

UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY



RUSSIA AND THE CAPTIVE NON-RUSSIAN NATIONS:
A SERIES

**THE CAPTIVE NATIONS
NATIONALISM OF THE NON-RUSSIAN NATIONS
IN THE SOVIET UNION**

By

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**THE CRIMES OF KHRUSHCHEV
PART 2**

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**PERSECUTION AND DESTRUCTION OF THE UKRAINIAN
CHURCH BY THE RUSSIAN BOLSHEVIKS**

By

Gregory Luznycky, Ph.D.

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COVER PAGE: The cover page of this issue represents vignettes of two maps of Ukraine made by two different cartographers at different times. The upper map was made by Vasseur de Beauplan, a French engineer and cartographer, who spent some twenty years in the service of the Polish king in Ukraine and made several maps of Ukraine upon his return to France in 1650. This map was printed in 1660 in Rouen. The lower map was made by the German cartographer Johannes Baptist Homann and was printed about 1710 in Nuremberg. These maps demonstrate most convincingly that the name of Ukraine has been in use for at least three centuries, and was not "invented" in the 19th century as stated in the Department of State *Soviet Affairs Notes* No. 58. See the article in this issue by Bohdan Krawciw, entitled, "Ukraine in Western Cartography and Science in the 17th and 18th Centuries."

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CONTENTS

Anti-Semitism in the USSR: Moscow's Double-Edged Weapon <i>Editorial</i>	5
China's Battleline of Freedom <i>Lev E. Dobriansky</i>	12
Russia and the Captive Non-Russian Nations: A Series	23
Ukraine in Western Cartography and Science In the 17th and 18th Centuries <i>Bohdan Krawciw</i>	24
The History of Armenia <i>Gregory D. Gourjian</i>	40
Georgia and Its People <i>George Nakashidse</i>	49
The State Department, Russia and the Cold War <i>Clarence A. Manning</i>	61
The Russian Academy on the Ukrainian Language <i>John P. Pauls</i>	70
BOOK REVIEWS	
<i>Le Colosse Aux Pieds D'Argile.</i> By Marie Kerhuel <i>Walter Dushnyck</i>	75
<i>Russian Bolshevism.</i> Compiled by Ukrainian Association for Research <i>Lev E. Dobriansky</i>	77
<i>The New Imperialism.</i> By Hugh Seton-Watson <i>Slava Stetzko</i>	78
<i>The Politics of Totalitarianism.</i> By John A. Armstrong <i>Clarence A. Manning</i>	81
<i>The Sword Does Not Jest.</i> By Frans G. Bengtsson <i>John V. Sweet</i>	83
<i>Ukrainians and the Polish Revolt of 1863.</i> By Wasyl Luciw <i>Yar Slavutych</i>	85
<i>Communism: Its Faith and Fallacies.</i> By James D. Bales <i>Joseph S. Koucek</i>	85
<i>Russia and the Soviet Union. A Modern History.</i> By Warren Walsh <i>Nicholas Andrusiak</i>	86
UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS	89

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ANTI-SEMITISM IN USSR: MOSCOW'S DOUBLE-EDGED WEAPON

Editorial

Anti-Semitism has always been a choice weapon of the ruling clique of the Kremlin not only against the Jews within the confines of the Soviet Empire, but also abroad, where it has efficiently served as an emotional lever in arousing Jewry against the enemies of the Kremlin.

The so-called "matzoh" legislation, that is, the interdiction by the Soviet government against baking unleavened bread by Jews on the occasion of their Passover observance each year, is the latest of the draconic measures undertaken by the Kremlin, directed specifically against the Jews. In a broader sense, however, this measure is directed against all religious peoples. To understand fully the significance of this "matzoh" policy we must recall what "matzoh" bread signifies for the Jews.

The significance of "matzoh" is to be seen in two aspects: a) It plays a symbolic role in the religious observance of the eight-day Passover festival, during which Jews partake of "matzoh," rigidly abstaining from eating any foods that contain leaven; b) Beyond this, for both religious and non-observing Jews "matzoh" is a reminder of the haste with which their forefathers escaped from slavery in Egypt 3,000 years ago to re-establish their existence as a free people. Thus "matzoh" symbolizes the liberation from tyranny.

Coincidental with the banning of the preparation of "matzoh" was the decision of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to postpone "the day of rest from Sunday, April 29, to Monday, April 30, 1962." Notice of this decision appeared in the April 10, 1962 issue of *Radyanska Ukraina* (No. 85), which is the official organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian S.S.R. Under ordinary circumstances such a decision would not call for any special interpretation. But April 29, 1962, was *Easter Sunday*, celebrated in Ukraine and in other republics of the U.S.S.R. according to the Julian calendar. Hence the decision of the Soviet government was aimed at the Christian holiday of Easter. It was a flagrant case on the part of the

Soviet government of hindering the millions of faithful in the Soviet Union in their observing the traditional Feast of the Resurrection, and in taking part in Easter Masses during the greatest Christian holiday of the year. Easter also symbolizes the resurrection of freedom for individuals as well as for the captive nations. It appears that, like the Jewish "matzoh," the Easter holiday and everything that it symbolizes is not compatible with the Soviet Russian type of "socialist freedom." Hence such observances must be opposed and eradicated.

It is significant that the first anti-"matzoh" campaign in the U.S.S.R. was launched in 1957, four years after the death of Stalin, whom Khrushchev labeled a "rabid anti-Semite." It took four years because Khrushchev needed this time to become firmly entrenched in power in the Kremlin. But the ban on "matzoh" at that time was not general. The test case was made in Kharkiv, the Ukrainian city, so that the Moscow rulers could always shift the blame on the "traditional anti-Semitism of local Ukrainian officials." But in subsequent years the ban was extended to Byelorussia, Lithuania, and this year to the entire U.S.S.R.

True to their traditional pattern of hypocrisy and double-dealing tactics, Soviet diplomats in Paris and at the United Nations in New York have told some Jewish representatives in "off-the-record" talks that anti-Semitic outrages, if they happened at all, take place "only in Ukraine," that the responsible culprits would stand trial, and that the Jews in the U.S.S.R. were free to bake "matzoh" in their own homes. Only communal "matzoh"-baking, the Soviet diplomats have stressed, has been outlawed.

But the hypocrisy of the Soviet government cannot be hidden any longer. It is evident that all the official acts concerning the ban of the Jewish bread for the Passover observance emanate from one source only: the Kremlin. This statement is further supported by the cases involving a series of Christian Ukrainians who had been arrested in 1959, 1960, 1961, and 1962 along with Jews and condemned to several years at hard servitude in penal camps for "economic frauds." In most of these cases, the Jews were helped by Christian Ukrainians in obtaining the flour as well as the facilities needed in preparing "matzoh" bread. The trials were held in such Ukrainian cities as Kharkiv and Uzhhorod. The Uzhhorod trial revealed that in 1961 a "Jewish-Ukrainian gang" allegedly used local collective farms for the purpose of preparing "matzoh," which fact reveals that the Ukrainian farmers and their families were willing to undergo hardships and privations and, furthermore, risked apprehension and punishment. *But had they been anti-Semitic, would*

they have helped the Jews, being fully aware that they were risking their personal, limited freedom, and perhaps their very lives in extending a helping hand to the Jews?

The trial of the Jews and their Ukrainian sympathizers in Uzhhorod conclusively demonstrates that the reports on anti-Semitic outrages perpetrated against the Jews in Ukraine are carefully manufactured lies, disseminated by the Soviet propaganda machine for the purpose of killing two birds with one stone: Jewish Zionists and Ukrainian nationalists.

While the Jews throughout the world have been protesting this Moscow-inspired anti-Semitism, the Soviet press and Soviet TV and radio networks have unleashed an unprecedented anti-Semitic campaign. As has been an established practice of Russian anti-Semitic governments in the past, the campaign is carefully diverted to the non-Russian republics. Thus, local newspapers in Tiraspol, Rivne, Kiev, Uzhhorod and Nikolayev in Ukraine, Riga in Latvia, Vilnius in Lithuania, Brest-Litovsk in Byelorussia, and the like—were given orders by Moscow to whip up anti-Semitic campaigns. Hence the radio broadcasts and newspaper series of articles stressing the “evil deeds of Zionist speculators and crimes” against the Soviet state.

It is significant that in the city of Nikolayev a group of Jews and Ukrainians were arrested and charged with “speculation” and “Ukrainian fascist-nationalist subversion.” It appeared that a group of Jews had celebrated the Passover with their Ukrainian friends who readily admitted that their Christian Easter *paskha* had the same meaning for Christian Ukrainians as the “matzoh” bread had for the Jews: both symbolized freedom and liberation. It is reported that the Soviet court dealt very harshly with these “offenders”—the Jews were given 7 to 12 years at hard labor, while some 11 Ukrainians received severe “administrative sentences of deportation to remote parts of the Soviet Union” (source: a special report by world journalist Leo Heiman from Haifa, Israel — Ed.).

It is highly ironic that Moscow should have had Peter E. Nedbailo, a member of the Ukrainian Soviet delegation to the United Nations (who recently was elected First Chairman of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights), propose recently in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights the establishment of an international “Freedom from Prejudice and Discrimination Year and Day.” Rightly, Professor Erma Cora of Austria retorted:

I don't see any reason for such a celebration while Jews are not permitted to bake unleavened bread and are not granted the rights given to all other minorities, and are not permitted to fulfill their religious duties or to use their own language . . .

This over-all anti-Semitic campaign in the Soviet Union is part and parcel of a new anti-religious drive systematically pressed by the Communist Party under the supreme command of Nikita S. Khrushchev.

Mr. Khrushchev recently personally set the tone of the anti-religious drive with the sarcastic remark that astronaut Gherman Titov "saw no sign of God during his flight into space."

The anti-religious campaign aims at the final eradication of any religious beliefs in the communist society. The anti-Semitic campaign is also tied up with the drive of Moscow against the widespread corruption of stealing that plagues the "classless" society, with Jews often singled out as scapegoats for this embarrassing development.

As we stated at the beginning of this editorial, Jews are not alone in suffering from this scurrilous campaign initiated by the Soviet government. The anti-religious pattern embraces the persecution of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western Ukraine, especially the third consecutive condemnation of Metropolitan Joseph Slipy, titular head of the Ukrainian Catholics, for his refusal to reject Catholicism and to embrace the spurious Orthodox Church controlled by the Kremlin; the involvement of Roman Catholic priests in so-called black marketeering in Lithuania, the clamp-down on religious sects, and the widespread closing down of Catholic and Orthodox Churches, synagogues and the Islamic houses of prayers as well.

Mr. Khrushchev has solemnly denied the existence of anti-Semitism in the U.S.S.R., and he has most vigorously denied that there is a specific anti-religious campaign. He is fond of quoting the Soviet constitution, which grants freedom of religion to all citizens. But his Communist Party's program even calls for a renewed struggle against religious beliefs:

The party uses ideological media to educate the people in the spirit of a scientific materialistic world conception to overcome religious prejudices without insulting the sentiments of believers.

But a recent assessment put the number of churches and houses of prayers closed by the Soviet government in the past two years at many hundreds. In the single Ukrainian province of Dniepropetrovsk more than 100 churches were closed by the local party secretary himself.

The American National Council of Churches estimated that at least 1,500 churches were closed by the Soviet government in 1961 alone. In February, 1962, the Kiev radio reported that in the province of Odessa 68 church communities were dissolved and 75 churches were turned into clubs and libraries last year. In June, 1961, *Komso-*

molskaya Pravda reported that 180 churches had been closed in the past few years in the Province of Volhynia in Ukraine, and that three of the eight Orthodox seminaries at Saratov, Kiev and Stavropol, and the Catholic seminary in Riga, had ceased to exist.

Islam is not spared in the present Soviet anti-religious drive. Recently *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* sounded the following warning:

According to Islam all that happens in nature and society . . . occurs through the will of God. Thus the ideology of the Moslem religion exerts an unhealthy influence on the believers; it fetters their will and initiative . . . Islam exists as a vestige of the past, the remnant of an exploiting society, and this vestige does great harm to the Soviet people . . .

Judaism above all has come under increasing attack. A recent issue of the Soviet organ, *The Militant Atheist*, charged that Judaism served the exploiting classes and was closely connected with Zionism—which Moscow considers to be a form of dangerous nationalism. In Ukraine, Zionism and “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism” are systematically denounced as “twin brothers,” whose followers take orders from “Wall Street imperialists” and “Vatican reactionaries.”

The Kremlin cannot afford to relax its rule over some 22 captive nations, including the Jews, who, although not living in a compact national territory, are considered by Moscow to be one of the most formidable enemies of the Soviet Russian empire and the communist ideology.

It is also not insignificant that a young Soviet poet, Eugene Yevtushenko, who wrote a poem of compassion for the Jews (*Babyi Yar*), is of Ukrainian origin and whose great-grandfather was exiled by Czar Alexander II from Ukraine for his liberal ideas.

In summing up the latest anti-Semitic and anti-religious acts of the Soviet government, we may point out that, as in the past, all anti-Semitic outrages in Ukraine were and are instigated by the ruling nerve center of Moscow. Yet Jewry outside the Soviet Union, including those in America, with few exceptions, all too easily fall prey to the anti-Ukrainian propaganda emanating from Moscow and wage an indiscriminate anti-Ukrainian campaign on the theory that “Ukraine is a traditional cradle of anti-Semitism.” In a number of American Jewish and non-Jewish publications an anti-Ukrainian campaign is pursued by some so-called “experts” or notorious haters of Ukrainians. In their emotional sentimentality these Jews often go back to the time of *Hetman* Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1648-1654), whom they charged with instigating vast anti-Jewish *pogroms*, forgetting that Khmelnytsky had waged a war of liberation against Poland, and that consequently many Jews and Ukrainians alike who served the

Polish king in Ukraine were dealt with sternly not because they were Jews or Ukrainians, but because they served the foreign ruler and were his tools of oppression and enslavement of the Ukrainian people.

Recently a noted New York daily newspaper, the *New York Herald Tribune*, printed a cartoon depicting the "disciples of political terror" of General Salan of the ill-famed French Secret Army Organization in Algeria, among whom was shown Simon Petlura, the Ukrainian revolutionary leader, head of the Ukrainian National Republic in 1919-1920 and commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian national armies. Petlura was assassinated in Paris in 1926 by a Soviet agent who claimed to be a Jewish avenger of anti-Semitic excesses allegedly instigated by Petlura and his government. The fact of the matter is that Petlura, himself in principle a Socialist and believer in international cooperation and justice, did everything in his power to prevent anti-Semitic outrages. His position is substantiated by official documents of that time, including reliable testimonies of Jewish leaders who were members of Petlura's government. Yet this did not prevent one Elias Cooper from writing to the *New York Herald Tribune* that Petlura was "the butcher of the Ukraine." On March 29, 1962, however, one of the editors of that newspaper had written to a reader: "Please accept our apologies for including him (Petlura — Ed.) in a cartoon depicting disciples of political terror . . . I am of course convinced that Petlura was a fighter for social justice and freedom . . ."

One might also mention such powerful American publications as *The New York Times* and *Life* wherein correspondents Harrison Salisbury and Patricia Blake, respectively, freely cast anti-Semitic charges against the Ukrainians, despite the fact that both do not pretend to be authorities on Ukrainian history and that their information is based on Soviet official sources.

These writers, it is evident, fail to understand the technique of Soviet propaganda sorcery. The facts are that Petlura was and still is the arch-enemy of the Soviet regime, because he opposed their seizure of Ukraine for almost three years, and that his memory is still very much alive in Ukraine, where the Ukrainians are opposing the communist rule of Moscow and are ready to grasp any opportunity to throw off the despicable yoke of Communist Russia. Naturally, the Russian communist masters see to it that the name of Petlura is smeared not only in Ukraine, but in the free world as well. Hence they find ready allies in all those who are campaigning against Petlura and everything that he stood for during his leadership in Ukraine.

In his penetrating article on "Ukrainians and Jews" (cf. *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Summer, 1961, Vol. XVII, No. 2), Leo Heiman, a noted specialist on Jewish-Ukrainian affairs, thus characterized the present policy of anti-Semitism implemented by Moscow in Ukraine:

Most experts believe there is still another reason why Moscow sponsors popular anti-Semitism in Ukraine, in addition to official anti-Jewish measures elsewhere in the Soviet Union. The Ukrainian population is seething with discontent. By holding up the traditional Jewish scapegoat, Moscow hopes to provide a ready-made emotional outlet for all the pent-up hates and resentments against the regime and conditions of life. But the Ukrainians of 1961, according to all authoritative reports, are not the Ukrainians of 1941, just as the Jews of 1961 are not the Jews of 1941. This is the reason why Moscow gets contrary results in Ukraine. It was easy for the Russians to stage a *pogrom* in a Jewish-populated suburb of Moscow where a Jewish cemetery and synagogue were desecrated and a Jewish woman killed. It is impossible for the Kremlin dictators to stage even a small token anti-Jewish *pogrom* in Ukraine, although Ukraine is—by all accepted Jewish definitions—the cradle of East European anti-Semitism. Whether the definitions were right or wrong in the past, this is certainly not the case now. In fact, considering the amount of anti-Jewish incitement and vituperation expended daily by Soviet-controlled schools, book publishers, radio broadcasting services and other media of public information in Ukraine, the only results have been a strengthening of pro-Jewish attitudes rather than the *pogroms* and excesses desired by Moscow . . .

Such is the opinion of an Israeli specialist on present Ukrainian-Jewish relations.

It is to be hoped that his considered opinion and knowledge persuade some of the Jewish publications and leaders in the United States to re-examine some of the myths and fables of Ukrainian anti-Semitism. They will come to understand once and for all, we are confident, that in following blindly these unfounded vituperations they are dancing to the tune of Moscow, the true center of anti-Semitism.

CHINA'S BATTLELINE OF FREEDOM

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

"Seeing is believing" may be a timeworn expression, but it certainly applies to the status, conditions and development of the Republic of China. Of course, the expression has its limitations. In any situation, regardless of its character, visual observation is not enough. Some background, some theory with preconceptions and perspective are necessary for a deeper perception and understanding of the object or situation. However, given all this, when one reflects on the egregious fictions spawned about Free China, then seeing is truly believing.

After an intensive trip to Taiwan, this writer is more than ever convinced that a Red China lobby is feverishly at work in this country. The blatant discrepancies between the objective realities of Free China and the fictitious notions circulating here cannot be adequately accounted for on any other basis. In too many respects the contrast is one of day and night. It appears that countless innocent and unsuspecting Americans are being fed misinformation and misconceptions which help to undermine not only China's battleline of freedom but also, indirectly, the security interests of our own nation.

The writer himself was not free of certain misleading preconceptions, particularly as concerns the island of Kinmen or Quemoy. Admittedly, he is not a so-called expert on the Far East. But considering the general record of such expert opinion in this country, it is perhaps advantageous not to be classified in this manner. There are many solid Far Eastern experts in the United States who share some of the observations presented here but, for some reason or other, they have not been as influential as those who would neatly fit into the operations of the Red China lobby.

A REPORT ON FREE CHINA

My observations here are simply in the nature of a report on Free China. As I saw it and analyzed it, Free China deserves far more study and investigation by the American people than has generally been the case. The emphasis of this study should be placed on present developments rather than on past history. Whatever may have been

the motivations behind the recent release of State Department papers on China, much of these deal with past history. Although they provide an undeniable background to the present, they cannot adequately offer an understanding of the significant changes which have overtaken the Republic of China in this past decade. On the basis of these papers we can expect the Red China lobby and its associates to re-hash many of the old criticisms and accusations that in the past were directed against General Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang. But if we are to live in the present and realistically view things as they are, an intensive and sympathetic study of Free China and its remarkable accomplishments is indispensable to our own strategic interest.

The arguments of those opposed to Free China or the Kuomintang are well known. We have heard them for over twenty years in this country. They will be analyzed here in systematic order. Prior to his trip the writer sought to obtain also the broadest range of favorable observations so that these, too, could be subjected to critical examination. Among the many he met and consulted with, Ambassador Dr. Tingfu F. Tsiang and Senator Hiram Fong of Hawaii presented excellent, objective perspective regarding the position and goals of Free China. The intellectual bearing and poise of Ambassador Tsiang are most impressive. The Republic has every reason to be proud of the scholarly type of representation he casts here, and, needless to say, his record in the United Nations is one of the most outstanding, particularly as concerns Soviet Russian colonialism and imperialism.

