience the present educational system makes his study unique.

The first two chapters are devoted to an exposition of Leninist nationality policy and a description of the nationality question in Ukraine from Lenin's time to Khrushchev's. Kolasky views Leninist nationality policy as favorable to the development of non-Russian peoples and their cultures. His short summary of Soviet Ukrainian history outlines the progress made by proponents of Ukrainian culture in the educational field during the relatively liberal period of the 1920's. He then discusses the advent of Stalinist rule, the centralization of power, the destruction of Ukrainian educational and cultural institutions, and the increase of Russification.

In describing recent policy, Kolasky devotes a chapter to Khrushchev's 1958 education law as an instrument of Russification in the national republics. Kolasky views this law, which was enacted in the national republics only after considerable opposition, as the basis of an intensified Russification program. He illustrates that while the provisions of the law ostensibly increase the individual choice over the language that he will study, the real effect has been to decrease the study of local languages in Russian-language schools in non-Russian republics. It has also permitted bureaucrats to exert pressure in increasing the number of schools which use Russian as the main language of instruction. Thus, students in Russian language schools in Ukraine no longer need even an elementary knowledge of Ukrainian, and will become a factor in increasing the pressure to Russify Ukrainian higher educational institutions. In addition, Mr. Kolasky maintains that all indications show a decrease in the percentage of students attending non-Russian language schools in the wake of the 1958 law.

The most valuable sections of Mr. Kolasky's study are those dealing with elementary and secondary, vocational and technical, and higher education in Ukraine. Given the lack of comprehensive Soviet statistics, Kolasky has had to glean as much information as possible from ambiguous and disparate sources. The picture that emerges is of the relegation of the Ukrainian language to a position not at all commensurate with the size of the Ukrainian population in the republic. The position of the Ukrainian language is especially weak in urban schools and higher education. The data also shows the under-representation of Ukrainians in higher educational institutions and in the academic and scientific professions. The under-representation of Ukrainians in higher educational institutions facilitates the Russification of those institutions and in turn makes it more difficult for graduates of Ukrainian-language schools to secure admission in the former in competition with Russian-language educated students.

This is especially so, because, as Mr. Kolasky points out, it has become increasingly common to demand that entrance examinations be taken in Russian, thus providing an obstacle to those students who have been educated in Ukrainian and increasing the pressure on parents to send their children to Russian-language schools.

While much of the data provided has been known to students of the field through careful study of Soviet published statistics, Kolasky's study includes material gathered through personal contacts during his stay in Ukraine. This data of course must be viewed with caution, as the author understandably is not able to divulge his exact sources. However, this material does coincide with the published statistics and serves to shed light on various aspects of Soviet educational policy. Thus, Kolasky shows the increase of Russification in the Lviv school system between 1964-65 and 1965-66 by comparing information given to him by T.D. Telyshkovsky, vice-chairman of the Lviv Regional Executive Committee with that subsequently published in Soviet newspapers.

The most startling of such statistics given are those for the school populations of major Ukrainian cities for the 1958-59 academic year. Kolasky lists as his source circulating hand-and-typescripts. These statistics reveal that in Kiev only 26.9% of the students were in Ukrainian-language schools, in Kharkiv 4.1%, in Odessa 8.1%, in Luhansk 6.5%, and even in the Western Ukrainian city of Ivano-Frankivsk only 39.4% of the students were in Ukrainian-language schools. Kolasky also states that he was informed that as a result of the increased Russification drive all Ukrainian schools had been closed in Luhansk and Donetsk by 1964. Even taking into consideration the traditionally Russified nature of these cities and assimilatory tendencies by Ukrainian parents who wish to increase their children's chance for advancement, these low percentages could only be the result of governmental policy.

Mr. Kolasky's statistical analysis conclusively shows that the Ukrainian language occupies a far less important role in the educational institutions of Ukraine than the Ukrainian population warrants. The remainder of his book is devoted to illustrating that this is the result of the activities of bureaucratic Russifiers in Ukraine and not of the desires of the populace. He outlines the attempt of the regime to create a rationalization for Russification by ascribing it to a process of the "natural merging" of Soviet peoples and languages. The final chapters of *Education in Soviet Ukraine* deal with government pressure against the Ukrainian language and with the opposition of Ukrainians

to this pressure. Mr. Kolasky's presence at many of the protest meetings of Ukrainian intellectuals against the Russification of Ukrainian institutions makes his comments especially valuable. The recent publication of works by contemporary Soviet Ukrainians, such as *The Chornovil Papers* and Ivan Dzyuba's *Internationalism or Russification?*, corroborate Kolasky's account.

The major drawback of the book is Mr. Kolasky's highly emotional style. In the light of the author's disillusionment during his stay in Kiev and his deep dedication to Ukrainian culture, one can understand this reaction. However, his tendency toward overstatement and oversimplification detracts from the factual material presented. Also, the chapter "Where Minority Languages Flourish" adds little in relevant material and does not deal adequately with the complex problem of intergroup relations and education in multi-national societies.

In spite of these drawbacks, Mr. Kolasky's study provides much that is useful for an understanding of both the educational system in Ukraine and Russian-Ukrainian relations. His work poses a real challenge to those who would see the Soviet educational system as having found an adequate and just solution to nationality problems.

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FIFTY YEARS OF COMMUNISM IN RUSSIA. Edited by Milorad M. Drachkovitch, The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, 1968, pp. 316.

The title of this compiled work expresses with inadvertent accuracy the contents of the numerous essays presented. In the case of each essay, well over ninety per cent of the material deals with Russia, the Russians, and Moscow, though the writer, of course, believes he's really treating the entire Soviet Union. Here and there, mention is made of the Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Armenians and several other non-Russian nations in the USSR but, generally, half of the population in that empire-state is virtually ignored. Not a single essay is devoted to the non-Russian nations. This is, indeed, a sad commentary for a work that presumes to survey all the major sectors and fields in Soviet Russia and then the Soviet Union these past fifty years.

