


THE

VOL. XX — NO. 4 / A JOURNAL OF EAST EUROPEAN
WINTER, 1964/65 / AND ASIAN AFFAIRS

UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY



THEY SPARKED THE HOPE FOR UKRAINIAN FREEDOM . . .



A group of officers of the Ukrainian Legion with Col. H. Kossak (center) in the village of Velyn, near Zhydachiv in Western Ukraine in June, 1918 under the oak, where, according to local tradition, *Hetman* Bohdan Khmelnytsky, rested during his victorious campaign against the Polish army in 1649.

PICTURE ON THE COVER: Ukrainians the world over observed in 1964 the 50th anniversary of the founding of the modern Ukrainian armed forces in 1914. A short article by *Ucrainicus*, appearing in this issue of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, gives a brief historical background of the formation of the *Ukrainski Sichovi Striltsi*, or the Ukrainian Legion, and its role in the rebirth of the Ukrainian armed forces fifty years ago. Here American Ukrainian artist, Bohdan Tytla, has drawn a symbolic picture representing this important event in modern Ukrainian history—the birth of the Ukrainian *Sich* Rifleman. The background of the drawing consists of two buildings: on the left the building of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* in Kiev, where important decisions were made during the war of liberation in 1917-1920, and on the right historic City Hall in Lviv, capital of Western Ukraine, where on November 1, 1918 the Western Ukrainian National Republic was proclaimed. The *chervona kalyna* or red guilder-rose was a symbolic flower of the Ukrainian Legion which has also become part of its tradition.

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THE SELF-DESTRUCTIVE AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Editorial

"We are going down any path," said President Lyndon Johnson on December 27, 1963, "that can possibly lead to peace. We will meet the Russians halfway, and even further than halfway if that is necessary."

In speaking of the USSR (it is now common American practice to lump the 100 million non-Russian inmates of the Soviet prison under the term "Russian"), Mr. Johnson touched the nadir of a foreign policy that has been steadily degenerating since the close of World War II. The immediate postwar policy of "containment," if unimaginative and timid, nevertheless possessed the virtue of recognizing the enemy. Today, some twenty-odd years after Munich, our foreign policy has all but forgotten the peril of peace at any price. True, one vestige of recollection does remain: it does so in the form of a single word, *appeasement*. But the unpleasant connotations of this word have been banished by the simple expedient of replacing it with another word: *accommodation*.

Today we have actually arrived at the brink of trading with the Soviet Union, our dedicated enemy. The products of our free economy may shortly be made available to strengthen those who are openly and fanatically dedicated to destroying that freedom. Forgotten is how before World War II we helped build up Japan's war economy by selling it scrap steel. Blotted from memory is our "business as usual" at the time with Nazi Germany.

An erosion of morality, a mounting inertia fed by fear and an almost psychopathic abhorrence of the unpleasant—all have combined to reduce steadily our foreign policy to a myopic, fact-avoiding, self-destructive instrument.

KHRUSHCHEV: ENTER VILLAIN, EXIT HERO

The transformation in American eyes of Nikita S. Khrushchev from villain to tragic hero offers a striking illustration of our developing political and moral bankruptcy.

Khrushchev burst upon the world scene with the blood of Beria (and possibly Stalin's) on his hands. Garrulous, boastful, peasant-like, a masterful creator of crisis after crisis, he promised to overtake America in output, he promised to bury us, he pounded a shoe in disdain in the United Nations General Assembly. The cold war waxed hot and cold at his behest; but gradually a terrorized Europe and an intimidated United States grew calmer. Khrushchev, it appeared, was not going to hurl thermonuclear missiles westward. With pathetic gratitude the West gulped down his concept of "peaceful existence."

Interesting to note is that when Khrushchev assumed power, he was identified here as a Ukrainian, a mark of some opprobrium thanks to the efforts of entrenched Russia-firsters in this country. (Khrushchev denied he was Ukrainian at a German Communist Party conclave in Leipzig in 1959; his Russianism was also confirmed by the Soviet Embassy in Washington.) Further, Khrushchev was reported to have brought with him a number of Ukrainian minions, including marshals, generals and admirals, all of which presumably foreshadowed a "Ukrainian policy." But his policy on Ukraine was to suppress the uprisings of Ukrainian prisoners in the Soviet concentration camps in Vorkuta, Kingir and Karaganda as brutally as he squashed the Hungarian uprising. He deported hundreds of thousands of the Ukrainian youth to the "virgin lands" of Kazakhstan, and he stepped up the Russification of Ukraine itself.

The Ukrainian farmers, of course, had known Khrushchev from as far back as the man-made famine of 1932-33, wherein as a minor but zealous Communist on his way up Khrushchev helped starve some 6 million Ukrainians to death. The Ukrainian Communists got to know him to their cost in 1937, at which time Stalin dispatched him to Ukraine to purge the rebellious Communists who had taken the fiction of a Ukrainian state at face value. During his tenure as Stalin's "iron fist" in Ukraine, liquidated were all but two of the 62 members and 40 candidates of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. Seventeen members of the Ukrainian Communist government vanished; all regional party secretaries were liquidated as "bourgeois Ukrainian nationalists" and "enemies of the people." Under his over-all supervision, the NKVD murdered 10,000 Ukrainian men, women and children in the city of Vynnytsia.

Khrushchev of the cherubic countenance also played a key role in the destruction of the Ukrainian Autocephalic Church in 1937-38, and approved the liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western Ukraine.

During and after World War II the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) also knew Khrushchev, who enlisted the aid of Poland and Czechoslovakia in hounding and destroying UPA guerrillas and their families.

These facts and others in detail and with full documentation were publicly presented by the Kersten Select Committee on Communist Aggression (1955); but the Committee's report had no noticeable effect on checking the emergence of Khrushchev's image as a practical politician with whom the West could do business, his later Cuban missile adventure notwithstanding.

Even the disclosure by the West German Supreme Court of the murders in 1957 and 1959 of two outstanding Ukrainian emigres, Dr. Lev R. Rebet and Stepan Bandera, *on the orders of the Soviet Government*, did not upset the growing American conception of Khrushchev as a crude but basically amiable man willing to play ball. He did, it was eagerly pointed out, relax the atmosphere of terror behind the Iron Curtain. He obviously was fully occupied with Soviet space exploration and the material advancement of Soviet Russia. He even quarreled with the other great Communist state, Red China. Above all, while he sternly warned us of our inevitable defeat by Communism, the defeat was to be a *non-thermonuclear* one.

American gratitude knew—and continues to know—no bounds. Where the Czechoslovaks were sacrificed at Munich; where Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and other European nations were sold out at Yalta, in our time the turn of the captive nations in Soviet Russia has come.

American propaganda beamed into the Communist captive world—official and semi-official propaganda that was never especially hard-hitting to begin with—has now become innocuous. The word "liberation" is not so much as mentioned. For over a year now, in fact, the Russians have not bothered to "jam" the broadcasts.

The United States consented to the removal of the Hungarian question from the United Nations agenda, and it has desisted from discussion of any other aspect of Communist colonialism when the older, non-Communist, varieties are being debated.

The executive branch of the Government of the United States began sabotage of the Captive Nations Week idea.

The Congressional Resolution establishing this institution had been clear and specific. Its reference to all the nations held in Communist captivity was clear. It ordained an annual mobilization of opinion and sentiment specifically to reaffirm American solidarity with the hope of liberation of the Central and East European peoples.

As Eugene Lyons, noted editor and journalist, recently put it before a meeting of the Assembly of Captive European Nations:

The first proclamation of that Week, by President Eisenhower, in 1959, conformed to this purpose. Though it was no more than an expression of sympathy and a call to prayer, it infuriated Khrushchev and his cohorts. Why? Surely it was not because those atheists were afraid of our prayers. It was because the weakest spot in the Soviet anatomy is its relations with the humanity under the Communist yoke. Any word or act that challenges the legitimacy or questions the permanence of Red rule, touches the Kremlin hierarchy on its most exposed nerve.

But since then the original purpose of the Captive Nations Week has been eroded, forgotten and betrayed. In January 1963, the Soviet magazine *New Times*, gloating over the suppression of the Hungarian issue in the UN, went on to say: "Is it not high time to discontinue the Captive Nations Week in the United States?"

And the White House, sad to say, took the hint, almost as if it were an order. The Presidential Proclamation that year, and the one that followed this year, were vague and generalized and careful not to point to, let alone identify, the nations in chains and their prison wardens. It asked for "renewed devotion to the just aspirations of all people for national independence and human liberty"—a meaningless formula that makes a joke out of the Congress's intentions.

No matter how you disguise it by semantics, this sort of thing is still appeasement. I submit that the peoples and the freedom of Communist-held Europe are being used as expendable chips in a game which we cannot win—a game which millions of Americans, if they understood its implications, would reject as both immoral and self-defeating.

Thus when the "apostle of peaceful coexistence" was toppled from his Kremlin power pinnacle, a wave of shock and disappointment swept American officialdom. Ironically, the same wave washed over the Communist Parties of Europe.

So enamored had we become of the Hangman of Ukraine and so perfectly attuned were we to his Pied Piper call that no one—neither our intelligence media nor our entrenched cadre of "know-all" Soviet experts—had any inkling of his impending fall. In our bemusement, his American popularity had to mean that he was equally popular at home. The awe in which we held him had become an aura of infallibility. No one foresaw the dawn of the rule of the bureaucrat over the greatest colonial empire in history.

American leadership that had failed to help East Germany, Hungary and Tibet—and all but ignores the plight of the captive peoples of the Soviet Prison of Nations—mourned the passing into oblivion of that now heroic figure, Khrushchev, piously believing that it had done all within reason for the cause of liberty in the world and that it was effectively safeguarding our own. With almost one billion people in East and Central Europe, Asia and Cuba in the Russian Communist fold, the President of the United States, on December 17, 1963, was able to say: "The great transition from colonial rule to independence has been largely accomplished."

UKRAINIAN "CLIQUE" IN THE KREMLIN

We see, then, what we wish to see; and nowadays any resemblance of our recorded images to actual visual truth appears to be a mere matter of coincidence.

We see to the East a "Russia" and a "Russian people." Our image of the multi-national lands behind the Iron Curtain is that of a "monolithic" and "historical state of Russia"—a case of acute astigmatism making for our fuzzy concepts in foreign policy: "non-predetermination," "non-dismemberment of Russia," and now "accommodation of Russia."

Once again our press sees as of importance Khrushchev's "Ukrainian appointees," who now rule the Empire. *The New York Times* editorialized on November 18, 1964:

In terms of personalities, the appearance of Nikolai V. Podgorny as the reporter presenting the report that justifies the undoing of Mr. Khrushchev's 1962 reform is the outstanding event. This would seem to confirm earlier Western speculation that the former Ukrainian Communist party leader is one of the seniors in the new ruling group. The elevation of Mr. Podgorny's former subordinate and present Ukrainian party boss, Peter E. Shelest, to full presidium membership also supports this hypothesis and makes clear that a "Ukrainian clique" occupies a strong position among the contending factions in Moscow...

The Washington Post, which has developed into a notorious Ukrainian-baiter in the past two years, ran an article, entitled, "Russ-Ukrainians Stack Kremlin Deck," by British writer Robert Conquest in its December 27, 1964 issue. It read in part:

When Khrushchev fell, there were three products of his Ukrainian machine in the Presidium: Brezhnev, Nikolai V. Podgorny and Andrei P. Kirilenko. In addition, Dimitri S. Polyansky is a Ukrainian, though his service has mainly been outside that republic. On November 16, yet another Ukrainian, Peter E. Shelest, was promoted to full membership in the Presidium. This is a gross over-representation of Ukrainians. Their delegation to the last Party Congress amounted to one-sixth of the total. Until Khrushchev's ascendancy, there was never more than one Ukrainian in the Presidium and often not even that.

Moreover, the Ukrainians now at the top have no seniority. Of the whole Presidium membership, only Podgorny, Polyansky, Kirilenko and Shelest were not members of the Central Committee in 1952.

In addition, Ukrainians are even more heavily over-represented at key levels within the machinery of power. Party Secretary Vitaly S. Titov is head of the Party Organs Committee, which controls all Party appointments; Vladimir Semichastny is head of the KGB (State Security Committee); Alexei Epishev is head of the Main Political Administration, which provides the Party's grip on the army...

The Ukrainians owe their excessive power to the fact that Khrushchev created the Ukrainian machine at the end of the purges and ran it for 12 years

as a field from which he nominated his vassals to key posts. They turned on him, or at least accepted his ouster, only when it became apparent that he was beginning to rely on a new group headed by Alexei Adzhubel, former editor of *Izvestia*, now with the magazine *Soviet Union*.

With the Ukrainians' patron gone, it seems most unlikely that the main body of the party will unprotestingly allow this jumped-up group from the periphery to hold on to its positions. For how can the Soviet Communist Party let itself be ruled by such a local cadre—and one from a section of the party always regarded as unreliable?...

On the other hand, how can the Ukrainians give up their power in the knowledge that retreat would mean disintegration? The promotion of Shelest would appear to be a declaration that the group intends to fight for its positions regardless of party conventions or feelings...

A fascinating glimpse of "Russia" and of people from the "periphery" called Ukraine; the significance of the Ukrainians cited (who do hail from a nation bearing a population ratio to that of true Russia of one to two and a half) is—in the Communist power structure—as minute as that of Stalin's having been a Georgian.

Meanwhile the new duumvirate of Kosygin and Brezhnev astride the Kremlin continues the tried-and-true Kremlin strategy of singing peaceful existence while they ram home cold war objectives.

"We, too, want peace," they say, and then brandish a finger at us for considering bombing the sources of supply for the Vietcong. In Indonesia, in conjunction with its supposedly estranged partner, Red China, the Soviet Union is providing Sukarno with arms for his impending aggression against Malaysia.

The past few months Red China has been shipping arms and munitions to the Congolese rebels via Algeria, the United Arab Republic, Ghana, the Sudan and Uganda. The USSR has now joined Red China in this peaceful pursuit. Soviet-built planes are transporting Soviet-manufactured arms to the Congolese rebels endeavoring to overthrow the government of Moise Tshombe. (A few weeks ago the Russians shut down the Congolese Embassy in Moscow.)

The United Nations continues to be a world forum for Soviet propaganda: from another familiar face—Andrei Gromyko's—have issued familiar denunciations of Western imperialism (and equally-familiar defenses of the attempted communist take-overs in Vietnam and the Congo).

And the Moscow-Peking rift, despite the exit of Khrushchev, has not appreciably improved. The conflict was not, of course, of Khrushchev's doing, but the outcome of a complex of historical factors long in the making and of the gulf between their respective stages of communist development. The one thing we may be sure of is that we've done nothing to exacerbate the quarrel or to weaken either partner.

Indeed, our present official thinking is in the direction of financing the expansion of the already swollen Soviet war potential through trade and extended credit. The timing could not be better—for the Russians. Disastrous harvests, continued poor efficiency combined with an enormous arms outlay and worldwide commitments have played hob with Soviet planned economy. The Brezhnev-Kosygin team is apparently receptive to a looser application of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, along the profit lines of Kharkiv University Prof. Yevsey Liberman's thinking:

As never before, we have realized the necessity to introduce economic incentives for promoting the development of production. Economic levers must be employed to induce the plants to make better use of the production capital, to use raw materials more sparingly, to improve the quality of the goods, and to increase work productivity in every enterprise. The solution of this task will enable us to properly harmonize the interests of the entire society with the material interest of every production collective, and with those of every individual worker. ¹

Great Britain, which lives by trade—some 16 per cent of her national income depends on it—and plagued by troubles with the pound—is blazing the trail of the West's self-destruction. Hungry for profits, it recently granted to Moscow an eighteen-year credit for a chemical plant. London is also known to be negotiating other such deals with the Kremlin, Czechoslovakia and other communist states.

Should the United States and other free nations follow Britain's lead, such credits will become a powerful weapon in communist hands to wreck Western economies. Aggravated will be a credit problem already serious in the West. We are on the threshold of not only fortifying our enemies but handing them as well a stranglehold on our own economic life.

As the final absurdity in our dealings with the Communist camp, we would be placed in a position wherein, in order to protect our investment, we would have a stake in the health and prosperity of our communist debtors! The fate of the captive nations will then have been sealed.

But in our fatal short-sightedness we can easily reassure ourselves by adopting Britain's rationalization: a fat Communist is less menacing than a hungry one. There is also, of course, the possibility that we may learn something ourselves from Communist technology. Finally, as a sop to an already strained conscience—the satellites'

¹ *The East of Today*, CIAS, Bonn. December, 1964.

dependence upon Soviet Russia would be weakened with such trade with the West.

But the Communists, on the other hand, would now have a double stake in expediting the bankruptcy and demise of the West, since that would also erase their indebtedness.

MUTUAL SELF-DESTRUCTION

Part of the romance of space exploration lies, of course, in the expectation of learning about new worlds. But a good part of the fascination with outer space, it seems to us, should reside in the eventuality of seeing ourselves, at long last, through the eyes of other, non-mundane beings. This is a consummation of our costly space effort devoutly to be desired.

In the absence of any other standard but ourselves, it appears that man will continue to exercise his boundless propensity for procrastination and his vast powers of self-delusion. The effect of performing, however, before an audience of alien eyes (and possibly superior intelligence) ought to be a salutary one. Surely then we could no longer afford to countenance one another's self-deceptions; we must finally acknowledge to ourselves our transparent hypocrisies, our tawdry self-deceits, our feet of clay.

Meanwhile the Russians, in their messianic craze, seek to lower the level of all mankind to that of the food-oriented animal. For our part, we in the West—well-fed, complacent, spiritually moribund—are increasingly unable to recognize, much less meet, the demands of conscience and morality.

50TH ANNIVERSARY OF REBIRTH OF UKRAINIAN ARMED FORCES

By UCRAINICUS

In 1964 Ukrainians the world over observed the 150th anniversary of the birth of Taras Shevchenko, Ukraine's great poet and national hero. His fiery writing, deep patriotism and great faith in man's eternal right to freedom inspired the long-suffering Ukrainian people to aspire once more to freedom and national independence.

But the year 1964 also included another important anniversary in the history of Ukraine, namely, the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the modern Ukrainian armed forces.

In 1914, in Lviv, capital of Western Ukraine then under the Austro-Hungarian rule, patriotic Ukrainians decided to organize the first Ukrainian military unit—*Ukrainski Sichovi Striltsi* (Ukrainian *Sich* Riflemen), with approval of the Austrian government.

The Ukrainians were not alone to secure permission from the Austrian government to form their own military units. The Poles and Finns also had their own legions, organized and equipped by the Austrian government, which fought on the side of the Central Powers against the Russian troops on the Eastern front.

The background of the Ukrainian legion, known in Ukrainian by its initials 'USS' (*Usususy*) dates from 1913, when the Ukrainian academic youth in Lviv organized a para-military organization called the *Sichovi Striltsi*.

As war clouds were gathering over Europe, the Ukrainians in Western Ukraine staged in 1914 huge manifestations commemorating the 100th birthday of Taras Shevchenko. These gatherings, in addition to honoring the great Ukrainian poet, constituted a form of protest against Czarist Russia for banning all Ukrainian manifestations in honor of Taras Shevchenko in Ukraine, then under Russian rule. Thousands of members of Ukrainian patriotic-sports organizations, such as *Sich* and *Sokil*, performed with military precision and discipline. This inspired Austrian representatives in attendance, especially one of its generals, to react favorably to youthful and patriotic Ukrainians.

On July 28, 1914 Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. A few days later, on August 2, 1914 a Supreme Ukrainian *Rada* (Council) was organized in Lviv. It was headed by such distinguished Ukrainian political leaders as Dr. Kost Levytsky, Michael Pavlyk and Mykola Hankevych. This body brought into being a military committee, which was empowered to organize all existing Ukrainian sports and patriotic organizations under one directing organ. The name given the new para-military organization was the "Ukrainian *Sich* Riflemen"—or *Ukrainski Sichovi Striltsi* (USS).

A special Mobilization Committee was established which began preparation for general mobilization of the Ukrainian youth on a voluntary basis to form Ukrainian military units, with Austrian government approval. Soon some 20,000 Ukrainian men, primarily high school and university students, gathered at various mobilization centers.

But this enthusiasm of Ukrainian youth to "fight for the liberation of Ukraine," then under the Russian Czar, soon cooled off, when the Austrian command accepted only 2,500 men and ordered the remainder to return home. Further complications arose when the Austrian army command insisted on a loyalty oath to the Austrian government rather than to the Ukrainian people.

After a few weeks of basic training, the Ukrainian Legion (USS) was thrown into the front line against the advancing Russian armies. It was soon clear to the Austrian High Command that the Ukrainian Legion manifested exemplary qualities of discipline and fighting character. This was especially evident in the fierce counteroffensive at the Makivka Mountain in the Carpathians during the spring of 1915. There the Ukrainian units achieved a substantial victory for the Austro-Hungarian command.

Later, the Ukrainian Legion was transformed into a regiment. As an efficient fighting unit it took part in several intensive campaigns against Russian troops. In the great push of the Austrian troops, under the command of General Mackensen, in the spring of 1915, the Ukrainian Legion played a prominent role in penetrating the Russian lines and opening gaps in them, thus enabling the Austro-Hungarian troops to cut off their deploying movements and to push the Russian troops from Galicia.

In 1916 the Ukrainian Legion played an active part in the battle for the Potutory Railroad, especially in the Lysonia Mountain, near the city of Berezhany on the Zolota Lypa River. There the unit suffered heavy losses. This caused the Austrian command to withdraw the Legion from the front line for the purpose of regrouping it with new recruits.

The March 1917 revolution in Russia found the reorganized Ukrainian Legion at the Austrian-Russian front in Galicia. Hopes of the rank and file of the Ukrainian Legion were raised high when news came from Kiev that the Ukrainian Central *Rada* had established a Ukrainian government and was negotiating with the Russian Provisional Government regarding establishment of an autonomous Ukraine. In the early summer of 1917 the Ukrainian Legion was confronted by Ukrainized regiments of the Russian armies. This resulted in fraternization between Ukrainians from both the Russian and the Austrian armies.

Members of the Ukrainian Legion were now receiving Ukrainian newspapers from Kiev and were well informed about the historic events then occurring in Kiev and elsewhere in Ukraine. In June 1917 the Ukrainian Legion, along with other Austrian units, was thrown against a powerful Russian offensive staged by War Minister Alexander F. Kerensky. The Ukrainian unit again suffered heavy casualties. Eventually the Austrian command mounted a great offensive which pushed the Russian troops behind the Zbruch River (the Austrian-Russian frontier of August 1914). Thus, the Ukrainian Legion entered the eastern Ukrainian territory where the national Ukrainian government was busy parrying the Russian attempts to prevent Ukrainians from establishing a free and independent Ukraine.

After the signing of the peace treaty between Ukraine and the Central Powers on February 9, 1918, the Ukrainian Legion was withdrawn from Ukraine and sent to Bukovina, also a Ukrainian territory then under Austrian rule.

On November 1, 1918 the Western Ukrainian National Republic was proclaimed in Lviv. The Ukrainian Legion at once entrained to go to the defense of the capital city of Lviv, then besieged by Polish troops freshly supplied with arms and equipment by France, Great Britain and the United States. The Polish army barred the Ukrainian Legion from joining the Ukrainian forces fighting around Lviv. This resulted in the capture of Lviv by Polish troops. It was a known fact that had the Ukrainian Legion joined the Ukrainian troops around Lviv the Poles probably would not have captured the city. Thus, the outcome of the Polish-Ukrainian war might have been different from what it was.

Eventually, the Ukrainian Legion was transformed into a brigade under the command of *Otaman* Osyp Bukshovany and became an integral part of the Ukrainian Galician Army (UHA). It took part in the Chortkiv offensive of General Alexander Hrekov and went through all the trials and tribulations of the UHA. In 1919 the Brigade took part in some of the fiercest battles against the Rus-

sian communist troops. The Brigade also participated in the capture of Kiev from the White Russian forces under command of General A. Denikin and in the subsequent campaigns against the Bolsheviks. But by the end of 1919 and at the beginning of 1920 the unit came to a tragic end—disarmament by the victorious Polish army and the Russian Bolshevik troops.

Organization of this first Ukrainian military unit fifty years ago was not a momentous step from the viewpoint of a military strategy. Yet, this was the beginning of the Ukrainian armed forces in modern history. Approximately 20,000 young Ukrainians received thorough military training in the Ukrainian Legion, also known as the Regiment and the Brigade. It became a center of Ukrainian military theory. It produced scores of young Ukrainian officers who were to play a leading role in the Ukrainian armed forces and the reborn Ukrainian state.

The Ukrainian Legion also was responsible for the founding of another outstanding Ukrainian military unit: the Corps of *Sichovi Striltsi*. This Corps was commanded by Col. Eugene Konovalts, later head of the Ukrainian Military Organization—UVO, and also of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists—OUN. He was assassinated by a time bomb placed in his trench-coat by Soviet agent Valiukh in May 1938, in Rotterdam, Holland. His Corps played a major part in the war of Ukrainian liberation during 1918-1919.