As many informed Americans know, Senator Fong played an instrumental role with his numerous addresses in 1961, opposing the admission of Red China into the U.N. While Ambassador Stevenson was spreading the myth of inevitability on this subject and Chester Bowles was unrealistically advocating a two-China policy, the Senator was in the forefront, upholding a position of integrity and loyalty for the United States. Senator Fong has both, a keen interest in and an intimate knowledge of Free China. His broad observations on the remarkable economic development of this Free World outpost squared completely with what the writer witnessed. In an interview in Honolulu, I felt that Senator Fong deserved great credit for the service he performed in 1961 in successfully stemming the tide on Red China's admission into the U.N.¹ Certainly the free people of Taiwan expressed their profound gratitude for it.

¹ "Fong Role In Keeping Peking From U.N. Halted," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, Hawaii, February 2, 1962.

A NATION OF SHEEP?

A "nation of sheep" is how one critic recently characterized the Chinese. Such ill-founded characterizations may make for commercialized literary appeal, but they hardly contribute to our understanding of any people. If the sturdy segment of the Chinese nation inhabiting Taiwan is made up of sheep, then we should by all means begin to breed such sheep here in the United States.

On arrival at Sungshan airport in Taipei, I formed my first impressions which were repeatedly confirmed throughout my visit. Greeted by a welcoming party led by the versatile and eloquent Mr. Ku Cheng-kang, the secretary of the National Assembly, I was introduced to many civilian leaders and members of the press. Their decorum, their questions, their general behavior suggested at the very start a depth of critical intellectual inquiry, a vigorous concern about the cold war in relation to both, Peiping and Moscow, and a wholesome anxiety concerning ways and means to win this war.

During the initial press conference I laid special stress on the necessity for the preservation and intensification of the Free World's anti-communist spirit which both, Moscow and Peiping, are attempting to weaken.² At the basis of this spirit is, of course, the rational recognition of the twin imperialist forces at work in the vast Eurasian land mass. The questions raised by the correspondents were most stimulating and indicated a deep comprehension of the multiple politico-economic problems posed by the Red Russo-Chinese cold war operations. It was my privilege also to make my first broadcast to the Chinese mainland at this time. The message emphasized my hopes for an early liberation of the captive Chinese on the mainland.

The Grand Hotel, at which I stayed for several days, cannot escape mention. It is one of the most beautiful structures in all of Asia. Situated on a hill overlooking Taipei, the provisional capital of Free China, it truly symbolizes the rich cultural background of China and the art and beauty of its people. Taste, grace, individuality, and a spiritual resourcefulness are resplendently displayed in its architecture and sculptural evidences. In these serene surroundings my first impressions were further deepened that day. A young representative of the Chinese Educational Radio program visited with me to record an interview. The interview dealt with a broad array of subjects pertaining to the cold war and U.S. foreign policy. Later in the evening of the first day a young and quite affable journalist from the *Great China Evening News* called for a similar interview.

² *China Post*, January 21, 1962.

In all of this, what struck me deeply was the youthfulness and expert resourcefulness of these independent and official interviewers, characteristics which I later found to be quite generalized in every other sphere of Free Chinese society.

According to some American myth-makers, Taiwan is supposed to be an island of old and aging men and women, a hotbed of policemen, and a tyrannical dictatorship in constant conflict with the Taiwanese and the aborigines. Wherever he toured, this writer brought these and other matters up. He also looked for himself to ascertain the validity or untruth of these conceptions. Naturally the elements in each of these conceptions were and are present, but whether they appear in the forms cast by these conceptions is the point at issue. And with some background anyone having the advantages granted this writer would be able to detect the relevancy and pertinence of these general notions to the real circumstances of Taiwan Province.

My travels up and down Taiwan and over on Quemoy have convinced me of one powerful truth, namely, the extent to which we Americans lend ourselves to fictitious beliefs built upon many a chasm separating reality and subjective conception. Whether at Yangmingsan or Sun Moon Lake, whether at the Taiwan National University or at a Chinese opera, whether at the Historical Art Museum or in the battlefront town of Kinmen City, the opportunity to mix freely, to exchange views critically, and to observe closely was ever-present. I seized every such opportunity.

Considering the above myths on age and the like, just imagine how you would have reacted to the following facts. On the subject of age, over 40% of the population falls into the 14 years and under category. In government, business, education and the military, young men and women occupy some of the most influential positions. As to policemen, the ratio on Taiwan per thousand of population is less than that prevailing in our large cities and towns. Where in several of our cities it is about 1.3 for every thousand, there it is less than one. As to the presence of a dictatorship and some constant conflict with the Taiwanese and the aborigines, these allegations are also of distorted value and usually uttered without fair perspective. A nation at war, a nation with customs and traditions different from ours could scarcely be expected to have the same institutional patterns of government and the like as ours—this aside from the pertinent question about the value of such imputed conformity. But more of this below.

FREE CHINA'S 'ELAN VITAL'

The permeating and driving force in the Free Chinese society is unquestionably the burning desire and hope for the liberation of

the Chinese mainland. Unless one is blind or plainly insensitive, this force cannot but be felt in all its suffusiveness in every sphere of day-to-day existence on Taiwan. It is inseparably bound with the 'elan vital' of Free China's total orientation and activity, namely its vigorous and realistic anti-communism. On this battleline of freedom, just a few miles from the camp of the enemy, it is understandable why the depth and scope of this spirit far exceed what one witnesses here. The realities of captivity and alien domination are closer to home. Yet this obviously is no excuse for our intellectual blindness, despite the span of the Pacific.

It is not possible to describe here all the events which have impressed me with this fundamental truth, but a few salient ones should be mentioned. The annual Freedom Day observance held on January 23 throughout Taiwan province is an outstanding one. Thousands congregate in all cities and towns to rededicate themselves to the objectives of driving the alien rule out of Peiping and thus also contributing heavily to the expansion of world freedom. As one of speakers in the capital city of Taipei, I said with all sincerity and feeling that "in a real sense this Freedom Day is a day of observance by all lovers and fighters for freedom, no matter where they are."³

Talks with students and scholars at the National Taiwan University and at centers in other cities pointed up the same powerful and vigorous spirit of anti-communism. My survey of the remarkable work of the China Broadcasting Company confirmed it, and at a luncheon with Chinese Ex-POW's the subject was all-consuming. I was a guest of honor at the opening ceremony of the basketball tournament for the Freedom Cup, and there, too, the overall theme was the same. It was heard and felt throughout a full day meeting with leaders of all civilian organizations in Taipei following Freedom Day. And the enthusiastic response of these leaders to my talk on efforts in this country to establish a Special House Committee on Captive Nations was most satisfying.⁴

Events of this kind can be multiplied in sphere after sphere to substantiate the observation made here. My hour-long talk with our astute Ambassador Everett F. Drumright, who filled me in on many essential matters, provided me with additional insights into this basic force of liberationist thought and feeling in Taiwan. As I stated publicly later, "the people of the United States can well be proud of our Ambassador in Taipei." He knows the language, he

³ "Support to All Enslaved Peoples Is Pledged At Freedom Day Rally Here," *China Post*, January 24, 1962.

⁴ "Every Road Leads to Freedom," *China News*, January 25, 1962.

knows the people, and he possesses a background on the Orient that is well nigh unsurpassable. It was evident to me that Ambassador Drumright was slated soon for re-assignment. However, should Admiral Alan G. Kirk be assigned as our new Ambassador to the Republic of China, I have no doubt that the spirit of liberation among the energetic people of Free China will be sympathetically understood. It was not without good reason that Admiral Kirk served as the head of the American Committee of Liberation and later was the chief of the old Psychological Strategy Board.

PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN FREE CHINA

To understand with perspective and fairness the government's position in Free China, one must bear in mind certain hard facts of political life on this Asiatic front of world freedom. The first and all-dominant fact is that the liberation of the mainland is the prime objective of the Republic of China. Although far too many still fail to comprehend this basic spiritual axiom of Free Chinese existence, it is, indeed, the Republic's *raison d'être* as well as an agency of political power for the interests of the Free World. Those who would attempt to pollute or undermine this sustaining faith, whether in the name of "democracy" or simple anti-President Chiang bias, are either blindly or clearly working in the interests of imperial Red totalitarianism.

For many obvious reasons comparisons with the Federal Republic of Germany will not do. Politically, culturally and geographically the cases are not parallel. Though both possibilities are of crucial importance to the expansion of freedom, the defeat of Peiping has far greater immediate consequences for the collapse of Moscow's empire than does the liberation of East Germany. Moreover, Bonn's liberationist spirit appears to be steadily sapped by Anglo-American quasi-appeasement. This, happily enough, is not the case in Taipei. Thus, for good reason the Free Chinese government cannot tolerate any political activity which would cause this mainspring of freedom to stagnate. The case of Lei Chen and the development of a distractive "Taiwanese Party" fall into this category.

Over and above this indispensable requisite of loyalty and adherence, there is considerable democratic expression and criticism in the Republic of China. If one talks unintelligently about an imitation of American democratic institutions, then my sole reply is "Where else in the world will you find this, assuming that this is at all desirable or possible?" Corruption? Sure there are instances of corrupt dealings there as here or anywhere else. Corruption found under

the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations did not blacken the entire administration. Reports of alleged deals in the provincial government were readily given while I was there, and it was not unusual to hear from students, workers and others criticisms directed at the government.

The opportunity of talking at length with government leaders and representatives and also members of opposing political parties (Democratic Socialist Party and the Young China Party) furnishes real insights into the liberal and democratic inclinations of Free Chinese society. The writer had this opportunity in abundance. His conversations with President Hwang of the Legislative Yuan, the President and members of the Control Yuan, the Speaker of the Provincial Assembly, the mayors of Taipei, Taichung, Tainan and Kaohsiung cities and many others were forthright and frank. The one indelible impression he left with was that there are genuine political counterparts of our elected representatives. Our political battles have nothing over theirs, and their psychology and behavior are parallel to ours. After all, many of them are graduates of American universities. Significant, too, is the fact that many are natives of Taiwan province.

Again, in this necessarily qualified democratic environment—qualified solely by the requisite of mainland China's liberation which logically cannot brook the divisionism implied by the notion of a Republic of Taiwan—the penchant for critical inquiry and learning on the part of student groups augurs well for the future of China. It was my privilege to address them and others on a variety of subjects. In Taichung city I lectured on "Free China's Increasing Recognition of the Captive Non-Russian Nations in the U.S.S.R."; in Tainan, the subject was "Moscow and Peiping's Reactions to the Captive Nations Week Resolution"; and in Kaohsiung, an address was given on "Significant Parallels in the Tragedies and Plights of Captive Europe and Captive China." In all three cases the response of the students and others was stimulating and challenging. With constructive intent they consistently sought the relationship of the factors and forces brought out in these subjects to the fundamental liberation policy of their own Government.

The myths of corruption and undemocratic government in Free China must be ceaselessly attacked in this country. Their circulation is both, unjust and detrimental to the most powerful ally we have in Asia. Seeing, again, is believing—seeing their Government in action, seeing their independent papers at work, seeing their remarkable broadcast activities, seeing their educational institutions and the expanding reservoir of free Chinese culture. The chasm

between our myths and their realities is tremendous—indeed, incredible. The truth is that Free China is a showcase of democracy in Asia.

THE SUPPOSED ECONOMIC DRAG

When we turn to the economic sector, the foolishness of our myths becomes quite evident. I couldn't have emphasized this more over Radio KGU in Hawaii and the Georgetown University Forum. While too many have come to believe that the Republic of China constitutes an economic drag for us, reality shows a phenomenal economic development with decreasing relative dependence on the United States. In the last ten years over a billion dollars have been given in economic aid to Free China, but in the past four years the rapid economic strides made by the Republic at a per annum increase of 8% render the average \$100 million per year of aid smaller in significance.

No important economic project or development was overlooked by me. My visits and inquiries covered the Shihmen Reservoir, the Taoyuan Exhibition of Land Reform Achievements, several random farms outside Taipei, the Taiwan Aluminum Company and the Taiwan Petroleum Refinery Company in Kaohsiung, as well as briefings at the Provincial Government. A five-hour conference with highly informed members of the sixth section of the Kuomintang afforded me information about economic conditions on the mainland which I doubt are available to our own governmental agencies. On the basis of all these observations and data I am impressed by two stalwart facts: (1) the agricultural development and reforms of Free China make it truly a model for all Asian, African and some Middle East countries, and (2) the Free Chinese economy is by sheer qualitative contrast a powerful cold war weapon against Peiping.

Here, too, it is amazing to contrast economic realities with the myths spread in this country. Although there is considerable room for the further development of entrepreneurialism, the "sheep" have shown enormous initiative and resourcefulness in private risk-taking. Industrial production has grown by about three times what it was in 1953. Agriculture has increased by 50%, though rising consumption has converted Taiwan into a net importer of rice. More meat and rice are eaten here than in other parts of Asia. The gross product of Free China stands over a billion U.S. dollars for a population of about eleven million. The population growth rate is around 3.5 per cent. There are some 800,000 farmers who under the land-to-tiller program own their own farms. Agricultural representatives from

other parts of Asia and Africa come to Taiwan to learn from the shining example built here.

There is unquestionably much room for expansion and improvement in industry, commerce and trade. Private investment is being steadily encouraged and tourism should attract considerable capital. The present third Four-Year Plan (1961-64) entails new capital investment of \$1.1 billion (U.S.). Much rationalization is needed in the marketing of industrial products. But considering these and other needs, the fact is that the economy of Free China is flourishing. What in time will be of concern to all is its rapidly expanding population. Where can it go? The only sensible answer is the mainland. The motive force behind the rapid economic development is the eventual liberation of the mainland. As shown before, this objective is also Free China's reason for existing and prospering. Thus the economic, the demographic and the political merge into a massive force for freedom. And the force is properly and sanely oriented toward liberation.

FREE CHINA'S LIBERATION POLICY

In a solid sense the Republic of China must continue to exist not only to liberate the mainland but also to liberate the United States from its recurring psychoses of apathy and appeasement toward Russian and Chinese totalitarian imperialism. I made this point in a lecture on "The Free World's Inescapable Policy of Emancipation" presented in Government Hall in Taipei.⁵ Conferring with leaders of civic Chinese organizations, I was deeply moved by the logic and practical common sense of their position on liberation. In both, a lecture on "The Liberation Policy of the United States" and an exchange of views on the Republic's policy, I couldn't help but fully agree with Chairman Ku Cheng-kang and China's members in the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League as to the utter vagueness of present U.S. policy and the fact "that only a policy of liberation could avert a third world war."⁶

Difficult as it is for me to make these admissions, the truth is that they are founded on fact. Some of them I made on a half hour USIS broadcast and to this day I wonder how much of it was approved.⁷ This first concerns the understanding and knowledge of

⁵ "A Sound Policy Toward the Enslaved Nations," *Mainland China*, February 1, 1962.

⁶ "China Calls For Global Freedom Crusade," *China News*, January 24, 1962.

⁷ Interview on Free China, United States Information Service, January 24, 1962.

Free China's leaders in regard to the policy of liberation. Having had much to do with this policy here, I can frankly state that they have a keener appreciation of it than many of our own leaders, particularly those who naively believe you can do business with Khrushchev. You may explain this in terms of their close proximity to the problem. What ever the cause, the fact remains as given. Should a mass eruption take place on the mainland, involving both, the military and the civilian population, President Chiang would have his opportunity to exercise in full this sane policy.⁸ The question is whether he would allow a likely U.S. policy drag make this a foregone opportunity. In the writer's judgment, as he publicly expressed it in Taipei, the Republic should do everything presently possible to incite such an eruption.

A second point of admission is that Free Chinese leaders have a far more enlightened understanding of the Soviet Union and the many captive non-Russian nations within it than most of ours. This was clearly indicated to me in a half-hour meeting with President Chiang Kai-shek whose health, vigor and mental alertness plainly contradict other mythical stories circulated here.⁹ Certainly nowhere did I encounter the absurdities committed by Secretary of State Rusk, for whom Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia are "traditional parts of the Soviet Union."¹⁰ With respect to the captive non-Russian nations I stated there what recently I stressed here: "The lack of an imaginative, positive and winning policy continues to be our blight."¹¹ In a lecture given at their Armed Forces Staff College on the basic subject, "The Fiction of the Monolithic Military Power of the U.S.S.R.," I examined the importance of the non-Russian nations and found a most receptive understanding on the part of the audience. In fact, it far surpassed my experiences in this country. An earlier article translated into Chinese may have contributed to this.¹²

These and other fundamental differences between their understanding and ours go a long way to account for the easy myths dis-

⁸ "Prof. Dobriansky Has Great Confidence in Free China's Recovery of Mainland," *China Post*, January 31, 1962.

⁹ "Dobriansky Visits Free China," *Foreign Service Courier*, Georgetown University, March 1962, p. 12.

¹⁰ Author's criticism on Rusk's fiction, *Buffalo Courier-Express*, April 1, 1962.

¹¹ "Captive Nations Policy Cleavages Are Detailed," *World*, April 17, 1962, Washington, D.C., p. 12.

¹² "The Adjustment of Several Fundamental Concepts Concerning Anti-Communism and Resisting Soviet Russia," *Modern Politics*, December 20, 1960.

seminated in this country. My visit to Kinmen and luncheon with General Wang were enough to establish the fictions discussed by our presidential aspirants in 1960. If Kinmen and Matsu are militarily dispensable, then we might as well throw in Taiwan, Okinawa, and Hawaii. The military fortress of Kinmen is vitally important to the defense of Taiwan, to the defense of Free Asia, and to the liberation of the mainland. Though it may seem far-fetched to some, in terms of the liberation policy it is vital also to Laos and Vietnam where Free Chinese forces may yet be employed.¹³

After my visit the pattern of a campaign developed in several Free World quarters for the shipment of U.S. surplus food to mainland China where, despite the blind statements of General Montgomery, famine, starvation, and resistance are rife. This proposal must be opposed in favor of a food for liberation campaign, starting with the donation of food by the people of the Republic of China. This is only one of a number of concrete things that could be done to further liberation and freedom. In sharp contrast to the views of some, this writer emphasizes again that the Republic of China is our strongest ally in Asia.¹⁴ To appreciate this, one should begin to pierce the myths with the empirical test of seeing is believing.

¹³ "Free Nations Called Upon To Fight Reds in Laos, Vietnam," *China Post*, January 22, 1962.

¹⁴ "Report on Free China," *Georgetown University Forum*, February 25, 1962; "Peter Tang Scores His Fatherland," *Newsdom*, Hong Kong, March 24, 1962.

RUSSIA AND THE CAPTIVE NON-RUSSIAN NATIONS: A SERIES

EDITOR'S NOTE: In the winter 1961 issue of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, we discussed thoroughly the letters of Secretary of State Dean Rusk which he wrote to Congressman Howard W. Smith, chairman of the House Rules Committee. The letters expressed the State Department's opposition to the establishment of a special committee on the captive nations in the U.S. House of Representatives. In his ill-advised and ill-conceived letters—the baselessness of which was discussed in our editorial cited above—Mr. Rusk also uttered what for an American statesman was an unpardonable *dictum* to the effect that "Ukraine, Armenia and Georgia . . . are traditional parts of the Soviet Union." A similar irresponsible statement also was made in the State Department bulletin, *Soviet Affairs Notes* (No. 158), saying that "the term 'Ukraine' is itself a modern political rather than historical term. It was invented in the nineteenth century by nationalists seeking to detach the southwestern borderlands of Russia from the Czarist empire."

There is no doubt that both, the statement of Secretary of State Rusk and the assertion of the State Department bulletin, revealed a distressing lack of true and unbiased knowledge of the history of Eastern Europe on the part of our high officials.