At this stage in the development of American knowledge and understanding of the Soviet Union, such a grave omission is both amazing and inexcusable. It reflects poorly on those responsible for the preparation of the book and definitely mars the objective of the entire work. Yet, despite this pronounced deficiency, the work is useful and valuable for the areas covered. Some of the contributors, such as Sidney Hook, G. Warren Nutter, Bertram D. Wolfe, and John N. Hazard, are prominent names in the field of analyzing communism, areas of the Soviet Union, and American policy toward the USSR. Their essays, as well as those of others, provide keen insights into the phenomena under consideration although, unfortunately, the basic, erroneous preconception of Russia being the Soviet Union runs through most of them.

The introduction, written by the editor, Milorad M. Drachkovitch, furnishes the regular, run-of-the-mill outline of Russian development since 1917. Lenin, for example, is characterized as a stern opponent of Russian chauvinism.

As he puts it, "Lenin himself died full of doubts and possibly even despair — observing the rudeness of his heir apparent, the growth of bureaucracy which shattered his earlier bucolic vision of 'simple, fundamental rules of every-day social life in common,'" the inability of the Bolshevik regime to get rid of 'chauvinism' in domestic inter-nationality relations, and the propensity of the Comintern to dictate to foreign Communists the typically Russian solutions" (pp. 4-5). A sober analysis of the consistent discrepancy between Lenin's words and deeds would show that Lenin himself was an archchauvinist. This uncritical and repeated treatment of Lenin is typical of the line of description found in this introduction. Whoever is familiar with the ordinary run of works on the subject will find here the usual explanations of dictatorial succession, purges and the like, along with a parenthetical interjection on the main movement of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism. Strange as it may seem, in describing Khrushchev's regime, not a word is said for the U.S. Captive Nations Week Resolution which, as the record shows, caused Nikita a whole series of apoplectic fits from 1959 to his ouster in 1964.

Bertram Wolfe's essay on "Marxism and the Russian Revolution" is absorbing and highly informative. It possesses all the marks of careful scholarship and detailed analysis. The reader will find the author's literary style pleasantly interesting. The anecdotes are prizes in themselves. For example, the writer relates, "In 1843 when Karl Marx went with his new bride to Paris to become co-editor of a journal, he was still anti-Communist. But the smell of revolution in the Paris air transformed him completely" (p. 19). The article is studded with many fascinating details and yet presented in a working framework of sound interpretation. As instances, "The term 'Marxism-Leninism' was never used by Lenin himself, but is the hallmark of the successor ideology" (p. 20); speaking of Lenin, "In his *Philosophical Notebooks*, written during the First World War only for his own eyes, he gravely set it down that 'after a half century, not a single Marxist has understood Marx'" (p. 21); or "'A revolution,' wrote Mussolini, 'is an idea with bayonets.' Or as Mao put it more nakedly: 'Power comes out of the barrel of a gun.'" (p. 31).

Wolfe's analysis is logically sound throughout. He demonstrates that the essence of Leninism "runs back not to Marx but to Babeuf, Buonarroti, Blanqui, Pestel, Bakunin, Nechaev, Tkachov, and Chernyshevsky" (p. 29). He shows the affinity of Bolshevism and Hitlerism, and the application of "one-party government, an elitist ruling caste, and personal dictatorship" to "Nasser, Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, Ben Bella, Sukarno, Ho Chi-minh and Mao Tse-tung" (p. 30). His description of the Moscow government as "a regime of permanent illegitimacy" sums up vividly the nature and character of the colonialist and imperialist Soviet Russian government. And his outlook for the future is a pessimistic one for he "cannot imagine any faction in the Communist Party that would make as its program and purpose the devolution of power to the limbs and parts of the body politic, or a genuine attempt to establish a new democratic legitimacy" (p. 47).

Leonard Schapiro's essay on "The Basis and Development of the Soviet Policy" traces the conflict between the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, examines terrorism, but throughout assumes fallaciously that the USSR is Russia. There is nothing about terrorism against the non-Russian nations, and the following is a sample of what the reader is exposed to. "It is only necessary to recall that the

much more politically developed Germans were subjugated by Hitler in fourteen months in contrast to the nineteen or twenty years required by the Communists to achieve the same result in Russia." (p. 58).

The article on "The Soviet Economy: Retrospect and Prospect" by G. Warren Nutter is substantial and penetrating, but the data provided, unfortunately, are cast in a defective political framework. The fallacious preconception of the author is that the Soviet economy is a national one, which conceptually precludes any consideration of economic colonialism and imperialism in the USSR. Thus, on this wrong assumption, the reader is given a strident survey of "Soviet economic development" from 1917 to the present. Production increased in the period about 5.7 times for the economy as a whole, 12 times for industry, 21 times for transportation, and 2-1 times for agriculture. Consumer goods production accounted for about three-quarters of total industrial production in 1913; today it accounts for only two-fifths. His treatment of collectivization is short in what can be called cultural economics, for the instruments of farm control were not imposed in any cultural and political vacuum.

In rapid succession, it may be pointed out that the remaining essays suffer also in varying degree from the strictures registered above. Lewis S. Feuer's article on "The Socio-Psychological Transformations of Soviet Society" strangely enough sheds little light on the political psychosis of Russianism and, as Radzinski so well showed, on the many masks of Moscow. John N. Hazard's piece on "Rigidity and Adaptability of Soviet Law" contains much valuable information but the context throughout is Russian. Also, it is doubtful that an informed student of the Soviet Union will gain much from Ivo J. Lederer's essay on "Soviet Foreign Policy" since much of its contents is standard material and the period of 1917-22 is largely a gaping hiatus. Jean Laloy's piece on "Proletarian Internationalism" is engaging and interesting, but it laps over considerably into other articles. "Military Theory and Practice" by Raymond L. Garthoff follows the usual and misleading lines of Soviet Russian historiography, as the following quote flagrantly shows: "The conflicts in Finland, Estonia, Latvia, the Ukraine, and the Transcaucasus in 1918 and 1919 were practically indistinguishable from the Civil War in Russia proper" (p. 216). If you're looking for a meaningful analysis of Brest Litovsk, the Petlura-Pilsudski campaign, the treaty of Riga, the UPA, etc., you won't find them.