Today Ukrainians in the free world commemorate the 50th anniversary of the founding of the *Ukrainski Sichovi Striltsi* Legion. It is a symbol of the Ukrainian nation, which, though enslaved and ruled by Communist Russia, is by no means destroyed. Its hopes for freedom and national independence continue.

When the proper time arrives, a new legion of freedom-loving Ukrainians will arise to defend the nation and to regain its rightful place in the international family of free nations.

THE ECUMENICAL COUNCIL: PROGRESS OF THIRD SESSION

By WALTER DUSHNYCK

"...The Spirit is here. Not yet to confirm with sacramental grace the work which all of us, united in Council, are bringing to completion, but rather to illuminate and guide our labors to the benefit of the Church and all mankind. We call upon Him, wait for Him, follow Him..."¹

(Allocution of the Holy Father at the opening of the third session of the Ecumenical Council.)

With the announcement by Pope Paul VI that the fourth and final session of the Ecumenical Council will be convened on September 14, 1965, both optimists and skeptics alike are wondering whether the Ecumenical Council, meeting for the last time, will bring to a workable completion the variety of topics and schemata which were outlined during the first and second sessions but were not completed during the third session in 1964.

In opening the third session of the Council, the Holy Father, stated, among other things:²

... The Council has many other important subjects to treat of, but this one (*De Ecclesia*) seems to Us to be weightiest and most delicate. The Council's deliberations on this subject will certainly be what distinguishes this solemn and historic synod in the memory of future ages. It must undertake a number of difficult theological discussions; it must determine the nature and mission of the Pastors of the Church; it must discuss, and with the favor of the Holy Spirit, decide the constitutional prerogatives of the Episcopate; it must delineate the relations between the Episcopate and the Holy See; it must show how homogeneous is the constitutional idea of the Church under its differing Eastern and Western expressions; it must make clear for the faithful of the Catholic Church and also for the separated brethren the true notion of the hierarchical organs which "the Holy Spirit has appointed as bishops to rule the Church of God" (*Acts*, 20, 28), with unquestionable valid authority in the humble and patient service of the brethren as becomes Pastors, ministers, that is, of faith and charity. These thoughts are all the more important for Us, and certainly for you, Venerable Brothers, because of the fact that this third session of the

¹ Concilio Ecumenico Vaticano II: Press Office. Release of September 14, 1964.

² *Ibid.*, p. 3.

Ecumenical Council has chosen among its many concerns this central objective: to investigate and clarify the doctrine of the nature of the Church...

In reviewing what the three sessions (1962-1964) of the Second Vatican Council have accomplished after meeting in 127 general convocations, the evidence on balance indicates progress toward *aggiornamento* in the Catholic Church.

Consequent to persevering work on the part of the members of the Preparatory and Council Commissions, much has been achieved through the discussions of the Council Fathers. The schemata of a number of conciliar documents assumed more precise character. Thus, the Constitution on the Liturgy was accepted by the Ecumenical Council and approved by the Supreme Pontiff, Paul VI, during the second session of the Council on December 4, 1963.

Three other important schemata—on the Church (*De Ecclesia*), Ecumenism (*De Ecumenismo*) and on the Eastern Churches—were also discussed during the third session, and approved by the Council Fathers. On November 21, 1964 Pope Paul VI solemnly and officially approved all three schemata.

During the third session of the Ecumenical Council members of the Council Commissions worked on the following schemata and declarations:³ the Role and Obligations of Bishops; the Priestly State; the Duties and Life of Priests; Missionary Activity of the Church: the Apostolate of the Laity; Catholic Schools; the Sacrament of Matrimony; the Church in the Modern World, and Religious Freedom. These schemata and several other topics will be discussed at the fourth session beginning in September, 1965.

Of far-reaching importance was acceptance by the Council of the statement on collegiality sharing by the bishops with the Pope in the government of the Church. The status of married deacons of mature age was accepted in the church when provided for with proper safeguards. Common prayers with Christians of other faiths have also been approved, as was use of an approved common Bible with Protestants and other Christians. The use of the vernacular in certain parts of the Mass also was authorized. Admission of the laity to work in ecclesiastical matters was authorized to a greater extent than heretofore.

Of special interest in the deliberations of the Council Fathers was the schemata "On Christian Unity" (*De Ecumenismo*), which treats of an important objective of this Ecumenical Council. Some

³Statement of the Most Rev. Ambrose Senyshyn, OSBM, Archbishop-Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the United States, *America*, December 31, 1964, Philadelphia, Pa.

of its provisions should contribute substantially to removal of barriers that have divided Christians for centuries. One of its chapters states that the Church must share in responsibility for discords that have split the Christian world. This is a major concession on the part of the Catholic Church, which heretofore had tended to avoid admissions of this kind.

In presenting the views of the Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity on the causes of the great schism (1054), the Most Rev. Maxime Hermaniuk, Archbishop-Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Canada, and a member of the Secretariat, in his *Relatio*, stated the following ⁴:

... The Secretariat for Christian Unity wished to make it clear that in the objective knowledge of the cause of the painful separation between East and West, everyone must be conscious that oftentimes the difference between them is only in a different expression of the same dogmatic truth, the same liturgical tradition, and a similar ecclesiastical discipline.

The historical and dogmatic importance of this truth cannot be overestimated, as a contribution to harmony among Christians and the safeguarding of unity in the Church of Christ. Losing sight of this truth can produce most harmful effects and give rise to bitter recriminations. A sad example of this is found in the case of the schism initiated in 1054 under Patriarch Cerularius. On that occasion, the Papal Legate, Cardinal Humbert, almost three months after the death of Pope St. Leo IX, in his celebrated excommunication against the Patriarch and his followers, gratuitously accused them of all heresies then known in the Church and then immediately proceeded to condemn them for these heresies. History has established today that throughout the whole of this conflict, no dogmatic truth was ever called into doubt. Consequently, the intention of the Secretariat was to clarify the mentality, history, liturgical traditions, spirituality, ecclesiastical discipline and proper characteristics of the Oriental Churches and to explain them to all the faithful.

To the objection that this Chapter should be omitted because it involves difficult judgment which the Council would do better to avoid, the reply is that the previous text was approved last year by a vote of 1,966 to 86, and this text has remained unchanged except for modifications provoked by recommendations from the Council Fathers. Another objection is the statement of the text that through the celebration of the Eucharist in these individual Oriental Churches, the Church of God is built up and grows. The question could be raised as to what would be the evil of separation if this is true. We reply to this that if every Sacrament validly and fruitfully received builds up the Church of God and contributes to its growth because thereby the Grace of Christ either comes to the soul or is increased in a soul, then this is all the more true of the Eucharist, which is the fount of the life of the Church and a pledge of future glory. Lastly, it has been objected that not sufficient attention is paid to the special role of the Catholic Oriental Church in the Ecumenical movement. This is because in the mind of the Secretariat, their special function is

⁴ *L'Osservatore Romano*, October 8, 1964, Rome; *La Croix*, October 8, 1964, Paris; Concilio Ecumenico Vaticano II: Press Office. Release of October 7, 1964.

to maintain perfect fidelity to the Successor of Peter and also to their own special traditions which are a treasure to the Church of Christ and a visible sign of its catholicity. This two-fold fidelity will the more easily open the way to dialogue with our separated Oriental brethren and thus further the work of reconciliation...

The Ukrainian Catholic Metropolitan from Winnipeg was warmly congratulated by the Very Rev. Archimandrite Andrew Scrima, Rector of the Greek Orthodox Church in Rome and representative of Patriarch Athenagoras of Constantinople, for the forthright statement stressing the importance of the Oriental Churches.

In similar vein Archbishop John C. Heenan of Westminster, England, spoke about the "ecclesiastical communities" in the West (Protestants) and outlined the common elements which unite them with the Catholics.⁵

SCHEMA ON THE ORIENTAL CHURCHES

Of special interest to this review is the acceptance by the Council Fathers of the schema on the Oriental Churches, which was conceived to give the Eastern Churches a more solid and assured place within the Catholic Church.

For at least two full days Council debate was devoted exclusively to the Schema on the Oriental Churches. Many Council Fathers participated in the discussions. It is to be recalled that the ante-Preparatory Commission had drawn up three schemata on the Oriental Churches, one of which, entitled, "The Unity of the Church," was discussed during the first session in 1962. It was then decided that the text should form a basis for the schema on Ecumenism (*De Ecumenismo*) and also part of the schema on the Church (*De Ecclesia*), both of which were discussed during the second session of the Council in 1963.

At that time also the Coordinating Committee ruled that the Commission on the Oriental Churches prepare a separate schema dealing exclusively with the Oriental Churches. On January 15, 1964, in accepting a new text, it ordered a further reduction of the schema to a small number of fundamental points. Thus the text of the schema presented for discussion in October, 1964, contained only the following points: a) Individual Churches; b) Spiritual Patrimony of the Oriental Churches; c) Oriental Patriarchs; d) Discipline of the Sacraments; e) Divine Worship, and f) Relations with the Separated Brethren.

⁵ Non-Catholic observers at the Council are listed at the end of the article.

On October 15, 1964, Amleto Giovanni Cardinal Cicognani, Vatican Secretary of State, and also President of the Commission for the Oriental Churches, commented on the subject. He stated that while there is substantial agreement in ecclesiastical discipline, the Eastern Churches possess many things proper to themselves, among them the rite to be followed by those entering the Catholic Church from a separated Oriental Church. The prevailing legislation dating back to 1957 permits freedom of choice, but the schema recommends that individuals should and must retain their former rite.

On that occasion Cardinal Cicognani also discussed the matter of marriage in the Oriental Churches. Since 1949 Eastern-rite members have been bound to a prescribed form, even when contracting marriage with baptized non-Catholics. The Commission thought at first that a proper solution of the many problems arising could be provided in the faculties for Bishops to dispense from this form. Later, however, it was decided that this canonical form would be required only for the liceity, not the validity, of the marriage, provided a sacred minister is present. A third point, he added, is that of participation in non-Catholic religious services, a problem which involves a number of points. Eventually the Commission decided to modify existing legislation, taking into account such matters as the validity of the Sacraments among the separated Eastern-rite brethren, their good faith and good will, and so forth.

Cardinal Cicognani, in opening the discussion, expressed praise for the Very Rev. Athanasius Welyky, OSBM, Proto-Archimandrite of the Basilian Order, for his work as Secretary of the Commission for the Oriental Churches. (The Rev. Melety Wojnar, OSBM, Professor of Canon Law at Catholic University in Washington, D. C., served also on the Commission as an expert on the Eastern Churches.)

Subsequently, Archbishop Gabriel Bukatko of Belgrade (who is also Apostolic Administrator for the Eastern-rite diocese of Kryzhvtsi, Yugoslavia) summarized the Schema. This, he said, is divided into two principal parts: the first part deals with the discipline of the Oriental Churches, and the second part with union of separated Eastern Christians.

In a two-day discussion many outstanding Council Fathers took part: Franciskus Cardinal Koenig of Vienna, Stephanos I Sidarouss, Coptic Patriarch of Alexandria; Maximus IV Saigh, Melchite Patriarch of Antioch; Cardinal Jaime de Barros Camara of Rio de Janeiro; Alberto Gori, Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem; Ignatius Peter Batanian, Armenian Patriarch of Cilicia; Joseph Slipy, Archbishop-Major and Ukrainian Metropolitan; Archbishop Isaac Ghattas of Thebes, Egypt; Archbishop Charles de Provenchères, Aix-en-Provence, France; Arch-

bishop Elias Zoghby, Patriarchal Vicar for Melchites of Egypt; Bishop Michael Doumith, Maronite Bishop of Lebanon; Bishop Joseph Stangl of Wuerzburg, Germany; Bishop Basilio Cristea, Bishop-delegate for Rumanian exiles in Europe; Giacomo Cardinal Lercaro of Bologna; Bishop Gerald McDevitt, Auxiliary of Philadelphia; Bishop Stephen Kocisko, Byzantine Eparch of Passaic, N. J.; Abbot Johannes Hoeck, President of the Bavarian Congregation of the Order of St. Benedict; Archbishop George Hakim, Melchite Titular Archbishop of Ptolemais, Israel; Archbishop Maurice Baudoux, of St. Boniface, Canada, and Archbishop Dominic Athaide, of Agra, India.⁶

With few reservations or objections, all these Council Fathers supported in substance the Schema on the Oriental Churches. Some of them proposed several modifications and amendments. But before the third session was adjourned the Schema finally was adopted by an overwhelming majority of the Council Fathers.

Special attention should be drawn to statements of three Council Fathers, because they touch specifically on the Ukrainian Catholic Church and its many sufferings and tribulations. They are: Metropolitan Joseph Slipy, Bishop Basilio Cristea and Abbot Johannes Hoeck.

Metropolitan Slipy, who was released from Soviet slave labor camps in January 1963 upon intervention of the late Pope John XXIII, and who between the second and third session of the Council was designated Archbishop-Major by Pope Paul VI, warned the Council Fathers against what he described as "over-zealous" Latinizers of the Eastern Churches:⁷

The real question for the Oriental Churches today is "to be or not to be." Many fine things have been said in the Schema on the Christian Orient. But the Oriental Churches must be viewed in the light of the catholicity of the Church. We all know what vexations and persecutions have been the lot of many Oriental Churches in recent years. But it must not be forgotten that the Oriental Churches have suffered much from the imprudence of overzealous Latinizers. Trying to force Oriental Catholics into the Latin Church not only works the ruin of the Oriental Churches, but also does great harm to the Latin Church itself. Such individuals, according to the expression of St. Augustine,

⁶ Since the above was set in type, several of the above have been elevated to Cardinalates. On January 25, 1965 the Holy Father elevated the following to the rank of Cardinals: a) *Joseph Slipy*, Archbishop-Major and Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western Ukraine; b) *Maximus IV Saigh*, Melchite Patriarch of Antioch; c) *Stephanos I Sidarouss*, Coptic Patriarch of Alexandria; d) *Paul Pierre Meouchi*, Maronite Patriarch of Antioch.

⁷ Concilio Ecumenico Vaticano II, Press Office. Release of October 16, 1964; also, Report by A. Wenger in *La Croix*, October 18-19, 1964, cited by *La Documentation Catholique*, No. 1436, November 15, 1964, Paris.

are making great strides, but they are off the road! Consequently, the Council should confirm and give new force to the prohibition already issued against such tactics...

The French journalist A. Wenger, writing in *La Croix* (October 18-19, 1964), reported thus on Metropolitan Slipy's statement:

... Everybody knows, said Msgr. Slipy, what enrichment there is for the universal Church in the tradition of the Orient, its theology, its rites, its spirituality, its doctrine on the Trinity, its Mariology, its great savants such as John Damascene and Bessarion, its legislation contained in the Nomocanon. Efforts have been made to reduce this vitality to the Latin style, and this has been going on from the time of the Reformation. All those who have acted or are acting in this way are destroying not only the Oriental Churches, but also bringing harm to the Universal Church itself. Let the Council act and show respect for the Oriental Churches, so that the faithful do not believe, and the Orientals think, that union with Rome is but a bridge leading them into a Latin sea. The Christian life in the Latin Church is no more certain than in other Churches. There have been schisms and apostasies. And Msgr. Slipy concluded: *Miseremini nostri*, have mercy upon us, help us, support us to that we can accomplish our mission toward unity...

Another Eastern-rite Council Father, Rumanian Bishop Basilio Cristea, made a strong denunciation of the persecution of Catholics in Ukraine and Rumania. Ever since the Ecumenical Council began in 1962, anti-Communist voices were scarcely heard in the Council sessions for obvious reasons. The presence of Russian-Orthodox observers at the Council prevented any really stronger statements regarding persecution of the Catholic Church behind the Iron Curtain.

It will be recalled that in 1962 the Ukrainian Catholic Bishops circulated a petition of protest against the presence of the Russian Orthodox observers from Moscow because, they said, how can we trust Moscow, when it imprisoned the entire Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy, among them, Metropolitan Joseph Slipy, Archbishop of Lviv. But the Vatican Secretariat of State was then negotiating release of the Ukrainian Archbishop and ordered withdrawal of the protest.⁸

Speaking on October 16, 1964, Bishop Cristea, bishop-delegate for Rumanians in Western Europe, stated:

Oriental Catholics number about 11 million. 6 million of these, more than half, belong to the Byzantine rite in Ukraine and Rumania. Contrary to what is thought in some quarters, the presence of Oriental Catholics among their separated brethren is a contribution to Christian unity. The Council should regard it as a duty to bring to the attention of the United Nations the sad

⁸ See the article of Norman Cousins, editor of *Saturday Review* (November 7, 1964) on his negotiations with Nikita S. Khrushchev, then undisputed master of the USSR, on the release of Metropolitan Slipy.

lot of some 6 million faithful of the Byzantine rite who are unjustly deprived of religious freedom, not only because they are Catholics, but also because they are Orientals.⁹

(The fate of the Ukrainian Catholics is described in a pamphlet by this writer, *Martyrdom in Ukraine*, published in 1946 by the America Press [New York City], with the *imprimatur* of Cardinal Spellman.)

A UKRAINIAN PATRIARCHATE UNDER DISCUSSION

The German Abbot Hoeck, in presenting his views on the Schema on the Oriental Churches, took the occasion to express a personal belief that new Patriarchates in the Oriental Churches should be established whenever necessary. It will be recalled that the idea of a Ukrainian Catholic Patriarchate was first raised by Metropolitan Joseph Slipy in his first and dramatic appearance at the second session of the Council in 1963 upon returning from Siberia. He stated that a patriarchal system in the Ukrainian Church would meet with overwhelming approval among Catholic and Orthodox Ukrainian faithful.

Commenting on the patriarchal system in the Oriental Churches, Abbot Hoeck spoke as follows:¹⁰

The point of cardinal importance in the Oriental Churches is the Patriarchal structure of the Church. This consideration is most important for Ecumenism. The Patriarchal system is not proper to the Oriental Church, but was in full force even in the Latin Church for 1,000 years. Actually, because of the break between East and West, there was the gradual forgetting of this Patriarchal system. For this, there were many historical reasons, not the least of which was to be found in such false documents as the "donation of Constantine." The system should be re-established in its full vigor. In any discussion aiming at the restoration of unity, the great Churches of the East ask immediately what will be their place within the Catholic Church. Will they be subordinated to the Roman Curia, especially to the Congregation for the Oriental Church and will they be given a secondary role alongside the College of Cardinals? It is a historical fact that for 1,000 years, the Churches of the East enjoyed full freedom to choose their own Patriarchs and Bishops, to organize their liturgy and canon law. The right of intervention by Rome was always recognized but was verified only in rare cases. If this system worked well for 1,000 years, why would it not be feasible today? Any attempt to restore unity with the Orthodox Churches must start from the premise that this unity will be on the same principles as existed before the break. This is not a question of recognizing favors or privileges, but a question of the fundamental structure of the entire Church. This whole matter should be discussed by a mixed com-

⁹ *La Documentation Catholique*, No. 1436, November 15, 1964, Paris.

¹⁰ Concilio Ecumenico Vaticano II, Press Office. Release of October 19, 1964, p. 3, Rome.

mission representing the Theological Commission, the Commission on the Pastoral Duties of Bishops, the Secretariat for Unity, and the Commission for the Oriental Churches. The question of the erection of new Patriarchates should be considered, e. g., in Ukraine, which has suffered so much for the faith. Honorary Patriarchates should be abolished. The restoration of the Patriarchal system would avoid the quarrels from centralization. This question cannot be discussed, much less decided, by a Council which is predominantly Latin.

The Schema on the Oriental Churches is now approved. It is the Supreme Pontiff who will make the ultimate decision as to whether or not a Ukrainian Catholic Patriarchate should be established.¹¹

LOOKING TOWARD THE FOURTH AND FINAL SESSION

When the third session closed on November 21, 1964, the Ecumenical Council necessarily delayed a number of projects which had not been brought to completion in 1964. Thus, "The Church in the Modern World" (Schema 13) was left unfinished. It touches upon various social problems of the day. That the issue of "religious freedom," was not acted on chagrined a number of people in Protestant ranks. Presumably, the "Declaration of Religious Liberty" will be given attention in the final session of the Council. The draft "Declaration on Jews and Non-Christians" received tentative approval of the Council, that is, for formal discussion at the next session, despite

¹¹ *Ukrainian Bishops at the Ecumenical Council.*—Sixteen Ukrainian Catholic Metropolitans, Archbishops and Bishops had come from all over the world to take part in the third session of the Ecumenical Council, which lasted from September 14, 1964 to November 21, 1964. They were: (1) The Most Rev. *Joseph Slipty*, Archbishop-Major and Metropolitan of Kiev and Halych; (2) The Most Rev. *Maxime Hermaniuk*, Metropolitan of Ukrainians in Canada, from Winnipeg; (3) The Most Rev. *Ambrose Senyshyn*, of Philadelphia, Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the United States; (4) The Most Rev. *Ivan Buchko*, Archbishop of Leukadia and Apostolic Visitor for Ukrainian Catholics in Western Europe; (5) The Most Rev. *Gabriel Bukatko*, Archbishop of Belgrade and Apostolic Administrator of Kryzivtsi (Yugoslavia); (6) The Most Rev. *Neil N. Savaryn*, Bishop of Edmonton, Canada; (7) The Most Rev. *Isidore Borecky*, Bishop of Toronto, Canada; (8) The Most Rev. *Andrew Roborecky*, Bishop of Saskatoon, Canada; (9) The Most Rev. *Joseph M. Schmondiuk*, Bishop of Stamford; (10) The Most Rev. *Jaroslav Gabro*, Bishop of Chicago; (11) The Most Rev. *Platon Kornyljak*, Apostolic Exarch for Ukrainians in Germany; (12) The Most Rev. *Volodymyr Malanchuk*, Apostolic Exarch for Ukrainians in France; (13) The Most Rev. *Joseph Martynets*, Apostolic Exarch for Ukrainians in Brazil; (14) The Most Rev. *Augustine Hornyak*, Apostolic Exarch for Ukrainians in Great Britain; (15) The Most Rev. *Andrew Sapeliak*, Apostolic Visitor for Ukrainians in Argentina; (16) The Most Rev. *Joachim Segedi*, Auxiliary of Kryzivski (Yugoslavia). The Most Rev. *Ivan Prashko*, Apostolic Exarch for Ukrainians in Australia, was not present at the third session of the Ecumenical Council.

opposition from Council Fathers from the Middle East and from North African and Asian lands, as well as from a number of governments of Arab countries.

The "Declaration on the Jews and non-Christians" would be included as an Appendix to the schema on Ecumenism, but not as a chapter. The reason given officially is that "Ecumenism" deals only with religious relations among Christians. The same Appendix would touch on relationships of Christians with non-Christian religions, with special emphasis on Islam.

Despite critical voices heard here and there, the third session made important strides toward the goal of unity among Christians, and perhaps of all humanity as well.