Consequently, this issue of *The Ukrainian Quarterly* provides three important articles which categorically refute these groundless allegations and gross historical inaccuracies which regrettably appear much too often in the pronouncements and in written statements of our high officials. Bohdan Krawciw, noted Ukrainian poet and journalist, in his article, "Ukraine in Western Cartography and Science in the 17th and 18th Centuries," traces the origin of the name "Ukraine" and its use during the past four centuries. The article is an incontrovertible refutation for those "experts" in our Department of State who recklessly and irresponsibly wrote that "the term 'Ukraine' . . . was invented in the nineteenth century . . ." Two other articles, "The History of Armenia," by Gregory D. Gourjian, and "Georgia and Its People," by George Nakashidse, deal with the history and political aspirations of the non-Russian nations of Armenia and Georgia, respectively. These analyses demonstrate conclusively that Armenia and Georgia, in the same manner as Ukraine and other non-Russian nations, were never and could never be of their own volition or choice "historical parts" either of the Soviet Union or its equally nefarious predecessor, Czarist Russia. The analyses of these three authors, each of them recognized and honored authorities on the history of their own nations, eloquently state the cases of Ukraine, Armenia and Georgia. Finally, Prof. Manning's article, "The State Department, Russia and the Cold War," lucidly analyzes the innate incapability of American officialdom to grasp the essence of Russian imperialism and colonialism. We humbly suggest that the officials of our State Department, charged with the affairs of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union at a perilous moment in our history, read them for a deeper understanding and appreciation of the problem of the captive nations of Europe and Asia.

UKRAINE IN WESTERN CARTOGRAPHY AND SCIENCE IN THE 17th-18th CENTURIES

By BOHDAN KRAWCIW

Last year the U.S. Department of State, in its research bulletin, entitled, *Soviet Affairs Notes* (No. 158), was guilty of a totally false and spurious definition of the name of Ukraine, which was given as follows:

The term "Ukraine" is itself a modern political rather than a historical term. It was invented in the nineteenth century by nationalists seeking to detach the southwestern borderlands of Russia from the Czarist Empire.

The intent of this article is to give the historical origin of the term "Ukraine" and at the same time to demonstrate the unreliability of some of the research produced by our government agencies.

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While in London in 1930 the well-known Polish geographer and cartographer, Prof. Eugeniusz Romer, visited the Royal Geographical Society and inspected its rich collection of historical maps and charts. Upon his return to Warsaw, Prof. Romer set down his impressions and views,¹ featuring an attack upon the Dutch cartographers of the 17th century, Guilielmus and Joannes Blaeu, because in their 10-volume *Atlas Maior* they cartographically did not do justice to the then Poland and thereby contributed to the creation of detrimental cartographical influences in the European opinion. Prof. Romer was incensed at the cartographers Blaeu because their atlas "lacks a map which would embrace the entirety of the Polish Republic of that time, while a map entitled, 'Polen' which was described as *Polonia Propria*, in the east did not reach the upper and middle Bug and did not even embrace Lwow." Prof. Romer added that such a cartographical picture of Poland was subsequently popularized (through other editions of the Blaeu atlases as well as through the atlas of Jansson and his successors, including *The English Atlas* of Moses Pitt in 1680) and wondered "whether this accidental result of an attempt to attain a cartographical detail in the 17th century had not become the source of a political and quite incomprehensible concept known as the Curzon Line."

We have not the slightest intention of engaging in polemics with Prof. Romer, who is known for his chauvinistic attitude toward

¹ *Polski Przegląd Kartograficzny*, Lwów-Warszawa, Vol. V, No. 33-34, April, 1931, pp. 1-31.

the aspirations for freedom and independence of the peoples of Eastern Europe. But as far as the "detrimental cartographical influence" of the Blaeus, the Janssons and of Pitt on European opinion is concerned, we freely admit that Prof. Romer chanced upon a very important point. What is typical of the political maps of Eastern Europe in the 17th century is that all eastern geographers and cartographers of the time treated the whole Eastern European territory under the domination of the Polish Republic of that time not as a political unity, nor even as a federation, but as a complex of completely separate ethnic and political lands and countries.

Such a cartographical picture of the European East, in which Muscovy did not play an important part, existed in the Western mentality not only in the 17th century. As far back as the 16th century, long before the Blaeus, the founders of modern cartography, Gerard Mercator (1512-1594), drew the maps of Lithuania, Taurica, and Poland, limited to their ethnic territories. His atlas, known as *Atlas sive cosmographicae meditationes* (between 1585 and 1682 there were 47 editions), contained separate maps of Lithuania, Rus', and Taurica, which embraced the Crimea and the present-day Ukrainian territory on both banks of the Dnieper River. A map of Poland embraced only the Polish lands proper reaching to the Sian and Bug Rivers in the east. There was also a map of *Russia cum confinibus*, as Muscovy was referred to at that time. Thus in fact the Blaeus and their successors merely followed in the footsteps of Mercator.

Yet Mercator himself was not the creator of the cartographical picture of the countries of Eastern Europe. Among the first pioneers who blazed the trail in fixing the political frontiers of Eastern Europe were Marco Beneventanus, Martin Waldsemueller and Sebastian Muenster. To quote from a work by the writer²:

In their writing and maps they distinguished it (Rus') from Poland proper and from Polish ethnographic territories. For instance, on Marco Beneventanus' first map of Central and Eastern Europe, entitled *Tabula Moderna Polonie. Ungarie. Boemie. Germanie. Russie. Lithuanie*, which was included in Ptolemy's Geography, published in 1507 (Rome, Bernhardus Vinetus de Vitalibus); or on the map of the eminent scholar and geographer of the early 16th century, Martin Waldsemueller, which was entitled, *Tabula Moderna Sarmatie Eur. sive Hungarie, Polonie, Russie, Prussie et Valachie* (Johannes

² Bohdan Krawciw: "Guillaume le Vasseur Sieur de Beauplan's 'Description of Ukraine' and His Military Maps of Ukraine" in *A Description of Ukraine by Guillaume le Vasseur Sieur de Beauplan*, New York, 1959, pp. IX-XIII.

Schott, Strassburg) found in Ptolemy's *Geography* published in 1513, *Rus'* was defined in the titles of the maps as a separate territory, equal not only to Poland, Lithuania and Wallachia, but also to Germany, Hungary and Bohemia.

Both maps, as was documented by contemporary researchers (Birkenmajer, Kordt, Piekarski, Buczek, Chowaniec), were published on the basis of the maps and information compiled by the Cracow canon and historian, Bernard Wapowski (d. 1535), who at the beginning of the 16th century lived in Rome and enjoyed friendly and academic associations with Marco Beneventanus in Rome and Martin Waldseueller in Saint-Die, author of several maps in the Strassburg edition of Ptolemy's *Geography*.

Rus' was treated—according to tradition—as a separate political and ethnic territory by the well-known cosmographer, Sebastian Muenster (1489-1552), publisher of several issues of Ptolemy's *Geography* (beginning in 1540 in Basel) and author of the widely-known *Cosmography*, published first in 1542 and reprinted more than a score of times during the 16th and 17th centuries in German, Latin, and other languages. In all these publications the description of *Rus'* (*Russia*), also referred to as *Ruthenia and Podolia*, is differentiated not only from the description of Poland but also from that of Muscovy (Muscowiters Lands). Even Polish cartographers of the second half of the 16th century defined *Rus'* (*Russia*) on their maps as a separate territory within the borders of Poland, with distinct boundaries, as, for instance, Waclaw Grodecki in a map published in 1558 and included in 1570 in Abraham Ortelius' atlas, entitled, *Poloniae finitimarumque locorum descriptio. Auctore Veceslao Godrecio Polono*.

This differentiation of Lithuania and *Rus'* and other lands from Poland proper, *Polonia Propria*, was based on their separate political and state status which they possessed heretofore. The Galician-Volhynian State, which ended with the death of Yuriy II and the conquest of Polish King Casimir, went under the domination of the Polish kings (in part the Lithuanian princes as well) and continued to be treated as the separate country of *Rus'*, with its own proper boundaries and distinct from Poland. In like measure Lithuania was a separate state organism until 1569, that is, until the Union of Lublin. It is to be recalled that Lithuania embraced the Ukrainian provinces of Volhynia, Kiev and Podolia, all of which remained nominally "Lithuanian" even after the Union of Lublin. But in the conscience of the West (including the Polish), geographers, cosmographers and chroniclers, considered *Rus'* and Lithuania with its Ukrainian provinces as separate countries and distinct from Poland from the

viewpoint of the political and ethnographical status. Therefore, in the atlases of the 15th and 16th centuries special maps and charts were made for them. To underscore the separateness from Poland: the Ukrainian lands under the Polish crown were referred to as *Rus'*, *Russia*, *Ruthenia*, *Russia Rubra*, and *Russia Nigra*, and these appellations extended not only to Galicia, the Kholm and Belz provinces and Pokutia, but were also applied on the maps of the 17th century to Volhynia and the provinces of Kiev, Chernihiv, Poltava and Podolia.

With the growth and development of the Muscovite state with its capital in Moscow—its territory was once part of Kievan *Rus'* destroyed by the invasion of the Tartars in 1240—this Muscovite state, known as Muscovy in the West, accepted as its name that of *Rus'*, whose Latin transcription was *Russia*. Thus appeared a paradox—the same name was applied to two culturally, ethnographically and politically different countries: *Rus'*-Galicia, with its capital in Lviv, and Muscovy, with its capital in Moscow. Both were referred to as *Russia*. This is the source for the confusion of nomenclature regarding Russia and Ukraine which lasts, in various degrees, to this day, inasmuch as both terms, *Rus'* and the later *Rossia*, translate into Latin and other languages as *Russia*.

As in the histories of other countries and nations which at various times had different names, the Ukrainian territory, populated by the Ukrainian people, was called *Rus'* and then gradually came to be known as *Ukraine*.

ORIGIN OF THE NAME "UKRAINE"

Ukraine, as a name designating a part of and subsequently the whole Ukrainian national territory, had already appeared in the 11th and 12th centuries, but it was definitely established only by the 16th century. Today, after many centuries of effort to suppress this name along with the endeavor by the enemies of Ukraine to destroy the Ukrainian people themselves, this name has earned a full-fledged right of citizenship in the world. It is the official and valid name of the Ukrainian land, populated by the Ukrainian people.

Nevertheless efforts still persist today to deny the Ukrainian people the right of freedom and self-determination, with consequent national statehood and independence. In some political capitals of the west the view still prevails that the separateness and statehood of Ukraine has no legal and political foundation, that it is a problem "invented" recently by Ukrainians and their anti-Russian "allies." This compound of ignorance and propaganda is being stubbornly disseminated by some Russian emigre groups which have managed

to inject it to some extent into U.S. political thinking. Their most popular version is that Ukraine was a "German intrigue." In the early 1950's these groups distributed an absurd pamphlet, entitled, *Ukraine — Invention of the 20th Century*, which was extensively bruited by *Novoye Russkoye Slovo*, a Russian-language newspaper in New York. This view probably had some effect on the pro-Russian officials of the U.S. Department of State.

It is therefore our salutary purpose here to trace the actual appearance and development of the term "Ukraine" on the maps and cartographical charts beginning with the 17th century, as well as its citation in the works of Western European historians and travelers. A wealth of source materials exist which are preserved in the Library of Congress and in other libraries of the United States, in the British Museum, in the *Bibliothèque Nationale* in Paris and in many other world libraries. Hence everything presented here is readily verifiable.

Some Ukrainian researchers, such as S. Shelukhyn and V. Sichynsky, maintain that the term "Ukraine" appeared on the maps of western European cartographers as early as the 16th century; but in any event "Ukraine" is clearly shown on the great map of Lithuania made by the well-known Dutch cartographer and engraver, Hessel Gerardus or Gerritsz (1581-1632), and published in 1613 by the Amsterdam publisher, Wilhelm Jansson Blaeu. It was sponsored by Lithuanian Prince Nicholas Radziwill-Syritka (1549-1616). The author of the map was Tomasz Makowski (1575-1620?). On this map, entitled, *Magni Ducatus Lituaniae et Regionum Adiacentium exacta Descriptio*, for the Right Bank Ukraine (Ukraine west of the Dnieper River — Ed.) the following description is used: *Volynia Ulterior quae tum Ukraina tum Nis ab aliis vocitatur*, which means "Outer Volhynia, which sometimes is called Ukraine, and sometimes the Flatland." The term, "Flatland," was used at that time to designate the territory of the Zaporozhian Host, with headquarters in the Zaporozhska Sich. This territory was also known as the "Liberties of the Zaporozhian Army of the Flatland" and embraced the central part of Southern Steppe Ukraine on both banks of the Dnieper River. This territory, although nominally under the Polish crown, was in fact a quasi independent republic with its own elected leaders. This territory, in addition to being called the "Flatland," was also referred to as Ukraine in the second half of the 16th century. We might add that although the map of Lithuania by Makowski was published in 1613, it had been prepared by Makowski in the last decades of the 16th century.



*Bohdan Chmielnicki Exercitus Zaporouien
Præfectus, Belli Sèrius autor Rebelliumq,
Cossacorum et Plebis Ukraïnen: dux.*

An inscription in Latin on an old wood-carving of *Hetman* Bohdan Khmelnytsky, reads as follows: "Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Prefect of the Zaporozhian Army, Author of the Liberation War and Leader of the Kozak Uprising and that of the Ukrainian People."

"Ukraine" was often used in the field of international relations among the peoples of Eastern Europe in the second half of the 16th century. For instance, in a letter of the Turkish Sultan, Suleiman, to Polish King Sigismund August, dated November 3, 1564, reference is made to a castle in Kamianets Podilsky which "lies in Ukraine." That meant that not only *Volynia Ulterior* belonged to Ukraine at that time, but also the province of Kiev with the "Flatland" and Podolia with its capital Kamianets. In his *universal* of 1580 Polish King Stefan Batory appealed to "Ukraine: Ruthenian, Kievan, Volhynian, Podolian and Bratslavian"; thus Ukraine comprised not only *Rus'*, but also the province of Kiev, Volhynia, Podolia and Bratslav. In the official records of the Polish *Sejm* of 1585 appears a reference to *Ukraina Podolska*.³

The term "Ukraine" began to be extensively used in international relations of the 17th century. Polish chronicler Marcin Bielski, in his chronicle, *Kronika Polska Marcina Bielskiego (The Polish Chronicle of Marcin Bielski)*, published by his son Joachim Bielski (1540-1629) in 1609, uses *Ukrayna* and writes about *Ludzi ukraïnych* (Ukrainian people). In a letter to the Ukrainian Kozaks in 1618 Polish King Sigismund III wrote:

The pagans desolated almost all areas of Ukraine: the once rich Volhynian land, Pokutia.⁴

This shows that the Polish King associated Pokutia with Ukraine; Pokutia, a province near the Carpathian Mountains, was then a part of *Rus'*.

But it was only the insurrection of Bohdan Khmelnytsky against Poland in 1648 which brought about the establishment of the Ukrainian Kozak State and which placed the name of Ukraine firmly in general use. "Ukraine" became widely known and used in Western Europe, especially in Western European maps and in the scientific literature of the time.

DE BEAUPLAN'S MAPS OF UKRAINE

The major works which clearly show the change in nomenclature of the Ukrainian land are the striking cartographic and descriptive works of the French engineer and architect, Guillaume le Vasseur de Beauplan (1600?-1673). He came to Poland at the end of 1630 upon the invitation of King Sigismund III and was assigned to service in Ukraine, specifically in Podolia and in the province of Kiev.

³ *Entsyklopedia Ukrainoznavstva*, Vol. I, p. 15, Munich-New York, 1949.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 15.

Remaining in Ukraine for 17 years, he became known not only as a famous builder of fortresses and castles, but also as the mapper of the lands of Ukraine, which were known as "wild fields"—*Loca deserta*. In the course of his long stay in Ukraine de Beauplan made a series of cartographical charts and maps and amassed a great quantity of materials for the description of the country. Specifically, he made a general map of Ukraine on a large folio, another map on 8 folios, a map of the course of the Dnieper River, and several plans of cities and fortresses. His work on the general map of Ukraine was completed in 1638, which was attested to by virtue of a copy made by a Swedish engineer, Frederic Getkant, in 1639 and included under the name of *Tabula Geographica Ukrainiska* in his atlas, preserved in the collection of K. Krigsarkivet in Stockholm.⁵

De Beauplan was released from service in the Polish army, in March, 1647, a year before the insurrection of Khmelnytsky, but even prior to his departure for France he took the first steps for the publication of his map of Ukraine with the known engraver of Danzig, Wilhelm Hondt (Guihelmus Hondius). Four years later, in 1651, his efforts culminated in the publication of his map of Ukraine, entitled, *Delineatio Generalis Camporum Desertorum, vulgo Ukraina, Cum adjacentibus Provinciis*. It also contained descriptive notes relating to the wars of Khmelnytsky against Poland, specifically the battles of Lviv in 1649 and of Berestechko in 1651. The map embraced the Ukrainian lands on both banks of the Dnieper River, the area up to the Black Sea, including the Crimea, and Podolia, Volhynia and the greater part of *Rus'* with the city of Lviv.

The second special map of Ukraine of de Beauplan on 8 folios was published (in partial editions only) by Wilhelm Hondt in Danzig in 1653. Its exact title was: *Delineatio Specialis et accurata Ukrainae cum suis Palatinatibus et Districtibus Provinciisque adiacentibus . . . Gedani Anno MDCL*. Dated 1650 the map contained the provinces of Kiev, Podolia with the Bratslav area, Pokutia, part of *Rus'*, and Volhynia, but lacked the region of the Black Sea and the Crimea. In the titles of both maps the spelling of Ukraine was correctly given as *Ukraina*, although in some inscriptions in the general map of Ukraine the name once appeared as *Ukrainia*, and another time as *Ocraina*.

Of specific value and importance with regard to events in Ukraine during the wars of Khmelnytsky is de Beauplan's description of the Ukrainian lands, the materials for which he collected during his stay in Ukraine, but the book itself was published upon his return

⁵ See Leo Bagrow: "The first Maps of the Dnieper Cataracts," *Imago Mundi*, X:92 and reproduction of Getkant's map on p. 91.

to France. The first edition of the description, published in Rouen in 1651, was entitled, *Description des Contrees du Royavme de Pologne, Contenes depuis les confins de la Moscouie, iusques aux limites de la Transilvanie.*

In the second edition, which appeared in 1660, the name of Ukraine has been added in the title of the book: *Description D'Vkraine, qvi sont plysiers Prouinces du Royaume de Pologne. Contenes depuis les confins de la Moscouie, iusques aux limites de la Transilvanie.* This edition contained also a map of de Beauplan entitled, *Carte D'Vkraine contenant plusiers Prouinces comprises entre les Confins de Moscouie et les limites de Transiluanie.*

In addition to these maps and descriptions of Ukraine maps of the Ukrainian lands appeared in the 70's and 80's of the 17th century, published in Amsterdam by the Dutch publisher and cartographer Joannes Blaeu and incorporated into some editions of his *Atlas Maior*, which appeared in the Latin, Dutch, French and Spanish languages. These were 1) *Ukrainae pars quae Kiovia vulgo dicitur*; 2) *Ukrainae pars quae Pokutia vulgo dicitur*; 3) *Ukrainae pars quae Podolia vulgo dicitur* and 4) *Ukrainae pars quae Barclavia Palatinatus vulgo dicitur.*

On all these maps the provinces of Kiev, Podolia (with the area of Bratslav), and Pokutia are marked distinctly as parts of Ukraine. These maps were subsequently reprinted or incorporated in *The English Atlas* of Moses Pitt as well as in the works of Jansson and Waesbergii, I. Ottens, Covens & Mortier, Homann, and others.

The book on the description of Ukraine published by de Beauplan in Rouen in 1660 evoked great interest in the contemporary world, especially in England. It was rapidly translated into English and published in the widely-known 6-volume collection of voyages and travels by the London booksellers, Awnsham Churchill (d. 1728) and John Churchill (fl. 1695). It appeared in print in three editions in 1704, 1732 and 1744, respectively, in London, under the title, *A Collection of Voyages and Travels.*

De Beauplan's description of Ukraine was added to the first volume of all these editions under the English title, *A Description of Ukraine, containing Several Provinces of the Kingdom of Poland, Lying between the Confines of Muscovy, and the Borders of Transylvania. Together with their Customs, Manner of Life, and how they manage their Wars. Written in French by the Sieur de Beauplan.*

De Beauplan's *Description of Ukraine* was published during the 17th and 18th centuries also in other languages. Thus a Latin translation was published under the title of *Descriptio Ucrainae* in a

collection published in Warsaw in 1761 called: *Historiarum Poloniae et Lithuaniae scriptorum collectio magna* (Vol. II).