The articles by John Turkevich on "Fifty Years of Soviet Science," Max Hayward on "Themes and Variations in Soviet Literature," and Sidney Hook's "The Democratic Challenge to Communism" also make for profitable reading to the extent of the informative backgrounds they provide, but it is in the area of critical interpretation that one must take issue with some of this output, particularly as concerns the fundamental forces of nationalism at work in the USSR.

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LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

ALONG THE ROADS OF THE NEW RUSSIA. By Hans Koningsberger. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. New York, 1968. P. 195. \$4.95.

Hans Koningsberger, the writer, was born in Amsterdam, Holland, received his education at the University of Zurich, and now lives in New York.

Of the several books to his credit, probably the best known book is *Love and Hate in China*, which he wrote in 1965 after his visit to Communist China — the first American-based novelist allowed to go there in modern times.

Along the Roads of the New Russia is also a result of a visit — this a recent visit to the Soviet Union. It is a pleasant, non-political and non-ideological record of his travels throughout the USSR, which he insists on calling the "New Russia" for reasons best known to him. Not even the ruling clique in the Kremlin calls the USSR the "New Russia"; the official name of the new Russian communist empire remains the Soviet Union.

The entire book consists of impressions gained by the author as he drove an old Italian army truck from the Finnish-Soviet border south through Ukraine and Moldavia. He made stops in small villages and in great cities — Leningrad and Moscow in Russia, Kiev and Odessa in Ukraine. Everywhere he talked to people — in the streets, restaurants, hotels, shopping centers and vacation spots.

He does not claim to be a "Kremlinologist," but only an ordinary tourist-writer with a keen eye and an eager ear. His digression into political history, as in the chapter on "Russia's Borders," bears him out. He writes that the tactics the Kremlin has employed with the non-Russian nations are somewhat different from those of the Czars: "As in Ukraine (which, however, is akin to 'Great Russia'), they showed less fear of national cultures and drew borders for the Latvian, Estonian and Lithuanian republics that recognized them as entities. . ."

It would be in order here for the reader to learn of the massive Russification pressure being exerted in the Baltic States, Byelorussia, Ukraine, Moldavia, and elsewhere in the USSR. This Russification is far more extensive, if more subtle and ingenious, than that followed and practiced by the Russian Czars.

In his reference to "Ruthenia" (Carpatho-Ukraine) in discussing Poland and Czechoslovakia, Koningsberger writes:

"One tip of land, Ruthenia — the name, strangely, is Latin for "Russia" — had been given to Czechoslovakia at Versailles, was grabbed by Poland after the Munich deal of 1938 (Poland had only a year to enjoy that acquisition), and now is part of Ukraine. . ."

Here the author is grossly mistaken. "Ruthenia" or, as it was known in 1938, Carpatho-Ukraine, was not "grabbed" by Poland in 1938. After the Munich pact, Germany forced Czechoslovakia to accept the "federative" form of government, in which Carpatho-Ukraine, along with Slovakia, became an autonomous unit. When in March of 1939 the German troops moved to crush Czechoslovakia, Carpatho-Ukraine proclaimed its independence on March 15, 1939, held a general election which elected a Diet and formed an independent government under the presidency of Msgr. Augustine Voloshyn. It was not Poland, but Hungary, supported by Nazi Germany, that invaded Carpatho-Ukraine with several army divisions. A young Carpatho-Ukrainian armed force, the Carpathian *Sich*, numbering some 5,000 youth, was decimated. During World War II Carpatho-Ukraine was a province of Hungary until May, 1945, at which time a treaty between the USSR and Czechoslovakia was signed, transferring Car-

patho-Ukraine to the Ukrainian SSR; it is now known as the Transcarpathian *Oblast*, a province of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The author may have confused Carpatho-Ukraine with a small area on the Polish-Czech border (Opole), which the Polish government annexed during the general dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in 1939.

In describing Kiev, the capital of Ukraine, the author again falls into a historical trap. Although he recognizes it as the capital of Ukraine, he calls it "the Jerusalem of Russia," thus implying that Ukraine is Russian.

Then he states that Ukraine has almost 50 million inhabitants and that theoretically (a "gray theory") Ukraine could secede from the USSR. He notes the "cultural hegemony" of Moscow and refers to the "trials of Ukrainian separatists" (perhaps Ukrainian patriots would have been a better characterization). He justly notices that the Ukrainian language is as different from the Russian as the Portuguese language from the Spanish. He then mentions Taras Shevchenko, Ukraine's foremost poet, whose statues and street names in number are "next to ubiquitous Lenin."

Author Koningsberger dwells extensively on many aspects of everyday life: prices, wages, shops, restaurants, all of which are interesting but not new.

In discussing the problem of young people in the USSR the author makes a brief reference to the Ginzburg-Galanskov trial and the protest by Pavel Litvinov and Mrs. Larissa Daniel against the jailing of Soviet intellectuals. However, the author either did not hear or does not wish to record anything on the mass arrests and trials of Ukrainian intellectuals in Ukraine in 1965-67, some of whom, such as Vyacheslav Chornovil, Svyatoslav Karavansky, Ivan Dzyuba, and Ivan Svitlychny, have had their writings, such as books, special appeals and petitions, published in the free world.

These inaccuracies and omissions aside, Hans Koningsberger's book is light and informative reading on lesser topics, providing yet another look at this vast Russian communist domain which of necessity is one of the most challenging problems faced by the free world today.

WALTER DUSHNYCK

ETHNIC MINORITIES IN THE SOVIET UNION. Edited by Erich Goldhagen.

Frederick A. Praeger. Published for the Institute of East European Jewish Studies of the Philip W. Lown School of Near Eastern and Judaic Studies, Brandeis University, New York, pp. 351, 1968.

The book under review was published in 1968, the year in which the entire world was observing the 20th anniversary of the Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 10, 1948. On that occasion many books and pamphlets as well as articles in various periodicals appeared, dealing with the problem of human rights on the global scale.

Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union is certainly one of such publications. In eleven chapters over one dozen authors deal with the different aspects of the nationality problem in the Soviet Union, particularly with the problem of enforced Russification of the non-Russian nations. Regrettably, the multi-national character of the USSR still receives inadequate attention on the part of scholars in the free world, despite the fact that the U.S. Congress enacted

in 1959 the "Captive Nations Week Resolution," calling the attention of the world to 22 captive nations languishing in the Soviet Russian slave empire.

The book is an excellent collection of articles and essays assessing such problems as the Soviet policy toward the nationalities and ethnic groups, Russification and repression of non-Russian cultures. Some of these authors maintain that the USSR is on "the move toward pluralism in Soviet society," although one can hardly accept such a hypothesis in view of the relentless persecution of the non-Russian nations and their undying desire for and aspiration to freedom and national independence.

One of the cogent articles of the symposium is Prof. John A. Armstrong's "The Ethnic Scene in the Soviet Union: The View of the Dictatorship," which contains also a number of tables and a bibliography. Dr. Vsevolod Holubnychy deals with "Some Economic Aspects of Relations among the Soviet Republics," while J. Ornstein describes the "Soviet Language Policy: Continuity and Change." Prof. Yaroslav Bilinsky writes extensively on the "Assimilation and Ethnic Assertiveness among Ukrainians of the Soviet Union" (Chapter 4, pp. 147-184), which article includes a rich bibliography in notes and quotations from Taras Shevchenko. Prof. Bilinsky also describes the literary creativeness of the young Ukrainian Soviet poet Vasyl Symonenko (1935-1963), whose daring poetry, nationalist in nature, evoked the ire of the party censors and engendered a wave of dissent and protest against the suppression of free thought in Ukraine.

Mary Kilbourne Matossian's article dwells on the problem of Armenia, while Jaan Pennar discusses "Nationalism in the Soviet Baltics." Soviet policies in Byelorussia are described by Prof. N.P. Vakar, while Edward Allworth writes on "The 'Nationality' Idea in Czarist Central Asia" and Garip Sultan on the problems of the Turkic peoples in the USSR.

The book concludes with an analysis of the Jewish problem in the USSR, especially the Yiddish periodical, *Sovyetish Heymland* (The Soviet Fatherland), by J. Brumberg and Abraham Bumber and "The Legal Position of the Jewish Community of the Soviet Union," by William Korey. The book contains notes and a list of contributors, but no index.

There is no doubt that the book will contribute substantially to the already overwhelming list of books on the USSR. This writer has only one reservation: the title of the book. The term "ethnic minorities" tends to give an erroneous impression to the effect that the USSR is *per se* a Russian state with a few "ethnic minorities." The Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Georgians, Armenians and other non-Russian nations in the USSR by and large are no minorities, but the *majorities* in their respective countries.

But, on the whole, the book is timely and important. Let's hope that it may inspire other scholars to continue their exploration of the problem of the captive nations in the USSR for the benefit of these hapless victims of Russian communist totalitarianism and of the free world at large.

Brooklyn Public Library

ALEKSANDER SOKOLYSZYN

THE SLAVIC COMMUNITY ON STRIKE: IMMIGRANT LABOR IN PENNSYLVANIA ANTHRACITE. By Victor E. Greene, Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968. Pp. xvi, 260. \$6.95.

Although this doctoral thesis won the Kosciuszko Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Award for 1968 and contains good references to barely accessible sources, it is also characterized by some glaring weaknesses.

The basic difficulty is that Greene has approached his subject by defining the concept of the "Slav" too widely, although he also is aware of the weaknesses involved in his definition: "I will use the terms 'East European' and 'Slav' interchangeably, although ethnically this is incorrect. Lithuanians and other nationalities of the area are not Slavic. I use the terms of contemporary social observers to avoid confusion." (p. 217). As a result, the author has not avoided confusion, but has actually added to it. Although a social scientist, he has chosen to follow this assumption couched in terms of formerly quite popular misconceptions, rather than from the standpoint of the ethnic and communal tendencies of the Slavic immigrants. To claim, for instance, that "Even though in many cases nationalism later gave birth to separate ethnic parishes, all Slavs made up one community in the Anglo-American world" (p. 35) is a conceptualization which neglects completely not only the socio-psychological "consciousness of kind" among the American Lithuanians but also between and among the Slavs themselves. This leads to further weaknesses of the presentation, all stemming, probably, from the author's lack of acquaintance with the available material on each Slavic immigrant group. (The Ukrainians are noted, for instance, only on pp. 35ff, 75, 100, 106-107, 128, 141.)

In general, then, the work is not without its value; but it could have been much, much better.

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JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

THE COMMUNIST REGIMES IN EASTERN EUROPE: AN INTRODUCTION.

By Richard F. Staar, Stanford University, California: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1967. Pp. xix, 387. \$7.50.

Although this little reference book presents hardly anything new, it remains quite a useful volume, introducing the reader to the basic political, social and economic factors influencing the development and course of eight East European satellites (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia). Recapping post-1945 history, Staar deals, country by country, with the current situations in these countries; for each country he explains how the Communist Party came to control and how party decisions are implemented through government facades, illuminating party histories with biographic accounts of their leaders; identifies the "interlocking directorates" that weld government to party, and analyzes the problems facing aging leaders and their socially imbalanced party organizations. He also makes clear the differing forms of government and describes developments in industry, agriculture, foreign trade, defense, religion, and the treatment of ethnic problems. Numerous tables show trends from 1945 to 1967 in politics, the economy, and other important features of national life in these countries. Interaction among the bloc countries and with the USSR is treated in separate chapters on military coordination through the Warsaw Treaty organization; on efforts toward economic integration through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, and on the concept of "polycentrism." An epilogue discusses prospects for stability or drastic change in terms of immediate conditions within the bloc. The survey is based on primary sources in the native languages (radio

broadcasts and periodicals of each bloc country) and on documentation from Russian and Western publications; and the bibliography (pp. 355-377), which includes many "foreign" studies, is also quite good. In short, quite a handy reference work.