DELEGATED OBSERVERS AND GUESTS AT THE SECOND VATICAN
COUNCIL THIRD SESSION 1964

ECUMENICAL PATRIARCHATE OF CONSTANTINOPLE:

Very Revd. Archimandrite Panteleimon Rodopoulos, Rector of the Greek Orthodox Theological School, Boston (USA);

Very Revd. John Romanides, Professor of Theology at the same Theological School;

(* Very Revd. Archimandrite Andrew Scrima, Rector of the Greek Orthodox Church in Rome, representative of His Holiness Patriarch Athenagoras;

RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH (Patriarchate of Moscow):

Very Revd. Protoierei Vitali Borovoi, Professor at the Theological Academy of Leningrad, president of the delegation of the Russian Orthodox Church to the World Council of Churches (Geneva);

Very Revd. Protoierei Livery Voronov, Professor at the Theological Academy of Leningrad;

THE ORTHODOX CHURCH OF GEORGIA:

Very Revd. Protoierei Vitali Borovoi (proxy);

COPTIC ORTHODOX CHURCH OF EGYPT:

His Excellency the Rt. Revd. Amba Samuil, bishop in charge of Social Affairs of the Patriarchate;

Revd. Morcos Elias Abdel Messih, pastor of the Coptic Orthodox in the United States and Canada;

SYRIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH:

Very Revd. Ramban Saliba Shamoon, Secretary of His Beatitude the Patriarch;

SYRIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH OF INDIA

Very Revd. Korepiscopa T. S. Abraham, Vicar St. Thomas Church, Ayroor (India), member of the Diocesan Council of Thumpamon;

APOSTOLIC ARMENIAN CHURCH (Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin);

Right Revd. Bishop Parkev Kevorkian, Delegate of the Catholicos of Etchmiadzin in Moscow, Bishop of the Armenians in Moscow;

Mr. Krikor Bekmezian, theologian, member of the Supreme Spiritual Council of Holy Etchmiadzin;

APOSTOLIC ARMENIAN CHURCH (Catholicosate of Cilicia):

His Excellency the Right Revd. Karekin Sarkissian, superior of the Patriarchal Seminary;

His Excellency the Right Revd. Ardavazt Terterian, Bishop of the Armenians of Southern France;

CATHOLICOSATE PATRIARCHATE OF THE EAST (Assyrians);

Revd. Quashisha Isaac Rehana, Rector, St. Thomas Church, New Britain, Conn. (USA);

Mr. George W. Lamsa, Doctor of Theology, Lecturer in Sacred Scripture (USA);

RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH OUTSIDE OF RUSSIA:

Very Revd. Archpriest Igor Troyanoff, Director of the Russian Orthodox Churches of Lausanne and Vevey (Switzerland);

Very Revd. Archimandrite Dr. Ambrose Pogodin, Rector of the Russian Orthodox Church in Rome

Substitute: Prof. Dr. Serge Grotoff, of the University of Rome;

OLD CATHOLIC CHURCH (Union of Utrecht):

Very Revd. Canon Peter John Maan, Professor of New Testament at the Old Catholic Seminary of Amersfoort and Vicar of the Cathedral Church of Utrecht (The Netherlands);

Substitute: Revd. Dr. Herwig Aldenhoven, Pastor in Wallbach, Aargau (Switzerland);

MAR THOMA SYRIAN CHURCH OF MALABAR (India):

Most Revd. Philipose Mar Chrysostom, missionary bishop, Kerala (South India);

ANGLICAN COMMUNION:

Right Revd. Dr. John Moorman, Bishop of Ripon (England);

Revd. Dr. Eugene R. Fairweather, Professor of Divinity, Trinity College, University of Toronto (Canada);

Revd. Ernest John, of the Brotherhood of the Ascension, vicar of the Cathedral Church of the Redemption, New Delhi (India);

Substitutes: Revd. Prof. Howard Root, Fellow and Dean of Emmanuel College, Cambridge, and Lecturer in Divinity, University of Cambridge (England);

Revd. Dr. Massey Hamilton Shepherd, Jr., Professor of Liturgics, The Church Divinity School of the Pacific, Berkeley, California (USA);

(*) Revd. Canon Bernard Pawley, Canon-treasurer of Ely Cathedral, representative of the Anglican Archbishops of Canterbury and York;

LUTHERAN WORLD FEDERATION:

Revd. Prof. Kristen E. Skydsgaard, Professor of Systematic Theology, The University of Copenhagen (Denmark);

Revd. Prof. Warren A. Quanbeck, Lutheran Theological Seminary, St. Paul, Minnesota (USA);

Right Revd. Dr. Sven Silen, Bishop of Västerås (Sweden);

Substitutes: Prof. George Lindbeck, Associate Professor of Historical Theology, Yale University Divinity School, New Haven, Connecticut (USA);

Revd. Dr. Vilmos Vajta, Director of the Theological Department of the Lutheran World Federation, Geneva;

WORLD ALLIANCE OF REFORMED AND PRESBYTERIAN CHURCHES:

Revd. Prof. Vittorio Subilia, Dean of the Theological Faculty of the Waldensian Church, Rome;

Revd. Dr. A. Allan McArthur, of the Church of Scotland, Minister of Pollokshield-Titwood Parish Church, Glasgow (Scotland);

Revd. Prof. John Newton Thomas, of the United Presbyterian Church, Professor of Systematic Theology, Union Theological Seminary in Virginia, Richmond (USA);

EVANGELICAL CHURCH IN GERMANY:

Prof. Dr. Edmund Schlink, Professor of Dogmatics at the University of Heidelberg (Germany);

Substitute: Revd. Dr. Wolfgang Dietzfelbinger, Pastor in Erbdorf (Germany);

WORLD METHODIST COUNCIL:

Revd. Prof. Harold Roberts, Principal at the Divinity School, Richmond College, Richmond (England);

Revd. Prof. Walter G. Muelder, Dean and Professor of Social Ethics, Boston University School of Theology, Boston (USA);

Revd. Prof. Albert C. Outler, Professor of Theology, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas;

Substitutes: Revd. Prof. William R. Cannon, Dean of the Candler School of Theology, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia (USA);

Revd. Prof. Robert E. Cushman, Dean of Duke University Divinity School, Durham, North Carolina (USA);

Revd. Dr. Philip Potter, member of the Methodist Missionary Society, London (England);

Revd. David Alan Keighley, representative in Italy of the British Methodist Church of the United Kingdom and of the Methodist Missionary Society, Rome;

Substitutes: Revd. Max Woodward, Secretary of the World Methodist Council, London (England);

Revd. Prof. Franklin H. Littell, Professor at the Chicago Theological Seminary, Chicago (USA);

INTERNATIONAL CONGREGATIONAL COUNCIL:

Revd. Dr. Douglas Horton, former Moderator of the International Congregational Council, Randolph, New Hampshire (USA);

Revd. Prof. George B. Caird, Senior Tutor at Mansfield College, Oxford (England)

Substitutes: Revd. Prof. Bard Thompson, Professor of Ecclesiastical History, Lancaster Theological Seminary, Lancaster, Pennsylvania (USA);

Revd. Prof. John R. Von Rohr, Professor of Historical Theology, Pacific School of Religion, Berkeley, California (USA);

Revd. Prof. Heiko A. Oberman, Professor of Church History, Harvard University Divinity School, Cambridge, Massachusetts (USA);

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Prof. Douglas V. Steere, Professor at Haverford College, Haverford, Pennsylvania (USA);

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Dr. William George Baker, Lecturer in Practical Theology, Scottish Congregational College, Edinburgh (Scotland);

Dr. William B. Blakemore, Dean of Disciples Divinity House, University of Chicago, Chicago (USA);

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INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR LIBERAL CHRISTIANITY:

Prof. L. J. Van Holk, Professor at the University of Leiden (The Netherlands);

CHURCH OF SOUTH INDIA:

Right Revd. A. H. Legg, Moderator of the Church of South India Synod, Trivandrum (South India);

WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES (Geneva):

- Revd. Dr. Lukas Vischer, Research Secretary in the Department of Faith and Order of the World Council of Churches, Geneva;
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Dr. Z. K. Matthews, on the Staff of the Division of Inter-Church-Aid, World Service and Refugees of the World Council of Churches, Geneva;
Revd. Dr. Jerald C. Brauer, Dean of the Divinity School, University of Chicago (USA);

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- Most Revd. Bishop Cassien, Director of the Orthodox Theological Institute St. Serge, Paris (France);
Revd. Pastor Marc Boegner, of the French Academy, Honorary President of the Protestant Federation of France, Paris (France);
Prof. Dr. Theodore Mosconas, Secretary of the Council of Churches of Alexandria, Archivist and Librarian of the Library of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Alexandria (Egypt);
Revd. Prof. G. C. Berkouwer, Professor at the Free Protestant University of Amsterdam (The Netherlands);
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Dr. David Du Plessis, Pentecostal minister, South Africa and California (USA);
Dr. Oswald C. J. Hoffmann, of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, St. Louis (USA);
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Revd. Dr. William A. Norgren, Director of Faith and Order Studies, National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA, New York City, (USA);
Revd. Pastor Roger Schutz, Prior of Taizé Community (France);
Revd. Pastor Max Thurian, Sub-prior of the same community.

THE SECOND TREATY OF MOSCOW

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

At the close of 1964 the American people seemed to desire peace above all else. According to a reliable pollster, about 83 per cent of the American public favored the partial test ban treaty with "Russia," this despite the doubtless advances made by Moscow from its previous super-megatonic tests.¹ Approximately 81 per cent felt that by keeping militarily strong we could avoid a global war; the prospect of being cornered into such a disastrous conflagration through continued cold war advances by the Red totalitarians was not considered. And some 63 per cent, ignorant of or wishfully impervious to all past experience, advocated attempts at reaching agreements with the totalitarian regimes in the hope of realizing world peace, regardless of the enslavement of one-third of the human race. The Consular Convention with the USSR is supposed to be an example of such agreements.

On June 1, 1964 the Convention was signed in Moscow and eleven days later was submitted to the United States Senate for ratification. Unlike the test ban treaty, it represents the first bilateral agreement between the United States and the USSR. However, like the Treaty of Moscow, which the test ban pact came to be known under Russian propaganda auspices, the Convention was consummated in the chief imperio-colonialist capital of the world and has provided further propaganda fodder for Moscow. Russian propagandists have lost little time in offering this second piece of evidence as confirmation of Moscow's intentions to secure world peace. For, after all and on the record, both pacts originated in and bear the stamp of Moscow, the vanguard of world "peace." Indeed, we might as well call the Convention the Second Treaty of Moscow. It's truly uncanny how low and how little our capacity is for propaganda advantage and value.

President Johnson was quick to hail this Second Treaty of Moscow. Before it was concluded, he said, "it is hoped that this treaty...

¹ Harris, Louis. "Public Favors Dealing With Reds on Peace," a nationwide syndicated article.

will be a step forward in developing understanding between the two countries which is so important in continuing the struggle for peace."² The President has the illusory conception that the USSR is not only a country such as ours but also a nation. He noted also at the time that the treaty would be "the first bilateral (two-nation) treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union."³ A few days later, when it was concluded, Johnson called it "a significant step in our continuing efforts to increase contacts and understanding."⁴ And on June 12 in his message to the Senate he approvingly declared, "I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to the convention and protocol submitted herewith and give its advice and consent to their ratification."⁵

Apparently at that moment Johnson thought ratification by the Senate would be swift and smooth. In its glowing spirit of "peaceful coexistence," Moscow joined with the President in hailing the Treaty of Moscow II. Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, for example, depicted the pact as "a positive step in the normalization and improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States."⁶ As we shall see later, he had good reason to view the treaty as "a positive step." Also, many editorial comments in the United States appeared to encourage the "early and favorable consideration" sought by the President. One large New York organ observed then, "The conclusion of a Soviet-American consular agreement marks an important step toward further normalization of relations between the United States and the USSR."⁷ Another, in Washington, had this to say, "That the two countries took 30 years to come to the threshold of such a routine and normal agreement is sobering indeed."⁸ From our standpoint, we haven't seemed to learn much about the Soviet Union these past thirty years, particularly the changes in relations between the non-Russian republics and Moscow within the USSR itself.

BLACKOUT FOR THE CAMPAIGN

Despite all this high-powered approval of a most questionable treaty, fear suddenly seized its advocates. Serious doubt spread in

² *The Evening Star*, Washington, D. C., May 27, 1964.

³ *The Washington Post*, Washington, D. C., May 28, 1964.

⁴ *The Washington Post*, Washington, D. C., June 2, 1964.

⁵ *Congressional Record*, June 12, 1964, pp. 13191-92.

⁶ "U. S., Soviet Union Sign Accord on Establishing Consular Posts," *Associated Press*, Moscow, June 1, 1964.

⁷ "The Consular Treaty," *The New York Times*, May 28, 1964.

⁸ "Welcome Accord," *The Washington Post*, May 29, 1964.

Administration circles about the ease with which ratification could be obtained. The Republican leadership in Congress began to question the prudence and validity of the pact. Senator Everett M. Dirksen of Illinois, the Minority Leader, bluntly stated that the treaty would be "an unprecedented concession to the Soviet Union." He directed his criticism chiefly at the diplomatic immunity provided for consular officers who are supposed to be principally concerned with trade and consultative duties. With this provision, they would be immune from prosecution for crimes, including espionage. Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper, high-ranking Republican of the Foreign Relations Committee, complained sharply about the lack of advance consultation on the pact, which was now being submitted for the Senate's "advice and consent."

This first flurry of attack frightened the Democratic leadership into postponing hearings on the treaty until the next Congress in 1965. As one report had it, "in an election year, the administration would prefer not to engage in a full debate on the merits of its policies toward the Soviet Union."⁹ This observation was amply confirmed when the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator J. W. Fulbright, let it be known that no hearings would be scheduled on the pact. The blackout action taken was not only in response to the initial Republican opposition but also to the heavy critical mail pouring into Congress from the Midwest and West, where two of the expected three Soviet consulates would be established. The National Captive Nations Committee also placed itself on record in opposition to the Convention as drawn.

One of the strange aspects of this background is this maneuver by the Administration to prevent the American electorate from discussing this vitally important treaty during the Presidential campaign. It would seem that in a democracy such as ours discussion on this and similar matters would be strongly encouraged rather than discouraged. Especially is this true during a Presidential campaign, when issues should be thoroughly examined. In his acceptance speech the Republican candidate, Senator Barry M. Goldwater, alluded to the treaty but, unfortunately, failed to develop it into an issue in the course of the campaign.

Apparently the only effort made in this direction was by the Republican National Committee. In one of its pamphlets special mention was made of the "sponsorship of Consular Convention with Moscow, sealing the permanent captivity of a dozen non-Russian nations in the USSR and opening up the U. S. to further Russian es-

⁹ "Johnson Seeks to Keep Red Pact out of Politics," *The Sunday Star*, Washington, D. C., June 28, 1964.

pionage, rackets, and propaganda (now before Foreign Relations Committee for ratification)."¹⁰ A second, widely distributed pamphlet urged the "Rejection of the Consular Convention as it is now written because it will be America's stamp of approval on Moscow's Russian Empire, diminish Baltic independence which has been steadily maintained since the end of World War II. And in this country Russian consulates will act as spy centers and means of duress and propaganda among American ethnic groups."¹¹ An open discussion of these and related points would undoubtedly have contributed to a productive national forum, which in essence a Presidential campaign should be.

ON THE EVE OF A HEARING

Following the Administration's strategy, an examination of the Consular Convention is thus confined to the Senate and its Committee on Foreign Relations. Of course this doesn't mean that others won't take an interest in the subject, but by no means could it be of the scope and depth that a campaign of issues would have occasioned. At this writing the treaty is being discussed in few circles, while preparations are being made for hearings by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It will be interesting to observe how close and thorough the hearings and examination will be.

By all evidence, the conceptions of the Committee's chairman regarding the Soviet Union will be countered by several of the fundamental criticisms directed against the Convention. In his unforgettable address last year on "Foreign Policy—Old Myths and New Realities," Senator Fulbright made the sound point that "If we are to disabuse ourselves of old myths and to act wisely and creatively upon the new realities of our time, we must think and talk about our problems with perfect freedom..." Then he appropriately quoted Woodrow Wilson: "The greatest freedom of speech is the greatest safety because if a man is a fool, the best thing to do is to encourage him to advertise the fact by speaking." Evidently, the proponents of the Convention were unwilling to bank on this truth during the campaign.

For some time now the affable Senator from Arkansas has clung to the myth that some "200 million Russians inhabit the Soviet Union, let alone the earth."¹² In the address quoted above he strikes a

¹⁰ Republican National Committee. *I Need Your Help*. Washington, D. C., 1964, p. 4.

¹¹ Republican National Committee. *Republican Win Policy: Johnson No-Win Policy*. Washington, D. C., 1964, p. 8.

¹² "Fulbright Asks Details of Goldwater's Views," *Associated Press*, July 25, 1962.

further mythical note about the Soviet Union being "a normal state with normal and traditional interests."¹³ That is, a state similar to ours in structure, composition and "for certain purposes" behavior. These and related myths, long entertained by the Senator, are not in the order of judgment and opinion, but rather of basic knowledge and understanding.

However, the spirit of free debate in which the Senator drenched his remarks is readily accepted by every thinking American. Such debate should have been staged in the 1964 campaign. In fact, it is high time for another "great debate" in Congress and across the Nation on fundamental subjects like U. S. policy toward the Soviet Union and the need for a coherent American cold war strategy. A staged debate on these issues has been long overdue. There exists now a concrete and specific subject before the Senator's own committee that should prove to be a valid test of his expressed bent for open inquiry and perceptive examination. The issue of the Consular Convention has broad policy ramifications and can easily ignite the type of healthy discussion the Senator seems to encourage.

Fulbright himself views the treaty as a small step toward "normalizing and regularizing" relations with "Russia." Nevertheless, "we must think and talk about our problems with perfect freedom." It would be interesting to see whether the Senator himself is intellectually willing to shed some of his encrusted myths about the Soviet Union. On the surface, the subject of consular exchanges appears innocuous and procedural; beneath, it is fraught with profound implications for our moral and political position in the Cold War.

ESSENTIALS OF THE PACT

The State Department has, of course, been pressing for heavy Senate support of the treaty. It naturally would like to see its work, which was started with discussions about the treaty in 1959, when Khrushchev was here, and accelerated by actual negotiations beginning in September, 1963, brought to a point of final culmination. On a reciprocal basis, the pact would lead first to the establishment of consulates in New York and Leningrad, and then gradually include other cities, very likely Chicago and San Francisco here, Odessa and Vladivostok there.

Supporters of the treaty keep stressing the rather outworn, self-legitimizing argument that this would be another step toward the easing of tensions. Whether it squares with the demands of political realities and what it implies for the aspirations of millions

¹³ *Congressional Record*, March 25, 1964, p. 6029.

of non-Russian captives in the USSR are considerations of negligible worth. Another chief argument advanced is that the pact would furnish more protection for U. S. citizens traveling and residing in the USSR. The case of Professor Frederick C. Barghoorn, who in 1963 was detained for a period of 13 days before American officials were notified, has been repeatedly used as an example of "spy arrests" which, it is argued, a consular system may tend to curb. The fact is that a politically and historically more realistic alternative to the consular treaty would realize the same objective, without all the deficiencies and disadvantages of the latter.

The Convention requires for ratification a two-third majority in the Senate and the President's signature before becoming law. Should it come to pass, the treaty as a law of the land would also conclude a history of deliberation that sporadically extends back to the early 30's. In a real sense, the treaty is a product of the rather naive thinking of the 30's which in many areas viewed the USSR as "a great experiment." When the U. S. recognized the Soviet Union in 1933, the intention to enter into a consular convention was expressed by both sides. In the Czarist Russian Empire there were eight U. S. consulates or consular agents. In the 30's, as now, American hope was expressed that through these diplomatic approaches, through trade and closer cultural visitations, the U. S. and the USSR would help mould the peace of the world. The events of that time showed how palpably naive we were.

Although no formal Convention was arrived at, both the U. S. and the USSR opened up consulates immediately prior to and during World War II. We established one in Vladivostok in 1934, and in the same year Moscow set up consulates in New York and San Francisco. In 1937 it opened up a vice-consular office in Los Angeles. Following World War II, we requested and received permission in 1947 to open up a consulate in Leningrad, but never did. For, by 1948, Russian cold war activity against the United States assumed bolder proportions, and after the Oksana Kasenkina affair in New York, the USSR broke off consular relations completely.

One would think that in the past twenty years our state of perceptive knowledge regarding the Soviet Union and its Russian center has improved measurably to warrant a more realistic and sophisticated approach in this area. The deceits of the period, the revelations of World War II on the Eastern front, the amendments to the Soviet Constitution, the indomitable force of non-Russian nationalism in the USSR, and events in the United Nations, all this and more should have at least made us a little more imaginative in this sphere of Cold War diplomacy. This, however, doesn't appear to be the case.

Instead, the unfounded preconceptions and myths of the 30's continue to mislead us in the 60's. Significantly, the consular pact rests on the very myths nurtured by Senator Fulbright himself.

MORE NEGATIVE ESSENTIALS ABOUT THE PACT

Needless to say, there are many more counter-arguments that have been raised in opposition to the consular pact. Some, with an eye for the entire spectrum of cold war conflict today, have rightly questioned the supposed change of circumstance from 1948. Behind the smoke screen of "peaceful coexistence" the cold war is far more intensive and obviously more extensive than it was then. From Moscow's viewpoint, the consular pact has as much cold war weight as any other treaty arrangement. It is easy to recite the details of what the Convention will do, such as protecting citizens, performing notarial services, processing birth and marriage certificates, certifying wills, expediting travel documents, providing translation services, advising about local laws, and representing citizens, but these are only administrative aspects of an instrument that will be used for various cold war penetration of our environment. To view it differently is to view it blindly.

Concerning the protection feature, opponents have pointed to the meager numbers of Americans in the USSR, annually now about 17,000, and the few hundreds of Russians and non-Russians of the USSR touring here, annually about 2,000, but only about 200 as "individual" tourists. These facts cause one to wonder whether this protection aspect isn't being overplayed. The argument is made that for the unusual concession of the immunity clause in Article 19 of the Convention and also in the specifics of the incorporated Protocol, Moscow has conceded heavily on the subject of detention of "nationals," which is provided for in Article 12 of the treaty and also in the Protocol. Moscow is supposed to have overridden its own criminal code by which a person can be held incommunicado during an investigation of as long as nine months. Now, according to the treaty, U. S. authorities are to be notified of the arrest of Americans within three days and be given access to them within four.

Why the privileges of early notice and access haven't been pressed for on a reciprocal basis within our present ambassadorial arrangement is still an unanswered question. Provision for such privileges in the consular treaty does not necessarily justify the treaty's ratification, particularly when its basic defects are understood. Such provision is logically not a necessary integral part of the treaty since it could be—indeed, should have been—obtained on the ambassadorial level, with the principle of reciprocity fully ap-

plied. Advocates of the treaty claim also that the U. S. Embassy in Moscow is inadequate to meet all the responsibilities of protection, representation etc., and that therefore consulates are needed in this vast area. With a practical and more realistic alternative, as given below, all of these needs and requirements can be even more efficiently realized. In addition to not generating the deficiencies and disadvantages of the consular arrangement, the alternative would sidestep the problem created by the treaty where other states would demand on a most-favored-nation agreement basis the inclusion of a diplomatic immunity clause in their outstanding consular pacts. In connection with Red totalitarian states and their representatives here, the policing problems would be immense.

Another ground of objection is Moscow's multi-faceted interest in having this pact. One facet is money and its present importance for a foreign currency-starved state. The treaty, in Article 10, provides for the handling of estates to relatives in the USSR, but these wills have not been executed because of the lack of consular representation. The legacies have accumulated, and it is rumored that they aggregate into sizeable sums.¹⁴ Surely the amount of these legacies should be investigated to determine the pecuniary measure of Moscow's interest in the treaty. If there is any American interest from this angle, then mirages must have surrounded our negotiators.

The second facet of Moscow's interest is unquestionably greater opportunities for espionage, propaganda, and racket activities on our terrain. The spy factor was emphasized by Senator Dirksen who quoted both FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and former Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy as to the danger involved. Hoover has underscored the fact that "a top-heavy percentage of Soviet bloc personnel assigned to this country actually have intelligence assignments," while Kennedy has pointed out that "the Communist espionage in this country is much more active than it has ever been." If we have any confidence in the two highest internal security offices of our country, this factor of spy activity cannot be taken too lightly.

Propaganda and racket activities also loom large in Moscow's scheme of interest. Soviet consulates in strategic sectors of this country would undoubtedly concentrate on breaking down the anti-communist force of several well organized ethnic groups. These groups would become prime targets of consular propaganda.

However, in advancing some of these counter-arguments aren't we implicitly admitting our inability to spy with equal or greater

¹⁴ "U. S. and Soviet Seen Nearer Consular Pact," *The Washington Post*, April 22, 1964.

efficiency, to propagate ideas with perhaps more subtle dexterity, and to substantially withstand their onslaughts in our ethnic areas? If, in truth, we are that incapacitated, then these alone are sufficient reasons for not ratifying the treaty. On the other hand, if we recognize a two-way street proposition for most of these and are determined to traverse the street, then the adequacy of these arguments evaporates somewhat.

Yet, for the sake of argument, let's admit that a consular pact will contribute to a further easing of tensions, that it will signify our good intentions for more peaceful relations and understanding between peoples, that it will provide some protection for Americans in the USSR, and also that spying and propagandizing are two-way streets. Hypothetically, even admitting all this, the Convention as it stands contradicts all of our official pronouncements on the self-determination and freedom of nations. As pointed out by this writer in a letter to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "Most important is the reason that under present circumstances consulates set up in the non-Russian republics in the USSR would constitute both a contradiction of our many official statements underscoring the self-determination right of the captive non-Russian nations and a virtual confirmation of the imperio-colonial nature of the Soviet Union."¹⁵ It was further stated: "The assumptions underlying the proposed agreement are in striking discord with the political realities present in the USSR and are scarcely in accord with both our moral and political objectives as concern colonialism and the independence of nations."

Based on truly reactionary and backward premises of thought, the Convention serves to perpetuate the myth that the USSR is "a normal state with normal and traditional interests" and in effect places a stamp of acceptance on the imperio-colonial character of the Soviet Union. Even the language of the text appears nonsensical in terms of both the Soviet Constitution and the political realities of the USSR. Beginning with Article 2 paragraph 8 and running through the entire Convention, use is made of the terms "nationals" or "national," foolishly implying that, like an American national, there exists a "Soviet national," a citizen of a non-existent Soviet nation. What has become of the Lithuanian nation, the Ukrainian, the Armenian, even the Russian, and their respective real-bodied nationals with this stroke of what one may rightly call juridical genocide?