A German translation appeared in Breslau in 1780. It was entitled, *Beschreibung der Ukraine, der Krim und deren Einwohner. Aus dem Franzoesischen des Beauplan uebersetzt mit einem Anhang, der die Ukraine and die Budziakische Tatarey betrifft, herausgegeben von J. W. Moeller, Breslau, 1780.*

Subsequently a Polish translation appeared in a collection by J. U. Niemcewicz: *Zbiór pamiętników historycznych o dawney Polsce*. Warsaw, 1822, Vol. III.

In the 19th century the work of de Beauplan appeared also in the Russian language. The name of Ukraine was always preserved in the title of the book: *Opysanie Ukrainy. Sochynenie Boplana. Perewod s frantzuskago (F. Ustrialov), St. Petersburg, 1832; Opysanie Ukrainy Boplana, 1630-1648*, translated by K. Melnyk in the collection of *Memuary odnosiaschiesia k istorii yuzhnoi Rusy, Vyp. II*, Kiev 1896.

The cartographical works of de Beauplan, especially his general and special maps of Ukraine, had great impact upon the establishment and confirmation of the name "Ukraine," and in the works of Western European cartographers. Beginning in 1650, this name figured not only on maps of Poland and Muscovy, which at that time embraced larger or smaller parts of the Ukrainian lands, but there also appeared special maps of Ukraine as a distinct and separate geographical and political unity with the name of Ukraine at their heading.

The best evidence of this influence is a series of cartographical works executed by such known French cartographers as the Sanson family: Nicholas Sanson (1600-1667), his three sons: Nicholas, Jr. (d. 1648), Guillaume (d. 1703) and Adrien (d. 1718), and grandson Pierre Moulard Sanson. On the maps of Poland and Muscovy prepared by this family which were published by Nicholas Sanson, Jr., and which were incorporated after his death in 1648 into the *Atlas of Europe*, the name of Ukraine does not appear. But on the same maps of his father and his brothers that were published after 1660 the Ukrainian lands are designated as *Ukraine Pays de Cosaques*.

Moreover, through the efforts of the Sanson father and sons there appeared in 1665 and 1674 six separate maps of Ukraine and its various provinces:

1) *La Russie Noire ou Polonoise qui Comprend les Provinces de la Russie Noire de Volhynie et de Podolie divisees en leurs Palatinats Vulgairement Connues sous le Nom d'Ukraine ou Pays des Cosaques. Par les Sansons, 1674;*

2) *Russie Noire, divisee en ses Palatinats & c. tiree pour la plus grande Partie de la grande Carte de l'Ukraine, du Sr. le Vasseur de Beauplan. Par le Sr. Sanson d'Abbeville. A Paris, 1665;*

3) *Haute Volhynie, ou Palatinat de Lusuc; tire de la Grande Carte d'Ukraine, du Sr. le Vasseur de Beauplan. Par le Sr. Sanson d'Abbeville . . . A Paris, 1665;*

4) *Basse Volhynie, ou Palatinat de Kiow, tire entierement de la grande Ukraine, de Sieur le Vasseur de Beauplan. Par le Sr. Sanson d'Abbeville . . . A Paris, 1665;*

5) *Haute Podolie, ou Palatinat de Kamienec, tire entierem. de la Gr. Vkraine, du Sr. le Vasseur de Beauplan. Par le Sr. Sanson d'Abbeville . . . A Paris, 1665, with inset: Basse Partie de la Basse Podolie;*

6) *Basse Podolie, ou Palatinat de Braclaw, tire de la Grande Ukraine. du Sr. le Vasseur de Beauplan. Par le Sr. Sanson d'Abbeville . . . A Paris, 1665.*

As we can see all these maps were based on the general and special maps of Ukraine by de Beauplan, except that the Sanson publishers went farther than de Beauplan by including in the territorial range of Ukraine also *Rus'* and the whole of Volhynia.

This cartographical picture of Ukraine, firmly established by de Beauplan and the Sanson family, was maintained by subsequent Dutch, French, English, German, Italian, and other cartographers and publishers.

Along with these maps of wide popularity, the general map of Ukraine of de Beauplan was re-published by various western European publishers under the name of *Typus Generalis Ukrainae sive Palatinatum Podoliae, Kioviensis et Braczlaviensis terras nova delineatione exhibens*. Such a map also was re-published, on the basis of the general map of Ukraine by de Beauplan of 1651, anonymously by Moses Pitt in his *The English Atlas*, in Oxford, in 1680-1682.

In addition, in the 17th and 18th centuries other maps bearing the name of and presenting Ukraine were published:

1) The one of the German cartographers, Johann Baptist Homann (1664-1724) published in two editions in Nuernberg around 1710 and 1720, and entitled, *Ukrainia, quae e/s/t Terra Cossacorum;*

2) Pierre van de Aa, a Leyden cartographer, in his 44th volume *Le Galerie Agreeable du Monde*, included a map of *Ukraine, Grand Pays de la Russe Rouge, Avec Une Partie de la Pologne, Moscovie, Bulgarie, Valachie, Podolie et Volhynie;*

3) That of the Augsburg publisher of maps and atlases, Matthias Seutter (1678-1756), entitled: *Amplissima Ucrainae Regio,*

A
DESCRIPTION
OF
UKRAINE,
Containing Several
PROVINCES
OF THE
Kingdom of Poland,

Lying between the Confines of *Muscovy*,
and the Borders of *Transylvania*.

Together with their Customs, Manner of Life,
and how they manage their Wars.

Written in French by the *Sieur DE BEAUPLAN*.

Printed for HENRY LINTOT, and JOHN OGDEN, at the Golden-Bull in St. Dun-
stons Church.

Title page of Beauplan's English translation of *A Description of Ukraine* and John Marshall's *Travels* (1772) on which the name of Ukraine is prominently displayed.

T R A V E L S

THROUGH

HOLLAND, || LAPLAND,
FLANDERS, || RUSSIA,
GERMANY, || The UKRAINE,
DENMARK, || AND
SWEDEN, || POLAND,

IN THE

Years 1768, 1769, and 1770.

In which is particularly Minuted,

THE PRESENT STATE

OF

THOSE COUNTRIES,

RESPECTING THEIR

AGRICULTURE, POPULATION,

MANUFACTURES, COMMERCE,

THE ARTS, AND USEFUL UNDERTAKINGS.

By JOSEPH MARSHALL, Esq;

V O L. III.

L O N D O N :

Printed for J. ALMON, opposite Burlington House,
Piccadilly.

MDCCLXXII.

Palatinatus Kioviensem et Braclaviensem complectens, cum adjacentibus Provinciis;

4) Conrad Tobias Lotter (1717-1777), son-in-law of Matthias Seutter, re-published Seutter's *Amplissima Ucrainiae Regio* with the name of Ukraine printed across the top of the map;

5) The one, entitled, *Ucrainia seu Cosacorum Regio*, and prepared by Christoph Weigel (1654-1725) and his brother, Johann Christoph Weigel (d. 1746).

In the middle of the 17th century the Dutch publisher, Danckerus Danckerts, published a map by de Beauplan embracing the whole of the Polish Kingdom, that is, the Polish lands proper plus Lithuania and Ukraine. It was printed on a folio and covered the territory from the southeastern seashores of Sweden and the southern borders of Finland to the southern coast of the Crimea, and from the island of Rugia to Moscow. The full title of the map read: *Nova totius Regni*

Poloniae, Magnique Ducatus Prussiae et Lithuaniae, cum suis Palatinatibus ac confiniis. Exacta delineatio par G. le Vasseur de Beauplan . . . Amsterdami apud Danckerum Danckerts. Although the name of Ukraine does not appear in the title of the map, the territory on both sides of the Dnieper River is designated as *Ukraina*.

Subsequently, the map of de Beauplan which was made in 1651 became the base of many other maps which appeared in a number of atlases or as separate maps. The map of Ukraine appeared also on a general map of the Polish Republic as, for example, the map published in 1679 by the Paris cartographer Nicholas Sanson, Sr. (1600-1667) and entitled, *Estats de la Couronne de Pologne*. Its original title in the French language read: *Royaume de Pologne, Duches et Provinces de Prussie, Cuiavie, Mazovie, Russie Noire & c. Duches de Lithuanie, Volhynie, Podolie & c., de l'Ukraine & c.*

Maps similar to that of the *Les Etats de la Couronne de Pologne* were published at the end of the 17th century by Frenchman Charles-Hubert-Alexis Jaillot (1640-1712). These also included all the north-central Ukrainian lands on both banks of the Dnieper River and Podolia, underscoring the fact that these provinces of Volhynia and Podolia embraced also Ukraine, or in French, *Les Provinces de Volhynie, et Podolie, ou est compris l'Ukraine ou Pays de Cosaques*.

In the title of the map of the "whole Polish state" — *totius Regni Poloniae* — published at the end of the 17th century on the basis of the Sanson family maps and which was printed by Nicholas Visscher, Jr. (1649-1709), Ukraine is given as one of the principal parts of the Polish state, and is listed in Latin in the following order: *Polonia, Ducatus Lithuania, Ukraina*. The definition of Ukraine states that it comprised Volhynia and Podolia: *Ukrainia & c. in qua Volhynia, et Podolia cums suis Palatinatibus ac Confiniis*.

The same component parts of the Polish Crown are also enumerated in the map of Frederic de Wit/t/ (1616-1698), son of Frederic de Wit/t/ of Amsterdam, which read as follows: *Regni POLONIAE at Ducatus LITVUANIAE, Voliniae, Podolie, UCRAINIE, Prussiae, Livoniae et Cvrlandiaae descriptio . . .*

In the 18th century we find that on the numerous maps of Poland, published mostly by the French geographer and cartographer, Guillaume De L'Isle (1675-1768), the Ukrainian territory is always marked as Ukraine, or in French, *Vkraine ou Pays des Cosaques* ("Ukraine or Country of the Cossacks").

All these examples attest to the fact that in the second half of the 17th and during the 18th century the concept of Ukraine as a separate ethnic unity had become firmly entrenched in Western Eu-

ropean cartography. This treatment of Ukraine as a separate territory was also accepted in Russia-Muscovy of the Peter I era and afterwards. This can be deduced from the fact that a map of Poland made by Carel Allardt (b. 1648), a Dutchman of Amsterdam, was reprinted on the order of Czar Peter I by another Dutch engraver, Peter Picard (1670-1737), and published in Moscow with Russian inscriptions. On this map the name of *OUKRAINA* embraces the vast Ukrainian territory on both banks of the Dnieper River. The name of *Russia Rubra*, printed twice on this map, pertains only to Galicia (with the area of Belz and Kholm) and Volhynia. The state and lands of Peter I are designated on the map as *chast Moskovskoga Gosudarstva* (part of the Muscovite state). The name, "Ukraine," designating the Ukrainian national territory was marked on all plans of the Poltava battle in 1709 which were made on the order of Peter I and published in Moscow and abroad.⁶

Moreover, the name of Ukraine was always properly used by the Petersburg Academy in the 18th century. In all the maps published by the Academy on the Russo-Turkish War of 1736-1738 and which subsequently were re-published in the West, Left-Bank Ukraine was designated in German as *Ein Theil der Ukraine*, or in French, *Partie d'Ukraine*. These maps of the Petersburg Academy with the name of Ukraine were used in all German, French and English editions of the memoirs of Christoph Hermann Manstein, a general in the service of the Russian army. The memoirs embraced the years 1727-1744. The book appeared in English in London in 1733 under the title of *Memoirs of Russia, Historical, Political and Military*.

At the end of the 18th century the name of Ukraine appeared on a modern map of Eastern Europe whose author was the most outstanding French cartographer of the XVIII century, Jean Baptiste Bourguignone d'Anville (1697-1782). His map, published in Paris in 1760 and which later was re-published in London and elsewhere, was entitled, *Troisieme Partie de la Carte d'Europe*. The territory on both sides of the Dnieper River is distinctly designated as Ukraine: *KRAYN ou UKRAINE*; Galicia is given with the cities of Lviv, Belz and Kholm as *Russie*; Volhynia as *Russie Polonoise*, and Muscovy as *Grande Russie*.

Such designation of the Ukrainian territory and its delineation from Poland proper and Muscovy-Russia was widely adopted

⁶ Cf. charts and plans in the article by L. A. Goldenberg, "Kartograficheskie Istochnyky XVIII v." in the collection of *Poltava*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 363-388, in which there constantly appears the designation, "Pultawa in d'Vcraine," as well the plan of de Fer in 1714, entitled, *La Journee de Poltawa en Ukraine*, and others.

during the 18th century in memoirs, travels and other publications. An extensive bibliography on this subject, compiled by the late Ukrainian researcher, Elias Borschak, is entitled, *L'Ukraine dans la litterature de l'Europe Occidentale*, published in 1935 as a reprint from *Le Monde Slave*.

Among the works cited by Borschak worthy of mention is the book of the English traveler, Joseph Marshall: *Travels through Holland, Flanders . . . Russia, the Ukraine and Poland. In the years 1769 and 1770 in which is particularly minuted the Present State of those Countries*, which was published in London in three editions—1763, 1764 and 1806, and once in Edinburgh in 1788; in a Dutch translation in Leyden in 1769, in two French editions in Paris (1768 and 1803) and in a German edition in 1787 in Hamburg. Significantly, the title of the *Travels* of Joseph Marshall differentiates the names of Russia, Ukraine and Poland as those designating separate countries.

Among other books of that time is that of a Hamburg doctor, Johann Wilhelm Moeller, who in 1780-1781 traveled through Ukraine and subsequently published his *Reise von Warschau nach der Ukraine im Jahre 1780 and 1781* (Herzberg am Harz, 1804).

But the most important document on the ethnic, cultural and political separateness of Ukraine was the appearance at the end of the 18th century of the first Western European history of Ukraine. Written by the well-known Vienna historian, Johann Christian von Engel (1770-1814), a German originally from Transylvania, it was entitled, *Geschichte der Ukraine und der Ukrainischen Kosaken* (*History of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Kozaks*). It was the 48th volume of the *General History of the World—Fortsetzung der Allgemeinen Welthistorie durch eine Gesellschaft von Gelehrten in Deutschland and England ausgefertigt* — and was published in Halle by Johann Jacob Gebauer in 1706.

Its frontispiece is a portrait of *Hetman* Ivan Mazepa. A portrait of *Hetman* Bohdan Khmelnytsky appears before the preface. This monumental history comprising 709 pages was divided into two parts: a) *Geschichte der Ukraine und der Ukrainischen Kosaken*, covering the period 1320-1795, and b) *Geschichte von Galizien und Lodomerien*, embracing not only the history of Halych and Volodymyr, but also the history of Kievan Rus', beginning in 980, that is, from the era of Prince Volodymyr the Great. Engel's history is the history of Ukraine as a separate state and country, populated by a distinct and separate people. A solid and reliable work, it had a powerful influence upon the development of Ukrainian historiography; the data it amassed constituted the basis for the works of

Western European historians in the field of history of Eastern Europe and its peoples. All the works based on this history which were published at the end of the 18th and throughout the 19th century only confirmed the previous deductions and data on Ukraine in Western cartography.

In the preface to his book, *History of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Kozaks*, published in 1796, Engel wrote:

Ukraine from the viewpoint of territory is equal to the Kingdom; it is a fertile land, liberally endowed by nature; it is a frontier wall between cultured Europe and uncivilized Asia, a pasture and a gateway to so many Asiatic hordes which have tried to invade Europe, and for this reason alone it merits much attention, especially in connection with new developments. Now Ukraine forms a considerable part of the Great Russian empire. But how did it come to be under Russia? How did it happen that these free, Spartan-like and independent Kozaks found themselves under the Muscovite yoke—these Kozaks who, as Boissy d'Anglas said, inflicted heavy defeats upon the Turks, Tatars and Poles?

How did it come about that the Kozaks, instead of having their own *hetmans* as was assured them when they went under Russia, had governors imposed upon them and the Ukrainian lands? The history of the Kozaks also had a great influence upon the history of Poland, Sweden and Transylvania, especially in later times. Without them the splendor and the decline of Poland in our day could not be imagined. Without them one could not practically imagine the quarrels, so pregnant in their consequence, between Russia and Poland, and without taking them into consideration one could not understand the internal relations in Poland, as the attempts of Vladislaus IV to preserve one autocratic monarchistic head on a corpse with many cut-off heads of the aristocratic *hydra*. The successors of Charles Gustave and Charles XII might have ruled up to this day in Warsaw, Moscow and Petersburg, as was desired by Khmelnytsky and the Kozaks of Mazepa. And perhaps Georg Rakoczy would have become a second Stephan Batory, had he not been stopped through the desertion of the Kozaks in his campaign of 1657 . . . But from the political viewpoint the history of the Kozaks is instructive in itself. Ukraine, a granary and a pasture for hordes of Poles, a bastion against the Tartars and Russians, has been subjected to the yoke of the latter, has increased their power and lately is helping to completely destroy Poland. In presenting these events the history of the Kozaks could be a very interesting lecture. The energy of many peoples and individuals which enchanted us in the historical events of the Greeks and Latins has manifested itself on the battlefields of Bilhorod, Korsun and Zbarazh, as well as in the heroic undertakings of Khmelnytsky and Mazepa. To shine in the way that the actions of the Greeks and Romans did, this history needs only such pens as those which masterfully and instructively described the collapse of the united Netherlands . . .

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In conclusion, the name of Ukraine has been a part of the history of the Ukrainian people for at least three and a half centuries. To say as our State Department "experts" contend, that it was invented in the 19th century is to confess one's lamentable ignorance of the history not only of Ukraine but of all Europe as well.

THE HISTORY OF ARMENIA

By GREGORY D. GOURJIAN

In a letter written on August 27, 1961, to the Hon. Howard W. Smith, Chairman of the House Rules Committee, by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, this statement appears: “. . . Armenia is a traditional part of Soviet Russia.”

Is this assertion true or false?

Armenia is one of the world's oldest states. In ancient times the country was known by various names — Urartu, Nairi and finally by its present name. Since Armenia occupied an extremely advantageous geographical position between the West and the Orient, it invariably played an important part in the political and economic affairs of the world, at least until the Middle Ages. It carried on an extensive trade with Egypt, Assyria, Babylon, Persia, Greece, and Rome, successively, and towards the end of its independent existence, with Byzantium and the other nations of the East.

At this point we may cite certain historical facts which are mentioned in many of the standard works on ancient history.

Pompey imposed upon the Armenian king, Tigranes, a tribute of 6,000 silver talents (approximate value of 1 talent — \$1,000.00). The Roman commander Lucullus took Tigranocerta (?), the capital of Armenia, seizing hitherto unheard-of quantities of treasure. Plutarch describes this episode for us: “Lucullus kept for himself the treasures found in the capital, while handing over the city itself to his soldiers to plunder. In addition to precious stones and gems, silver coin to the value of 8,000 talents was found. The spoils taken by Lucullus from Armenia to Rome included a bedstead made of gold which took eight mules to carry, 56 mule-loads of silver ingots, 100 mule-loads of silver coin and 200 boxes of gold ornaments and precious stones, to say nothing of the royal diadem of Tigranes or of the riches that had been divided up among the soldiers, each soldier receiving 950 denarii.”

In the army of Alexander of Macedonia which subdued India, almost all of the cavalry were Armenians. After Alexander's death, the empire which he had created broke up into a number of different

states—Macedonia, Egypt, Athens, Armenia, etc. (Prof. V. Soloviev.) In the course of ancient history the power of the Armenian kings made them welcome allies of such large and mighty states as the Persia of Darius and the Rome of Nero. At one time the kingdom of Armenia extended from the Black Sea to the Caspian, from the Euphrates to Cilicia. The invasions of Mongols and Seljuk Turks from the 9th to the 11th centuries put an end to the Armenian state in the Armenian heartland. The Seljuks captured Ani, the capital of Armenia, looted it and wielded sword and torch throughout the land as far as the Euphrates. Only that part of Armenia known as Cilicia was spared to become the second historic homeland of the Armenian people. (Prof. Geltzer.) The kingdom of Cilician Armenia came into existence during the era of the Crusades, when the European states first mounted their campaigns against Jerusalem in order to set free the Lord's Sepulchre. Being a Christian state, Cilician Armenia became an ally of the Crusaders and served as the West's forward line of defense against the incursions of the Seljuk Turks.