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JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

THE RUSSIANS. By Leonid Vladimirov. New York: F. A. Praeger, 1968, pp. vi, 249. \$6.95.

This is not a scholarly study, and it does not pretend to be one. It is a sort of a running commentary on the daily life of the Soviet citizens, featuring the marked characteristics of city and factory life, the press, drinking habits, religion, the ways of crime, the training of leaders of tomorrow, the arts, the farmers, Soviet science, and the like — all discussed in 18 chapters. There are no footnotes and no bibliographies.

Vladimirov has a sense of humor and is a good writer, showing quite an insight into the party jacket in which the life of the Soviet Union is confined. His qualifications are unimpeachable; he was an editor of one of the USSR's leading science magazines, a contributor to *Pravda*, *Izvestia*, and other publications. He defected in London in 1966. His little volume (although rather expensive) is a definite contribution to the numerous accounts of the refugees who have been informing us what the Soviet is and how it operates at the mass level of daily living.

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JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"HUMAN RIGHTS EMBARRASSMENT," an editorial. *The Washington Post*, Washington, December 11, 1968.

Scandalous is hardly the word to deprecate the United Nations nomination of Professor Nedballo for an award in the field of human rights. He is supposed to be the choice of the Soviet-East European region. It appears that his only "outstanding achievement in human rights" was to defend in the U.N. Human Rights Commission a Soviet anti-Semitic tract.

As this editorial points out, the choices of other regions include Eleanor Roosevelt and the late Chief Albert Luthuli of South Africa. Rightly, it states, "They comprise a worthy company, and it is embarrassing and scandalous that United Nations logrolling has made Professor Nedballo a part of it." Again, scandalous is too mild a word for this unbelievable action.

"TEN YEARS OF CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK," an article by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky. *The WACL Bulletin*, Seoul, Korea, December 1, 1968.

This new publication of the World Anti-Communist League, expertly edited by Dr. Jose Ma. Hernandez and distributed out of The Freedom Central in Seoul, Korea, carries in this issue a lengthy article by the president of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, titled "Ten Years of Captive Nations Week." The piece was reprinted from the *U.S. Congressional Record* of September 10.

In a comprehensive way the article outlines the development of Captive Nations Week since July, 1959. It not only describes this development but also significantly analyzes it in the light of current international problems over the past ten years. For a quick grasp of the essentials and highlights of the Week, particularly in what the author calls "this era of confetti diplomacy," this sweeping piece serves the purpose.

"INTERPARLIAMENTARY UNION CONDEMNNS SOVIET INVASION," a report. *Hairenik Weekly*, Boston, Massachusetts, November 21, 1968.

The leadership displayed by Congressman Edward J. Derwinski of Illinois in the condemnation of the USSR for its rape of Czecho-Slovakia is fully portrayed in this report. The far-seeing Congressman spearheaded the adoption of a resolution on this score by the Interparliamentary Union meeting in Lima, Peru. This is a most significant achievement which embarrassed to no end the

so-called parliamentary delegates from the Soviet Union and other Red states.

For his successful efforts in this regard, Representative Derwinski has been roundly condemned in turn in recent issues of *Izvestia* and other Red periodicals. It is noteworthy that the Soviet delegation was led by J. I. Paletski, a Lithuanian Red, who in 1940 collaborated with the Russians in their conquest of Lithuania. He has been dubbed ever since as "Lithuania's Quisling."

As the report describes, "Another major triumph for the free world was the vote by the conference to readmit the parliament of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) to membership." This, too, was led by the American delegation.

"DISHONORING AN HONOR ROLL," an editorial. *New York Post*, New York City, December 5, 1968.

Joining numerous other organs in a strong and valid criticism of Soviet Ukrainian Nedbailo as a nominee for a Human Rights award, the editors of this newspaper plainly state "the choice could not be worse." On December 9, the United Nations conferred its first awards for Achievement in Human Rights, and at the very outset it prostituted the new institution with this incredible nomination.

Aside from his serving in recent years as the puppet Ukrainian delegate on the UN Human Rights Commission, what are Nedbailo's qualifications for this award? In 1964, he defended the Russian-inspired, anti-Semitic book *Judaism Without Embellishment*. This was written by a fellow puppet, Trofim Kichko. Just last March, 1968, he again defended Kichko. Then, as the editorial cites, his "other contribution to human rights was an attempt to add 'Zionism' to a UN condemnation of 'Nazism,' apartheid and similar ideologies." Fantastic, but true!

"DISSIDENT SOVIET VOICE," a special article. *The New York Times*, New York City, November 16, 1968.

Pyotr Grigoryevich Grigorenko is the subject and theme of this fascinating but, in spots, grossly inaccurate article. Grigorenko is a "bald, broad-shouldered Ukrainian," who is also a former military general with an impressive background of high command positions and numerous awards and citations. In addition, on the basis of this performance, he has earned the reputation of being a single-minded foe of arbitrary power in the USSR — and he has paid for it.

His loud opposition to Khrushchev in 1964, as establishing a regime based on the cult of his personality, resulted in his arrest, seven months in prison without trial, and eight more in a prison psychiatric ward. He has been expelled from the party, and after his open protest against "the trampling on man" in the Soviet Union, the general lost his job as a construction foreman. The only work available to him now is that of a common laborer.

Courage, conviction, and honor are undoubtedly personified by this Ukrain-

ian. But to say, as the writer of this piece does, that Grigorenko is the voice "of the conscience of this nation of 236 million" is obvious nonsense. His is the voice of many nations in the USSR.

"ARTICLES COMMEMORATING 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK INCLUDED IN U.S. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD," a detailed report. *Asian Outlook*, Taipei, Republic of China, September, 1968.

This Free Asian magazine reports on the activities of the ROC Committee supporting the peoples behind the Iron Curtain during the 10th observance of Captive Nations Week in July, 1968. These activities included seventeen anti-Communist radio programs against mainland China, intense broadcasting from the frontline areas of Kinmen and Matsu, and mass rallies throughout the Republic of China.