This semantic comedy is extended in Article 7 paragraph 6 wherein the language of the "Soviet national" is accepted as Rus-

¹⁵ Communication, May 4, 1964.

sian, Sovietese not having yet emerged. This oblique and indirect American support of Moscow's linguacide program against the colonial non-Russian nations in the USSR is really something for us to ponder. When in Article 16 we witness a provision for a "national flag" and a "national coat-of-arms" to be hung over Soviet consulates here, we wonder first whether the U. S. negotiators know the difference between the concept of nation and that of state and, second, whether they realize the depth of their conceptual and political contribution to Moscow's long-range genocidal plans. Article 23, dealing with taxation by the state, states or local governments, suggests the myth of parallelism, that the USSR is like the U. S., made up of various states in a bond of federation and consisting of local governments. In short, the "state" of Latvia is equivalent to the state of Rhode Island.

It doesn't require much foresight to see this Convention as an opening wedge for our eventual recognition of the forced incorporation of the Baltic countries in the USSR. The "problem" of the Baltic states, as some "realists" put it, can be disposed of in this manner. As Odessa in Ukraine is being bandied about for a prospective U. S. consulate, Latvian Riga or Estonian Tallinn will eventually crop up to receive our consular and diplomatic blessings on the eternal solidarity of Soviet Russia's internal empire. The reader should find most entertaining the State Department's wiggly and vacuous response to this essential criticism: "the convention does not deal with the question of opening consulates which will be the subject of separate negotiations."¹⁶ Not only is the conceptual construction of the Convention overlooked but also one's credulity is taxed to the point of believing that with the foundation laid by the Convention our Department of State would religiously observe the Russian/non-Russian line of demarcation.

Finally, and worse still, as an additional step toward "peaceful coexistence," the Convention deprives us of a Cold War advantage with no parallel sacrifice by the Russians. In fact, as shown above, it plays beautifully into Soviet Russian hands. It also makes mockery of the President's own statements. Is there a rational alternative to this ill-advised Convention?

THE ALTERNATIVE OF AMBASSADORIAL EXCHANGES

In his April 3, 1964 statement on NATO, President Johnson stressed, "In particular we must be alive to the new spirit of diversity that's now abroad in Eastern Europe." By all means, let's do so, starting with the multi-national USSR. The consular pact runs coun-

¹⁶ Department of State communication, May 14, 1964.

ter to this statement, but the initial establishment of U. S. Embassies in Ukraine and Byelorussia would demonstrate how truly alive we are to the "spirit of diversity." Not only this, it would realize with greater effectiveness all the objectives cited for the consular pact without losing any advantage in principle or kind in the ever-present Cold War. More, in contrast to the pact, it would furnish objective credence to the President's words: "If we are to live together in peace, we must come to know each other better."¹⁷

Once we cast aside the populational and constitutional myths mentioned earlier, we can begin to understand that scarcely half of the population in the USSR is Russian and that Kiev, the national capital of Ukraine, is no political counterpart of Chicago; nor is Minsk, the Byelorussian capital, a substantive parallel to San Francisco.¹⁸ In short, the United States is a single nation; the USSR is not—it's a diversity of nations. Thus, logically, if we are wise and true to ourselves and also to the realities in the USSR, we should urge a consular pact for Russian cities, like Leningrad, in federated Russia (The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) administratively linking the consulates with our Embassy in Russian Moscow. At the same time, in behalf of realistic contacts with diverse nations, we should also proffer direct and full diplomatic relations with Ukraine and Byelorussia, at least as a start.

This important subject of ambassadorial exchanges with the national governments of the non-Russian republics in the USSR has an even more interesting background than the consular convention.

In 1953 a special subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee considered every aspect pertaining to the exchange of ambassadors with Ukraine and Byelorussia.¹⁹ Hearings on House Concurrent Resolution 58, which was sponsored by the late Congressman Lawrence H. Smith of Wisconsin, brought out these salient facts: (1) Article 18a in the USSR Constitution stipulates that "Each Union Republic has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states and to conclude agreements and exchange representatives with them"; (2) being Charter members of the United Nations, Ukraine and Byelorussia are de facto recognized by us; ²⁰ (3) despite a secretive and abortive attempt by the British Government in 1947

¹⁷ State of Union Message, January 4, 1965.

¹⁸ See Dobriansky, Lev E. *Nations, Peoples, and Countries in the USSR*, U. S. GPO, Washington, D. C., 1964.

¹⁹ *Favoring Extension of Diplomatic Relations with the Republics of Ukraine and Byelorussia*, U. S. GPO, Washington, D. C., 1953.

²⁰ *Review of the United Nations Charter*, U. S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. GPO, Washington, D. C., 1955, pp. 1829-1851.

to make direct diplomatic contacts with these two nations, open negotiations are justified both by the demands of changing times and all the legal credentials involved; and (4) if we are earnest about understanding and maintaining peaceful relations with different nations and peoples, then we should make every effort toward the non-Russian nations in the USSR.

Every conceivable criticism of the resolution was treated, including those submitted by the State Department in opposition to the proposal.²¹ The Department expressed itself twice; once in a statement, dated June 26, 1952, to Senator H. Alexander Smith, who took a keen interest in this, and later, on March 13, 1953, in a communication to the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. Robert B. Chipfield. Both statements are virtually alike.

In view of its present pressure for the consular pact, it is interesting to note some of the Department's arguments against ambassadorial exchange. One, it is "doubtful whether the American people would look with favor upon an increase in the number of communist missions in the United States." Two, it "would require a large expenditure of money by the United States Government..." These two major arguments might just as well be applied against the consular pact. Again, spying is a two-way street, and the multiple benefits to be derived from ambassadorial exchanges would more than justify the money expended.

The Department also argued that U. S. Embassies in Ukraine and Byelorussia would bolster the myth of their sovereignty and pave the way for further participation of these republics in international organizations. Surely U. S. diplomatic missions in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the other captive countries are no evidence of their sovereignty. The second point is utterly specious when one surveys, for example, Ukraine's participation in the International Labor Organization, UNESCO and many other bodies.

Having embassies in the countries taken over by the Communists with the help of the Soviet Russian armies does not in any degree imply recognition of the military aggression against them by Communist Russia or the regimes installed therein. It is a matter of simple and practical expediency on our part, which would provide us with additional opportunity to know at first hand what is actually going on in these two captive nations.

Moscow may refuse the diplomatic exchange regarding Ukraine and Byelorussia, although such ambassadorial exchanges are now taking place on an impressive scale between the countries of the

²¹ Dobriansky, Lev E. "The Dilemma of the State Department on Diplomatic Relations," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. X, Spring 1954, pp. 159-166.

world and the newly-arising independent states of Africa. Let us ask Moscow in the court of world opinion: Who is colonialist and imperialist? The United States or the USSR? Let us take this opportunity to use this tactical gambit and to find out how Moscow really feels about Ukraine and Byelorussia, which it claims are "free and sovereign" and which may not only maintain diplomatic relations with foreign states, but even may secede from the Soviet Union.

Many other possible criticisms, such as the effect of this action on our non-recognition of Red China, the possibility of Moscow rejecting our offer, or the attitude of our allies, were so convincingly answered that the special subcommittee, headed by Mrs. Frances P. Bolton, unanimously favored the Smith resolution. Before the measure could be considered by the full Foreign Affairs Committee, the State Department intervened in July, 1953, requesting that it be given time for its further study. The request was granted and, regrettably, a short time later the resolution's able sponsor passed away.

Actually, no serious study of this subject was undertaken. In 1956, Undersecretary of State Murphy admitted this to the writer. Two years later, Assistant Secretary William B. Macomber confirmed this fact when, in response to an inquiry by Representative Leonard Farbstein, the new sponsor of the resolution, he stated that "the Department has no record of a study such as you described having been made subsequent to this time."²² He enclosed a copy of the Department's 1953 statement to Mr. Chipfield.

The need for a full examination of this issue is more pressing now than ever before. The basic criteria for diplomatic recognition, as set forth by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in an Overseas Press Club address in March, 1954, are fully satisfied by the proposal for ambassadorial exchanges with Ukraine and Byelorussia. They entail (1) usefulness of diplomatic intercourse—informational, psychological, cultural etc., (2) absence of any moral approval of the governments involved, and (3) no intense hostility toward the United States. There is no problem on this score.

The real problem is the mythical notions that many harbor with respect to the USSR. They represent the case of old myths about old realities. The occasion for Senate judgment on this consular pact is also an occasion for judgment on ambassadorial exchanges. As the President not too long ago put it, "Our guard is up, but our hand is out." Question: Will the hand remain fractured by old myths?

²²Dobriansky, Lev E. "Revived Interest in U.S. Diplomatic Relations with Ukraine and Byelorussia," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. XVIII, Autumn 1962, p. 231.

NEW EVIDENCE OF COMMUNIST THREAT IN SOUTH AMERICA

By ENRIQUE MARTINEZ CODO

"... we shall make the Andes Mountains the Sierra Maestra of America."

FIDEL CASTRO

"... but to change things, combat is the only remaining course: to impose our arms over their arms, our forces over their forces. We should take the rifles from their hands, and soon we shall be thousands. We, who fight in the mountains and hills; the workers in mills and factories."

(From a proclamation prepared by communist guerrillas recently flushed out in the province of Salta, Argentina.)

Reports of suspicious activity in the forests of the interior came in recently to a station of the National Gendarmerie in the Province of Salta, Argentina. Specially-trained patrols of the gendarmerie, both uniformed and plainclothed, were quickly dispatched to comb the tropical forest. Almost at once—on March 5, 1964—they succeeded in apprehending their first guerrilla.

Six additional guerrillas, taken by surprise, surrendered without offering resistance a day or two later.

The prisoners, wearing uniforms adapted to tropical conditions, sported Cuban-style beards and bore military insignia featuring an emblem inscribed with the words, *Ejercito Guerrillero Popular*—EGP (People's Insurgent Army), as well as a sun whose upper half was red and lower half was black—the very colors adopted by Fidel Castro's "26th of July Movement" in Cuba.

Interrogation of the prisoners plus a careful search of the area brought to light a considerable amount of military arms, material and communist printed matter, both military and ideological. This booty was found in "bunkers," concealed dugouts of the type used by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in Ukraine.

Of especial interest were the modern anti-tank rifles as well as some odd projectiles, similar to U. S. bazooka rockets. On closer inspection, however, the latter proved to be none other than the RPG-2 anti-tank missile of Soviet manufacture, still displaying Rus-

sian language markings. For the first time Soviet missiles—used by the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries, China, Egypt and Cuba—had appeared in South America.

Since their origin was probably Cuba, implied was the existence of large-scale Red logistics of continental scope.

The gendarmes redoubled their efforts in ferreting out the members of what obviously was a sizeable group. Hunger and exhaustion soon accounted for six more guerrillas. The remaining guerrillas, driven to inhabited areas, slew a ranch foreman who refused their demand for supplies. Swooping down on this area, the gendarmes brought down two guerrillas in an armed encounter, at the cost of one of their own number. The bodies of three more guerrillas, wounded in the encounter, were found in the dense vegetation a few days later. Testimony by guerrillas subsequently captured revealed that they had been abandoned to the wild beasts by their comrades. Other guerrillas perished while trying to descend a steep precipice.

Taking into account the known dead, the prisoners and the results of the interrogations, it was estimated that this particular band of guerrillas had numbered at least thirty heavily-armed men, ranging in age from 19 to 30.¹ Almost all had been well placed economically, many were well educated (a majority were university students), none were impoverished. All were ideologically motivated: they were Communists. And in their fanatical zeal they had executed two of their number by firing squad for a suspected intention to desert.

Found in their possession were 6,000 American dollars in cash and equal amounts in Argentine and Bolivian currencies.

This band, in short, showed that the threat of Castro-type subversion in South America is now a reality, beards, black caps and all.

FRUITFUL GROUND

The development of communist penetration and subversion in Latin America is little known. What is worse, it is largely misunderstood.

The elite of most Latin American countries are of no help. Holding on to traditional liberal democratic concepts of the past century and yet maintaining the old economic systems which keep down many millions of human beings, the ruling class misguidedly looks for

¹ With respect to this quantity it is pertinent to record what "Che" Guevara said on this matter: "In my opinion, taking into account natural desertions and weaknesses, notwithstanding the most rigorous process of selection, 30 to 50 men should be considered as a base; this amount is enough to initiate armed struggle in any one of the Latin America countries." (*Guerrilla Warfare*, p. 160, "Lucha" Publishers, Montevideo 1960).

solutions only in the form of economic and military aid from abroad. This stance provides fertile ground for the sprouting of communist seeds, offering instant social and economic solutions.

Nor is it understood outside this continent, on the other hand, how powerful oligarchic forces, unable to respond to the social dreams of the American peoples, entrench themselves more and more in unconscious alliance with the forces of communist subversion.

Concomitantly the strength of Catholic Christianity has waned, a process accelerated by the identification of certain liberal forces with foreign political and economic interests. Here, too, the ground is prepared for the sowing of the atheistic and materialistic ideas of communism, which in turn tend to make a communist takeover inevitable.

As elsewhere, the communist movement in Latin America does not spring from the legitimate demands of the peoples, but from the seductive Utopian propaganda disseminated by foreign agents. This propaganda has its greatest impact upon the intellectual and yet developing middle class, as is borne out by the class character of the insurgent band run down to earth in Salta.

THREE PRONGS

These guerrillas, known as the people's or the peasant guerrillas, are but one prong of the three-pronged communist subversion. In the past few months Argentine security has apprehended members of both the urban terrorist organization—the second prong—and of the third prong, a clandestine network which unites and nourishes the first two.

Typically enough, those militant members of the communist conspiracy do not identify themselves as Communists. Acting in accordance with their instructions from Moscow (and like all other Reds on the continent) they label themselves as "left-of-the-center nationalists," or even "Marxist nationalists." The advantage, of course, is that the door is left open for restless nationalist elements as well as for so-called idealistic Marxists to whom the term "communist" may be repugnant.

In fact, the urban terrorists—the city counterpart of the rural guerrillas—have become integrated into the so-called *Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario* (MNR), whose tendencies are openly left of center.

The importance of this urban prong is considered to be "extraordinary" by Castro's henchman, "Che" Guevara, who says:

One good operation of this type, spread throughout a wide sector, paralyzes almost completely the commercial and industrial life of that sector, placing the entire population in a state of worry, anguish and anxiety which almost forces it to take up violent action in order to extricate itself from this situation.

The urban task force is charged with the responsibility of providing funds (to relieve the burden on Moscow), which it manages chiefly by armed bank robberies, after the example of Stalin and the Tiflis bank. To obtain arms, it raids arms factories, depots, armories, the more isolated sentinel posts, etc. But above all it is charged with the creation of terror in the villages and towns.

Some recent examples of the activity of the MNR: a bank haul of almost a million dollars, an assault on a transportation company which netted some thirty thousand dollars, and a raid of the "Halcon" arms factory (164 guns plus 150,000 rounds). Laid to its door are some fifty terroristic actions to date, including use of explosives, incendiary bombs and the assassination of various people.

Operative plans of the MNR call for the "liberation" of the Malvinas Islands (the Falklands)² from British occupation, the destruction of electrical utilities, gas lines and petroleum refineries, and assaults against military units and garrisons.

Government action against this second task force has thus far resulted in the arrest of 18 persons, the recovery of some 5,000 dollars and seizure of a considerable amount of ideological propaganda material and of several clandestine printing presses.

The clandestine network of this insurrectional movement supports the guerrillas with living necessities, arms, ammunition and volunteers. To obtain information about the security measures being undertaken by the government, it employs espionage and infiltration of official bodies.

It is very difficult to uncover the whole underground organization since it operates on the basis of the classic *troika* type closed cells, acting individually, without knowledge of one another.

This is wholly in accord with Guevara's precept: "Under clandestine conditions nobody—absolutely nobody—should know more than is strictly necessary, and should never talk in front of anybody else."

Regardless of this rule of secrecy, Argentine authorities have been able to break down this clandestine prong into the following components:

² The Malvinas Islands belonged to the Argentine Republic until the year 1833 when the British took them over by force. Since then they have been the object of vehement Argentinian irredentism. The communists intend, evidently, to force events in order to obtain national and international prestige and at the same time to condemn British "imperialism."

A recruiting group, tentacled throughout the country, whose purpose is to select and dispatch recruits to guerrilla training centers (such as Camp Camilo Cienfuegos and Camp Augusto Sandino, which have been discovered and destroyed with the capture of five persons).

An espionage group, members of which infiltrated the communication sections of the Secretaries of War and Navy by acting as teletype operators. Four such agents have been apprehended.

An arms supply group, engaged in procuring and transporting arms from neighboring Bolivia. Four of this group were arrested in the act of smuggling a cargo consisting of five machine pistols, 19 rifles and ammunition of Czechoslovak make, and explosives, all obtained from Bolivian workers' organizations headed by leftist elements.³

A provisions supply group, charged with providing the guerrillas with food, medical supplies, and articles required for operating in the forests.

AMBITIOUS OBJECTIVES

Someone unfamiliar with the geography of the Argentine Province of Salta might wonder why the guerrillas chose this particular zone for the development of their uniformed bands. The answers come readily. In the first place, the Province of Salta, situated in the tropical zone, furnishes all the conditions that are ideal for guerrilla warfare: mountainous forest terrain, impassable for the most part and sparsely populated.⁴ Second, it is a frontier province where communist agitation is very much advanced and where the Communists expect to win in the next presidential elections, thereby paving the way for the establishment of the first "popular" republic on the Latin American continent which, they hope, will become the first big base for communist operations in South America. Third, Salta Province is the region through which some 30,000 Bolivian workers pass annually to Argentina to work in the sugar cane harvests. It would not be too difficult to infiltrate several thousand guerrillas

³ In Bolivia there exists a strong infiltration and domination of certain workers' unions by communist elements, who obey the orders of Juan Lechin, accused many times of being a Communist. These unions have organized the so-called "Armed Militia," equipped with arms taken from the Bolivian army after the revolution of 1952.

⁴ It was a military detachment in Salta, the so-called "Guerrillas of Güemes," who, in the second decade of the last century, detained the Spanish troops marching from Peru to quell the revolution which gave Argentina its independence.

armed and trained in Bolivia, more specifically, in the region of Tarija.⁵

Although the particular guerrilla band that was flushed out was not large, it confirms the long-held suspicion that the communist conspiracy is well developed and is rapidly nearing the stage of large-scale activity. The possibility of large numbers of guerrillas being trained in Bolivia is especially unsettling.

Called for is an all-out effort on the part of Argentine authorities to neutralize the threat of communist takeover. The presence of Russian arms on the continent also furnishes grounds for an international denunciation of the meddling by Cuba and its Soviet master in the internal affairs of Argentina and other South American countries.

"Peaceful coexistence" is as much a mirage in South America as anywhere else in the West.

⁵ *La Prensa*, Buenos Aires, May 9, 1964.

AN AFRICAN IN KIEV

By MEKOFFI METONGO, as told to LEO HEIMAN

In a frantic attempt to woo the peoples of awakening Africa away from the West, and indoctrinate them with communist ideology, the Soviet Union and its East European satellites have established a chain of "Friendship Universities" in Moscow, Kiev, Kalinin, Leningrad, Sofia, Prague, Leipzig, East Berlin and Bucharest.

Objective students of Soviet affairs have known for a long time that racial, ethnic and religious discrimination is rife behind the Iron Curtain, covered by a smoke screen of slogans and propaganda.

The Soviet Union, the greatest colonial empire which exists today, a veritable prison of captive nations, is doing its utmost to subvert young Africans, who are lured to Moscow and other cities by generous scholarships, and Moscow's self-styled role as the champion of the world's progressive anti-colonialist forces.

But from time to time, news leaks through the Iron Curtain of spontaneous demonstrations by African students in protest against racial bias, discrimination and brutal persecution, which show the Russians to be the champions—not of progressive anti-colonialism—but of South African-style apartheid.

Indeed, deep in their hearts the Russians are just as conscious of their national and racial superiority, as the most reactionary racists anywhere.

African students behind the Iron Curtain have been insulted, spat upon, beaten, tortured, raped and even murdered. All this in the name of "anti-colonialist progress" and "socialist brotherhood of nations." African students who protested too loudly were denounced by Soviet authorities as "imperialist-fascist elements," "colonialist hyenas," or paid *agents-provocateurs*, given short shrift and expelled from the Soviet Union. Hundreds of disenchanted and embittered Africans have already packed up and left the Iron Curtain "Friendship Universities" of their own volition, disgusted and repelled by the Soviet-Russian racism and discrimination.

A group of 28 African students who escaped the communist racial "apartheid" in the Soviet Union has recently arrived in Israel, to continue their studies at institutions of higher learning in Jerusalem, Haifa and Tel-Aviv.

A prominent member of this group is 24-year-old Mekoffi Metongo, a student of medicine from Ghana, whose personal account is printed below. Mr. Metongo's testimony is the more valuable since he studied at the University of Kiev, and was able to observe life in the Ukrainian capital with the unbiased eyes of an objective outsider.

Mr. Metongo was born on July 2, 1939, in the little provincial town of Kirache, on the banks of the Volta River, in Central Ghana. The fourth son of a post-office employee in the then British Colonial Administration, he attended an English Missionary School in his hometown, graduated from the Government Secondary School at Accra, studied for one year at the Advanced Agricultural Center operated by Israeli experts in Ashanti, and swallowed the Soviet hook, baited with a generous offer of a free five-year scholarship to study medicine in the Soviet Union. He now attends the Jerusalem Medical College, and will graduate next year. Mr. Metongo saw his best friend murdered by Russian hoodlums in the Soviet Union. He was threatened with "liquidation" if he dared to tell the truth. But he nevertheless decided to risk reprisals by Soviet agents and disclose his experiences behind the Iron Curtain to the uncommitted world, and as a warning to other naive and gullible Africans who may fall prey to the communist propaganda line. This is his first-person story).

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In April 1960, I received a personal letter from Mr. Vladimir Tulpanov, who then served as the Assistant Cultural Attache at the Soviet Embassy in Accra, the capital of Ghana.

I do not know how he found out about me, my dreams, ambitions and aspirations, or how he obtained my address. Only now, after more than three years behind the Iron Curtain, do I realize the Soviets are deadly serious in their planned campaign of worldwide subversion. They are no amateurs in this game, and before tackling any subject, they amass a wealth of information, including complete dossiers on "suckers" who can be hooked for brainwashing and indoctrination by sugar-coated bait of scholarships behind the Iron Curtain.

Mr. Tulpanov's letter advised me that it was brought to his attention that I desired to study medicine, but could not pursue my studies for lack of funds. He informed me that several scholarships to study medicine in the USSR were still available to gifted African students, and that in case I was interested and wished to apply, I should present myself at his office in the Embassy without delay.

Mr. Tulpanov received me in a very friendly and charming way. He won me over right away. I thought to myself that if all the Russians are like him, the future creative center of all mankind will be in Moscow, rather than in Paris, London or New York.

I was pretty naive at the age of 20, I must admit now. But thousands of other African and Asian students fell for the Russian charm, warm handshakes, friendly smiles, free airline tickets, free meal tickets, free food coupons, money-order booklets and promises of paradise on earth. In fact, everything was free, except life in the USSR.

Mr. Tulpanov did not bother testing my IQ, general education level, or suitability and aptitude for medical studies in the Soviet Union. He talked to me for about two hours, and filled out lengthy questionnaires, but most questions centered about my family, political affiliations, if any, and social-cultural background.

At the end of our talk, he shook my hand again, and handed me a thick manila envelope with airline tickets to Paris, and a "Putiovka" (travel orders) to Moscow, via the Soviet Embassy in France.

I went back to my hometown, to celebrate my departure with my parents, brothers, sisters and a brother-in-law and his folks. We drank native beer, sang and danced till dawn. I was the first Kirache boy to have been granted any kind of scholarship by an important foreign university, and the first Kirache man to be a doctor of medicine.

My father made a long and rambling speech, in which he praised "Our true and loyal friends in Moscow." He compared Moscow's generosity with the disdainful attitude shown to Ghanaian students by British colonial administration officials. By the time he finished speaking, the crowd attending the bon-voyage party was ripe for a small communist revolution. And I must state here that my father was neither a pro-communist fellow-traveller, nor a stupid man. But for an African boy from a small town in the bush, to get a generous scholarship to study medicine in a European capital, was something unprecedented and unheard of.

Most of us local boys could study at the local primary and elementary schools operated by Christian missionaries, if they liked us—which was not always the case. But to attend a secondary school, one needed the approval of the colonial administration's educational department. It cost a lot of money too. And to graduate from it, after being screened by tough and unfriendly white examiners, was a real achievement. After that, came the problem of pursuing higher academic studies. Graduates of the Secondary School at Accra

could apply for enrollment at colleges in Paris, London or Heidelberg, but it cost a great deal of money. Even if a partial scholarship was granted, it covered the cost of tuition only. The African student had still to pay for food, room, clothes, transportation, airline tickets, books, etc. And few were the African families who could afford that kind of expenditure. And here was I, granted not only a full and complete scholarship, but also a dozen pink, yellow, green, white, blue and orange-colored cards, which entitled me to a room at the Foreign Students Hostel, free airline and railroad tickets, monthly pocket money, vacation bonus, holiday expenses, free books, clothes, tuition and everything else. In fact, I earned more by studying in the Soviet Union, than I would have earned by hard work in my own country.