The defense of the Christian West required an effective military strength, but the Armenian sovereigns were not powerful enough to provide that strength. Moreover, the European powers, as represented by the Crusaders, were more interested in acquiring wealth than in aiding the defenders of Christ's Tomb. The campaign against Byzantium, which was captured by the Crusaders at the beginning of the 13th century, is a good illustration of this tendency. In 1375, Leon VI, the last Armenian monarch, was forced to abandon his kingdom. He received no help in the West from the kings of Europe, his erstwhile allies. He died in exile in Paris and was buried there. The fall of Cilician Armenia was followed directly by the occupation of the country by the Seljuks and their successors, the Ottoman Turks, who ruled Armenia as a conquered province. The Armenian people entered upon a dark age in their history.

In this period the Armenians knew nothing of Russia, which was then under the Tartar yoke. Armenia was still very remote from Russia geographically, for between Armenia and the early Muscovite Czarism lay many provinces which had been conquered by the Turks and were subject to their authority. Because the Armenians were Christians who generally refused conversion to Islam, their Turkish conquerors treated them very cruelly. Representatives of the Armenian clergy and merchant class turned to the West for help, but they obtained nothing in the way of protection from the European rulers except assurances of sympathy. From Persia Armenian merchants began to travel to Moscow on business, where they

supplied the Czar's court and the lesser princely nobility with silks and brocades. In the 17th and early 18th centuries Armenian merchants were already appealing to the Russian government to liberate Armenia from the yoke of the unbelievers. They communicated with Russia indirectly, through European channels. This same period saw the steady expansion of Russia to the south and southeast against the Crimean Tartars and the Persians. But as yet the Russians were unable to free the Armenian lands even from the Persians, to say nothing of the Turks.

Russian troops began to advance along the Caspian littoral. Derbent and Baku were taken. But Czar Peter the Great could not permit himself to occupy the Transcaucasus, a step which might have led to an unwanted war with Turkey, then still one of the world's most powerful nations. (See Soloviev's *Istoria Rossii*.) And after Peter I's death in 1725 all his plans and undertakings were abandoned or postponed by the various ruling favorites of the Empresses who succeeded him. On the whole, the 18th century Russian court was totally uninterested in the fate of the Christian peoples who were living under Moslem domination. This situation continued for more than one hundred years. At the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries—when Russia had established itself in firm control of the northern shore of the Black Sea, had conquered the Crimea and "New Russia," annexed Georgia and was approaching the border of Turkish Armenia—hopes rose high among the leading spirits of Armenia's clergy and laity. Hitherto their hopes and expectations had been centered on the West, but now they believed that Russia might become the liberator of Armenia . . . As a result of the Treaty of Turkmaichai with Persia in 1828 and the Treaty of Adrianople with Turkey in 1829, part of Northern Armenia was ceded to Russia. For their part the Armenians gave Russia their wholehearted assistance. Many Armenian volunteers joined the Russian army to fight the Turks. It is enough to mention here the names of such Armenian generals who served in the Russian army as Loris-Melikov, Lazareff, Madatoff and Silikoff. Above all, these men sought to deliver their country from the Turkish yoke.

But while the Catholicos, the spiritual head of all Armenians who resided at the monastery of Etchmiadzin, was giving unreserved if secret support to the Armenian liberation movement, the other head of the Armenian Church, the Patriarch of Constantinople, whom the Turkish Sultan had invested with broad powers over the Armenians of Constantinople and other places, was attracted to the West, despite the fact that the contemporary West thought only in terms of business and profits. In Constantinople the position of the Armenians was

distinctly better than in other Turkish cities and regions. The Armenians of the capital controlled an important part of the country's domestic and foreign trade. They were also connected with the ruling circles of the Sultan's regime. There were Armenians in high civil service posts in the various ministries and there were even some Armenian ministers. In the liberal professions there were doctors, lawyers, engineers, architects, etc., by the score. For example, the Minister for Foreign Affairs under Sultan Abdul Hamid, a monarch who was notorious for his exceptionally cruel treatment of Armenians, was ironically enough an Armenian—Noradugian Effendi.

Unfortunately, the influential Armenian bourgeoisie of Constantinople were concerned more with their own well-being and with personal material gains than with their country's real interests. The Patriarch entertained a negative attitude to the idea of Armenian liberation through Russian aid; his sympathies lay all on the side of the Western Powers. In the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, the Armenians took part on Russia's side. Many Armenian officers, including generals, were decorated by the Russians for their valor in battle. When the Russian forces approached Constantinople, the Treaty of San Stefano was signed with the Turks. According to Article 16 of this treaty Turkey undertook to carry out reforms of conditions in the Armenian *villavets*; these reforms were to be supervised by the Russian authorities who would occupy the Armenian-inhabited districts for that purpose. The long-awaited autonomy of Armenia seemed to be near.

Of course, Russia intended to use San Stefano as a means of attaining its fundamental goal—control of the Bosphorus, the outlet to the Mediterranean Sea. The Treaty met with the concerted opposition of the Western Powers. At the Congress of Berlin the Western diplomats revised the San Stefano Treaty, and Russia perforce accepted their re-editing of, among other things, Article 16 as Article 61 with all Turkish concessions on the Armenian question cancelled. In this respect the pre-war *status quo* remained in force.

In 1914 the First World War began. The roar of Russian guns on the northern frontiers of Armenia heralded the freeing of all Armenia from Turkish oppression. The war aroused the whole Armenian nation. The troops of Czarist Russia took the offensive and won victory after victory over the Turks. At the same time units made up of Armenian volunteers who had fled Turkey were organized in the Caucasus by the Russians. These formations were also officered by Armenians. There were six such units, each commanded by an officer who had won fame in guerrilla warfare in Turkish Armenia. Operat-

ing as a special combat group under the High Command of the Russian Transcaucasus army, the Armenians fought vigorously against their ancient enemies. Soon the Russian army had taken almost all of Turkish Armenia. Armenian uprisings against the Turks broke out in several districts of Turkish Armenia — Van, Sasun, etc., — on the eve of the Russian offensive. The age-old Armenian dream of independence and sovereignty seemed to be on the verge of being realized. But a terrible disaster was about to shatter the Armenian people. Periodically, as under Abdul Hamid, the Turkish government had organized *pogroms* against Armenians, exterminating these peaceful folk on the ground that they continued to adhere to their Christian faith. Now, in 1915, the Turkish government issued a decree that all Armenians were to be exiled from Turkish Armenia to the Arabian desert. This action was accompanied by mass liquidations and robbery of the Armenian population. The fact that the Turkish government decided to use this means of destroying an entire nation of more than one and a half million people, thus disposing forever of the Armenian question—which the Turks viewed as an instrument of “extortion” or blackmail of their country by the “humanitarian” European states and Russia—bears eloquent witness to the Turks’ extraordinary cruelty and inhumanity. To this day this genocidal act ranks as one of history’s greatest crimes.

Armenian soldiers served the Czar’s armies well, winning many decorations not only on the Caucasian front, but against the Austro-Germans as well. However, the sudden outbreak of the March Revolution in 1917 changed everything. The creation of the ill-omened Soviet of Soldiers’ and Workers’ Deputies led to a breakdown of discipline throughout the Army. On April 3, 1917, Lenin and thirty-three of his followers arrived in St. Petersburg on the famous sealed train, as arranged by the German military intelligence. Instead of being arrested as he had expected, Lenin and his comrades were hailed by the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Soviet with wild enthusiasm. Interesting background material on this period is contained in a series of four articles by S. Pushkarev which appeared in *Novoye Russkoye Slovo*, the New York Russian daily, starting on January 21, 1962. Lenin’s brilliant anti-war propaganda, which helped to demoralize the Russian army in the summer and autumn of 1917, was paid for by German funds (see *Pravda*, April 28, 1918). Lenin was able to seize power with the help of only a small detachment of Baltic Fleet sailors and a few hundred “Red Guards” because his propaganda had effectively neutralized the entire Petersburg military garrison and the bulk of the city’s working class population. A handful of cadets and

women troops were all that remained for the defense of the discredited Provisional Government.

All this, of course, is not directly connected with our subject. But it might be useful at this point to recall some of the slogans which Lenin and Co. used so assiduously to help Bolshevism to seize power and to maintain itself in power: "Peace to the huts, war to the palaces," "Expropriate the expropriators," "Peace without annexations and contributions on the basis of the self-determination of peoples," "The land to the peasants, the factories to the workers," "Down with taxes," "Long live the Worker-Peasant People's Rule," "Down with capitalist exploiters, the bourgeoisie and the officers," "Everything for the people," etc., etc. We all know how the Bolsheviks actually treated the people after they had seized power.

The *coup d'état* in Petrograd brought about a completely chaotic situation throughout Russia. In many regions local regimes were set up which did not acknowledge the authority of the Bolsheviks. With the beginning of the Civil War early in 1918, the Transcaucasus seceded from Russia and proclaimed its independence. The Transcaucasian Federal Republic consisted of three nations—Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. Elections were held to select the members of a Transcaucasian *Sejm* (*Parliament*). Unfortunately, the Bolshevik propaganda of Lenin and his adherents was just as successful in the army of the Caucasus as elsewhere in the former Czarist army. Such Bolshevik slogans as "The land to the peasants, the factories to the workers" struck a responsive chord especially among the Russian soldiers. They began to abandon the front in large numbers, hurrying homeward to take part, or so they thought, in the division of land and factories. Chaos reigned, both at the front line and to the rear, and the Caucasian front disintegrated.

The Transcaucasian Federation did not recognize as valid the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Bolshevik Russia and the Central Powers by which Batum, the fortress of Kars, Ardahan, Artvin and the adjacent territory were returned to Turkey. Now, for the first time in the war, the Turkish army took the offensive against a Russian army whose military capacity had vanished. A new army composed of Azerbaijanians, Georgians and Armenians, and organized along national lines, was hastily created. And at the end of May 1918 the Transcaucasian Federal Republic, bedevilled by internal contradictions among its three constituent nations, ceased to exist. On May 26, 1918, Georgia declared its independence, assuming the name Georgian Independent Republic. On May 28 the Armenian Republic followed suit.

The collapse of the Russian army owing to the effect of Bolshevik propaganda meant that the entire Caucasian front, from Lake Urmi in Persia to Trebizond on the Black Sea, now lay open to Turkish assault. The organized Armenian units were faced with a defensive mission which was beyond their strength. They could only conduct a fighting retreat from Turkish Armenia. Azerbaijan, being a Moslem nation, came to terms with Turkey and withdrew from the fight. Georgian representatives in Germany signed a peace treaty with that country which, in turn, agreed to guarantee the inviolability of Georgia's frontiers. Armenia found itself in a disastrous position and was forced to enter into peace discussions simultaneously with the Soviet government in Moscow and with Turkey.

The Armenian-Turkish peace conference was held at Alexandropolis. An important role was played there by Comrade Legran, a Soviet emissary sent by Moscow for talks with the Armenian government. Legran gave the Turkish delegates all possible aid. For its own reasons, Moscow at this time was aiding the Turks in their struggle against the Anglo-French forces. The Soviets took this policy quite seriously, agreeing to give Kemal Pasha material aid as well as political support. Through Legran Moscow openly informed the Turks that it would not defend Armenia. Thus the Turks were able to seize and retain the fortress of Kars and other Armenian towns and districts. Moreover, late in April, 1920, Moscow occupied Azerbaijan, which meant that the Red Army had now reached Armenia's eastern frontier.

The Soviet delegation in Alexandropolis, which consisted of Legran and the Armenian Communist historian and Marxist theoretician Ovanesian, journeyed to Erivan for "discussions." At Moscow's signal, Communist-organized uprisings broke out in several Armenian provinces. The Dashnaktsutium, the political party which was then governing Armenia, concluded an agreement with Moscow providing for an equal Soviet-Dashnak condominium over Armenia. On December 2, 1920, the creation of an Armenian Soviet Republic was announced (see Boryan's *History of Armenia*).

The Sovietization of all aspects of Armenian life began at once. Purges, requisitions, confiscations (i.e. the "socialization" of private property, banks, industry, land and trade) were the order of the day. On February 18, 1921, less than three months after the creation of Soviet Armenia, a general revolt against the Communist tyrants from Moscow flared up throughout the country. The Soviet regime and the Red Army units fled. The insurgents captured the capital and installed a restored national government called "The Committee To

Save the Motherland." Erivan remained in their hands until April 2, 1921, when the city was reoccupied by fresh Red Army troops who had been rushed in from Russia to deal with the revolt. The Armenian national forces and the "Committee To Save the Motherland" retreated to the mountainous region of Zangezur, where they continued the struggle until July 25, 1921. At the end of July 1921, the remnants of the Armenian National Army, accompanied by tens of thousands of refugees, crossed the River Araxes and found shelter in Iran (see Boryan's book, *Problemy narodov S.S.S.R.*, chapter 8, published in 1962). The subsequent Communist treatment of the Armenian population, of whom many thousands were deported to concentration camps, is only too well known.

In the light of this brief but accurate summary of Armenian history can the reader discern *any historical grounds whatsoever* for the assertion that Armenia is a "traditional" or "historical" part of Russia, or of the U.S.S.R. of today? Obviously, this assertion is totally without historical foundation. Let us turn to present-day life in Soviet Armenia to gain a true perspective. A few years ago *The New York Times* published an editorial on the fate of certain former American citizens of Armenian origin who had been led astray by Soviet propaganda and had settled in Soviet Armenia in the mistaken belief that they were returning to their long-desired native land. These American Armenians, who were for the most part pre-World War I immigrants to the U.S.A. from Turkish Armenia and their American-born and educated children, had found a second homeland here, to say nothing of the blessings of American citizenship. But from 1947 to 1949, swayed by the persuasive propaganda spread by the Communist press and by Soviet agents and beguiled by the promises of the carefree, happy life awaiting them in "the motherland," they sold all their property, abandoned the secure life they had enjoyed in the United States and moved to Soviet Armenia. What kind of a life have they had in Armenia? In 1958 the Armenian emigrants from America appealed to President Eisenhower to be allowed to return to the U.S.A. This step was the inevitable outcome of a process of disillusionment and bitter regret at their own stupidity in leaving the U.S.—the land where they had enjoyed full civic rights for more than 40 years—a process which had started almost from the very moment of their arrival in Soviet Armenia. *The New York Times* stated that the American Armenians had made several previous attempts to reach the U.S. Embassy in Moscow with similar appeals for help. But each effort was forestalled by the Soviet authorities. Only the visit to Armenia of an American delegation gave these people a chance to deliver their

appeal to President Eisenhower to allow them to return to America and to restore their rights as Americans citizens.

Several years ago *Paris-Match*, the mass-circulation French news magazine, published a report on the tragic fate of the 7,000 Armenians from France who had moved to the U.S.S.R. after World War II. After visiting Moscow, an official French government delegation headed by Guy Mollet, then Premier of France, and consisting of the French Foreign Minister and seven other official delegates accompanied by 16 journalists and three French TV reporters, toured the Soviet Union. One of their stops was in Erivan. On the main square of the city a carefully guarded crowd, held back by lines of KGB agents, watched while the French visitors listened to welcoming speeches and received the usual bouquets of flowers from little girls. Suddenly a number of women broke away from the crowd and rushed toward G. Pineau, the French Foreign Minister: "We are Frenchwomen," they shouted. "Save us! *Vive la France!*" The woman who was first to reach the Frenchmen held in her arms her child . . . and the *tricouleur*. She fell on her knees before the Minister and began to sob. The French were at first bewildered. Other women and men, too, ran forward and surrounded the French. Weeping and embracing the French visitors, they hurriedly told their story. All were Armenians who had lived in France until the end of World War II. Many had married Frenchmen or Frenchwomen and had children born in France. Many had had homes and property in France. After the war ended, the Soviets had started a propaganda campaign to get these people to move to the "homeland," promising them free transportation to Armenia as well as housing and employment. But, said these Armenians to the attentive French journalists in the group, from the moment of their arrival in the U.S.S.R. they lost all the freedom they had enjoyed in France. Now they dreamed only of returning to France. They kept imploring Pineau: "Save us! Petition them in Moscow to let us return to France." In fact, Pineau made an official representation to the Soviet government on the subject when he got back to Moscow.

Unfortunately, neither the Armenians' appeal to President Eisenhower, nor *The New York Times* editorial, nor the official representation by former French Foreign Minister Pineau achieved their aim . . . For slave owners have never yet been known anywhere in the world to free their slaves voluntarily.

GEORGIA AND ITS PEOPLE

By GEORGE NAKASHIDSE

When in May, 1918, Georgia declared its independence, it notified all the governments of the world, as is the international custom.

When Prime Minister Lloyd George was informed of the birth of the new state, he exclaimed, "It is impossible! I just have seen the Ambassador of the United States and he said nothing about the separation of the State of Georgia from the United States." Whereupon Lord Curzon, then Foreign Minister, explained to him that there is another Georgia in the Caucasus on the coast of the Black Sea.

"But the Georgians are Russians," rejoined Lord Curzon. "How dare they separate from their brothers at such a time! No. I will never tolerate and recognize such a thing!"

We ourselves cannot vouch for the authenticity of this exchange, but the fact remains that such a story circulated in Tbilisi, Georgia, in the same year of 1918, by way of pointing up the hostile behavior of the high command of the English forces then arrived in Georgia and the Caucasus.

It is said that the general recognition of the history and culture of Poland contributed much to the inclusion of its independence demands in President Wilson's renowned fourteen-point declaration. It is a pity that one of the greatest political men of Europe, the chief architect of the postwar world, should have had no idea about the Caucasus and its peoples, whose fate and destiny had interested cunning, farsighted England for almost all of the nineteenth century. Unfortunately for Georgia and the course of history, Lloyd George had nothing in him of Lord Palmerston or Lord Ponsonby.

After three years of independence, Georgia was invaded and occupied by the Russian Communists. Since that time we, the political emigres, have been wandering from one country to another or settling in one corner of the free world or another. And wherever we find ourselves, we keep answering one typical question, along with its variations:

"Are the Georgians not Russians? Is your language any different from Russian? Do you have your own alphabet, literature,

history? If so, how could a Georgian, Stalin, be the Russian dictator?" And so on.

And we always give the same answer:

"We are not Russians. Our language is as different from Russian as English is from Japanese. Our alphabet was invented in the fifth century or earlier. And, of course, every nation has men of the type of Stalin-Dzugashvili."

On this occasion, however, we should like to fully describe Georgia and what it stands for.

Georgia occupies the southwestern part of the Caucasus; on its relatively small territory (70,000 sq. km.) live 4,500,000 people, of whom three million are pure Georgians. Situated between the Caucasian Mountains and the Black Sea, this land offers a rare variety of flora and fauna, an uncommon contrast of sceneries. On one side rise the majestic peaks of the mountains, covered with everlasting snow. Extending to the other side are the charming valleys, filled with sub-tropical plants and beautiful flowers. Small wonder that such admirers of nature and beauty as the ancient Greeks should have woven many fairy myths around this country. It is not by chance that they chained their hero Prometheus not to Olympus but to a Caucasian granite peak. Not in vain did Jason drive to flaming Colchis for the Golden Fleece, while great Homer brought Ulysses to this wonderful country of bewitching Circe . . .

The earliest information about the component tribes of the Georgian people are found in the Assyrian and Urartu annals and inscriptions dating back to the twelfth century. The ancient Greek historians, such as Hecates, Herodotes, Xenophon, Strabo and Plutarch, and the Latin historians, such as Pomponius Mela, Gaius Plinius Secundus and Cornelius Tacitus, describe the ancient life of the two Georgian kingdoms, Iberia and Colchis (Lazistan), sometimes in great detail.

In the first half of the fourth century paganism and Zoroastrianism gave way to Christianity among the Georgians. The common religion of the Roman-Byzantine Empire and Georgia drew these two countries closer together and in the unceasing contention between Persia and Byzantium for possession of the Near East and the Caucasus the Georgians almost always were on the side of Byzantium, sometimes with disastrous results for the Georgians.