Indeed, of all the countries observing Captive Nations Week, Free China has been in the forefront for many years now. The indefatigable efforts of Dr. Ku Cheng-kang, chairman of the committee and outstanding civic leader in the Republic of China, have made this possible. The large rally in Taipei featured the address of U.S. Congressman Horace R. Kornegay. All the statements and documents on the Week appear in the *U.S. Congressional Record*.

"CZECHOSLOVAKIA: SOME SOVIET PEOPLE PROTEST," an analysis of dissent in the Soviet Union by Jeri L. Laber. *Radio Liberty Research Paper*, New York, 1968.

In reality, there is no such entity as a "Soviet people," but aside from this stricture, this account is informative and meaningful as concerns the reactions of some peoples in the USSR to the Russian rape of Czecho-Slovakia. Just one quotation is sufficient here. As the writer puts it, "In the nationalistic Ukraine, the scent of freedom from neighboring Czechoslovakia spread quickly, leading to a situation of ferment, arrests and trials. Young Ukrainians demanded the access to Western culture that was permitted in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia, and Aleksandr Botvin, Party chief of Kiev, found it necessary to write in *Pravda* in July condemning 'hostile propaganda' about the necessity of a 'democratization' and a 'liberalization' of socialism."

As seen by many who predicted the Russian clamp on Czecho-Slovakia, one of the chief reasons for the Russian action was the explosive, repercussive effect further liberalization in Czecho-Slovakia would have had in Ukraine. It was reliably reported on more than one occasion that Ukrainian Party chief Shelest strongly urged this action because of this real possibility. There can be no doubt that this factor alone indicates the fundamental weakness of Moscow's inner empire, a matter that requires the closest American attention in the future.

"FOCUS ON THE SOVIET PEOPLE," reprinted article by Richard V. Allen et al. *The WACL Bulletin*, Seoul, Korea, September 1, 1968.

This article is a reprint from the work *Democracy and Communism*. In many respects it is a valuable piece for the basic information it provides and the sound interpretations it forms for the inquiring reader. Unfortunately, it

is somewhat marred by certain glaring inaccuracies and also myths it tends to perpetuate. For example, in a chart purporting to show areas of major language concentrations in the USSR, no mention is made of the Ukrainian language, though the Baltic and Finno are cited. The reader is supposed to conclude that Ukrainian is identical with Russian, which, of course, is both silly and inexcusable.

But there are many other unpardonable defects. It is stated, for instance, that "In the Soviet Union there are more than two hundred nationalities, or ethnic (racial) groups." Now, what is it — nationality, ethnic or racial? The three are not identical. A Ukrainian in Ukraine is marked by nationality; in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, he would be an ethnic; and anywhere in the USSR, he is a Caucasian. Conceptual precision in this regard is most important because it predicates clear socio-economic thinking about nations, peoples and territories in the Soviet Union, with political consequences of wide and deep ramification.

Also, strange as it may seem, nothing is said about the Russian genocide of the Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox Churches, though the authors go deeply into Red religious oppressions of the Jews, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Moslems. In short, it appears that much homework still remains to be done.

"BACKGROUND NOTES — USSR," a publication (7842). Department of State, Washington, D. C.

A pamphlet of thirteen pages on essentials concerning the Soviet Union should consist of all basic facts and proper information when it is officially prepared for public distribution. In comparison with some of the Department's output in the 50's, this one, to be sure, is a marked improvement. But, regrettably, it still falls short of the mark for accuracy, meaningful perspective, and official wisdom.

This presentation is studded with misinformation and fundamental omissions, and thus affords further evidence of defects in our higher policy formulations regarding the Soviet Union. For example, the reader cannot but conclude that the Soviet Union is Russia when he reads the following drivel: "The low Urals mark the traditional division between European and Asiatic Russia. To the east are the vast Siberian lowlands and the deserts of Central Asia." So the poor Turkestani are Russians! As to the people of the USSR, the reader is told that "More than 170 separate ethnic groups live within the borders of the USSR." He is left with the impression that the USSR is a nation like the United States with its multiple ethnic groups. Nowhere is the basic conception conveyed that the USSR is really an empire of many distinct nations with their own ethnic groups.

As to religion, churches, history, the economy, and "foreign policy." the same basic misconception prevails throughout. Is it little wonder that our policy toward the Soviet Union has been weak and misguided?

"TATARS STILL STRIVE FOR AUTONOMY," an article by Paul Wohl. *The Christian Science Monitor*, Boston, Massachusetts, July 9, 1968.

Although Mr. Wohl still remains under the illusion that the Captive Nations Week Resolution (Public Law 86-90) originated with some unidentified

Baltic groups and is aimed chiefly at the freedom of the Baltic countries, the fact is that his writing has been concentrating on the force of nationalism in the USSR, and this can only augur well for the near future. The author's articles have brought up the importance of Ukrainian nationalism on a number of occasions, albeit with several pointed inaccuracies, and in this piece he dwells on "Soviet nationalism" — whatever this means — as expressed by the Tatars.

Were the author familiar with the actual contents of the Captive Nations Week Resolution, he would find the concept of Idel-Ural most useful for what he attempts to convey in this article. He starts off pointedly enough when he states, "Nationalism in the Soviet Union appears to be one of the country's most formidable foes. For 50 years the Communist Party has preached proletarian internationalism but in practice it has turned out to be a very different story." Of course, there has been no Soviet Union in existence for 50 years, and the Russification waged by Moscow over the past 40 years has been successfully resisted by the non-Russian nations and peoples in the Soviet Union.

The writer is closer to this truth when he stresses, "The important thing in the plight of the Crimean Tatars is the complete failure of Soviet attempts to Russify them or, later, to assimilate them with their fellow Moslems, the Uzbeks." He also points out, "Suspicion of the Tatars is old and widespread among Russians. In a Tatar novel published last year in a Tatar literary magazine we are told that before the revolution there were restaurants in Moscow with a sign at the entrance saying 'dogs and Tatars are not permitted.'"

"ΑΞΡΟΦΛΙΟΤ — OUT TO MAKE THE GOING GREATEST," a report. *Life Magazine*, New York, N. Y., July 26, 1968.