True, all the tickets and coupons were not valid yet. They still had to be counterstamped by the Soviet Embassy in Paris. But I was confident of clearing that hurdle too.

It was easier and faster than writing these lines. In May 1960, I landed at the Orly Airport near Paris, took a taxicab to the Soviet Embassy at Rue Grenelle, and after waiting for some fifteen minutes, was admitted to the officer of the Cultural Affairs Counselor, Mr. Ivan Korensky. He talked to me, asked a few dozen questions, filled out another yard-long questionnaire, and took out a violet-ink pad to stamp my tickets, coupons and multicolored cards.

"You are a lucky man indeed, Mr. Motongo," he remarked casually, "these stamps are worth at least ten thousand dollars to you right away..." I was stunned. "You are very generous," I managed to stammer. Mr. Korensky laughed. "Not generous, but only practically helpful, my young friend. By helping our true and trusted friends liberate themselves from the yoke of colonialist domination, by teaching them to free themselves from imperialist influences, we are advancing the cause of liberty, true freedom and democracy."

Yes, the stamps affixed by Ivan Korensky were worth at least \$10,000, perhaps even more. And it took me a few years to learn the bitter truth, that you don't get something for nothing. I got ten thousand dollars' worth of free food, clothes, lodgings, books, airline junkets and educations, and I had to pay for it with my honor and pride. I am now much poorer than I was way back in 1960, when I shouted "Long Live Moscow!" and went to study in the Soviet Union.

I am poorer both in money and my own illusions. I am embittered, disenchanting and cynical. I won't believe any propaganda or political creed any more. It's for suckers. Sure, I got \$10,000 for free, just by signing my name on the scholarship application. But

to get out of the Soviet paradise, I had to sell my wrist watch and clothes.

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There were some twenty other African, Asian and Arab students abroad the Czechoslovak jetliner which took us from Paris to Moscow, via Prague. I was seated next to an Indian girl, who was going to study architecture in Moscow, and kept extolling the virtues of Soviet "democracy" all the way from France to the Soviet capital.

"My mother was a prostitute," she declared proudly. "At the age of nine she was sold to a brothel in Calcutta. Her impoverished parents had to sell her to feed the other children under the rotten capitalist-imperialist-colonialist system. But now, thanks to my mother and the Soviet Union, I am going to study at a university, and will return to India a famous architect and fighter for peace and freedom..."

Poor little Indian girl. The last time I saw her, she was in a hospital, recuperating from the results of a brutal assault by a band of Russian "*blatnoy*" hoodlums. She was raped by five men who tortured her with burning cigarettes, and kept calling her "Dikaya Martyshka" (wild black monkey). Even worse than the pain which raked her mutilated body was the agony of her smashed dreams and illusions. The moment they let her out of hospital, she committed suicide by jumping into the Dnieper River.

We landed at Sheremetyevo Airport near Moscow, and were taken in tow by a reception committee composed of officials representing the Ministry of Higher Education, the Committee for Cultural Links with Foreign Countries, and the Central Office for Administration of Foreign Students. A special bus took us across the city to the Kievsky Vokzal railroad station. En route, English and French-speaking officials explained that because of overcrowding at educational institutions in Moscow, our group was diverted to the University of Kiev. Special facilities had been prepared for us, and we were expected there as the most honored guests in the ancient university's 400-year history.

We boarded the Moscow-Kiev express. Overwhelmed by the impressions and changing scenery of a 2,000-mile flight, I fell asleep on my "myagki wagon" (soft coach) seat, as soon as the train moved out of Moscow. I woke up early next morning and looked out of the window. We were rolling through dense birch forests, unlike anything I ever saw in Africa. Rays of bright sunshine played on stacks of hay on green forest clearings. "We are crossing the Bryansk Forest now," our guide explained. We waited until all students woke up,

and washed in the small lavatory at the end of our coach. He then shepherded us along the narrow swaying corridor to the restaurant coach, where white-jacketed waiters fed us a typical Russian breakfast of boiled meat, thick gravy with mushrooms, buckwheat pancakes with sour cream, smoked fish, jam, honey and tea with milk. Some Indian students refused to partake of the breakfast, saying their religion forbade them to consume either meat or fish. Our guide got angry and shouted at them: "Eto niezakonniye predrassudki!" (these are illegal superstitions).

The official who conducted us, paid the restaurant-coach manager with a booklet of coupons. But not all passengers aboard the train could afford such a breakfast in the glittering diner.

Only a few senior officers, unshaved officials with bulging briefcases, and a couple of overdressed ladies were served the same morning repast. Most passengers waited until the train stopped at Khutor Mikhailovsky, the first Ukrainian station on the Moscow-Kiev line.

We were immediately surrounded by a mob of shawl-covered peasant women, who offered for sale hardboiled eggs, jars of sour cream and pickled cucumbers, big apples, huge sweet onions, salt herrings, fried "Blintzy" pancakes, and "Rassolny" tomatoes cured in vinegar. One Russian officer bought a newspaper-wrapped herring, bit off its head and tail, licked the meat off the bones and spat them out through the open window. He then used his fingers to tear the herring apart, stuffing each part of the fish into his gaping mouth. He finished chewing and smacking his lips, wiped his chin with the soiled newspaper, tossed it out of the window, belched loudly and grunted with satisfaction.

We looked at him in wide-eyed amazement. Later on, when Russian hoodlums called us "wild jungle savages" and "Martyshki" (monkeys) I used to remind myself of the herring-chewing Russian lieutenant, the "Kulturny" representative of the "new Soviet man." Back in Ghana, we have a tribe called the Mumbutsi which is really quite primitive. But even the Mumbutsis would not have eaten a fish the way the "Kulturny" Soviet officer consumed his herring.

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We arrived in Kiev at noon, and were taken in buses to the new dormitories for foreign students on the university campus. Our building was a V-shaped architectural monstrosity, with four floors and 400 rooms in each wing. But I have to admit that our living conditions were much more luxurious and comfortable—by Soviet standards—than those enjoyed by nine out of ten Soviet stu-

dents. The reason for the V-shaped construction became apparent after we were shown to our rooms. Each dormitory had only one entrance-exit doorway at the apex of the giant V, and it was guarded by "Druzhinniki" (volunteer militia) with red armbands and rubber truncheons. It was explained to us that the guards were posted to protect the buildings from vandals, hoodlums, thieves and criminal elements. We, the tenants of these new buildings, were of course free to come and go as we pleased.

We soon learned, however, that the real reason for the "Druzhinniki" guards was to prevent any contact between us and the local students. The next day, our guides took us to see Professor Nikolai Svetkov, the Dean of Foreign Students. He shook hands with each one of us, talked in English and French, and told us we would be studying the Russian language for five months, in special intensive-cramming courses, to enable us understand the lectures in regular classes, as of October.

I guess we were pretty naive then, and figured that since Kiev was the capital of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic, the language we would be required to learn would be Ukrainian, instead of Russian. But when I asked Professor Svetkov about it, he laughed heartily and exclaimed: "Mon ami, my friend! Russian is the language of science, culture and civilization throughout the Soviet Union. All the books and texts are in the Russian language, as well as all lectures and scientific films. Ukrainian is taught in the Ukrainian Literature section of the Linguistic Department. But those of you who wish to study medicine, architecture, engineering, biology or physics must know Russian first, of course." Of course. I spent more than three years in Kiev, and the only place where I heard Ukrainian spoken was at the Farmers' Market.

The University of Kiev has been turned into a bastion of Russian cultural influence. Not only were many of the students—some forty-five per cent, I would say—Russian, but even those who said they were Ukrainian, spoke Russian too.

One of them, whose name I will not mention, as he became one of my few friends in Kiev, was quite frank and outspoken on this subject. "If I persisted in speaking Ukrainian here," he once told me, "they would expel me on one pretext or another. We speak Ukrainian at home, but it's not healthy to make a habit of it here at the university. All the bosses and most of the professors are Russians, and they don't like Ukrainians. They never did."

At the end of our five-month Russian-language course, we knew enough to get by, and Professor Svetkov arranged for us a joint

celebration with the local students, to commemorate the 43rd anniversary of the Communist Revolution on November 7th.

On November 6, 1960, we assembled to be introduced to Professor Grigori Alexandrov, at that time the Rector of the University of Kiev. Both Alexandrov and Svetkov were Russians, and the whole lay-out at Kiev U. reminded me of the Accra Secondary School under the British colonial administration. There too, the bosses were Englishmen, sent to "enlighten" the natives.

Everything was fine and happy until the fateful January 12, 1961, which will be etched in my memory as long as I live. Svetkov and Alexandrov decided—without consulting us in advance—to organize an Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference of students at Kiev University to protest against "imperialist intervention" in the Congo. We were handed a resolution printed in Russian, English and French, and told to sign it. It was not the resolution itself, of which we approved at that time, as the manner in which it was presented to us, which made us boiling mad. We were treated by the Soviets like imbeciles or little children, incapable of making up our own minds, and unable to decide on anything without being told. We did not realize then that it was the way the Soviet regime treated all of its 220 million citizens plus all satellite nations of Eastern Europe.

We returned to our dormitories buzzing angrily, and decided to set up an autonomous organization of African students in Kiev. We elected representatives, drew up a full protocol of the meeting, and sent the copies of our resolution to Alexandrov, Svetkov and our embassies in Moscow.

The next morning, our classes were abruptly cancelled without any explanation. Professor Alexandrov himself came to see us, and demanded angrily to disband our "illegal" organization forthwith, threatening us with immediate expulsion if we persisted in "undermining" the friendly relations between foreign students and Soviet authorities.

We could not see how the existence of a separate organization of African students could have undermined or "wrecked" the friendly relations. It is customary for foreign students at any major university abroad to be represented by autonomous bodies and national organizations. I know of African student committees in Germany, France, Britain, Israel, Egypt, Italy and Switzerland. But not in the Soviet Union.

Still, in the interests of our studies, we agreed to disband the organization. Now I know that Soviet policy is opposed to any kind of "national" organizations. If we African students could get away with it, the Ukrainian students would have envied us, and perhaps

demanded the same rights. Kiev is a beautiful city, but not a happy one. We could feel the pent-up tension and seething discontent wherever we went. There was no clearly-defined reason for the tension. But after I got out of the Soviet Union, and could compare notes with other African students, I could see that Kiev was the USSR's most strained, emotion-wise, city. Pent-up hatreds erupted at the smallest provocation. There was always the tense air of violence associated with Havana, Istanbul, Cairo and Calcutta. I do not think there was any national background to this feeling. As a matter of fact, the Russians rather than Ukrainians were always ready to hit out with brass knuckle-dusters, strike out with sharp "*finka*" knives.

In June 1961, my friend Mboko Ntebbe, also from Ghana, was wounded by Russian hoodlums for having kissed and embraced his white girl friend in the Dnieper riverside park. Five Russian ruffians, including a man in the official railroad service uniform, fell upon him with sticks and knives, and would have killed him but for the arrival of a group of Latin American students. Olga, Mboko's girl friend, was kicked by the thugs, and hospitalized with smashed ribs. They called her "nigger slut" and other names. It was not the first case of discrimination, and not the last one either. The girls, Ukrainian and Russian, were generally friendly to us. The reaction of the local populace was one of curiosity. But the men were mostly hostile. That is, our fellow-students were cool to us, but correct, and the people we came in daily contact with—our teachers, lecturers, bus conductors, post office clerks, etc.—were even friendly. But there was a large segment of youth—Russian, not Ukrainian—which was openly hostile to all foreign students, but especially to Africans. These were the so-called "Stilyagi," teddyboys and punks, whose only interest was girls, drinking, parties, dancing and clothes. They envied us our Western-made suits and dacron shirts, begrudged our higher standard of living, and boiled mad with rage whenever we went out with white girls. These "Stilyagi" hoodlums were not some underprivileged and ignorant scum from the slums, but sons of Soviet officials, party big-shots and administrators. They did not have to work for a living, despite the Soviet laws against "Tuneyadtsy" (social parasites). For the record, they were registered as students, though I never saw any of them at the university. I don't believe there were any Ukrainians among them, because while they reserved their arsenal of insults against us (nigger, black monkey, jungle animal, savage, crocodile face, etc.) they called the Ukrainians "Khokhly" and the Jewish students "Zhidy," both very derisive and insulting names, used by Russian ruffians throughout the ages. Our next encounter with the Russian "Stilyagi" gang in Kiev was on May 27, 1962. Some twenty

of us were walking down the Vladimirskaya Gorka hill towards the Dnieper River, when we were suddenly surrounded by at least fifty of the Russian punks. Some of them hefted ice picks, others displayed daggers, iron bars and brass knuckle-dusters. They ordered us to undress and hand over to them our clothes, wrist watches and money. A free-for-all brawl broke out, in which an African student from Bechuanaland named David Mukaddy, was stabbed to death by the Russians. My friend Adredde Shoketly from the Central African Republic, was mortally injured, and died in hospital two days later. Three more students, Akwo Ebenezer from Ghana, Sulu Amatzene from Dahomey, and Abdul Kader Abdou from Somalia, were seriously wounded and flown home after recuperating in hospital. They were visited by Soviet diplomats and bribed to keep quiet. The whole affair was hushed up. But no one will bribe, intimidate or blackmail me. Now that I am able to tell the truth, it is my duty to do so. I don't care what the Soviets do to me, and I don't think they'll dare to do anything. While we were being butchered by the mob of Russian hoodlums who ganged up on us, two militiamen stood by and did nothing to help us. They simply stood there, smoked cigarettes and laughed. We were saved by a group of Ukrainian stevedores who had just finished unloading barges with cement, gravel and construction materials down at the riverside docks. They came to our aid, and beat up the Russian hoodlums. Otherwise, many more of us would have been slaughtered that afternoon. They came prepared to ambush us with knives and axes, and we had only our fists, in addition to being outnumbered and taken by surprise.

Only after the Ukrainian workers started punching, pummeling and kicking the "Stilyagi" hoods, did the militiamen bestir themselves into action. One rushed to call for reinforcements, while the other one took out a notebook and started registering witnesses who gathered to watch the street fight.

When two truckloads of militia arrived, they did not waste time asking who is right and who is wrong, but hit out right and left, beating us up with rubber truncheons. The next morning we staged a mass protest demonstration along the Khreshchatyk, Kiev's main thoroughfare. It was the first time in many years that Kiev saw anything like that. We moved with black mourning flags towards the militia headquarters, and staged a sit-down strike at the railroad station, demanding to be repatriated home. Once again, senior officials persuaded us to stay and promised to punish the killers and protect us. I really don't know whether the "Stilyagi" hoodlums were ever brought to trial. Two weeks later, we were advised that five of the delinquents who attacked us were sentenced to death,

and the others of their gang to prison terms ranging from three to fifteen years. But if they had any kind of trial, how come none of us Africans were ever called to testify as witnesses? How can you condemn young men to death, even if they are hooligans, without proper legal procedure, witnesses for the defense and prosecution, and all the other paraphernalia of justice associated with courtroom proceedings? Or could it be that the killers went unpunished? Did their parents have that kind of influence with the authorities? In any case, the aftermath of the Dnieper riverside battle, culminating in murder and injury, left a bitter taste which was not dissipated by sugar-coated Russian propaganda.

Early in 1963, another gang of Russian hoodlums murdered a Congolese student, Epana Edenis, as he walked with his girl along the river embankment. The girl was stabbed, raped and mutilated, and tossed into the river, but fished out by a boat crew and survived.

Another protest demonstration, sit-down hunger strike and threats of violence erupted on the Kiev University campus. Dr. Eugene Popov, the Russian Minister of Education and Culture in the "puppet government" of the Ukrainian "republic" came personally to apologize to us, and beg us to go back to our dormitories and classes. But from his torrent of words, we gathered that he regarded us as equally guilty for the outbreak of violence in Kiev, because we dated white girls and wore superior quality Western clothes.

I was fed up with Soviet hypocrisy, discrimination, double-faced standards, cheating, lying and racial persecution. I also knew that I was blacklisted by the authorities as a "ringleader" and "potential troublemaker." The real reason was that a few African students who fled after the first murders in Kiev, enrolled at colleges in Israel, and sent me glowing letters from the Jewish State. Their letters were naturally intercepted and opened by the secret police censorship and I was classified as a "Zionist agent." But the letters gave me an idea, and a way out when I felt I could no longer go on, and call myself a human being.

I fabricated a false story about a sudden sickness of my father in Ghana, and applied for special leave to go back home and visit my family. The Soviet authorities in Kiev let me go to Moscow, but the Moscow officials checked through their Embassy in Accra and found out that I was lying. My airline tickets, food coupons and money orders were cancelled, and I was left in Moscow penniless and homeless. I was told I could still save myself by going back to Kiev, to apologize and resume my studies. I was also threatened with kidnapping, assassination and life imprisonment. I had to sell my watch, books, suitcases and clothes to survive during the five weeks it

took the officials to give me an exit permit from the Soviet Union. Only after daily calls at the Ghanaian Embassy in Moscow was the necessary stamp granted, and I boarded a Scandinavian Airlines jet at Vnukovo airport, the tickets having been provided by the Embassy of Ghana.

I am studying now in Jerusalem, and trying hard to learn Hebrew and forget Russian. Not that I dislike the Russian language. It is a beautiful language. But to me, it has the associations of wild yells, hateful and spiteful insults, murder, bloodshed and violence. I feel the same about Kiev. It is a beautiful city and the people are probably very nice too. But the cruel Soviet system has bred a new bloodthirsty kind of people. Hatreds flare up without provocation, knives and vicious razor blades are flashed at the smallest real or imaginary slight. And I don't blame the Ukrainians. The simple bargemen and workers came to our aid. But the young people are being brutalized and deprived of their humanity by the bestial Soviet system. This is my warning to the world!

THE OUSTER OF KHRUSHCHEV

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

In the middle of October, the world was surprised and stunned to read a sudden announcement from the Kremlin that Nikita Sergeye-
vich Khrushchev had been deposed as First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, that he had resigned from his post as Premier because of the deterioration of his health and some emotional difficulties and that he had been removed from the Central Committee, while his son-in-law, Alexei Adzhubei, had been removed as editor of *Izvestia*. Everything was done on the surface in accordance with the usual Soviet procedure but everything also points to a palace revolution pulled off against an unsuspecting Khrushchev and carefully prepared by many of his supposedly former friends and associates. Three months later it is still impossible to determine with any certainty just how it was arranged and—still more important—why, for it came at a seemingly inauspicious time.

So far as Khrushchev himself was concerned, it seemed to occur at a moment when he was without any suspicion or warning. He was resting at his vacation resort on the Black Sea in preparation for a visit to Kiev to mark the twentieth anniversary of the “liberation” of Ukraine from the Nazis and special preparations had been made for his visit. He was then slated to repeat the performance in Belgrade in Yugoslavia, where likewise arrangements had been made to receive him.

The last recorded appearance of Khrushchev was at his resort. His old friend, Anastas Mikoyan, who had apparently through the years been his closest associate among the older Bolsheviks, was with him. Khrushchev broadcast a greeting to the crew of the Soviet spaceship and promised to be on hand for the great reception of the cosmonauts in Moscow a few days later. Then he closed with the apparently good-humored remark that Mikoyan was trying to get the microphone out of his hand. He succeeded and also broadcast a greeting. The next day Khrushchev was to have lunch with the French Minister of Atomic Energy Palewski but he suddenly changed the time to the morning. Mikoyan had already left and apparently Khrushchev flew back to Moscow as soon as Palewski had gone.

Then came the announcements and the complete elimination of the name of Khrushchev from the Soviet press. His downfall was sudden and complete and his whereabouts at the present time are unknown. He was succeeded in his post as First Secretary by Leonid Brezhnev who earlier in the year was moved from the titular head of state to Deputy First Secretary, when his place was taken by Mikoyan and the post of Premier was given to Alexander Kosygin.

We can instinctively compare this apparently easy deposition with the hold that Stalin was able to maintain to the very end of his life, unless it can be shown in the future that Stalin's death had been assisted, to put it mildly, by some of the men who succeeded him. Yet Khrushchev was unable to secure the prestige and power that Stalin had won through the years. Age certainly prevented it, even more than conditions in the Soviet Union. Stalin was in his early forties when Lenin died and he had been in the post of First Secretary for some years. But Stalin, oriental spider that he was, needed several years to cement his power. He had first to deal with Trotsky and later with men like Zinoviev and Bukharin, likewise outstanding Old Bolsheviks. It was only after he had become strong enough to remove these and to prevent the rise of similar men outside of his personal entourage that he was able to exert absolute power.

Khrushchev never had the time or the opportunity. On the death of Stalin, it had been the first task of the new group to rid themselves of Beria. Then Malenkov was in full control but not for long. First he had to share the power by making Khrushchev First Secretary and then a little later, he was forced to resign his post as Premier in favor of Bulganin. It was barely ten years that Khrushchev was unopposed and it was not long enough for the story of his invincibility to take root, especially after his denunciation of the "cult of personality" and his expose of the criminal character of the old dictator.

As seen now, this was not the first attempt to depose him. In 1957, Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich made the attempt and for one moment they secured a majority but then Marshal Zhukov intervened, a full meeting of the Central Committee was held and this denounced the "anti-Party" group of Khrushchev's foes and he emerged stronger than ever. This time there was no Zhukov, Mikoyan sided with the opponents and whether or not there was a full meeting, Khrushchev was left without any help or hope and had to yield.

Khrushchev's characteristics which helped him rise undoubtedly contributed to his fall. Stalin had been cold, scheming and reserved. Once in the Kremlin, he had lived a secluded life, rarely appeared in public and save for occasional visits to his native Georgia, he sel-

dom moved out of Moscow and its environs. Khrushchev was an ebullient person, a complete extrovert, incessantly in motion. He lacked the self-restraint of Stalin and also that sense of personal dignity which his predecessor had so strongly. There have been rumors that Stalin treated Khrushchev as a buffoon and compelled him to dance for his own amusement. Khrushchev's behavior at the United Nations when he pounded his desk with his shoe was exactly in keeping with his character and so were many of his sallies especially in his younger days, when he became known for his sprees and jollification.

He should have pondered well that phrase in the unfinished novel, *Vadim*, by the young Lermontov to the effect that "the Russian people can overlook the haughtiness and cruelty of their rulers rather than a lack of virtues." The very excesses of Stalin in pursuance of what Khrushchev called the "cult of personality" could be overlooked by the people who tended to accept Stalin's identification of himself with the traditional types of Ivan the Terrible and Peter I, two Czars who were Muscovite to the core and even though Stalin himself was a Georgian, yet except when he was at home, he identified himself with the Great Russians and frankly gave them the credit for all the Soviet victories in World War II.

In exposing Stalin, Khrushchev laid the basis for being called to answer the same charges, if he attempted to exalt his own personality and this with Khrushchev's temperament he could not avoid doing and so step by step Soviet history was rewritten to degrade Stalin and to exalt the patriotic services of Nikita Khrushchev, his overwhelming part in winning the victories of World War II, his clairvoyance when Stalin was wrong, his thorough understanding of all the problems of the Soviet Union and especially those connected with agriculture.

Yet in this last field his character and his habits caused a backfire. Almost alone among the Communist leaders, Khrushchev had built his support, when he emerged from being the "Hangman of Ukraine" on the general Soviet scene, on his wide acquaintance with the leaders of the various republics and the Russian provincial and regional leaders. For years he was constantly travelling and he had at least a superficial acquaintance with many of the locally important figures miles and hundreds of miles away from the capital. It was the influence of these men on the Central Committee and the higher councils of the state on whom he relied to offset any opposition to him in Moscow and it paid him well.

But agriculture was still not in the prosperous condition of which Khrushchev was always boasting. His remarkably ingenious mind

supplied him with ever new excuses and ever new methods for making good the deficiency of agriculture. He talked in season and out of his knowledge of the science and he provided rapidly for new measures which never seemed to solve the problem at hand. Thus he had favored *agrorods*, huge farms on which the *kolhospniks* would be treated as workers in a factory and the distinction between agriculture and industry would be reduced to a minimum with the reduction or almost total elimination of private plots of land to be worked by each family. Later still he had spoken out for the planting of the "virgin lands" in Kazakhstan to wheat and had sent to that remote area thousands and millions of young people from the Russian and other European Soviet Republics, despite warnings from many experts that he would create a dust bowl in the area and that the wheat would not be a stable crop and so it turned out. Then came his infatuation with hybrid Indian corn or maize as the true solution of the Soviet agricultural problems, for he had heard and seen the enormous yields of corn in the United States, particularly in the cornbelt of the West, where all conditions are almost uniformly favorable to gigantic yields and these are still more increased by the careful use of fertilizers in the soil. Finally he reached the solution that the only way out was the establishment of huge fertilizer factories to furnish the needed supplies, while the Soviet Union after boasting of its agricultural achievements started to buy wheat and grain on the capitalist market. Add to all these his constant tinkering with the various regions, his endeavor to divide the entire Soviet Union into a series of regions, each to have his own specialty, his endeavor to reorganize the country into industrial and agricultural sections with different staffs of men in control of each in all local areas, and he brought it about that he proved his incompetence to the very men who had greeted him because of his personal acquaintance with their sections. This is perhaps one of the reasons why he could not appeal successfully to the full Central Committee this time as against the professionals in the Moscow area.