In the year 640 the Arabs, after conquering Persia, occupied Eastern Georgia—Iberia. Western Georgia, or the territory between the Black Sea and Suram ridge, was never conquered, and temporarily became part of Byzantium's protectorate. The first decades

of Arab domination were characterized by religious tolerance, relatively mild tribute, and almost no interference in the internal affairs of Georgia. But in the long run the situation worsened: the tribute became heavier and heavier, the rule became more and more oppressive, and soon one insurrection after another erupted in the whole country. Ruin and devastation followed the crushing of the revolts by the Arabs. Many inhabitants left their homes and emigrated to Western Georgia or to the southwestern part of the country, in the mountainous, inaccessible territory of Tao-Klarjeti. This region, whose capital was Artanuji, developed into one of the greatest trade centers in the whole Caucasus. Many monasteries, churches and schools were founded.

In 977-978 Bagrat the Third Bagrationi unified the southwestern, eastern and western parts of the country, except for the city of Tbilisi, still held by the Arabs. But in King David the Builder (1089-1125) Georgia was fortunate enough to receive a ruler who was one of the greatest men of his epoch. Astute, a lover of books, a skillful politician and diplomat, a devout man and yet one tolerant of other religions, a military genius, King David routed the Arabs and Turk-Seljuks from the Caucasus and created one mighty Georgian-Caucasian state.

The highest development of Georgia's political, economic, military and cultural strength was attained in the time of Queen Tamar. History has known many remarkable women—Jadwiga of Poland, Isabella the Catholic, Elizabeth I of England, Catherine the Great of Russia, among others—but it is possible to say that no people revered a queen more than the Georgians did their Queen Tamar. The subject of hundreds of folk songs, she still lives in the memory of the Georgian people. During her rule Georgia was supreme in the whole Near East, and it was at this time (1184-1213) that Georgia enjoyed the extraordinary right of entering the Holy City in military fashion without paying duty or tribute for the privilege of praying at the Holy Grave. To the credit of the Moslem rulers, Georgia was allowed to retain this right even when it became only a shadow of its former glory.

The economic situation was so favorable that, according to contemporary historians, the common people lived like gentry and the gentry like magnates. The population of Queen Tamar's Georgian-Caucasian kingdom was about nine million, a half of it Georgians, and the state income was three times greater than that of contemporary England or France. Noteworthy, too, was the movement demanding some kind of constitutional parliamentary institution. Although this reform was not formally installed, before making

important decisions Queen Thamar always consulted the so-called Great Council, which consisted of the ministers, representatives of the nobility, clergy and the commercial world.

A faithful heiress to King David the Builder's ideas, Queen Thamar was religiously tolerant, built many convents and churches, and abolished capital punishment and torture. But nothing contributed so much to the splendor and glory of Queen Thamar and her time as the unique bloom of culture, traces of which are still to be found in Georgia and the Caucasus—the ruins of marvelous architecture, frescoes, paintings, and, above all, literature. It was the Golden Epoch of Georgian history. It produced the greatest of Georgian poets, Shotha Rusthaveli, whose work, *The Man among the Tigers Fell*, ranks among the imperishable monuments of human genius. This poem, which has been translated into thirty languages, has been compared to Dante's *Divine Comedy*. At the end of the twelfth century Rusthaveli gave his homeland a banner and the name, *Vepkhis Tkaosani*. This is the title of one of the finest love poems ever composed.

Some years after the death of Queen Thamar the Mongols came, conquered, and remained for a hundred years. King George V (1318-1346) drove them off and united the whole country and Caucasus again under his rule. But at the end of the fourteenth century six invasions of Georgia by Tamerlane completely devastated the country. The wars, with Tamerlane, although lasting only ten years, wreaked incomparably more damage than had a hundred years of rule by the Mongols.

Under Constantine and Alexander in the first half of the fifteenth century Georgia, free and united, became for a time an important factor in the life of Asia Minor. In 1453 the Osman Turks conquered Constantinople and the whole Byzantine Empire, thus cutting the whole of the Caucasus away from Western Europe. Fully aware of the fatal consequences of this event for the future of Christianity and his own country, King George VIII welcomed the plan of the Roman Pope, Calixtus III, for building a common front with the European powers against the Turks. King George urged the European kings to forget their mutual hates and quarrels and to attack the Turks with united forces from the side of Syria and Palestine. His plea went unheeded. Left alone, menaced from one side by Turkey and from the other by Persia, and weakened by internal wrangling, Georgia split up into three kingdoms and several principalities in 1493.

With Suleiman the Magnificent began (1545) the continuous invasions of the Turks and the old, eternal fight for the possession

of the Caucasus resumed between the two great contending powers. In 1553, the Persian shah Thamasp and Suleiman agreed that Western Georgia should be under the influence of Turkey and Eastern Georgia under that of Persia. Until the nineteenth century, however, the Georgian kingdoms and principalities preserved their thrones and complete freedom in internal affairs and even in the foreign arena. They sent and received foreign delegations, the main activity being the formation of a common front among the European countries against the Turks and Persians. Yet on the whole Europe evinced little interest in Georgia and its fate.

At the end of the sixteenth century there appeared on the international scene a new powerful Christian kingdom claiming to be the heir of ancient Rome and Byzantium and the protector of all Christians harassed by the Moslem world. After conquering Kazan and Astrakhan and encroaching upon the possessions of Persia on the coast of the Caspian Sea, this long awaited ally, Russia, was asked for help by Georgia against Persia and Turkey. The Czar sent many costly gifts to the Georgian king and promised his help and protection. Many delegations were exchanged by Georgian kings and Russian Czars, many promises were given during the following two hundred years, but Georgian relations with its neighbors only worsened because of the friendship with the Russians.

When King Heraclius II ascended the throne of united Eastern Georgia and achieved victories over the forces of Turkey and Persia, he recalled the past glory of King David and of Queen Tamar. Nobody could then foresee that the treaty he would conclude with Catherine the Great would contribute to the loss of Georgia's sovereignty. Despite his victories, King Heraclius understood well that Georgia could not enjoy peace and order without possessing a trustworthy and powerful ally. After looking in vain for such an ally in Western Europe, King Heraclius turned once again to correligious Orthodox Russia. For its part, Russia, having subdued Ukraine, the Don Kuban area and the Terek region, had already set up a plan of expansion to the Near East and even India. Since an alliance with Georgia would be expedient, Russia welcomed the advances of King Heraclius.

In 1783 an agreement was reached between Russia and Eastern Georgia by which the latter accepted a Russian protectorate and declared itself ready to carry out a common foreign policy with Russia and, if necessary, to supply military aid. Russia solemnly proclaimed it would forever maintain the royal Bagrationi dynasty on the Georgian throne, that it would not interfere in Georgia's internal affairs

of state and church, and that it would come to Georgia's side should the latter be attacked by the Turks or Persians.

The news of this agreement aroused much anxiety in Turkey and Persia. They demanded that King Heraclius renounce this pact, promising in return great territorial concessions and privileges. The Georgian king categorically rejected all their propositions. In 1795, Aha Mahomed, the shah of Persia, invaded Eastern Georgia and devastated the capital of Tbilisi and most of the country. The Russians did not lift a finger in assistance.

In 1798 King Heraclius died, and his son George XII, now grown old, ascended the throne. According to the will of his father, his brother Yulon was to be his successor. But George XII decided that his son David should follow him. Because of this he asked Emperor Paul of Russia, as his suzerain, to support him in his intention. But when George died in 1801, neither his son David nor his brother Yulon was allowed to ascend the throne. Instead, Russian troops entered Georgia in great numbers and carried out the manifest of Emperor Alexander I by which the kingdom of Eastern Georgia was abolished and the Russian administration installed in the whole country.

The flagrant violation of the treaty and the cruelty of the Russian civilian and military officials provoked loud protests, and when these protests went unheeded, revolts broke out in many parts of Eastern Georgia. All members of the Georgian royal family who had no time to escape were arrested and sent forcibly to Russia. After ten years the autocephaly of the Georgian church, which had lasted since the fifth century and which had maintained its integrity even under the Arabs, Mongols, Persians and Turks, was abolished.

The independence of Western Georgia was forcibly ended in 1810. Its king, Solomon the Second, fled to Turkey. Then followed new uprisings and insurrections, some led by the king himself and by escaped royal princes, but they were of no avail. From 1801 to 1832 more than twenty revolts against the Russian administration took place in Georgia. Their only result was increased misery for the country, and the imprisonment and exile of members of the royal family and many prominent representatives of the nobility and clergy to the northern provinces of Russia. Azerbaijan and some Armenian principalities were soon subjugated. After encircling the Northern Caucasus, the Russians eventually succeeded in dealing a deadly blow to the brave warriors of this region led by Imam Shamil, the legendary hero of the whole Caucasus. The Russian government installed its own administration and imposed the Russian language on Georgia while banishing the Georgian.

The literature of this epoch, beginning with the lyric verses of two daughters of King Heraclius, Thecla and Kethevan, and ending with the works of Nikoloz Baratashvili, the Georgian Byron, were filled with deep distress and pessimism, mirroring the bitter resentment and disappointment provoked by the Russians.

Before long there appeared new men, inspired and carried away by the liberal conceptions of Western Europe and by the fighters against Russian absolutism, such as Dobroliubow, Chernishevsky, Adam Mickiewicz, Kostomarov, Taras Shevchenko and Władisław Choroszewski.

There were the young writers and poets—Ilia Tchavchavadse, Akaki Tsereteli, Niko Nikoladse, and others. They rejected the poetry of complaints and incessant tears:

“Enough weeping over our past,
We must follow the other star,
We must create and form our present,
We must give the future to our people . . .”

“Our country must be ours” was their catchword, and toward this goal they dedicated all their energy and talent. They attracted thousands and thousands of followers and were instrumental in wiping out every kind of national particularism, all social, religious and other differences among the Georgian people.

The unbridled Russian absolutism was recognized as the greatest enemy of fundamental national and social rights. When, therefore, at the end of the nineteenth century radical ideas spread in Russia and the Caucasus, the Georgian people in their majority joined socialist parties as the uncompromising opponents of the Russian monarchy.

The Georgians and other nations expected the Czar's dethronement to be the beginning of a new period, a period of national freedom and social justice. Since 1905, when the *Gosudarstvennaia Duma* had been created, the Georgian representatives always served as the chairman of the socialist group in the *Duma*, and Georgians Tshoidse, Gue-Guetchkori, Tsereteli, Tshenkeli and others were the leading figures of the great Russian Revolution in March, 1917. The Bolshevik revolt prompted the separation of the Caucasus from Russia and the creation of the Transcaucasian Federal Republic. Unfortunately, this union of the Caucasian nations lasted a very short time. Instead, three new republics were created: Georgia, on May 26, Azerbaijan, on May 27 and Armenia, on May 28. The Northern Caucasus had already declared its independence on May 12, 1918.

In 1919 elections to the first Georgian Parliament were held. Eighty-five per cent of the representatives to Parliament were so-

cial-democrats. No communist was elected. The new government and its president were all prominent members of the Georgian social-democratic party. A Georgian national army was organized, a radical agrarian reform was carried out in the whole country, schools were nationalized, a Georgian university and a college of technology were opened, the administration, courts, finances, and so on, were brought into order.

After the victory of the Allied forces, political and trade relations abroad were partially restored in spite of the fact that the victorious Great Entente, having been a warm partisan of a "One and Indivisible Russia," viewed the new Caucasian Republic with suspicious and critical eyes. The High Council of the Great Entente, however, recognized Georgia *de facto* on January 12, 1920.

Among the foreigners who visited Georgia in 1920 was a special socialist delegation from the Second International. It included such world figures as Ramsay MacDonald, Emile Vandervelde, De Bruecker, Paul Renaudel, Camil Huismans and Karl Kautski. The delegates wrote enthusiastic reports on Georgia and its people, citing Georgia as an example to Europe and Russia on how to peacefully build and organize a truly democratic and socialist government and state.

Early in 1920 Russia, having occupied the Northern Caucasus and Azerbaijan, attacked Georgia. Its forces were thrown back, and a peace treaty was signed on May 7, 1920, according to which Russia recognized the independence of Georgia.

The text of the pact ran as follows:

Article I: Based on the right proclaimed by the Russian Socialist Federalist Soviet Republic of all peoples to dispose of themselves fully, including the right to secede from the state of which they form a part, Russia recognizes without reservations the independence and sovereignty of the Georgian State, and voluntarily renounces all Soviet sovereign rights which belonged to Russia with respect to the Georgian people.

Article II: Based on the principles proclaimed in Article I, Russia agrees to abstain from all intervention in the internal affairs of Georgia.

On January 27, 1921, the Georgian minister for foreign affairs, Eugene Gue-Guetckori, received a telegram from Minister Aristide Briand stating that Georgia had been recognized *de jure* by the High Council of the Great Entente. It read in part:

I hurried to communicate the contents of your letter to the Conference which unanimously decided to recognize the Georgian state *de jure*. The Allied Nations are happy to confirm again in this way the sympathy with which they observed the efforts and strivings of the Georgian people towards independence, and at the same time, express their appreciation and admiration for the work already achieved.

This happy news, so long waited, flashed to all corners of Georgia, arousing great joy and enthusiasm. The dreams of several generations were being fulfilled. After a hundred years of slavery and abandonment Georgia had re-appeared on the international stage, free and independent and reveling in the glory of its revolutionary fight for freedom and justice.

At an official banquet the representative of Soviet Russia made a resounding speech. In the name of Lenin and the People's Commissariat he expressed his sincere joy that imperialist Europe should at last have followed Russia's example and recognized Georgia. He remembered the common fight of the Russian and Georgian peoples against the monarchy, praised the important part played by the Georgians in the Russian revolution, and ended his speech by expressing his firm conviction that friendly relations would eternally exist between the great Russian people and the small but heroic Georgian nation . . . His words were received with delight and with credence.

As he spoke Russian troops were gathering on the borders of Georgia. Informed of it, Lord Curzon, then foreign minister of Great Britain, sent a telegram of protest to Moscow. Chicherin, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, replied:

Russia has recognized the independence of Georgia. Russian policy supports the principle of self-determination of small nations. We have made no demands on Georgia. Soviet Russia has not committed and will not commit in the future any hostile act against the Republic of Georgia.

These words spelled the doom of Georgia.

Russian military forces suddenly invaded Georgia from three sides, and after six weeks of bloody warfare, conquered the greater part of Georgia.

Before the smoke of battle had cleared the Bolshevik TASS told the world that the Georgia workers and peasants, oppressed by imperialist agents and social-traitors, had risen in arms against the Menshevik (social-democrat) government and had appealed for help to the "brotherly" Red Army. The technique used in the forcible Bolshevikization of Azerbaijan in April and that of Armenia in November, 1920, was again successful. The lie was believed. That TASS lied insolently may be seen from the letter of the leader and ideologist of the Georgian Communist party, Philip Makhharadse, to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, December 6, 1921:

The arrival of the Red Army and the establishment of Soviet power in Georgia had the outward appearance of a foreign occupation, inasmuch as in the country itself no one was ready to take part in a rebellion or a revolution.

And at the time of the proclamation of the Soviet regime, in the whole of Georgia there was not a single communist member capable of organizing action or providing leadership. This task was accomplished mainly by doubtful, sometimes even criminal, elements.

When questioned directly and repeatedly by cable by the President of Georgia, Noe Jordania, both Lenin and Trotsky denied shamelessly that the Russians had attacked Georgia, ascribing the aggression to Armenians and Azerbaijanians living on the Georgian border who, presumably, were dissatisfied with the social democratic government of Georgia. Representatives of European countries who were in Georgia during the invasion, as well as hundreds upon thousands of foreigners, immediately refuted this preposterous, base lie. The Second International, and notably Emile Vandervelde and Pierre Renaudel, tried to negotiate in Berlin in April, 1922, with the representative of the Third International, Karl Radek, for a plebiscite to be held in Georgia under the direction of a committee to be composed of the representatives of the two Internationals. But this compromise was not accepted by Radek, who justified the occupation of Georgia because it gave the Soviet Russia access to the oil fields of the Caucasus.

The exile Georgian government and the Committee of Georgian Independence presented its case to the governments, parliaments and public opinion of the whole world. The Georgian problem was placed on the agenda of the meetings of the League of Nations and the Second International.

The Assembly of the League of Nations, having considered the situation in Georgia, invites the Council to follow attentively the course of events in this part of the world, so that it may be able to seize any opportunity which may occur to help in the restoration of this country to normal conditions by any peaceful means in accordance with the rules of international law (September 22, 1922).

On September 24, 1924, the Second International declared:

Sixty years ago, the principle of the rights of peoples to self-government was claimed by Poland for independence. This independence was established. Today we are conforming to this principle of the International in claiming the right of self-government for Georgia, symbol of all peoples enslaved by force.

Men of the stature of Poincare, Millerand, Briand, Paul Boncour, Renaudel, Emile Vandervelde, Camil Huismans, Karl Kautski, Robert Cecil, Ramsey MacDonald, Henderson, Herriot, Leon Blum and hundreds of other distinguished figures spoke in defense of tiny Georgia and called for its liberation. They included even Lloyd George, who was said to have given his tacit consent to the turning over of the entire Caucasus to the Bolsheviki after the latter had

routed Denikin's Army, and who had maintained that it is possible to trade even with cannibals.

But Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev and the others had not spent many years in emigration without learning that this was a straw fire and that, given some concessions, official Europe would forgive and digest anything. That they were right is evident from the fact that Soviet Russia was recognized *de jure* almost at the very moment the most bloody Georgian uprising against the Bolsheviks was being savagely put down by the occupying forces.

In March-April, 1926, the U.S. Congress dedicated three sessions to the Georgian question. In a resolution the Congress severely criticized the occupation of Georgia by the Russian Bolsheviks and proposed to the President of the United States that he name a diplomatic representative to the exile Georgian government in Paris (*The Republic of Georgia*, published by the Senate of the United States).

Subsequently, the state which had violated all international obligations, had destroyed within its boundaries all democratic freedoms and had established an all-pervading terror was invited almost unanimously (Holland, Portugal and Switzerland voted against it) to enter the League of Nations; it was solemnly admitted on September 18, 1934. In speaking against the admission of the Soviet Union, the delegate of Switzerland, President Motta, had made the following statement:

When it (the Soviet Union) has been admitted, the Council and Assembly will be faced with several questions that are still pending before them. The assembly's resolution relating to the independence of Georgia will not sleep the sleep of death. Armenia, Ukraine, and other countries will still enjoy the interest of men of good will. The sympathies of civilized mankind will never fail heroes fighting for life and liberty.

In spite of the protests of the champions of democracy and freedom, the Soviet Union became one of the most important rulers of the destinies of the League of Nations and the whole world. How in 1939, at a tragic moment for all mankind, it crushed the hope of the democratic world everyone well remembers. When Soviet Russia treacherously pounced on heroic Finland, even the weak and completely discredited of Nations became indignant and finally ousted Soviet Russia.

The Second World War brought no freedom or even relief to the Georgian people. On the contrary, it strengthened the position and authority of the Soviet Union in every area. Now in our nuclear era, Georgia and its problem have disappeared completely from the

international scene. But the Georgian people continue to live, to fight, to hope against hope. As the English historian W. E. D. Allen says: “. . . Many political systems and many creeds have lain heavy on the country. They have passed away, and the Georgian has remained, laughing, easy, unchanged and untroubled . . .”

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THE STATE DEPARTMENT, RUSSIA AND THE COLD WAR

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

Last summer, in an effort to prevent the establishment by Congress of a special Committee on the Captive Nations, the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, wrote a letter to the Hon. Howard W. Smith, Chairman of the House Rules Committee, which opposed the resolution on the ground that Moscow would not like it, and he added the very significant paragraph:

The United States Government's position is weakened by any action which confuses the rights of formerly independent peoples or nations with the status of areas, such as the Ukraine, Armenia, or Georgia, which are traditional parts of the Soviet Union. Reference to these latter areas places the United States Government in the undesirable position of seeming to advocate the dismemberment of an historical state.