In terms of psycho-political strategy, it would be expecting too much for *Life* to see the Moscow-Washington air exchange during the 3rd Week of July as a timed phenomenon to offset the 10th observance of Captive Nations Week. A coincidence, an accident? — hardly, after ten years of negotiation and then, of all times, to stage the exchange during this Week. This was Moscow's answer this year to the Week, and Washington's confettiists — those pursuing the course of confetti diplomacy — were gratified to be honored with another strand of confetti — one month before the Russian rape of Czecho-Slovakia.

The superficial facts that "the Ilyushin jet flew 95 minutes in New York air traffic before getting clearance to land," that "the Russians picked a crack crew which included Meritorious Flier of USSR. Boris Yegorov as captain," that they "also picked the prettiest and most efficient Aeroflot stewardesses — 'the sort,' one blind American reporter wrote 'who have vanished from most U.S. airlines' — and, as an obvious Russian stunt, that "the airline promised that any child born on any flight would get one Aeroflot ticket free every year of his life," all this constitutes so much shadow over substance in the event. Once again, the Russians have pulled the wool over our eyes, attaining several objectives at one stroke.

"IMPORTANT MESSAGE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE," an advertisement by the Cuban and Puerto Rican Committee. *The Washington Post*, Washington, D. C., November 2, 1968.

The importance of this as for all who view the USSR as a sub-empire with an extended empire is seen in the dominant concepts used by the writers

of this committee. These concepts measure a progress in understanding and a further validation of the increasing conception of captive nations in toto. Referring to Cuba, for example, the question is raised, "Why does this colony of Russia, center of subversion and shame to the United States, still exist? The answer: another result of the Appeasement of the Democratic Administration which is so naive that it hides from the American people the fact that in Cuba still exist missiles capable of delivering nuclear war heads."

Covering the 1960-68 period, the writers accurately maintain that "This Government has lost the great opportunity of weakening the Russian Communist Empire, and its policy of doing nothing has permitted the invasion of another small country who was just gaining its freedom." The Czecho-Slovak case involved Ukraine and many other captive non-Russian nations. It's encouraging to see certain determining concepts at work among Cubans and Puerto Ricans in our hemisphere.

"BACKGROUND NOTES," a commentary. *Amnesty Action*, Washington, D. C., August, 1968.

A group, which has been concentrating on the release of political prisoners everywhere, has undertaken the publication of this highly informative and instructive periodical. This issue features Vyacheslav M. Chornovil, the 30-year old television journalist and literary critic who now lingers in a Russian slave labor camp for his courage and right to denounce certain kangaroo trials in the USSR.

The background is depicted essentially and concisely. Described vividly are Chornovil's assignment to report the trial of 20 Ukrainian intellectuals in Lviv, his refusal to testify for the prosecution against M. Osadchy, a lecturer at Lviv University, and eventually his arrest by the KGB in August 1967. Charged for "anti-Soviet activities and propaganda," Chornovil was sentenced to three years of hard labor. His letters and papers, now in book form, substantiate the tyrannical nature of the Soviet Russian regime. Undoubtedly, we shall hear more about this heroic personality in the future.

"MARK CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK," a report with photo. *The Catholic War Veteran*, Washington, D. C., September-October 1968.

"To commemorate Captive Nations Week," begins this report, "the Catholic War Veterans of the District of Columbia Department invited members of the captive nations to join with them in saying the rosary at their regular Fourth Sunday Memorial Rosary and Mass at St. Dominic's Church, Washington, D. C. for the American war dead and world peace." Organized by Mr. Ladislaus J. Esumas, a POW in Germany, the annual observance of the Week is integrated in the schedule of prayer and activities of this historic church.

As the report continues, "Once a year during Captive Nations Week groups from the Captive Nations Committee join the CWV. Some come in costumes of their country." The service is an impressive one. The report states, "The rosary was recited in Hungarian, Ukrainian, Spanish, Lithuanian, and English for the people in countries behind the iron and bamboo curtains."

L.E.D.

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CONTENTS OF VOLUME XXIV

(Book Reviews in Italics)

	Page:
<i>Almechingen, E. M.: The Romanovs. Review by Clarence A. Manning</i> ..	179
<i>Andres, Karl: Murder to Order. Review by Austin J. App</i>	88
Bilinsky, Yaroslav: Current Soviet Policy Towards The Non-Russian Nations	62
Bouscaren, Anthony Trawick: Communism's Asia Strategy	218
<i>Bulgakov, Michael: The Master and Margarita.</i> <i>Review by Clarence A. Manning</i>	177
Chornovil, Vyacheslav M.: A Voice from the Soviet Prison Camp	13
<i>Chuikov, Vasili I., Marshal: The Fall of Berlin.</i> <i>Review by Lev E. Dobriansky</i>	275
<i>Cookridge, E. H.: The Third Man. Review by Walter Dushnyck</i>	167
D., L. E.: Ukrainica in American and Foreign Periodicals	90
D., L. E.: Ukrainica in American and Foreign Periodicals	186
D., L. E.: Ukrainica in American and Foreign Periodicals	283
D., L. E.: Ukrainica in American and Foreign Periodicals	379
Dobriansky, Lev E.: James Russell Wiggins: "I Am in Love"	227
Dobriansky, Lev E.: New Pathways for U.S. Leadership	49
Dobriansky, Lev E.: Some Basic Thoughts For the New Nixon Administration	321
Dobriansky, Lev E.: Ten Years of Captive Nations Week	149
<i>Drachkovitch, Milorad M., Ed: Fifty Years of Communism</i> <i>In Russia. Review by Lev E. Dobriansky</i>	371
Dushnyck, Walter and Sosnowsky, Michael: International Human Rights Year; see: Sosnowsky, Michael and Dushnyck, Walter: International Human Rights Year.	
<i>Dzyuba, Ivan: Internationalism or Russification?</i> <i>Review by Walter Dushnyck</i>	270
Editorial: International Human Rights Year and Communist Russia	101
Editorial: 50th Anniversary of Ukrainian National Revolution and Independence	5
Editorial: "Mother Russia's" Shadow Over Western Europe	197