There was the same lack of continuity in his foreign policies. He achieved his greatest success in the West by preaching "peaceful coexistence" for most of the people of the free nations have preferred to believe that this was what they meant by peaceful coexistence but to Khrushchev it was merely a device to lull suspicions to sleep while he regarding it as the most advanced form of ideological struggle, carefully explained to the people that it left abundant room for all kinds of "wars of liberation" whereby, once the opportunity offered itself, the USSR would be free to send arms and munitions and even men to install a communist regime and in the last

years he has given absolute proof of this interpretation. Yet in Cuba he endeavored to go one step further and after denying the existence of Soviet long and medium range weapons in Cuba, he was compelled to withdraw them or at least to pretend to, while the United States failed to insist not only on that but on his open repudiation of Castro in an effort to preserve peace.

Yet even this was too much for the Chinese Communists. From the time of the death of Stalin Mao Tse-tung maintained that he was the senior leader of the Communist world. Moscow could not accept this and so there has been a steady sharpening of the relations between the two countries, with an unlimited flow and counterflow of accusations and attacks. Finally Mao called on the Russians to repudiate Khrushchev and he in turn demanded a meeting of all Communist parties to indict China as false to the Communist ideals as set forth by the true spokesman, Nikita S. Khrushchev, from his knowledge of the ideas of Marx and Lenin. This idea did not please some of the parties in the satellite countries which objected to the cold-blooded assignment of some to be agricultural and others to deal with one or more branches of industry without regard to the local resources and needs of the population. It led to schisms in some of the parties with a large minority or even a small majority siding not with Moscow but with Peking. At various meetings Chinese delegates were openly insulted and feelings were running high with the result that when Khrushchev fell, there seemed for the moment a diminution of the tensions between the two chief Communist states.

Khrushchev did not show himself to advantage during his Scandinavian trip this last summer either in Sweden where he commenced to boast about Peter's victory over the Swedes at Poltava, or in Denmark where he lectured the very efficient Danish dairy industry on the changes that they would need to compete with the Russians in three or four years, despite his failure to increase either the number of cattle or their output of milk and meat. It was the ebullient, rather than the acute Khrushchev speaking and it drove home to his associates the truth enunciated by Lermontov.

In the same way his policy satisfied neither the conservatives nor the progressives in art and literature and lacked the clear cut policy of Stalin. He seems to have displeased important elements in the armed forces, among the industrialists, in fact among all those important sectors which had their representatives or partisans in the Central Committee. Then with the terror imposed by Stalin weakened, some of these malcontents, perhaps with the support and instruction of some of Khrushchev's old foes in the "anti-Party" group commenced to intrigue. This time they won over apparently Mikoyan

and so in October, while Khrushchev was out of Moscow, they carefully pulled the coup before he became aware of it. Then it was too late.

Reporters in Moscow have commented on the relative calmness with which the population took the news. He had never become the man necessary to the state and to the people as both Ivan the Terrible and Stalin had seemed to be. Under these conditions it was easy for the conspirators to cover their actions with the mantle of Soviet legality and even Soviet democracy without worrying in their own minds what either term meant.

The charges against Khrushchev had been based on his development of the "cult of personality," his tendency to ignore the Central Committee and to act in a way that was not in accordance with the traditions of Communism and for the good of the movement. It was therefore almost inevitable that in filling Khrushchev's various posts as Premier and First Secretary, the new victors reverted to the doctrine of collective leadership which was so much in evidence after the death of Stalin until Khrushchev had secured enough power to do away with it. As a result the leading posts were separated and Leonid Brezhnev who had been shifted only a few months before from Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the top nominal post in the Soviet Union, to Khrushchev's assistant as Deputy First Secretary, should now move into the post of First Secretary. Alexander Kosygin who is admitted to be one of the most able Soviet economists was made Premier, while some of the other men of the Central Committee were given other posts and some new men as Alexander Shelepin, former head of the Comsomol and apparently the man in charge of the murders of various anti-Soviet leaders abroad, was made a candidate member of the highest body in the state. So far as age goes, Brezhnev is 58, and Kosygin 60, but there are potential leaders in the 40's and the 50's who may be able to rise rapidly.

It by no means follows that the present division of powers will be of long duration. Each one of the leaders has his own followers and his success in giving these men suitable posts will undoubtedly strengthen his own position, for under the Soviet system the division between the Party organization and the government is one that is very difficult to operate and there is an almost inevitable pressure for one man to wield the supreme authority in both and so prevent needless rivalries and clashes. At the moment the odds seem to favor Brezhnev but no one can tell whether he will be the man who succeeds in beating off his rivals.

Both Brezhnev and Kosygin seem to be competent and sincere Communists. Both are rather colorless figures who were too young at the time of the October Revolution to remember distinctly the old regime and the fierce struggles for power before the Soviet take-over of the government. Their training has been therefore under the Soviet system and only time will show how they can get along with the other systems in the world.

It is also highly conventional that the new regime has already relegated to insignificant posts a number of Khrushchev's proteges who apparently were not willing to join the new masters. Some army men and provincial leaders deposed by Khrushchev have been restored to their posts and steps have already been taken to end many of Khrushchev's later innovations in the administration of the Soviet Union. More can be expected as they weed out men who do not suit either of the two leading figures in the regime.

Soon after the ousting of Khrushchev, there seemed to be an easing of the conflict with China and a Chinese delegation appeared in Moscow. Yet there does not seem to have developed any satisfactory solution and the Chinese have published some articles to the effect that there are still men in the regime who have been too identified with Khrushchev and should be removed. The new leaders have given up the idea of an immediate meeting to confront the Chinese but they are now hoping for a Communist gathering in the spring to discuss general Communist affairs and to endeavor to prepare for a large and important conference.

At almost the very beginning both Brezhnev and Kosygin tried to make clear that in their relations with the West they would advocate "peaceful coexistence," of course, in Khrushchev's sense. It reassured those Western statesmen whose constant dream is the elimination of tension but it remains to be seen what practical steps will be taken. The Kremlin has become, if it were possible, even more vociferous in its references to American imperialism and more stentorian in its promises to send Soviet backing to North Vietnam and to the United Arab Republic and to the Congolese rebels against Moise Tshombe—in a word to everything anti-American. Yet it is not clear whether all this is directed against the United States and the free world or whether Moscow is bidding in the underdeveloped areas for support for its own policies and hoping to undercut the influence of Communist China.

Barring some unforeseen crises in international affairs, it seems likely that for some time the new leaders of the Soviet Union are not going to risk any sudden overturning of the international situation, even though there may be discernible preparations for a harden-

ing of it. On the other hand, they have already started to attack the domestic problems which they claim were aggravated by Khrushchev. To do this, as so often in Soviet history, they have condemned Khrushchev for capitalistic concessions and are now attempting on a small scale to provide more consumer goods and to criticize the poor quality of much that has been turned out by Soviet factories, a policy first mentioned by Khrushchev and one that assisted in bringing about his fall. By the time that planting comes in the spring, the leaders should have their own agricultural policy existing at least on paper and possibly a faint hope that it can be carried out in practice.

The circumstances of the ousting of Khrushchev show us clearly that in reality nothing has changed in the Soviet Union and the Communist Party even though the brutal terror imposed by Stalin has at least for the moment been removed. As in any totalitarian state, the rivalries between the chief assistants which in free countries would be expressed by a difference in parties is here underground in the never-ending scheming for the ear of the leader of the state or party. The moment that leader fails in his attention to all details and allows too much leeway to his associates, one or several of them will scheme for his post, gradually deprive him of support, take advantage of his errors and then grab his place as soon as he safely can. Stalin did it after the death of Lenin and gradually removed from power and from life his chief rivals. Khrushchev did the same, even if he left them alive in obscurity and probably under strict surveillance. Now it is Khrushchev's turn and all the reports of the deterioration of his health as broadcast by his successors only serve to cover up the fact that absorbed in his own importance and his own fertile plans, he neglected to provide security for himself and his policies and he has paid the price.

It is for the free world to realize the significance of all this and not be misled by hopes or desires for an easy diminution of tension in the old struggle between freedom and slavery. It must not imagine that the Communist world has entered a new era of peace and friendship. It should be warned by the denunciations of American policy and imperialism and set its course even more resolutely than before toward its goal of freedom for all men and all nations, whether they live this side of the Iron Curtain or beyond it.

SOVIET EXCHANGE STUDENTS IN AMERICA

By WALTER ODAJNYK

The Exchange Program calls for the exchange each year between the United States and the Soviet Union of about fifty students. It was the good fortune of the writer, while living for two years as a student at the International House in Berkeley, California, to become well acquainted with two separate groups of Soviet exchange students. The following is an account of my impressions of these youthful people from the Soviet Union. I am, by the way, a native Ukrainian, outgoing by nature, and, I hope, fairly objective in my views and reactions.

The Soviet exchange student, I found, is unlike his American counterpart in that he is usually a professional who has already practiced his profession for some years. For him, it is part of a long-study process, in the course of which he is often asked to teach courses at a Soviet school (on a part-time basis) in his area of specialization.

The Soviet student usually holds the equivalent of our Master of Arts degree, and is working for the equivalent of our Doctor of Philosophy. In age he ranges from the mid-twenties to the early thirties. He is married, with a child or two. (Only one or two of the Soviet students are women.) He has been recommended as an exchange student on the basis of his proven ability and of a satisfactory political character.

I learned that these Soviet students, prior to departure for the United States, receive an orientation course in Moscow. They are introduced to former Soviet exchange students who answer practical queries and give specific information on the various American institutions of learning. Thus the second group of students I knew had a list of names of people in the International House and in Berkeley upon whom they could call for a friendly reception. Undoubtedly other tidbits of useful information were also passed down in this manner: the excellent but inexpensive restaurant nearby, the interesting sights, and so on.

As a Russian-speaking fellow student, I was able to help the exchange student with his plethora of problems: filling out forms,

shopping, transportation, use of telephone. Later, there were school reports and technical papers to be translated or simply polished. And, in the meantime, the Soviet student wanted to be shown around, to sightsee, to relax and, above all, to discuss things in Russian. This afforded me the rare opportunity to learn at first-hand what educated Soviet citizens are like, how they live and how they think. I ate with them, I went on trips with them, and I went to countless parties with them. I got to know them well.

Their acceptance of me, after an initial period of natural restraint, was a wholehearted one. Like youth everywhere, they were eager for experience; and all of life lay before them. The information and the impressions they had received about America had been carefully structured by the Kremlin. But now the gates were down. They were free to come and see and judge for themselves; the propaganda blinkers finally were off.

I remember my first visit to Volodya's room on the seventh floor of the International House. It was only the second day after his and his companions' arrival. They had flown to San Francisco from Moscow with short stopovers for plane changes in Copenhagen, Washington, and New York. I asked the usual question: "What do you think of America?" The answer was determined although defensive. "You have cars and roads here" he said, looking out the window. "We have them at home. You have buildings and trees here; we also have them at home. So you see, it's not all new and strange to us."

I asked no more questions then. But sharply different were Volodya's freely given reminiscences a few days before his departure from Berkeley. He spoke with gratitude and obvious pleasure of what he had seen and learned in the United States. He spoke with admiration of the American people and of American technology (he was a research engineer). Looking out the same window, he told me: "Now when I go back to my laboratory I will not be satisfied with what we have. I have seen something different. I have seen that things can be done in different and better ways." He was speaking of his profession, but it seemed to me he had his society in mind as well.

During my two years at Berkeley I got to know well eight Soviet students like Volodya, and through them I met many other "Soviet" people, not all of them students, who had come for a visit to San Francisco or Berkeley. The students I befriended formed a good cross-section of the Soviet Union: they came from many cities and republics—Moscow, Kiev, Tiflis, Leningrad, Gorky. Their areas of professional specialization also varied, although most were in the natural sciences and in engineering—chemistry, physics, geology,

petroleum engineering, machine design, automation. A few were in jurisprudence and journalism. As far as I was able to discover, two of them were members of the Communist Party and most were candidates for membership. But everyone of them was quite different; each, unsurprisingly, had his own personality.

WHAT ARE THEY LIKE?

On the whole, I found, these exchange students do not look upon their sojourn here as a period of intense academic work and study. They see their visit here mainly as a vacation, possibly as a reward for their former work, and certainly as an interesting and valuable personal experience. They do take a course or two; they do perform some research; many even write a paper. But these are not their dominating interests. Rather, they very quickly become involved in an active social life. They concentrate on learning English if only to learn about life and politics in the United States and in the Western world. Their social contacts are wholly free and unrestrained.

In appearance, manner, and general character they are very close to Americans, and so Americans have little difficulty in becoming acquainted with them, speaking with them, and understanding them as people. They have the robust and open friendliness of most Slavs, and in addition possess the self-assurance of men who are basking in the light of their own hard-earned success.

Thus one played on the House soccer team; another was on the House Program Committee, and all of them sang or performed for the residents during one or another of the monthly Sunday suppers. Several even acquired girl friends. They made visits, individually or in groups, to American families in Berkeley and the surrounding locality. But some of their warmest relationships were with Russian emigre families whom they visited to celebrate both American and Russian holidays—Christmas and Easter included. Their interest, however, was primarily directed towards Americans. They were eager to know Americans, and Americans were eager to know them. During the second semester, when their command of English was firmer, they either volunteered or were invited to give talks in the university, in neighboring high schools, and in any organization which would have them. They spoke and argued animatedly with anyone who would speak and argue with them. Yet near the end, I noticed, they became bored with the same questions and arguments.

They went on sightseeing trips, to parties, to dinners; they went shopping, at first for their own needs, then just windowshop-

ping. They were surprised by the high prices of most goods (not that prices are lower in their country). Apparently they thought—as still does most of the world—that the streets of America are paved with gold.

The group I knew this past year made a cross-country tour of the United States by bus, stopping at places they themselves chose where private hosts would welcome them and shelter them for a day or two. Their original plan had been to buy an inexpensive car and to make the trip across the continent at their own convenience. But they could not obtain official permission for such a junket. Another restriction which they faced while living at Berkeley was a twenty-five mile travel limit. If they wished to go further they were obliged to give a two-day notice to Washington; later this was changed to seven days prior notice. They did not complain at all about this restriction (which was nonetheless a foolish one).

A marked characteristic of these students as individuals, however, was their childishness and naivete. They seemed disciplined and mature in their studies only. They wanted to be told what to do, how to do it and when; they became confused when no such directions were forthcoming. They did not feel directly responsible for themselves or for their actions, placing all such responsibility upon their superiors. And what is more, they enjoyed it; it seemed to go far deeper than the sudden carefree abandon of the tourist in a strange place. Once a conflict in timing arose between two homes that they were supposed to visit for dinner on the same day. Before anything could be done to straighten out the snafu, one of the hosts arrived with a car to pick them up. So Alex, the accepted leader of the group (and, I am fairly certain, a party member), got into the car to discuss the situation. I stood outside with Volodya, who said only half-jokingly, "You see how good everything is for me. My superiors are deciding my fate, drawing up the contract, and all I have to do is sign."

Such an attitude, I believe, is the result of the Soviet system. It is a rigid, hierarchical, authoritarian system which does not provide enough freedom for the development of independent, self-reliant individuals. Both the Communist theory and the dictatorial government demand an individual who is more a part of the collective, of the community, who obeys authority in all matters, rather than his own will or belief.

Another illustration: I once accompanied group leader Alex, who wanted a pair of slacks, to a clothing store. He asked me to pick out the color for him and to give my approval as he tried on various pairs. When I gave noncommittal answers in order to let

the decision be his, he became surprisingly upset, only grudgingly forcing himself to choose. The fact that the range of prices varied with the same article presented an additional psychological problem. (This variation in cost, by the way, mystified all the students. They could not understand how one and the same article could have a different price in different stores. To them this seemed an unnecessary burden placed upon the consumer).

The influence of the Soviet paternalism is also evident in these students' attitudes towards their own families. In their remarks one notices a certain coolness; lacking is the usual pride of the Western husband and father. You ask them: "Do you have a family?" or "Do you have any children?" The answer is "Yes." And that is all. Once in a while they do show you pictures or do speak about missing their family, but again it is without that enthusiasm that one is accustomed to here.

My explanation for the strange phenomenon is that marriage in the Soviet Union is guided more by convenience and custom than by any other consideration: economically, it is more convenient, and, culturally, it is advisable to be married by a certain age. (One is reminded of the marital attitude of the so-called "organization man" in the United States.) The phenomenon can be explained further by the fact that in a socialist state the husband believes that no matter what he does or what happens to him his family will be provided for and his children educated. Consequently, he does not feel a deep personal responsibility for his family's welfare and future. As the Soviet government intends, he is able to devote himself to his work, i.e. to his state. The opposite is true of the West, where the husband is still the chief breadwinner in the household and where his family's life, health, education, and future depend almost wholly upon him and his spouse.

The students' lack of self-reliance and independence of mind is reflected in their political thoughts and pronouncements as well. True, they are much more sophisticated in political affairs and even in political philosophy than most educated Americans. For in order to complete their university training they must pass written and oral examinations in Marxism and dialectical materialism as a requisite subject. Yet while living at Berkeley all of them made a weekly if not daily pilgrimage to the Slavic Studies Library to read their *Pravda*. It was obviously an obligation. And they would express no opinion on current political topics had they not yet read up on the official position of their government. Once the position was given, they would collectively parrot it and collectively defend it. The question of what they thought individually about the matter

was not even considered, for they simply accepted the Soviet thesis that in these things they themselves were ignorant, that the leaders of their country knew what was to be done and what was for the best. (In this light our major party conventions are refreshing and reassuring, even if not the best television fare).

Upon their arrival they expected to find the same political practice and uniformity of views in the United States. The first serious discussion that I had with them, in fact, was exactly on this issue. They had been here two weeks or so when we decided to see Chinatown in San Francisco. I borrowed a car to chauffeur them around. On the way, Alex delicately broached the subject with me (I was doing graduate work in political philosophy), asking what the official philosophical position of the professors was. He added that in his country they taught Marxism and dialectical materialism and that he imagined that here the position was characterized by anti-Marxism.

I answered that everything here depended upon the individual professor, that there were professors who were Marxists (although not necessarily Communists—a distinction too narrow for them, as for most of our people), that there were many professors who saw value in Marxism in a number of aspects but did not consider it a sacred doctrine as do the Soviets, and that there were many more professors who were non-Marxists. Thus a student is exposed to all views and in the end must make his own decision as to the significance of Marxism. In addition, I pointed out, not every class in school dealt with Marxism or any other political philosophy; classes in the sciences, literature, etc. were classes in those subjects only and the mention of political philosophy was to be considered an accident, never an aim. I said this remembering how one of the Russians, who was studying chemistry, had described to me the truth and the value of dialectical materialism in understanding and analyzing chemical processes.

Alex was at first surprised by my reply, then openly skeptical.

It was only much later, I believe, that he and the others came to acknowledge the validity of my answer.

The second group of students that I knew had been here only a month when the Cuban missile crisis flared up. They, as did all the students in the International House, saw on television Zorin's denial at the U.N. and the pictures taken of the missile sites, listened to the President's speech and later participated in discussions around the University. It was their first lesson in American democracy. They saw and heard many students and groups of people around the country taking opposing stands on the issue. In a subsequent

interview with the school paper they acknowledged that discussion during the Cuban crisis was free, but, one of them added, "there were a lot of police around" at the outdoor meetings around the university. He asked me later what I thought of the interview and I told him that his observation revealed that evidently in his country the role of the uniformed police was not limited to the maintenance of public order. Nevertheless, through these and similar experiences, that overworked American phrase—"This is a free country"—hit home, and near the end they were using it as jokingly and as perceptively as do our high school students in their first mature glimpse of freedom and its responsibilities.

I observed that they were curious and pleased to be able freely to follow foreign affairs from the American point of view and see the reactions of Americans to various matters. They showed a lively interest in all international issues as well as in that tragic, and to foreigners enigmatic, American domestic issue—the Negro and the civil rights problem. Their own burning domestic issue—Stalinism—was a sore point with them. They did not defend Stalin and his times, but they did point out (as did Khrushchev) that the direction in which Stalin was aiming was correct, although the means were not. Pointing out that the remnants of Stalinism are still with them, and that the nature of their system is such that it can easily give rise to another Stalin, usually left them silent after a perfunctory denial. This was especially true of the older students, who remembered Stalin's days. To the younger, Stalin is history, and history can be denied without accompanying uncomfortable memories or emotions.

On a problem which was of a more personal interest to me, I once cornered the student who was born and educated in Kiev, the capital of my father's country—Ukraine. It was a sad revelation to me that I spoke Ukrainian better than he. Piece by piece I dug out the somber story of the continued subjugation and unceasing Russification of my parents' country. For centuries it had suffered under the brutal yoke of the Russian Empire. Now, aside from a change in its rulers, its name, and a further extension in its boundaries, it is still the same empire. Its success is even greater because the new communist ideology used to justify imperialism is more subtle, more disarming, and therefore more effective. The basic methods, however, remain the same.

This Ukrainian student had been educated in Kiev, capital of Ukraine, but in Russian-speaking schools. His scientific terminology was Russian, which made for an incongruous situation when he wrote his articles. If they were for Ukrainian journals, they had to be translated, since Ukrainian scientific terminology is totally different

from the Russian. So here was a Ukrainian writing in Russian for Ukrainian journals who had to have his articles translated from Russian to Ukrainian. I chided him on this and on his poor language. He answered that Russian is the most often-used language: Kiev is bilingual in newspapers, communications, posters. I wondered then what was the use of calling oneself Ukrainian and bothering with the Ukrainian language at all; why not just forget it and be Russian. His somewhat murky answer was that in time all languages will develop into one universal language so that such things make little difference in the first place. I imagine he thought he was helping the universal process by speaking Russian.

Asking about his national pride, history and culture, I was told that in the Soviet Union the question of nationalism was not posed as I put it, that Ukrainians, for the first time in their history, are united in all their lands, and that the Communists have done much to make Ukraine a modern, educated, industrialized nation. I asked about pride in self-rule as well. He thought Ukraine possessed it. Besides, again it is not Ukraine or Russia but the Soviet Union which is the nation of which Ukraine is a part, receiving much help. On the contrary, I rejoined, Ukraine has been giving the help, and industrially and agriculturally does not need the rest of the Soviet Union to exist. I asked about Ukrainian culture. He said there was now only the Soviet culture. I asked him to define that, and also asked if there were a capitalist culture as well. I was told that there was, and he derided the usual Ukrainian folk pictures of the cherry orchard near a mud hut and spoke of the new Soviet culture of cities and factories.

Later, when I saw all the students for the last time in New York City, they were surprised to find portraits of Taras Shevchenko, the Ukrainian poet, on the walls of all the Ukrainian meeting houses, for they had always thought that he was a proponent of unity with Russia. I explained that that was the result of their government's forced interpretation; in actuality, he was first of all a Ukrainian patriot. Surprisingly, they accepted my statement without protest. But they informed me that among the Ukrainian peasants "Petlura" is considered a derogatory term (Simon Petlura, head of the Ukrainian Army during the stormy 1917-1921 period).

IMPRESSIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

Their open or implied criticism of the United States, I found, was mild, becoming negligible with duration of stay. When they come here, I would say, they really don't know what to expect. The

reports about America that they receive in the Soviet Union are conflicting. On the one hand, they are told that America is a dying nation and that its economy cannot supply and feed its people. On the other, they are told that America is a powerful enemy and that they should learn to emulate its progress in economy and technology. Even though they are sophisticated enough to distill some of the propaganda from the facts, nonetheless they are shocked at finding a powerful, elastic, and viable industry and commerce of a magnitude they never imagined possible. They come to find the large majority of ordinary workers living at an economically higher standard than does the Soviet elite—that is, themselves. Instead of a nation of immoral degenerates they find that most of the American people are more moral and more religious than their own.

Soon after their arrival, one of the students (whom I put down as the other party member) was glad to hear me confirm the fact that serious people do not plaster pin-ups all over their living room walls. He apparently was under the impression that all Americans chew gum or smoke fat cigars (still a capitalistic symbol, apparently), put their feet up on the table or desk, and stare all day at pictures of nude women. It is these naive but pervasive stereotypes that the exchange students soon discard during their stay here. On the other hand, the Americans who meet them similarly drop the stereotypes of the Russian who eats the glass with his vodka and smiles idiotically and backslaps everyone within reach, or of the melancholy booted peasant in a long frock who weeps over his accordion.