This is an extraordinary statement of a Secretary of State in an administration which has shown its willingness to accept the dismemberment of Portugal, its ally in the NATO alliance, by accepting the occupation of the Portuguese area of Goa by India and by giving consent at least by silence to the Angolan revolutionaries, a movement that will undoubtedly have its reflection in a similar movement by Mozambique and perhaps other non-European portions of Portugal. It is also extraordinary since he lays great stress on the United Nations, in which there are representatives of the "independent" Ukrainian and Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republics voting side by side with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It sounds rather as if it had been prepared by the Imperial Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czar forty-five years ago in St. Petersburg, or at most Petrograd, for it accepts fully and completely the identification of Imperial Russia with the Union of Soviet Republics, even to admitting the validity of the Czar's claims to Western Ukraine, or Eastern Galicia, as it was called under the Hapsburg rules. It overlooks the struggles of the Ukrainians and other peoples in the then Russian prison of nations which included also the Poles in Russian Poland, the Finns, and the peoples of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania

who won and held their independence between the wars and whose independence is still recognized by the State Department.

Yet the fact that the Secretary of State in 1961 can make such a statement shows the extent of the failure of the American people and of all administrations of both parties during the period since 1918 to face fully and clearly the problems offered by the Russian Communists to the established principles of diplomacy and national sovereignty, until the acquisition by Moscow of the atomic weapons has brought the promise of world annihilation to our very doors. The United States, like the free world, has worked itself into the unenviable position where it has debarred itself from taking any strong or aggressive action for the freedom of the peoples behind the Iron Curtain. If it maintains its present position, it will inevitably face new extensions of the Iron Curtain — as it has recently in Cuba — and it must reconcile itself to the gradual loss of freedom everywhere or trust in some revival of a spark of decency and honor, despised bourgeois characteristics, in the hearts of the men in the Kremlin and in Peiping.

It may be interesting therefore to look back at some of the phenomena connected with the growth of this Frankenstein monster that now menaces the entire world. Again and again the leading statesmen of the United States have called attention to it but none has consistently endeavored to do anything positive about it or to suggest methods to stop its course.

The germ of this state was planted by the Scandinavian (Varangian) — Slav rulers of Kiev in the ninth century. It is idle to attempt here to trace out in more detail the original population which received its religion and culture from Constantinople. The people were undoubtedly the Ukrainians of the period and as such they used the name *Rus'*. Princes of this family sat on all the thrones and sub-thrones in the entire land but in the course of time the Grand Princes of Suzdal and later Moscow tended to increase in power. Then with the great Mongol invasion of Genghis Khan and his successors, Kiev was destroyed and the Moscow princes became the most obsequious servants of the Khan and only rebelled when the Golden Horde began to fall apart and it became possible to obtain independence without undue risk.

Once Moscow had recovered its independence, it commenced in earnest to endeavor to extend its rule over all the Eastern Slavs, the Ukrainians and the Byelorussians. It was aided in its thinking by the fact that Moscow had assimilated many of the principles of the Mongol system of government which were alien to the other Slavs or to the ancestors of its princes. It adopted the theory that Moscow was

the "Third Rome," the Christian centre of the world, an idea composed of the Czar's claims to be the legitimate heir of the Byzantine Empire and an adaptation of the thesis of Genghis Khan that just as there was one sun in heaven, so should there be one lord of the earth. That should be the Czar, and the various Czars strove to make good on their claims.

When the old dynasty of the Rurykovychi finally died out and the Romanovs, who had no legitimate claim to the throne, succeeded them, they continued the same tradition and acted upon it even more blatantly and forcibly with an expansion on all possible fronts. Yet as the Czars proceeded with their policy, they incorporated in it also the notion that all Slavs should become members of the Russian Orthodox Church dependent on the Patriarch of Moscow, no matter to what Orthodox grouping they were originally attached.

This expansion has some very unusual features which are of the utmost importance when we try to evaluate the policies of the Russian Empire (Russia) and the map of the present Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and especially the map of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (the R.S.F.S.R.). Moscow is, of course, landlocked, as a map of Eurasia shows at a glance, but from relatively early times the rulers of Moscow could, if they desired, communicate with the outside world through the Arctic Ocean in the neighborhood of Archangel. In the reign of Ivan the Terrible (16th century) after the overthrow of the Golden Horde, the forces of Ivan went down the Volga and secured a foothold on the Caspian Sea. Elsewhere by an almost unparalleled burst of endurance, the Russian woodsmen and fur-traders moved steadily eastward across Siberia and by 1639 they had established a foothold on the Sea of Okhotsk on the North Pacific. They were unable to penetrate the Amur valley because of the opposition of the powerful Manchu rulers of China. It was only with the Manchu decline in the nineteenth century that the Russians were able to extend their control over the area where Vladivostok now stands (as late as 1840). Yet it is this large area—extending roughly from the Trans-Siberian Railroad to the Arctic Ocean—that has been joined with the original Great Russian provinces in European Russia to form the Russian Federated Republic with its bewildering mass of Autonomous Republics, Autonomous Districts, and even smaller divisions, for the mass of the non-Russian population consists of relatively primitive Finno-Ugric and Siberian tribes which never developed a written language before the coming of the Russians, were largely shamanistic in religion and offer rich anthropological material to modern scholarship. The overwhelming majority of the people speaking small languages live in this territory. Many of the tribes are so

small that we can hardly predict a development of a real nationalistic character among them. Yet it is these peoples who figure very largely in the Soviet contention that the nationalities problem in the U.S.S.R. has been solved.

The Russian occupation of this northern and eastern area proceeded rapidly, for by and large the various tribes were not skilled in arms and their main protection was the inaccessibility of the region and the severity of the climatic conditions over a large part of the area. But when we consider the Russian expansion to the west and south and Central Asia, there is a very different story to tell. Here the Russians ran up against a series of developed states, European, Caucasian and Asiatic, and the resulting conflicts were often severe, involving very complex diplomatic and even military operations. As a result, although the Russians reached the Pacific Ocean early in the seventeenth century, they did not secure a foothold on either the Black Sea or the Baltic until well along in the eighteenth and even the nineteenth centuries. Hence it is hardly fair to say that they were traditional parts of either the Russian Empire or the Union of Soviet Republics. In fact, the very structure of the present Union was devised to facilitate the Russification of the non-Russian areas and to lull to sleep the aroused national feelings of the various peoples until the Communist rule could be firmly established. Thus even in the middle of World War I, the Kirghiz Mohammedan tribesmen rebelled against the attempts of the Russian Empire to draft their manpower for labor battalions for the army. Still remembering the days of their own freedom, they saw in the Russian difficulties a chance to recover their ancient rights and privileges, but in the confusion that followed the abdication of the Czar, they did not find any hearing from the victorious Western powers (as was the case with other peoples once included in the Russian prison of nations).

Let us look a little more closely at the fate of Ukraine, for this is the largest, if not the most bitter, opponent of Russian centralization, be it white or red. After the destruction of Kiev by the Mongols, Ukraine drifted peacefully into the newly established Lithuanian state along with Byelorussia and with this it passed also into the composition of the Polish Republic, which during its great period had kings of the Lithuanian dynasty and an army of Byelorussians and Ukrainians. When the murmurings of popular unrest commenced, the Zaporozhian Kozaks appeared to champion the cause of the Ukrainians and in 1648 there came the great revolt of *Hetman* Bohdan Khmelnytsky, who restored an independent state. In an evil moment at Pereyaslav in 1654 he made an alliance with Czar Alexis Mikhay-

lovich and this gave Moscow the chance to interfere in Ukrainian affairs on the ground that it was now an appanage of Moscow.

Yet it was a strange appanage as part of the unified Russian land, for the Czars dealt for nearly a century with the Kozak *Hetman* state through their equivalent of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and not the Ministry of the Interior, maintaining custom houses on the border of Ukraine. It was only in 1775 that they abolished the last vestiges of the independence of the Kozak *Hetman* state, although that independence and Ukrainian rights had been painfully neglected earlier, especially after the revolt of *Hetman* Mazepa, who had joined Charles XII of Sweden in a desperate attempt to recover his people's freedom. It was only accomplished then by the winning over of the Ukrainian nobles by gifts of land and titles, the destruction of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church which had been directly dependent upon the Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople, and the turning of the people into serfs. Yet the Russians never could persuade or compel the Ukrainian peasant to accept the regular redistribution of landed property in the name of the collective that had been for centuries the standard type of agricultural holding in Great Russia.

Nicholas I who in the nineteenth century sentenced the Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko to a prison battalion in Central Asia without the right to write or paint shows clearly the Russian dilemma. On the one hand the Czar distrusted his own governor in Ukraine, Prince Repnin, because he had married a daughter of the last *Hetman*, Kyrylo Rozumovsky. He was in constant fear that the poets and story tellers would remind the Ukrainian people of what they had had in the past and thus of their losses and yet he just as steadily denied that there was any Ukrainian language or any difference, cultural or political, between the Ukrainians (the "Little Russians") and the Great Russians. We can hardly wonder in view of the latter history why the Ukrainians so rapidly demanded autonomy and then independence once the Czarist rule had broken down and the Provisional Government attempted to maintain the same unflinching control without the power or prestige of the Czars.

Lenin realized the situation and with his accustomed cynicism decided to utilize it. He recognized the Ukrainian National Republic and then, because it was not Communist and its leaders were not members of the Russian Communist Party, he declared war upon it and established a Ukrainian Soviet Republic led by his Russian agents. The White Russian generals unconsciously helped him for they were fighting for a unified non-Communist Russia and did not recognize Ukraine any more than Nicholas I. But when the resistance

of the Ukrainians was broken in the field, Lenin was too cunning to deny their existence. Out of the debris he arranged the continuation of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic as part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics but he deprived that republic of most of its rights by continually forcing upon it Russian officials as officers of the Communist party hierarchy. Stalin, more rigid and ruthless, broke the power of the Ukrainian Renaissance by deporting or executing most of its outstanding men, but he too saw to it that the enfeebled Ukraine after its opposition to Moscow and the Nazis in World War II became a charter member of the United Nations, although Ukraine could be represented only at the general meetings of that body. Khrushchev, after toying with the Ukrainians over whom he had tyrannized for years, is now continuing the work of Russification by claiming that he is aiming to produce a Russian-speaking Soviet citizenry. He is trying to break up any national sense by establishing independent economic regions, each of which is directly dependent on Moscow and all of which are within the "independent" Ukrainian Republic. Is it fair to call this a traditional part of Russia, unless we assume that Russia is the land of the Czars and Soviet tyrants alike?

We could point out that the same is true of the other non-Russian Soviet Republics. Take Georgia (Gruzia) in the Caucasus. This is an old Christian state with a culture far older than either Moscow or Kiev possesses. It played its part as a major power in the eleventh and twelfth centuries and then declined under the pressure of the Turkic peoples and the Iranians. Its princes became friendly to Moscow after the Russians reached the Caspian Sea but as Moslem pressure increased, a Georgian king in exile, in order to save his people, bequeathed his land to the Czars around 1800. That was enough. Against the wishes of most of the nobles and the people, the Czars proceeded with their standardizing policy and soon the Georgians fell victim to the Russian system. The fate of Armenia was similar, and so was that of the Baltic states when in the eighteenth century the Czars found the way to incorporate them.

Poland, too, after a brilliant past fell finally into the Czar's clutches (but not altogether, for both Prussia and Austria took their share of the partition). This created more turmoil in Europe, for Poland belonged to the Latin Rite of the Roman Catholic Church. So Czar Alexander I, after the Napoleonic Wars, determined to set up a satellite Polish state, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. He was bitterly opposed by old Nicholas Karamzin, the great historian of the Russian Empire, who reminded the Czar that by so doing he was breaking his coronation oath and that the setting up of this state differed

little from the restoration of the Golden Horde. The Polish revolt of 1830 ended all agitation here but Polish bitterness remained with more access to European opinion than was had by the other peoples.

So, too, with Finland. When Alexander I took over Finland from Sweden in 1809, he promised autonomy to the Grand Duchy precisely as Czar Alexis had promised *Hetman* Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Ukrainians one hundred fifty years before. In the nineteenth century the Finns, long trained in the Scandinavian system, developed their own free institutions. This was too much and the last Czars, Alexander III and Nicholas II, constantly tried to Russianize them and their mode of thinking. The stubborn Finns resisted and so in 1917 Finland was the first of the non-Russian peoples to declare their independence. They did not waste time in calling for autonomy, and in the person of Baron Karl August Mannerheim they found a worthy leader and Finland maintained its hard-won independence.

Very little of this was known in Western Europe or the United States. There were indeed in France a handful of scholars who had travelled extensively in the Russian Empire and were prepared to give advice. In England the situation was even worse, although there had been isolated students of language and foreign affairs for a half century or more. Even these, however, had drawn their ideas either from the official imperial Russian program or from association with radical groups which still visualized the remodelling of Russian political institutions on some general principle without regard to the wishes of the population.

In the United States the situation was worse yet: the lack of information was both tragic and pitiful. Especially after 1914 there were many Czarist supporters who preached the unity of Russia and argued that all internal disorder and opposition to the Provisional Government was inspired only by paid agents of Berlin and Vienna. There were refugees from the Revolution of 1905 who preached the traditional ideas of that period but who entirely ignored, as they still do, the nationalities problem. There were few libraries adequately stocked with books on the various problems and fewer scholars able to interpret them, for most who knew Russian had come fully under some form of influence of Russian official circles. The Americans did know of Poland from the services of Pulaski and Kosciuszko in the American Revolution just as they had sympathy for France because of Lafayette. They knew of the Americans from the reports of Protestant missionaries in the Near East but how little they understood the situation can be seen from Wilson's Fourteen Points in which he called for a Poland including Polish territories with an ac-

cess to the sea, autonomy for the nationalities of Turkey, and the "evacuation of all Russian territory and . . . cooperation in obtaining for it an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of its own political development and national policy." (How could Poland on this score include Russian Poland?) There is not a word of any problem of nationalities in Russia, and it was in line with this that the three Baltic republics, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which had been able to maintain their independence, were recognized *de jure* not by President Wilson but by President Harding and not without much hesitation on the part of the State Department which objected to the Balkanization of Europe. In the same way the United States alone refused to recognize the cession of Bessarabia to Rumania and hesitated in giving recognition to other areas which definitely refused to remain in the Russian prison of nations.

It was the same kind of blindness and of devotion to a non-existent unified democratic Russian state that inspired the fiascos of the American troops sent to Archangel and to Siberia to preserve governments that existed only in the imagination, that inspired American relief missions to "Russia" but would not seek to check the ravages of communism lest that would be an interference with the desires of the "Russian" people.

There can be little doubt that the basic element in the American attitude toward the Russian social revolution and the non-Russian nationalist revolutions was ignorance of the real situation which somehow or other became fused with the feeling of the Monroe Doctrine forbidding foreign influence in the Americans. That feeling has now grown into a blind adherence to a doctrine of non-intervention, even where foreign influence is clearly discernible, and insofar as the United States today is playing a major role in the free world, it has led it to turn away from any action which may support freedom against tyranny, once tyranny has climbed into the saddle. Gone are the old days when the armed peasants with their flails and scythes could defeat the heavily armored knights and express their will for freedom. Today the world is faced with a new threat, that of the organized transformation of peoples into slaves, and to combat this threat every weapon in the arsenal of freedom as well as every thought is required.

That cannot be done if the United States still continues to cherish the old idea that all the people of a given area going through a revolutionary development must belong to a land with the same boundaries as the preceding one. The Thirteen Colonies as part of

British America could not rally to their cause the French Canadians of Canada but that did not deter them from seeking independence and today Canada and the United States are good neighbors and friends.

With the Soviet Union practicing unlimited infiltration in all countries, it is unrealistic for the United States to continue to stress the "unity of Russia" and to overlook those divisions that are openly recognized by Moscow when they insist upon the "independence" of the various Republics. The American people at the present time should learn for their part that Russia now is merely the Russian Republic, which is imperialistically dominating the Soviet Union. Once this is made clear, the way will be open for a new propaganda of freedom, a new promise to the oppressed and a new challenge to tyranny.

It requires a sharp change in our thinking, a realization that in more ways than one we are in a new era, and that we must employ a new terminology and not meekly submit to the argument that because Pushkin could repeat in 1831 "Does not the Russian land extend from Perm to the Crimea, from the cold crags of Finland to the flaming Colchis (the Caucasus), from the shaken Kremlin to the walls of immovable China" ("To the Slanderers of Russia") it must be true today. Yet a few years later the Ukrainian Shevchenko could parody this with the phrase:

From the Moldavian to Finn
On every tongue there is a seal.
For — there is happiness! ("The Caucasus")

That seal is now on an increasing number of lips and only a correct policy on the part of the United States can start the current that will ultimately break it. That is what the administration and the people alike must seriously consider. If they find the right solution, the menace of Russian Communism will vanish away and the world can then proceed to a real international organization for the good of mankind but they cannot do it by misreading history to please the Russian emigres and the Russian Communist dictators as the State Department says to the Hon. Howard W. Smith. They must realize that freedom is indivisible and in the words of the Battle Hymn of the Republic, "God's truth is marching on."

THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY ON THE UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE

By JOHN P. PAULS

The celebrated and oft-reprinted history of Russia by the late Bernard Pares contains the authoritative sounding but erroneous statement:

The Ukrainians speak a kind of Russian, which philologists themselves have not yet determined whether to regard as a separate language or a dialect.¹

Many generations have studied this book, described by the editors as "an accurate, undistorted picture of the real Russia," and yet the learned specialist on Russia had not taken into consideration the view of the most competent institution on the relationship of the Ukrainian and Russian languages, the Russian Imperial Academy of Sciences. But Pares was not alone in this distortion. A British manual on the position of the Russian language in the family of Slavic languages treats White Ruthenian (Byelorussian) and Ukrainian as "dialects" of Russian.² And just recently (July 11, 1961), *The Chicago Daily News*, in a report on Ukraine by George Weller, reflects the same inaccurate information: "Forty million Ukrainians . . . speak a dialect different from Russian."³ The author of this article himself often has been confronted by the same attitude, particularly among the so-called "specialists" on Russia. Therefore, we feel some clarification is necessary. We shall give here excerpts of the memorandum, "*On the Repeal of Restrictions of the Little Russian Printed Word*," which was prepared by a special commission of the Imperial Academy of Sciences and submitted to the Minister of Education in 1905.⁴

Nowhere in its memorandum did the Imperial Academy refer to the Ukrainian language as a Russian dialect, but instead as an in-

¹ B. Pares, *A History of Russia*, 5th ed. (New York, 1945), p. 374.

² W. J. Entwistle and W. A. Morison, *Russian and the Slavonic Languages* (London, 1949), pp. 280 and 282.

³ *The Ukrainian Bulletin*, Vol. XIV, Nos. 15-16 (New York, 1961), p. 63.

⁴ *Ob otmene stesneniy malorusskogo pechatnogo slova (On the Repeal of Restrictions of the Little Russian Printed Word)* by Imperatorskaya Akademiya Nauk (St. Peterburg, 1910), 43 pages.

dependent Slavic language. As a matter of fact, the Ukrainian language has a longer history than the Russian itself, a fact which the Academy clearly recognized by stating that the oldest East Slavic monuments from the Kievan period, written in Old Slavic, had some Ukrainian traces. In the memorandum we read:

South-Russian (Ukrainian) monuments of our old literature of the XI and XII centuries, as first proved by our respectable colleague, academician A. I. Sobolevsky, contain a series of peculiarities typical of the Little Russian (Ukrainian) language; from them one can conclude with assurance that as early as the pre-Tartar period there existed significant differences between the South-Russian (Little Russian) dialects and the Middle-Russian, and the North-Russian dialects as well (page 25).

Therefore, in the eyes of the Russian Academy there was no doubt that the differences between the Ukrainian and Russian languages were created by history itself, and not as some Russian nationalists often claim, by the Ukrainian intelligentsia:

Thus historical conditions contributed to the full disunion of South-West-Russia (Ukraine) and the lands occupied by the Great Russians: hence the differences in the languages of the two nationalities — Great Russian and Little Russian (Ukrainian). The historical life of these nationalities did not create a common language for them; on the contrary, it redoubled those dialectical traces with which the ancestors of the Ukrainians, on the one hand, and the ancestors of the Russians, on the other, appear at the beginning of our history (page 25).