	Page:
Editorial: "Socialist Commonwealth" — Alias Russian Prison House of Nations	293
Engin, Arin: East Turkestan: Victim of Sino-Soviet Colonialism	265
Epstein, Julius and Possony, Stefan T.: Tired Lies for New Battles; see: Possony, Stefan T. and Epstein, Julius: Tired Lies for New Battles.	
<i>Franke, Wolfgang: China and the West.</i> Review by Anthony T. Bouscaren	176
<i>Galbraith, John Kenneth: The New Industrial State.</i> Review by Lev E. Dobriansky	170
<i>Goldhagen, Erich, Ed.: Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union.</i> Review by Alexander Sokolyszyn	375
<i>Goldston Robert: The Russian Revolution.</i> Review by Stephan M. Horak	86
<i>Granowsky, Anatoli: I Was an NKVD Agent.</i> Review by Roman Smal-Stocki	274
<i>Greene, Victor E.: The Slavic Community on Strike: Immigrant Labor In Pennsylvania Anthracite. Review by Joseph S. Roucek</i>	376
Heiman, Leo: Russification of Soviet Armed Forces, 1917-1967	38
Horbovy, Volodymyr and Shukhevych-Berezynsky, Yuriy: "Soviet Legality" in the Light of Trials and Detention of Ukrainians; see: Shukhevych-Berezynsky, Yuriy and Horbovy, Volodymyr: "Soviet Legality" . . .	
<i>Karavansky, Svyatoslav Y.: A Petition to the Council Of Nationalities of the USSR</i>	108
<i>Knightley, Phillip; Page, Bruce; and Leitch, David: The Philby Con- spiracy; see: Page, Bruce; Knightley, Phillip; and Leitch, David: The Philby Conspiracy.</i>	
<i>Kolangs, John: Education in Soviet Ukraine. Review by Frank Sysyn ..</i>	369
<i>Koningsberger, Hans. Along the Roads of the New Russia.</i> Review by Walter Dushnyck	373
<i>Lednicki, Waclaw: Russia, Poland and the West.</i> Review by Nicholas Andrusiak	182
<i>Leitoh, David; Page, Bruce; and Knightley, Phillip: The Philby Con- spiracy; see: Page, Bruce; Knightley, Phillip; and Leitch, David: The Philby Conspiracy.</i>	
<i>Lewin, M.: Russian Peasants and Soviet Power.</i> Review by Clarence A. Manning	278
<i>Lyons, Eugene: Workers' Paradise Lost. Review by Lev E. Dobriansky ..</i>	83
<i>Manning, Clarence A.: The Problem and Danger of Asian Communism ..</i>	73
<i>Manning, Clarence A.: The West and Moscow in 1968</i>	239
<i>Mandryka, M. I.: History of Ukrainian Literature in Canada.</i> Review by W. T. Zyla	272
<i>Martos, Borys: First Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada</i>	22
<i>McSherry, James E.: Stalin, Hitler, and Europe.</i> Review by Kenneth V. Lottich	174
<i>Mnacko, Ladislav: The Taste of Power. Review by Joseph S. Roucek ...</i>	181

	Page:
Nakashidse, George: What Happened to Georgian Consciousness Under Russian Rule	129
Nekrasov, Victor: <i>Kira Georgievna</i> . Review by Clarence A. Manning ..	279
Page, Bruce; Knightley, Phillip; and Leitch, David: <i>The Philby Con- spiracy</i> . Review by Walter Dushnyck	167
Philby, Eleanor: <i>Kim Philby</i> . Review by Walter Dushnyck	167
Philby, Kim: <i>My Silent War</i> . Review by Walter Dushnyck	167
Pilnyak, Boris: <i>The Tale of the Unextinguished Moon and Other Stories</i> . Review by Clarence A. Manning	279
Poltava, Leonid: Destruction of Ukrainian Historical Monuments by Moscow	346
Possony, Stefan T.: Understanding Russia and the USSR	141
Possony, Stefan T. and Epstein, Julius: Tired Lies for New Battles	247
Procko, Bohdan P.: Ukraine, 1967: A Historian's Personal Impressions	253
Proffer, Carl R.: <i>Letters of Nikolai Gogol</i> . Review by Clarence A. Manning	179
Prychodko, Nicholas: <i>Stormy Road to Freedom</i> . Review by Walter Dushnyck	82
Schechtman, Elya: <i>Erev</i> . Review by Clarence A. Manning	181
Shimoniak, Wasył: Russian Linguistic Policies toward the Uzbek People and Other Muslims of the U.S.S.R.	361
Shoup, Paul: <i>Communism and the Yugoslav National Question</i> . Review by Clarence A. Manning	280
Shukhevych-Berezynsky, Yuriy and Horbovy, Volodymyr: "Soviet Legality" in the Light of Trials and Detention of Ukrainians	206
Slavutych, Yar, Ed.: <i>Slavs in Canada</i> . Review by W. T. Zyla	86
Smal-Stocki, Roman: George Washington Traditions in Ukraine	250
Solchanyk, Roman: The "Sophistication" of Soviet Nationality Policy in Ukraine	332
Sosnowsky, Michael and Dushnyck, Walter: International Human Rights Year	301
Staar, Richard F.: <i>The Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe: An Introduction</i> . Review by Joseph S. Roucek	377
Statement of the Delegation of Free Ukrainians to the International Conference on Human Rights in Teheran	165
Sydorenko, Alexander: Ukraine at Brest Litovsk	117
Taubman, William: <i>The View from Lenin Hills</i> . Review by Joseph S. Roucek	281
Ukrainian Congress Committee of America: Memorandum to the International Conference on Human Rights in Teheran	351
Vladimirov, Leonid: <i>The Russians</i> . Review by Joseph S. Roucek	378
Wolfe, Bertram D.: <i>Gorky and V. I. Lenin</i> . Review by Joseph S. Roucek ..	282
Yaremko, Michael: <i>Galicia-Halychyna: From Separation to Unity</i> . Review by Roman V. Kuchar	172

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