In the end, the serious criticisms that these students are able to make reduce themselves to the poor or to the lack of medical attention for people without money; the social stigmatization and abandonment of a worker and his family who is ill or old and has no earning power; the right of employers to discharge employees without concern about the employees' future welfare; the large number of people who contribute nothing to the economy or society and yet earn great incomes simply because they inherited money, and, lastly, the outlawing of the Communist Party in what we ourselves claim is a "free country."

On the positive side, boundless is their admiration for America, its people, technology, power and wealth. They are puzzled by our political system and never fully understand it. But although the economic system is less mystifying, they are amazed by its results. They are staggered by the sight of millions of cars on the roads, in every town, in every driveway. They are dazzled by the speed with which American workers are able to work, the speed

with which a large building goes up, the degree of standardization, the efficiency in organization, the highly developed practical technology. And they are beguiled by all those innumerable useful and useless gadgets, products, stores. They are surprised that the economy bothers to make such a thing as Q-tips; they are bewildered to find many variations and prices of the same article.

And the fact that this is possible in the maze of differing and conflicting opinions, volumes of independent newspapers, and a lack of any official philosophy is the biggest surprise of all. America seems an anarchy compared to their land of national campaigns, crash-programs, priority systems, late hours, and a six-day week.

The exchange students were greatly impressed as well by the American people. The feminine part of our society, for which of course they had a universal interest, they found to be almost too practical and too self-reliant. Not enough romance, it seemed (despite the statistical fact that there are more working and career women in the Soviet Union than here). But they were pleased to find that Americans are helpful, friendly, kind, polite—polite even when they are drunk, added the student from Georgia. They found that Americans desire peace and not war, and that they work hard. (The last is a revelation to most foreigners, who think of Americans as well-fed and slothful. Educated Europeans have a cavalier attitude towards work, and are surprised to discover that Americans are not afraid to get their hands dirty. Only then do they realize that the power and the wealth of America is due in no little degree to the sweat of its people.)

The Soviet students ended by thinking that Americans really work too hard and do not know how to enjoy themselves. They complained that an American's enjoyment consisted of his house, his car and his TV set. They thought him too lonely; he did not know the pleasures of frequent social gatherings of friends, feasts, and so on. They also thought he was almost too moral and too religious, taking these matters with an extremely somber and serious attitude. But they only then understood why America protests so vehemently to Communist atheism and its persecution of religion. (In an attempt to shed some light on these attitudes of Americans towards work, leisure, and religion, I described to them the Puritan tradition and the Germanic temperament to which Americans are heirs).

As for American students, they thought students are the same the world over, but again, as with the rest of the American people, they thought that American university students also work and study

harder than do their counterparts in the Soviet Union. Aside from this, they found the educational systems to be comparable.

I last saw my Soviet friends in New York City. Through a coincidence their embassy placed them in a student hostel only two blocks away from my apartment on the lower East Side. My meeting them on their arrival at Berkeley, my good-natured chaperoning of them there, my Russian language, my subject of study—Political Science with a thesis on Marxism and Existentialism—and, lastly, the proximity of our dwellings in New York—all this, I fear, finally made them somewhat suspicious of me. Was I working for my government or theirs? The truth is, of course, that I was working for neither. It is unfortunate that their upbringing and the relations between our countries should be such as to give rise to such suspicion.

THE CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAM

Suspicion can only be allayed by increased knowledge; and for this reason if none other the cultural exchange program is a most useful one. For my part, I saw that the students who come here are not spies, agitators, or propaganda agents; they are, at worst, products of the Soviet system who come to our country with burning curiosity and leave it with gratitude for the opportunity to visit and live here for even a short period of time. A visible and favorable change occurs in their attitude toward the United States between their arrival and departure. Needless to say, the return to the Soviet Union broadened by their experience with democracy in action.

We here in America know there are imperfections in our way of life. Perhaps one day the seed these students carry back with them will sprout and permit the flowering of a dignified and liberated life for them. I speak, of course, of the seed of freedom.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE POETICAL WORKS OF TARAS SHEVCHENKO: THE KOBZAR. Translated from the Ukrainian by C. H. Andrusyshen and Watson Kirkconnell. Published for the Ukrainian Canadian Committee by University of Toronto Press. Toronto. 1964, 563. \$8.00.

Vasyl Simovych's edition of *The Kobzar* which served as the Ukrainian original for this translation is considered to be a very reliable and well prepared work. This edition was carefully translated into English by C. H. Andrusyshen, who kept not only the accuracy of the text but also its spirit. This accurate text was then versified by Watson Kirkconnell. He, as an experienced translator, aimed to render the text as closely as possible, providing at the same time poetry which would be well read in English. In doing this he tried to avoid the mistakes of the late A. J. Hunter who, being moved more by zeal than by art, produced a rather rough and ready rhymed version of Shevchenko's poetry. Clarence A. Manning approached Shevchenko's writings with more scholarly preparation. In his translations he struggled mostly for direct meaning, observing the rhythm but with less success in rhyme. Even the recent translations by Vera Rich are commonly based on assonance rather than on rhyme. Her permanent struggle for accuracy which resulted in such lovely renderings of the original, often deviated from normal English syntax and rhythm.

Watson Kirkconnell succeeded in avoiding previous deviations, especially in rhyme. He used congenial English metres, making Shevchenko's poetry more memorable for English readers and at the same time showed the greatness of Shevchenko's work, which is for the first time truly depicted in English.

Shevchenko's metrical heritage consists of two main patterns of rhythm—*kolomyika* verse (alternative lines of eight and six syllables, with general trochaic movement and great freedom in stressing) and the *koliadka* verse (lines of eleven and twelve syllables with general groupings into amphibrachs and equally free stresses on either side of fixed caesuras). The two types of rhythm are subtly varied, and the presence of iambic and anapaestic metres adds to the rhythmic richness of Shevchenko's verse. As these forms are unknown in English the translator tried to substitute them with varied English metres as he passed from poem to poem. In translating ballads, he used the ballad metre. In other poems he resorted to octosyllabic couplets, to heroic couplets, to blank verse, etc.

The greatest asset of this translation lies in the fact that the authors had art in mind and tried to get all other factors in coherence with it.

To see the difficulty in securing rhymes which are exact in sound, adequate in meaning and both natural and unprosaic, let us compare the Ukrainian original with the English translation:

My dark-browed beauties, fall in love,
But love no Muscovite,
For Moscow troopers aliens,
And court in your despite.

("KATERYNA," p. 14)

Ukrainian original:

Kokhaytesia, chornobryvi!
Ta ne z moskaliamy,
Bo moskali—chuzhi liudy,
Robliat' lykho z vamy.

(“KATERYNA”)

Here the translator used the ballad stanza—a quatrain in alternate four and three-stress lines, rhyming abcb. This way he preserved the original rhyme in Ukrainian, adequately showing the meaning and making his English translation natural and meriting English poetry. However, in order to overcome the structural differences between English and Ukrainian the translator rendered 14 Shevchenko words to 20 English. As a result Kirkconnell's translation is as close as possible to the original, and at the same time is kept on a high aesthetic level.

Let us now investigate the heroic couplet in the poem “The Neophytes.” The Kirkconnell version:

For some time now, a prisoner I stay
Like some dark thief in exile hid away;
At highroad and at fields my glance I toss
And at a raven perched upon a cross
In a graveyard,—nothing else enranded
Shows from my prison window; God be thanked
For what I see! 'Tis certain to my eye
That fellow-Christians live and pray and die
As once they did.

(“PROLOGUE,” p. 484)

Ukrainian original:

Davno vzhe ia sydzu v nevoli,
Nenache zlodiy vzaperti,
Na shliakh dyvliusia ta na pole,
Ta na voronu na khresti
Na kladovyshchi; bilsh nichoho
Z tiurmy ne vydno; slava Bohu
I za te, shcho bachu, shcho zhyvut,
I Bohu moliat'sia, i mrut'
Khryshcheni liudy.

(“NEOPFIT”)

Here, the lines of poetry rhyme in pairs in the form of the iambic pentameter which is so widely used in heroic couplets. Shevchenko's narrative is again rendered with a full understanding of the original rhythm and rhyme and is exact in sound and adequate in meaning. To overcome the structural differences the translator used 68 English words to Shevchenko's 44.

As a whole Shevchenko's poetry which is permeated with elements of folk-speech, has an astonishing power of expression and is very colorful and of wide range. Sometimes it seems too simple, but on the whole it is exceptionally rich and stylistically varied. In the *Biuletyn'* of 1939 published by the Ukrainian Academy of Kiev, we find that hardly more than fifty percent of the total number of verses in *The Kobzar* are written in Ukrainian folk-song metres and that thirty percent of the verses are iambic, directly in variance with the predominantly trochaic meters of the folk-songs.

In this translation, we notice the high qualities of Kirkconnell's poetical abilities which he showed in the poetical form and in the understanding of the spirit of Shevchenko's poetry. His translations are far from mechanical renderings of the text. They show linguistic and aesthetic maturity and fine poetic taste. Every line of poetry is not only translated into English, but created with a unique quality of freshness and poetic expression.

Kirkconnell wrote in his preface to this edition: "I was all too well aware, moreover, of the possible vulnerability of my Ukrainian scholarship." However, his Ukrainian scholarship, as proved by his poetic translation, is of high quality and of a deep and varied poetic touch.

The rough work for this translation was done by C. H. Andrusyshen who equally shares the high qualities of this poetical work. His eloquent English in the introduction and in the footnotes is one additional proof of his scholarship and understanding of Shevchenko and his poetry.

Thus the joint effort of Andrusyshen and Kirkconnell produced a monumental work. Shevchenko, the immortal Ukrainian bard, now speaks to the English reader with his fiery, creative word which is of high quality and invincible spirit. "The unconquerable hope" became conquerable and the translated version shows high accuracy and definitely carries the merit of English poetry.

This first translation of the complete poetical works of Taras Shevchenko should have wide appeal to all who are interested in Ukrainian poetry and in the Ukrainian struggle for democracy and freedom.

The Poetical Works of Taras Shevchenko: The Kobzar is sponsored by the Ukrainian Canadian Committee to commemorate the 150th birth anniversary of Taras Shevchenko. This edition offers a fine opportunity for all English speaking people to become acquainted with Shevchenko's literary treasury and his ideals of truth, liberty and beauty.

Texas Technological College

W. T. ZYLA

RUSSIAN PANORAMA. By Kumar Padma Sinasankar Menon. Oxford University Press, London-Bombay, 1962. Pp. 278.

The author of this book served as the Indian Ambassador to Moscow in the years 1952-1962, in the course of which he traveled extensively throughout the Soviet Union. Despite the well-known limitations on travel in the Soviet Union Ambassador Menon succeeded in making a thoroughgoing study of the nationality problem within the USSR on the basis of his personal experience and observation.

Thus, for instance, his description of Ukraine is not only sympathetic but accurate as well. While traveling through Ukraine, Mr. Menon noticed the beauty of the Ukrainian countryside and that the villages of Ukraine were far more attractive and far cleaner than those in Russia. The same holds true for the appearance of Ukrainians as compared with Russians. The Ukrainians, he notes, are more friendly, gayer, better dressed and freer in their personal relationships with foreigners.

He also notes that Ukraine is larger than France; after the incorporation of Western Ukraine, Carpatho-Ukraine and the Crimea into Ukraine, it became the largest (after the Russian Republic) state within the USSR.

In Kiev Ambassador Menon was enchanted with the beauty of St. Sophia's Cathedral, built in the Polish-Ukrainian rococo style, especially in the execution of its dome and the symbolics of Jesus Christ and his twelve apostles.

In Kharkiv, which up to 1934 was the capital of the Ukrainian SSR, Ambassador Menon was impressed with the development of Ukrainian industry, and in Poltava he noticed the characteristics of a "true Ukrainian city" (p. 106). He also describes vividly the port city of Odessa. In the city of Zaporizhia the Indian author found many examples of Ukrainian antiquity, as it was the seat of the Ukrainian Zaporozhian Kozaks, whom author Menon characterizes, regrettably, inaccurately as playing "an important role in the history of Russia in the 17th and 18th centuries" (sic!). Now Zaporizhia has over 430,000 inhabitants.

Author Menon complains of the fact that the Russians use only the letter "g" in their alphabet, while the Ukrainians use both "g" and "h." By confusing these two letters one may encounter serious difficulties and misunderstandings. He also warns the foreigner not to be misled by the superficial similarity between the Ukrainian and Russian languages, inasmuch as the basic differences are great and substantial.

On the whole the book, *Russian Panorama*, despite its somewhat inappropriate title, is fascinating and lively reading. No little of its value lies in the fact that its Indian author did not fall into any political and propaganda trap, as unfortunately is the case with many American tourists and visitors to the Soviet Union who see in the USSR nothing but "Russia" and the "Russian people." No one reading this account can continue to believe that the Soviet Union is a "monolithic" nation. It is, of course, a conglomeration of many non-Russian nations that are virtual colonies and dependencies of colonial Moscow, the seat and center of the largest colonial empire in the world today.

Rector, Ukrainian Free University, Munich PROF. VASYL ORELECKY

RUSSIA AT WAR, 1941-1945. By Alexander Werth. New York, E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1964 xxv. + 1100.

This is a very important book and in some ways it perhaps justifies its rating by William L. Shirer as "the best book we probably shall ever have in English on Russia at war." Alexander Werth, who had been born in St. Petersburg (now Leningrad) in 1901, had left it after the Revolution and had then spent many years as a reporter in England and France. In 1941 he flew back to the Soviet Union and remained there as a reporter for *The Sunday Times* and the British Broadcasting Corporation until 1948 and all this gave him unusual opportunities not only for observation but for personal contacts with people of all classes including the foreign representatives. A later visit in the post-Stalin era gave him the opportunity to become familiar with the new version of the war that was on many points promulgated by Khrushchev who was building up his own "cult of personality" and again correcting certain points in history and falsifying others. We can expect the same thing to happen again since the fall of Khrushchev but we cannot yet know what points are to be restored and what advanced afresh.

His introduction which contains some valuable reflections on his aims and methods should be read carefully, for in it he comes closer to giving judgments than he does in the work particularly about the Poles and Stalin. He tends to accept the Polish statement that the dead in Katyn were killed by Communists but he also tends to accept the Stalin side of the failure to take Warsaw.

On the other hand his point of view throughout is what we can fairly call standard Russian. As a result he is somewhat aghast at Stalin's frank

statement in May 24, 1945 in his special praise for the Russian people, "the most remarkable of all the nations of the Soviet Union" (p. 1001). He asks what that speech really meant including "all sorts of mental reservations not only about the 'disloyal' nationalities like the Crimean Tartars, the Caucasian mountaineers and probably also the Balts (who were punished in varying degrees), but even about the Ukrainians whose record, in Stalin's suspicious eyes, had been uneven. The Red Army was rich in Ukrainian generals and Ukrainian "Heroes of the Soviet Union," and yet there were other Ukrainians whose loyalty to Moscow and the Soviet system had been questionable. In Western Ukraine, at that time, Ukrainian nationalists were still conducting a guerrilla war against the Russians, and this was going to continue until 1947" (p. 1002).

This is his most respectful reference to Ukrainian nationalism, which in Werth's mind had no other basis than a plot deliberately set forth and fostered by the Germans and Nazis to hurt Russia. Yet this is a standard attitude not only in Czarist writings but in many of the Soviet Russian authors who refuse to see the Ukrainians as a separate people included in the Russian prison of nations, now the Soviet Union.

As a result all of his references and quotations about them are extremely bitter and sarcastic, as on p. 788, when he says "Petlura, head of an ephemeral Ukrainian nationalist 'Government' in 1918 and Makhno, head of a peasant anarchist movement during the Civil War, were both notorious for their banditry and anti-Semitic pogroms. Petlura was assassinated by a Jew in Paris in 1928." (Actually Petlura was killed on May 25, 1926). In other references to the Ukrainians in his description of the German occupation of Ukraine, he is equally scurrilous in his inexactitude. His references to the Balts and the Tartars are of the same general character, although he perhaps recognizes that their differences from the Great Russians were more obvious and perhaps more justified.

We have the same tendency in his remarks on the various Ukrainian Orthodox Bishops and he completely ignores the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western Ukraine and does not refer to it once.

In the same way, he expresses disapproval of the American military representatives whenever they had any reservations on the successes of Communism. Likewise he himself thought (p. 853) that the Russians disliked American shuttle-bombing bases near Poltava (because the natives were Ukrainian and not Russian?).

These criticisms show the main defects of the book. Alexander Werth is apparently an accurate observer and has tried to present a true picture but even he has been staggered by the differences, once he was compelled to take note of events and feelings outside of Great Russian territory. His opposition to the Nazis is so great that he cannot appreciate that other peoples in Russia who had been ruthlessly exploited and massacred (as at Vynnytsia in Ukraine) felt at the outset of the war far less repulsion than he and so he has very inadequate references to the opposition of the non-Russian peoples to both Nazi excesses and Communist tyranny. If this is remembered, the work can be used very fruitfully.

Columbia University

CLARENCE A. MANNING

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, A COMMUNIST BLUEPRINT FOR VICTORY.

By the Standing Committee on Education Against Communism, American Bar Association, Chicago, Illinois, 1964, pp. 123.

Though a short work as far as pages go, this valuable book is long in depth and incisive in the penetration of its major subject, the Russian concept

of "peaceful coexistence." Basically, it is a highly useful compilation of selected communist statements on the meaning and intent of peaceful coexistence. The American Bar Association has for over a decade encouraged such studies, and in this case it enlisted the services of Mr. Richard V. Allen of the Center for Strategic Studies at Georgetown University to produce the work. The study is conveniently arranged according to numerous sub-topics of pointed relevance to the general subject and makes for easy understanding by the average reader.

Back in 1950 the far-sighted American Bar Association established through its House of Delegates a Special Committee on Communist Tactics, Strategy and Objectives to inform not only the barristers of the nation but also the general public about the nature and operations of what is vaguely called world communism. Associated with the body is the Standing Committee on Education Against Communism, which has made possible the publication of this work as well as others. It goes without saying that in these fundamental respects the contributions of the A.B.A. to the growth of American understanding and vigilant appreciation of the mortal threat confronting all of us have been immensely salutary. The present study is a solid addition to the cumulative list of its contributions.

In the foreword, the chairman of the special committee, Morris I. Leibman, sets forth the problem with clarity and succinctness when he declares, "Genuine peace is one thing; the charade of Communist 'peaceful coexistence' is a game of quite different intent" (p. IX). The neatly documented contents of the work prove this chasmic difference with more than telling effect. However, in the preface furnished by the standing committee it is unfortunate that the usual artificial constructions about Marx and Marxism are injected into a work of this kind. For example, it is speciously stated that "Marx himself believed that Communist and Capitalist states were wholly incompatible" (p. XII). If the writer of this were really familiar with the Marxist system and its underscore of the inevitability of socialism for better or for worse, he would find that the problem of compatibility hasn't even academic worth. To assert that "Marxism must reject any genuine form of 'peaceful coexistence' (or anything more than the temporary basis of expediency) or cease to be" (p. XIII) makes no sense in the context of Marx's objectivist analysis of capitalist dynamics and, worse still, sadly confuses Marxism with imperio-colonialist Russianism and its empire-building techniques, which long before Lenin included the substance of "peaceful coexistence."

Fortunate for the purpose of the work itself, the preface and its many inaccuracies are in a sense extraneous to the essential contents of the study itself. To cite another example, when dealing with Lenin, the standing committee gives evidence of a similar lack of background to the man and his period in imperial Russian history. "At Brest-Litovsk," it states, "he signed a formal treaty with Germany which allowed Mother Russia to be dismembered" (p. XIII). As any careful analyst knows, this treaty was only a temporary retreat for Lenin in his pursuit for entrenched power. From an historical viewpoint, it involved no dismemberment of "Mother Russia" but of the Russian Empire itself, and the two, strictly speaking, are not identical. On the other hand, the lengthy preface has many good points about Stalin and his function as manager of "planned periods of peaceful coexistence," demonstrated for instance by his leading the USSR into the League of Nations while he was financing plots, subversion activities, Popular Fronts all over the world, and also "peace movements" during the 30's.

After studiously reading this work one can have little excuse for not comprehending the Russian meaning of peaceful coexistence. Lenin had used the concept, as did Stalin later, albeit with a defensive connotation when Soviet Russia and then the USSR were ostensibly encircled by hostile capitalist powers. Khrushchev infused the concept with an offensive tenor along strategic as against tactical lines. In his eye-opening address of January 6, 1961, the former Russian leader put it this way: "The policy of peaceful coexistence, as regards its social content, is a form of intense economic, political, and ideological struggle of the proletariat against the aggressive forces of imperialism in the international arena" (p. 14). This conception is identical in substance to the one expressed in the statement of the 81 Communist and Workers Parties of December 1960: "The policy of peaceful coexistence is a policy of mobilizing the masses and launching vigorous action against the enemies of peace" (p. 15). The active and offensive nature of this conception is obvious.

The study becomes most useful in concisely relating this latest conception of peaceful coexistence to questions of primary import to most citizens, such as global war, the nuclear test ban treaty, the balance of power, the idea of systemic convergence, and the future of capitalist society. To realize goals of conquest without engendering war and the confrontation of military forces is a crowning achievement that has been a jewel in Muscovite-Russian policy since the days of Ivan the Terrible. In essence, there is nothing new in this; and objectively, the Russian strategem of peaceful coexistence does not preclude war, nuclear or otherwise. It is regrettable that these conceptions are not cast against the long background of imperialist Russian history, showing, for example, how "peaceful coexistence" was applied to Ukraine, Poland, Georgia and others in the 18th and 19th centuries. But, lacking this perspective, the reader can nevertheless gain some insight by observing how contemporary Moscow apologists view the issue of war and "peaceful coexistence." Writing on Soviet defense might, I. Glagolev states, "Peaceful coexistence, which is the general line of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries, does not imply a temporary absence of war, or a breathing space between clashes. Not at all" (p. 17). If Moscow should ever achieve a technologic breakthrough to nuclear military superiority, the full meaning of this theoretic position would be witnessed with utmost concrete clarity.

While many Americans viewed the partial nuclear test ban treaty as a progressive step toward "peace," Moscow and its satrapies interpreted it as an advance for the interests of "the socialist countries," negatively by decelerating U. S. military, technological progress and positively by allowing Moscow to digest data from the fifty megaton blast that the U. S. low yield program failed to accommodate. Immediately after the signing of what the Russians insisted should be called the Moscow Treaty, Khrushchev elucidated the Russian position perfectly: "A fight is in progress between the two systems, a life and death combat. But we Communists want to win this struggle with the least losses and there is no doubt whatever that we shall win" (p. 27). Hitler never expressed his intentions more clearly than this. We ignored the open Nazi record thirty years ago and paid for it dearly. Are we foolish to commit the same mistake again, at that with a far more insidious enemy?

A very interesting point is brought out in the study on the notion of "correlation of forces," which the Russians prefer to speak about rather than balance of power. Khrushchev saw a shift in power registered thus by a higher correlation of forces when the West, despite its firm reluctance, accepted at least the use of the term "peaceful coexistence." Former President Eisenhower, Sec-

retary of State Dulles and numerous others rejected even the use, not to say the meaning, of the term. Actually, the shift in power was far more propagandistic, playing on the instinctive desire of peoples for peace, than physical in a military or economic sense. The fundamental weaknesses of the USSR armed services are as deep as they were ten years ago. The shield of nuclear weapons cannot conceal the frailties of a multi-national mechanism which Moscow itself is most reluctant to commit to any direct engagement, and with good historical reasons. Little wonder that Khrushchev turns to other types of war: "Liberation wars will continue to exist as long as imperialism exists, as long as colonialism exists. These are revolutionary wars. Such wars are not only admissible but inevitable..." (pp. 58-59).

Vitally important, too, is the Russian attitude toward the systemic convergence theory which is wishfully nurtured in numerous Western circles. The theory sees in time a gradual shift toward the right in the framework of so-called Soviet society as it adopts more "capitalistic" methods, while the Western nations move toward the left with more "socialistic" forms of socio-economic organization; a point will be reached that will spell societal convergence, war will have been avoided, and all will live happily in peace and prosperity. A Russian theorist, A. Solodovnikov, describes this unrealistic theory well when he says, "A dream, perhaps a sweet dream, but one that will not come true. First, they ignore the fact that the social structures of these two countries are diametrically different" (p. 51). As his second point, he could have mentioned that the totalitarian structure of the USSR depends for its survival on the long-term advances of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, the one reinforcing the other. He is confident, however, in this: "Our Socialist world is definitely helping capitalism in one thing: to dig its grave the more quickly. Such are the facts of the 'fruitful' competition of the two systems" (pp. 52-53). This obsessive dedication to victory is quite common. On numerous occasions Khrushchev had uttered it to this effect: "Capitalism... wants to bury the Socialist system and we want—not only want but have dug—quite a deep hole, and shall exert efforts to dig this hole deeper and bury the capitalist system forever" (p. 83).

Taking the substantive part of this study alone, there are several limitations and drawbacks. For reasons explained above, the commentary is exceedingly weak in connection with imperialism and colonialism. The documented excerpts show a heavy emphasis on these points, but it seems to escape the commentator that the reason for this depth of protest is the breadth of commission of these political crimes by the accuser. The Soviet Russian and Red Chinese imperio-colonialists are extremely vulnerable in this respect. However, it is somewhat strange that a wholesome insistence is made throughout the study on the precise meaning of words and a necessary recognition of qualifiers, and yet one finds the use of a whole list of fallacious concepts and answers, such as the USSR being "a 'have' nation," the "Soviet people," "the Soviets," Russia equated with the USSR, and similar imprecise, misleading notions. To be sure, "Know your enemy" should be reiterated endlessly, but the purpose of it is, after all, to really come to know the enemy. And lastly, it is strange, too, that the otherwise excellent glossary of terms at the end of the work should include no mention of "bourgeois nationalism." More than any other, this term of Soviet Russian opprobrium has outlasted the best of Moscow's favorites in denunciatory vehemence, and its use is reflective of the internal struggles of the USSR itself. Its omission is indicative, again, of the short background material brought to the treatment of the main subject.

Nevertheless, despite these detractions, this study attains favorably to its objective, namely, demonstrating the strategic value of "peaceful coexistence" to Moscow. It also embraces many fine insights into the current struggle. For example, as the author puts it, "The cold war has not concluded, but has entered a new and still more complex phase in which the spectrum of psychological, political, economic, and class warfare will be radically expanded" (p. 84). More than a prophetic note is struck when toward the close it is pointed out that "The great paradox of our time may well turn out to be our inability to recognize that the cold war has in reality become more intense despite the increasing appearances of peace" (p. 85). These are only a few of the challenging perceptions running through this study.

Georgetown University

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN, By Joseph S. Roucek and Kenneth V. Lottich. The Caxton Printers, Ltd., Caldwell, Idaho, 1964. Pp. 631.

Much has been written lately on political "changes and developments" behind the Iron Curtain. In fact, some of our leading newspapers, and indeed, our policy-makers, stubbornly insist that substantial changes are now taking place in Eastern Europe, all of which are supposedly adding up to a powerful trend toward "liberalization" and "evolution of freedom" behind the Iron Curtain. Even President Johnson, in his State of the Union message, strongly indicated that relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are such as to warrant a visit on his part to the Soviet Union. "Bridges to Eastern Europe" are now being built, at least imaginarily, and some of our enthusiastic "do-gooders" are doubtlessly ready to send a U. S. Peace Corps unit to Eastern Europe.

Yet there are other men among us who, by virtue of their training and specific knowledge, tell us a wholly different story.

Joseph S. Roucek of Bridgeport University and Kenneth V. Lottich of Montana State University, have produced a powerful work, *Behind the Iron Curtain*, which is packed with vital information, data and reports on the day-to-day life in the ten so-called satellite countries—Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania. Although the book confines itself to these countries, the anti-Russian and anti-Communist opposition in Ukraine and in other non-Russian nations within the USSR proper is dwelt on in Chapter II, "The Communist Ideology."

The book closely scrutinizes the experience of these ten captive nations under the communist masters since the end of World War II.

Concentrated profiles of the early history of each country are presented in order to show the impact and influence and potential educational significance of nationalism and the relationship of the new and the old in the educational and social structures. Heretofore little attention has been given—or at least not to the extent that this book devotes—to the attempt of the Communist rulers in Eastern and Central Europe to create a "new" Soviet type of man. Here we find a vivid picture of the educational system being implemented by the Communists in the production of this "flesh and blood robot," a process which we have come to know as "brainwashing." The creation of *homo sovieticus* is not confined, we see, to the captive nations in Soviet Russia proper.

The book can be considered both subjective and objective in its treatment of and approach to the Communist world. It does not condone political indoctrination through subversion of schools or other agencies at the disposal

of a totalitarian state. On the other hand, it does not falsify the record, nor does it include many instances of the use of extreme terror in the totalitarian states in order to make the book "sensational" and hence more widely saleable.

The chapter on Mao Tse-tung was contributed by Dr. Theodore Hsi-En Chen, Director of the Soviet Asia Studies Center at the University of Southern California. This chapter sheds much illumination on the present schism between Moscow and Peking.

The book is an authoritative account on the way of life proposed and extolled by the Communists. Both authors are outstanding authorities in this field and their expert knowledge is tapped in depth in the book. Both Prof. Roucek and Prof. Lottich are members of the Editorial Advisory Board of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*; and their articles and expertise have considerably bolstered the attempt of this periodical in the past twenty years to present the realities existing behind the Iron Curtain. We recommend this book to all students of Communism, Russian imperialism and colonialism, as well as to school and private libraries and government offices, for *Behind the Iron Curtain* is a veritable fount of information on what is actually going on in ten captive and satellite countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

WALTER DUSHNYCK

DICTIONARY OF ORTHODOX THEOLOGY: A Summary of the Beliefs, Practices, and History of the Eastern Orthodox Church. By George H. Demetropoulos, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1964), Pp. vii-185, \$5.00.

Although obviously designed to bridge the hiatus in information available on the Eastern Church, and despite the fact that the introduction by John E. Rexine of Colgate University terms it "another important milestone in the ever-increasing recognition of the Eastern or Greek Orthodox Church in this country," this work falls short of any real fulfillment of the promise inherent in its title. It is unfortunate that a greater theological insight and historical precision was not brought to bear on the various topics included in the work, for their timeliness in view of the present ecumenistic spirit is beyond question. The author cannot be held wholly to blame for this failure, for to handle definitively the vast range of topics which he attempts to encompass in his book would present a monumental task for even the most indefatigable and profound scholar or team of scholars.

In his preface (p. xv) the author defines the limitations of his work by stating that "the book lays no claim for either completeness, or for an exhaustion of the materials as it is only a summary of the essentials of the beliefs, practices, and history of the Orthodox Catholic Church." Despite these admitted shortcomings, credit is due him for his attempt to satisfy the popular quest for information concerning the Orthodox faith. One valuable aspect of the work may be its role in stimulating a more precisely detailed and more accurately orientated quest of information on the beliefs, practices, and history of the Eastern Orthodox Church. The work is well edited, structurally concise, and its non-technical terminology is geared to the tastes of the general reading public.

Rosemont College

LUDVIK NEMEC

CHROATI CATHOLICI BOSNAE ET HERCEGOVINAE. By Dominicus Mandić. Chicago-Roma: Institutum Chroatorum Historicum, 1962. 234. pp. \$4.00.

This is a study written in Latin, the first volume of the *Monumenta Croatiae Vaticana*, published by the Croatian Historical Institute, a body of

the Croatian historians in exile, with its center in Rome. The volume contains the names of Croatian Catholics taken from two censuses. The first was undertaken in 1743 under the administration of the Apostolic Vicar for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bishop Pavle Dragicevic, and written as a report for the papal Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith (Congregation de Propaganda Fide) by the secretary of the bishop, Rev. Mato Marcinkusic Lasvanin, O.F.M. The second census was taken in 1786 by Rev. Josip Tomic, O.F.M., a secretary to Bishop Marijan Bogdanovic.

These documents—now in the archives of the Propaganda—contain detailed reports on the Catholics in these two Turkish provinces. The Roman Catholic Church in Bosnia-Herzegovina was under the jurisdiction of Propaganda from 1735 until 1882. In that year, while under the Archbishop of Sarajevo, Stadler, the former Turkish provinces ceased to be missionary territory.

At the times of the censuses almost the entire Catholic clergy in these two provinces consisted of Franciscans, popularly called "ujaci" by the people. The Franciscans witnessed for many years a mass exodus of the Catholics to various parts of Europe. Despite occasional persecution and great difficulties, however, they stayed with their flock, thus becoming very popular with the people.

The Foreword explains the ecclesiastical history of Bosnia-Herzegovina. A map shows all the parishes existing in the Vicariate of the province in 1743 and 1768. Also included are four photostats of the two censuses. Since the time of Ivan Lucic (Ioannes Lucius)—the founder of the Croatian historiography who spent many years (1654-1679) in Rome, was a member of the papal St. Jerome College for the "Illyrian" priests, and drew upon the Vatican archives for the information for his historical works—Croatian historians have found the Vatican archives an indispensable source for the writing of many phases of Croatian history. Dominic Mandic is one of them. With this publication, the noted author of several scholarly works on Croatian history has made another significant contribution to the ecclesiastical history of Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is only one question with respect to the censuses: how complete were they?

John Carroll University

GEORGE J. PRPIC

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"HEARINGS... PROVIDING FOR CREATION OF A FREEDOM COMMISSION AND FREEDOM ACADEMY," a compilation of testimonies. Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, Washington, D. C., 1964.

These hearings on bills calling for the creation of a Freedom Commission and Freedom Academy represent some of the best thought in the United States on the Cold War, its threats and dangers, and its diverse requirements. The testimonies are divided into two parts, each making up solid reading. Over ninety per cent of the testimonies submitted are in favor of establishing both the commission and the academy.

At the present time copies of the two volumes are being distributed to every opinion-forming organization and group in the country. On the basis of the hearings measures are being introduced in Congress for early consideration in the first session of this 89th Congress. The fight for these two necessary institutions continues. And with further public enlightenment on this crucial subject the chances for passage appear bright, indeed.

Most aspects of structure, curricula, and functions of the two proposed bodies are well covered in the presentations. In one of them, the utter necessity of delving into centuries-old cold war techniques of Russian empire-builders is strongly underscored. The point is made that no existing educational institution in this country adequately covers this subject, which is so essential for a working perspective in this area. There still is a serious gap of understanding with regard to the numerous captive non-Russian nations in the USSR.

"JOINT U. S.-USSR AIR STRIKE AGAINST RED CHINA," a report. Research Institute Recommendations, Research Institute of America, New York, October 30, 1964.

As this highly reputable institute states, this is "one of the most extraordinary stories of our time." In July, 1963, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Mr. Harriman proposed to Khrushchev a plan to stop Red China's nuclear progress. The report minces no words: "The U. S. proposal was explicit: a joint warning to Red China to stay out of the nuclear race—coupled with the threat of a joint U. S.-USSR air strike against the unfinished Chinese A-plants if Peiping refused to heed the warning, stop work on her A-bomb."

The source of this information is held to be "impeccable." Also, it is pointed out that the *Associated Press* reported on October 1, 1964 of a U. S. offer of "cooperation" with the USSR, "hampering" Red Chinese nuclear development. Khrushchev refused to take this kind of action against a "fellow Socialist country," this despite his public irritation over Peiping's propaganda concentration on the colonial non-Russian nations in the USSR, including Ukraine.

If all this is true, it is surprising that no one in Congress has brought it up for investigation. This type of trigger-happy diplomacy and naive relationships

with Moscow would undoubtedly awake many Americans. The subject is fraught with spectacular implications.

"MRS. JOHNSON WILL DEDICATE RAYBURN STATUE WEDNESDAY," an article by John Sherwood. *The Sunday Star*, Washington, D. C., January 3, 1965.

Attention is directed to this interesting article because of the status enjoyed by the Taras Shevchenko statue in Washington. At the very outset, the writer states, "Sam Rayburn of Texas on Wednesday follows Ukrainian poet-hero Taras Shevchenko and the Boy Scouts of America into recent Washington immortality." The unprecedented unveiling of the Shevchenko statue on June 27, 1964 has left an everlasting imprint on our Nation's capital.

Soviet Ukrainian emissaries of Moscow's deceptive "peaceful coexistence" program chose to lay wreaths on this second Statue of Liberty. Perhaps some in their hearts and silent minds find this as a means of expressing their hopes for a liberated and independent Ukraine. The statue, by inscription, is dedicated to the liberation and independence of all the captive nations.

"KHRUSHCHEV TIGHTENS HIS KREMLIN DEFENSES," an article by Edward Crankshaw. *The Washington Post*, Washington, D. C., July 21, 1964.

Although Khrushchev has been removed from power in the USSR, the continuity of Soviet Russian imperialist policy is very much intact. The type of personality policy played by Washington in relation to Moscow has always been close to puerile. What the writer states here is as applicable to Brezhnev or anyone else in the Kremlin as it was to Khrushchev.

He observes, "the Russians are seeking to develop closer links with an American President whose official challenger is a man dedicated to the dismemberment not only of the Communist bloc but also of the Soviet Union itself." There is no question about the Soviet Russian fear of Goldwater's candidacy. His election would have complicated Moscow's cold war strategy immeasurably. However, the writer's thinking here is somewhat backward. What is so distinctive and sacrosanct about "the Soviet Union" itself? It is as much a part, indeed the fundamental part, of "the Communist bloc" as any other. In war, hot or cold, this internal empire of Russia surely is not beyond the ken of necessary dismemberment.

Referring again to the past Russian dictator, the writer states "he will do nothing at all that might tend to irritate more Americans into voting for Goldwater; but it is hard to see what more he can do than he already has done to encourage them to vote for Mr. Johnson." As to the reasons why, not much profound cold war thinking is necessary.

"A PROPER APPROACH TO THE NATIONAL QUESTION," an article by Paul Novick. *Political Affairs*, New York, N. Y., January, 1965.

It appears that the 1964 campaign of the Republican Party, in particular the Republican National Committee, among the ethnic groups of America has even startled U. S. Communist quislings. This article, in what is dubbed the "Theoretical Journal of the Communist Party, USA," deals with a dubious "national question" and, in effect, calls upon "Marxists," meaning the Red quislings to take a leaf of political activity from "the Goldwaterites," another misnomer.

Some of the writer's observations scarcely require comment. In one place, for example, he states "Too long has the Marxist movement in the United States neglected the problems of the various nationalities in this country... That this was a serious mistake, one can realize by observing how the Goldwaterites have tried during the election campaign to gain a foothold among the Poles, the Ukrainians, the Hungarians, the Lithuanians, the Italians and others." The writer is evidently ignorant of the results achieved, despite Johnson's election.

In another place, he emphasizes, "It would be criminal, I think, to leave it to the ultras to champion the cause of national interests—that is, to harm these interests—as the Goldwaterites did among the national groups during the election campaign." For a supposedly "theoretical" article, this piece is a veritable jungle of twisted concepts and complete misreadings of Lenin's deceptive essay "On the Right of Nations to Self-Determination." The "theorist" is also unaware of the decades of failure on the part of the Communists to penetrate these patriotic American groups.

"UM EDITOR AMERICANO VISITA A REDACCAO DAS 'NOVIDADES,'" a report by A. Avelino Goncalves. *Novidades*, Lisbon, Portugal, November 22, 1964.

A lengthy interview is reported in this Portuguese organ between its editors and Mr. Walter Dushnyck, editor of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*. Mr. Dushnyck visited Lisbon after his representation of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America at the third session of the Ecumenical Council in the Vatican. The editor's coverage of the Council has been extensive.

This account covers several important data about the American organization the editor represented. It portrays also the background of activities Mr. Dushnyck has participated in, including his work for the United States Escapee Program in Brazil. His meeting in Lisbon with members of a Congressional group headed by Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina is also mentioned.

"CAPTIVE NATIONS SOFT-PEDALED," an interpretative report by Bernard Guertzman. *The Sunday Star*, Washington, D. C., July 12, 1964.

There was general agreement last summer that the Johnson Captive Nations Week Proclamation was a weak and unenthusiastic one. This fact is stressed in this interesting report. It claims that some officials hold the concept of captive nations is outmoded by the "independent trends within the various Communist states." These unnamed officials go so far as to say "Captive nations... no longer is a true description of some of the Communist states where the regimes have gained a considerable degree of popularity." Evidence of this? None.

Just how successful Moscow's "peaceful coexistence" strategy has been is amply evidenced by these groundless generalizations. Analogous to our military disarmament before World War II, they demonstrate how perilously disarmed we are today for the Cold War. From a logical viewpoint alone, not one of the Red totalitarian regimes could possibly survive without its ultimate dependence on Moscow's imperio-colonial strength. The changes going on in Eastern Europe are basically administrative ones, designed to make the totalitarian Red Empire stronger than ever before.

Recounting the impact made on Khrushchev by the Captive Nations Week Resolution, the writer adds, "He seemed especially angry at the fact that the resolution listed as 'captive nations,' not only countries of East Europe, but such non-Russian Soviet republics as Georgia, Armenia and the Ukraine." It is evident the writer doesn't know a quarter of the story.

"THE 1964 CAPTIVE NATIONS WEEK AND HOUSE RESOLUTION 14," an address by the Honorable Daniel J. Flood. *Congressional Record*, Washington, D. C., August 20, 1964.

Despite Johnson's attempt to play down the 1964 Captive Nations Week observance, the nation-wide celebration was the most successful yet. As Congressman Flood put it in his address, "In Philadelphia, New York, Boston, Buffalo, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Chicago, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and scores of other cities, the rallies were greater than ever before." And indeed they were. Playing up to totalitarian Red regimes in Eastern Europe means essentially playing down the captive nations, the peoples themselves, under the tyranny of these regimes.

As a leader in the Captive Nations Week movement, the Congressman cited numerous examples of the successful 1964 Week. The proclamations issued by scores of Governors and Mayors are incorporated in his address. TV presentations, programs of outstanding rallies, as in Buffalo, articles and newspaper reports, and many other examples are provided to show the increasing popular interest in this basic subject. The energetic legislator put it cogently: "By all reports and evidence this year's observance surpassed those of all previous years."

"NEW MEN ON PRESIDIUUM," a report. *The New York Times*, New York, November 22, 1964.

This report highlights the elevation of Alexander N. Shelepin and Peter E. Shelest to the Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It mentions Shelepin's leadership on the Committee for State Security but fails to cite the blood on his hands in his responsibility for the murder of two Ukrainian leaders, Bandera and Rebet, at the end of the fifties. A murderer in this position is, of course, not unusual.

Shelest, the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, is an old protégé of Khrushchev. His advance is attributed to Podgorny, another quisling in what has come to be known as "the Ukrainian mafia" in the Kremlin. The Russian technique of using non-Russian quislings as window-dressing for imperio-colonial Russian schemes is as old as the Russian Empire itself.

"HOW TO SUPPORT CAPTIVE NATIONS AND PEOPLES WITH PRACTICAL ACTIONS," an editorial. *Free China and Asia*, Taipei, Taiwan, China, July 1964.

Since 1961 the Republic of China has been an enthusiastic supporter of the Captive Nations Week movement. Each year the entire province of Taiwan observes the occasion. As this editorial accurately depicts it, "The Captive Nations Week initiated by the United States has now become an international movement which has as its chief objective deliverance of the captive nations and peoples from the yoke of Communist tyranny." In Asia, Nationalist China is the leader in this movement, and many other nations in that quarter of the world are soon to follow.

The editor is quite right in pointing out that the movement has been confined to "various memorial and propaganda activities short of any concrete action." He calls for such action and specifically recommends the adoption of a policy of liberation by the United States on mainland China. The policy would be directed at the extension of the anti-Communist revolution on the mainland.

This could be done without any direct intervention by the United States. Unfortunately, what the editor does not adequately appreciate is the paralyzing fear in America of the term "escalation."

"METHOD OF 'BURYING' FREE WORLD ONLY THING DIVIDING SOVIET, CHINA," an article by Guy Richards. *New York Journal American*, New York, January 2, 1965.

The main subject of this absorbing article is the "soaring ascent" of Alexander N. Shelepin in the Kremlin hierarchy. A comprehensive account is given of Shelepin's rise, with several paragraphs devoted to his hand in the Rebet and Bandera murders. Dr. Jagusch, president of the West German court that tried and convicted Shelepin's agent, is quoted as saying "Political murder has now, as it were, become an institution."

With much justification, the writer feels that Shelepin may very well rise to the summit in Moscow. Soviet Russian publicity certainly has spotlighted the "show" face of this Khrushchev protégé. He warns that in the days ahead we shouldn't forget this face. It may very likely be that "the face of the Kremlin itself may be fashioned more closely after his."

"KHRUSHCHEV ENDS TRIP WITH ATTACK ON PEKING," a report. *Associated Press*, Prague, Czechoslovakia, September 5, 1964.

It is more than just an historical observation to take note of Khrushchev's last speeches before his downfall. The thoughts he expressed are not without influence on his successors. In fact, as concerns the Sino-Soviet Russian rift, the Brezhnev policy has been to play down and soften the rift.

When in Czecho-Slovakia last summer, Khrushchev made this alarming statement: "Things have gone so far that the Chinese leaders are making territorial claims on the Soviet Union and one wonders that they do not suggest the dismemberment of the Soviet Union." The prospect of dismembering the USSR seemed to harrass the Soviet Russian imperio-colonialists from all quarters last summer. Necessarily involving the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR. This idea is the last thought the Kremlin would want circulating abroad.

"ONE LANGUAGE HELPS RUSSIA UNITE EMPIRE," a correspondent's report. *Times of London*, London, England, September 29, 1964.

Not too often does a Westerner get the opportunity to travel 8,000 miles across the USSR. The British writer of this engaging account was most fortunate. And his article reflects a great deal of perception into Moscow's lingual technique of maintaining and reinforcing its internal empire. Essentially, as he describes it, "the Russian language is a bond holding together this disparate empire and a prized opening to the big world outside."

As in Ukraine, Lithuania and other parts of this internal Soviet Russian empire, Kazakhstan, which really is the largest sector of the national territorial unit of Turkestan, is receiving the full treatment of this subtle technique. Populationally, like other colonial parts, it has been subjected to a Russian invasion. "In Alma Ata, capital of Soviet Kazakhstan," writes the correspondent, "the local population has been swamped by Russian immigration and now amounts to only a third of the inhabitants."

However, the writer evinces some political naiveté when he recounts the meeting of a Russian, Kazakh, and Uzbek at the same table and swallows somewhat their pointed remark about there being "No racial discrimination

here." His story about the 18-year-old Uzbek girl and her being first and foremost "a Soviet citizen" falls into the same category.

"THIS MAY HAPPEN TO YOU," an extensive article by V. L. Borin. *Pacific Letter*, Belmore, Australia, 1964.

Written by a Russian exile in Australia, one who was a member of the Bukharin opposition to Stalin, this article is a powerful exposition of the brutal developments in Viet Nam. It is strongly recommended to the reading of all concerned Americans. As Geoffrey Fairbairn states it in his short introduction: "Mr. Borin speaks for the silent: the peasants and soldiers and officials and women and children of Vietnam who have no voice in the Press and Radio of the Western world."

The writer brings a wealth of background to his exposé of the gruesome atrocities witnessed in Viet Nam at the hands of Viet Cong terrorists. A section captioned "A Polish Khakhol Dance" is most interesting, bearing as it does on the 1954 Geneva Agreement and the International Commission of Control in Viet Nam and Viet Cong. It deals with the Polish delegate to the commission, a Mr. L. Pohohyles, who apparently associated himself with the Viet Cong assassins.

He states: "The Polish delegate is no credit to the Polish national tradition of Kosciuszko, nor to the tradition of the Polish communist revolt of 1956... He has a Ukrainian name; neither is he a credit to the Ukrainian national tradition of Bohdan Khmelnicki, who fought the Polish landlords, or Mazepa, who resisted the Russian Czar Peter The Great, or Bandera, who fought against Stalin." Some of the writer's interpretations may be discounted, and certainly his identification of Khrushchev as a "Ukrainian" is completely inaccurate, but his overall treatment of the subject is rich and penetrating.

"THE REPUBLICAN CONVENTION," a TASS report. *Radyanska Ukraina*, Kiev, Ukraine, July 15, 1964.

The August *Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press* in New York reproduces the full text of the TASS report on the San Francisco Republican Convention as it appeared in this official Ukrainian newspaper. Typical of the Soviet Russian smear campaign, Goldwater is branded as "the chief of the mad mob."

What is significant is this particular passage: "The program rejects peaceful coexistence, and demands a ruthless policy against the socialist countries, the restoration of capitalism in Eastern Europe, the partition of the Soviet Union ('liberation' of Ukraine) etc..." In short, Moscow feared the beginning of an American cold war program for victory.

Equally significant is the obvious suppression of this TASS account from Ukrainian newspapers on the whole. The editors of the *Digest* point out in a footnote that this report, mentioning the liberation of Ukraine, was published in only one of the more than fifty publications received. Evidently, Moscow is scarcely desirous of letting the Ukrainian people know about any growing American interest in the freedom of their nation.

L. E. D.

EUROPE'S FREEDOM FIGHTER: TARAS SHEVCHENKO

1814 — 1861

A DOCUMENTARY BIOGRAPHY OF UKRAINE'S
POET LAUREATE AND NATIONAL HERO

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