The Imperial Academy also did not hesitate to mention "the influence of the Ukrainian writers and men of learning upon the Muscovite culture, and then upon Peter's reforms."

Indeed, this influence was reflected in our language as well, although it was transient; the efforts of our great writers more and more were linking the literary language with the vernacular, and nothing stopped that movement, which by the end of the XVIII and the beginning of the XIX century had made our literary language completely Great Russian, freeing it, by the way, from the foreign Ukrainian stress, which was not unfamiliar, according to Professor Budde, in the writings of Lomonosov and Sumarokov (page 25 f.).

After discussing the historical fate of the Ukrainian language, its differences from the Russian language, and the journalistic and governmental hostility toward the Ukrainian language, the Russian Academy stressed the historically unprecedented, drastic censorship:

To take away from educated people the privilege of writing in their native language is to infringe on that which for these people is as dear as life itself. This is to encroach on the life of the nation for in what else is it expressed if not in the word, the bearer of a thought, the expression of a feeling, the embodiment of the human spirit? A state which cannot secure one of the most

elementary rights of a citizen—the right to speak in print in the native language—arouses in a citizen not respect for the state, not love, but an unconscious fear for his very existence. This fear generates dissatisfaction and a revolutionary tendency (page 35).

The commission of the Imperial Academy which prepared the memorandum was composed of seven Russian academicians, among whom were the most prominent philologists of the time, such as: A. A. Shakhmatov, F. F. Fortunatov, and the chairman of the commission, F. E. Korsh. They found that censorship could apply to ideas, but not to language itself. Therefore, “with full conviction” they recommended the abolition of censorship of the Ukrainian language, concluding their memorandum with a quote from the Russian Slavophile, Yury F. Samarin, who, in the year 1850, said:

Let the Ukrainian people keep their language, their customs, their songs, their traditions; let them, in fraternal communion and hand in hand with the Great Russian race, develop in the field of learning and art, in which they are so richly endowed by nature. Let them develop spiritual uniqueness in all their inborn originality and in accordance with their aspirations. Let the institutions created for the Ukrainian people fulfill more and more of their local needs (page 42 f.).

The Academy added to this memorandum its own warm recommendation for the abolition of the censorship:

Only a sequence of unfortunate accidents could, therefore, have put under prohibition the whole language; only some misfortune could have impelled the government to persecute the whole literature and to impose the Russian orthography upon the Ukrainians. The Academy of Sciences is convinced that the order of 1863 and the sovereign's decrees of 1876 and 1881 could not be in agreement with the basic fundamentals of Russian legislation (page 7).

Then the Academy of Sciences stressed that the senseless prohibitive laws against the Ukrainian language “were not scrutinized in the State Council,” and that the sovereign's issued decrees, which ran contrary to the basic state laws, “were not published by the Governing Senate.”

The Academy came to this conclusion:

In the light of all these considerations, the Imperial Academy of Sciences thinks that it is now necessary to revoke the sovereign's decrees of May 18/30, 1876, and October 8, 1881, and also the order, honored by the sovereign's approval, of the minister of interior (Count P. A. Valuyev) of the year 1863, which served as a foundation for these decrees⁵ (page 7).

⁵ In 1863 the Russian minister of the interior, Count F. A. Valuyev, issued an order forbidding the printing in the Ukrainian language, of scientific works or books intended for popular reading, with the exception of belles-lettres. His reason for this was that “there never was any separate Little Russian language,

And in a final sentence the Academy expressed this noble hope:

At the same time, all of the foregoing has brought the Academy of Sciences to the conviction that the Little Russian (Ukrainian) population should have the same right as the Great Russian population to speak publicly and to print in their native language (page 8).

Such was the opinion of not a few philologists, but of the whole Russian Academy of Sciences, a body of the highest integrity and competence. Yet more than half a century later the so-called "specialists" on Russia still continue to disseminate the imperialistic bias of the Russian nationalists under the guise of "an impartial truth." These "specialists" apparently do not know that the reactionary Russian government, with the chauvinistic Great Russian nationalists behind it, tried to Russianize the Slavic Poles, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians, and harshly persecuted them when they refused to give up their ethnic identity. Even such a fine poet as Pushkin betrays this chauvinistic strain when he asks: "Will the Slavic streams flow into the Russian Sea or will it dry up?" (*To the Slanderers of Russia*, August 2, 1831.)

The impartial, scholarly point of view of the Imperial Academy of Sciences was deprived of any real and practical meaning by the Czarist government as soon as it regained power, after the unsuccessful revolution of 1905. Disregarding the Academy's recommendations, the government did not revoke its prohibitive laws against the Ukrainian language. After a short-lived relaxation, it returned again to the old policy of merciless Russianization of Ukraine, i.e., applying tacitly the repressive "laws" of 1863, 1876, and 1881.

The reactionary and imperialistic elements of the Russian society constantly attacked the Ukrainian cause as a threat to the "unity" of the Russian Empire. Their favorite argument was that

there is not one now, and there cannot be one," and that the Ukrainian problem was being initiated by the Poles for their own benefit.

In 1876, in Ems, a German health resort, Emperor Alexander II, issued a decree condemning the Ukrainian language in general: Ukrainian concerts, songs, plays, lectures, and fiction were entirely prohibited, and only the printing of historical documents and belles-lettres (poems, stories, and sketches) was permitted in the Ukrainian language, and then only with Russian orthography and under the strictest censorship. The importation of Ukrainian books from abroad was strictly forbidden. For some time no Ukrainian books appeared at all in the Russian Empire.

In 1881, the decree of 1876 was once more confirmed by Alexander III, but he allowed the printing of Ukrainian dictionaries and the production of Ukrainian songs with Russian words.

there is no Ukrainian nationality, and that Ukrainian is not a language but "merely a dialect." To the defense of the Ukrainian people, their culture, literature, and language came the most prominent Russian philologists of that time, the academicians A. A. Shakhmatov and F. E. Korsh. Shakhmatov even successfully blocked the acceptance as a member of the Russian Academy of notorious Ukrainophobic, the Kievan professor and censor, T. I. Florinsky, who had been recommended by academician A. I. Sobolevsky. Shakhmatov firmly argued that the Academy is a corporation whose highest aim is the greatest freedom of the human spirit—the freedom of learning. It could not admit into membership a man who had become notorious in his writings and speeches as a persecutor of the Ukrainian word, and who had accepted the position and duties of a censor.⁶ Still more active in the defense of the Ukrainian cause was the academician, Korsh. In the essay, *The Ukrainian People and the Ukrainian Language* (1913), Korsh gave a clear-cut answer to the question, "Is Ukrainian a language or a dialect?":

Theoretically, this question is important only for people ignorant of linguistics, because, in reality, every language can be looked upon as both language and dialect, depending with what it is compared.

From the linguistic-genealogical point of view, singularly taken, French, Italian, Provençal, Portuguese, Rumanian, and Spanish are languages, but in comparison with Old-Italic, all the Romance languages are only dialects. Even Latin is one of the dialects of Italic, which, in turn, is a dialect of Indo-European. Thus Russian and Ukrainian are dialects of Old Slavic, although they are languages in themselves.

Taking the cultural-historical view, Korsh stated:

Language is a means of expressing the thoughts and feelings of a people who have their own culture and their own history; a people representing in themselves a distinctive ethnographical unity. From this point of view, the Ukrainian language is doubtlessly as much a language as is Russian.⁷

Instead of formulating their own subjective opinions on philological problems, the Russian "specialists" would do well to accept the competent, objective conclusion of the Russian Academy of Sciences on the Ukrainian language.

⁶ O. Lototsky, *Storinky mynuloho*, II, *Pratsi Ukrainskoho Naukovoho Instytutu*, Vol. XII (Warsaw, 1933), p. 355.

⁷ F. E. Korsh, "Ukrainskiy narod i ukrainskiy yazyk," in *Izvestia Obshchestva Slavyanskoy Kultury* (Moscow, 1913), Vol. II, Book I, as cited in O. Lototsky, *op. cit.*, p. 339 f.

BOOK REVIEWS

Le COLOSSE AUX PIEDS D'ARGILE (The Colossus with Clay Feet). By Marie Kerhuel. Editions Subervie, Paris, 1961, pages 382.

L'indépendance de l'Ukraine est la clef de voute de la liberté de l'Europe — "The independence of Ukraine is the keystone of Europe's liberty" — is the final conclusion of Madame Kerhuel, author of this extremely illuminating and timely book.

It is evident that Madame Kerhuel had done extensive research in writing her present book dealing with the Soviet Russian empire, for her knowledge and her ability to interpret the history of Eastern Europe, and particularly that of the Russian empire, are quite extraordinary.

Le Colosse aux pieds d'argile could easily serve as a textbook of modern Russian colonialism and imperialism. The author has divided her book into four principal parts embracing a total of twenty chapters. She deals effectively with the phantom of Soviet statistics, which more often than not say nothing and which do not reflect any real conditions that might tend to give a comprehensive and true picture of the Soviet Union. She ridicules the Soviet slogan of "overtaking America" economically and technologically, defining it as a "hollow incentive" for the hungry and oppressed citizens of the Red empire.

The part entitled, "The Human Cost of Modernization," deals with the colonial expansion of the Soviet totalitarian state through the colonization of Central Asia, the industrialization of the Great North, and the like. In dealing with the population of the Soviet concentration camps, Madame Kerhuel vividly describes the heroic rebellions led by the Ukrainian prisoners in Vorkuta, Karaganda and Mordovia after the death of Stalin in 1953. Of interest and value is the chart depicting the concentration camps in which anti-Kremlin revolts and rebellions occurred.

The third part of the book, entitled, "The Mine which Will Detonate the U.S.S.R.," deals with what this reviewer considers to be the most vital and important aspect in any study or research on the U.S.S.R.: the multi-national imperial structure of the Soviet Union.

In dwelling on the history of Czarist Russia the author states that the presence of the non-Russian nations in what is colloquially known as "Russia" had made the Russian empire weak and vulnerable. This French scholar is especially well acquainted with the liberation struggle of Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia, and possesses an unusual grasp of the modern and medieval histories of these countries. She is openly resentful at the fact that after the fall of the Czarist empire in 1917-1918 the Western powers, including France, were hopelessly myopic in refusing to give a helping hand to the newly-independent nations which had fought alone and unaided by the West against both White and Red Russians.

The author covers the efforts of the Ukrainians and other non-Russian peoples to win their independence during World War II in an expert and un-

biased fashion. Her description of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), as well as of the underground forces of other non-Russian nations, reveals an intimate knowledge of the Ukrainian problem as a whole. Among her sources of information are the 15 special reports of the Kersten Committee on Communist Aggression, and numerous French, German, American, Ukrainian, Polish, Spanish, Estonian, Russian, Georgian, Hungarian and Rumanian works and reports.

In her concluding part, "Where Do We Go Tomorrow?," Madame Kerhuel excludes the possibility of an atomic war between the United States and the Soviet bloc. She envisions the slow and certain decline of the Russian communist empire which began with the death of Stalin, especially when the first waves of anti-Russian rebellions swept East Germany and Hungary. "Sorcerer" Khrushchev, she says, has succeeded only in slowing down this decline by his elastic and shuttlecock maneuvering which has befuddled the Western leaders into believing that he sincerely wants "peaceful coexistence" with the West.

Like most Europeans, Madame Kerhuel is acerbic in dealing with the United States, especially the Department of State, for its reticence concerning the captive nations behind the Iron Curtain. She points out that whereas the United States has taken strong positions against the British and French empires both inside and outside the United States, it maintains an inexplicable silence as regards the Russian empire. The author, in fact, goes to extremes in describing the attitude of the United States toward the Russian empire:

"The indifference of the masses of the American people may be explained by their ignorance of history and ethnography. This ignorance is something monumental. It has a tendency of simplifying and of imagining that the Russian state is not a colonial empire because it extends as a land mass; France and England, on the other hand, are hated oppressors because they sought overseas the expansion which they did not dare to impose upon their civilized neighbors of Europe . . .

"In the high political circles, one is better informed; but the powerful interests act from within. Great Jewish American finance — also to be found in London and in France — does not want the dismemberment of the Russian empire. It is the domination of Jewish financier Baruch over the 'Voice of America' and other organisms of the 'anti-communist' struggle which explains the position taken by them, as well as their absurd silence concerning this question, their numerous blunders and, finally, their ineffectiveness . . ." (pp. 290-291).

Although the attitude of U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet Russian empire, as recently exemplified by the ill-advised letter of Secretary of State Dean Rusk expressing opposition to the creation of a special captive nations committee in the House of Representatives, is indeed detrimental to the interests of the United States itself, nonetheless it is nonsense to describe it as an "instrument of high Jewish finance" as the author contends.

On the whole, however, the book of Madame Kerhuel is a thorough compilation of essential facts which justly describes the Soviet empire: a colossus with clay feet. It is hoped that the book will be translated into English and other world languages because it is a valid contribution to the many books — all too many of them shallow and superficial — on the modern Russian communist empire and its nerve center, Moscow, which has openly declared that its ultimate objective is the destruction of our freedoms and our way of life.

WALTER DUSHNYCK

RUSSIAN BOLSHEVISM. Independent Ukrainian Association for Research of National Problems in Soviet Theory and Practice. Verlagshaus Bong & Co., Federal Republic of Germany. Pp. 336.

It is truly pitiful that this work was published. The problem is not one of content and solid scholarship. On the contrary, it is entirely one of format and arrangement. The pity of it all is that only a few students and analysts will be willing to plow through this work for its excellent data and interpretations. The general public, including those in governmental bodies, will be discouraged by the obvious defects of publication. Truly, a pity.

The issue is not one of European style versus the English or American. It is clearly one of attractiveness and convenience to the reader. It seems almost that the primitiveness of the publication is enough to distract potential readers. Three authors have contributed to this work and yet their names in co-authorship are not deemed important for the title page. If the work was subsidized, as it apparently was, a note of gratitude in the foreword would have been adequate and proper. The lengthy name of the association on the title page is forbidding in itself. If the reader seeks to know the year of publication, he will have to write to the association or the publisher. There is no indication of it in the work. The table of contents is uninformative and a helpful index to the English-reading public is non-existent. The chapters, which are not indicated as such, are excessively lengthy and, after a time, dreary and boring. The first chapter, for example, consumes 125 pages. The others are just as bad. Yet each could have been divided into additional chapters out of consideration to the reader, if nothing more.

Needless to say, whatever the intentions of the three authors, the work has defeated itself by sheer defect in presentation. Appearances may count for naught in the eyes of those seeking substantive content, but even they cannot be entirely immune to appearance and avoid judging the substance accordingly. What, in effect, we have here is a genuinely scholarly work published in an unprofessional manner. The papers contained in it are unquestionably valuable. The documentation is heavy, detailed and impressive. This is a work that should be in the hands of every governmental policy-maker in the Free World. Its potential impact on Free World thinking about "communism," Russia and the Soviet Union is enormous but, for the reasons given here, not much of this will be realized.

The three authors are Ukrainian scholars who lived and worked in the Soviet Union. They know the nature and substance of Russian "communism" at first hand. Professor J. Boyko and O. Kulchytsky are faculty members of the Ukrainian Free University in Munich, and Mrs. O. Sulyma is a lecturer at the Ukrainian Institute of Economics. Over half of the work is the contribution of Professor Boyko.

A scan at the titles of the scholarly papers offered here is sufficient to indicate the dominant themes developed by the authors. The two lengthy papers written by Professor Boyko are titled "Russian Historic Traditions in the Bolshevik Solutions of the Nationality Problem," and "Russian Populism (*Narodnichestvo*) as a Source of Leninism-Stalinism." The Kulchytsky contribution is on an "Analysis of the Russian Nature of Bolshevism in N. A. Berdyaev's Writings," and Sulyma's very interesting paper deals with "The Russian Nature of Bolshevism as seen through the Works of Russian Writers, Publicists, and Scholars . . ."

Just a quick glance at these titles reveals the basis for the reviewer's almost angry criticism of this work. On the one hand, they are obviously unwieldy and stifling, while, on the other hand, they suggest the vital directions of analysis pursued by the authors. Once the reader overcomes his immediate adverse impressions of this work, he'll find about the richest content that has yet appeared in the English language on the background, the ideological threads, continuities and flavors of what has come to be vaguely known as "Soviet communism," "international communism" or similar smoke screens for traditional Russian imperialism and colonialism. The reader will also find the expositions of these very well written and methodically and scrupulously substantiated by excellent documentation. The quotes from Russian sources are precious for anyone seeking to deepen his insights into the ideologic Russianism that so far has successfully potemkinized "communism."

Among the countless quotes, just consider some of the following. The Russian conservative writer Leontev observed in the 1880's, "Russia has a peculiar political fate; but whether it is a happy lot or an unhappy one—that I do not know. Its interests bear the somehow moral feature of supporting the weak, the oppressed and all those weak, all those oppressed are its partisans—at least up to a certain time" (p. 9). Of interest to "brotherly Slavs" and to mankind today should be the writings of Pogodin who lived in the mid-19th century and wrote: "I ask—who can compete with us? and who is there whom we could not force into obedience? . . . My heart trembles with joy . . . Oh Russia, oh my fatherland! . . . It is you, you who are destined to crown the growth of mankind" (p. 23). Writing in this century, the Menshivist leader Plekhanov declared, "The Ukrainian movement is assuming a character which threatens the Russian state with a terrible disaster" (p. 59). One could go on quoting Dostoyevsky, Nechaev, Tkachev, Gradeskul, Solovev, Bakunin and many others to show the elements of Russian totalitarianism, statism, imperialism, colonialism, messianism, genocide and a host of other institutional realities which underlie the subject of contemporary psychiatry, namely so-called communism.

The authors perform a most valuable service in assembling all this basic material for a realistic understanding of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism. The total myth of communism—which even Moscow cannot concretely define—is effectively revealed and demonstrated throughout the work. As a reference source, the book is a must for all serious students of Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism. With a different format, it could be a vital general work for readers of the English-speaking world.

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LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

THE NEW IMPERIALISM. By Hugh Seton-Watson. Published by William Clowes and Sons, Ltd., 10 Earlham Street, 1961, London W.C. 2.

This very interesting book provides much insight into the growth of the Russian empire. Mr. Watson gives a precise list of all the conquests of the Russian imperialists beginning with the 14th century. But in his impartiality the author sometimes goes too far, e.g., in comparing Russian imperialism with that of the European states. However, he does say that "every type of expansion and imperialism known in the history of Europe and the American states can be found in that of Russia," and he rejects "a widespread belief especially among Asian

and African nationalists, that because all Russian conquests were overland and not overseas they were somehow less imperialistic than . . . the European Atlantic nations."

Writing about Russian economy he says that all the agriculture and the mineral wealth of the empire came principally from the non-Russian areas.

As regards the conscious policy of Russification, it began, according to the author, in the Russian empire in the 19th century. "The Russification was directed with special energy against Ukrainians and Tatars, but on the whole spared both the Christian Georgians and Armenians and the Moslem people of Turkestan." After the revolution of 1905 all the non-Russian peoples enjoyed greater freedom, but after 1907 Russification set in once again.

Anti-Semitism in the Russian empire tried to divert the national feeling of the subject nationalities away from the dominant Russian nation and its government toward the Jews as the scapegoat. It was certainly so understood by the Russian authorities who deliberately encouraged pogroms.

The multi-national Russian empire, 55% of whose subjects were not Russians, entered the First World War with its social and national conflicts far from a solution. Lenin was far too great a realist not to recognize this. Therefore, he stood on the one hand for absolute centralism in his own Bolshevik party, and on the other hand for the right of self-determination of every nationality within the Russian empire. When Lenin seized power in November 1917, the Russian empire was already threatened with dissolution by national movements among the non-Russian peoples. The most important to be considered were Ukraine, Trans-Caucasia and the Tartar lands. The Bolshevik government was in fact forced to accept, by the treaty of Brest-Litovsk of March 1918, the loss of all the Western non-Russian countries, Ukraine and Trans-Caucasia.

Georgia was by far the healthiest and one which won the admiration of the Europeans who visited it. But none of the Caucasian republics survived. This was partly because of quarrels with one another and partly because they failed to interest the Western nations sufficiently in their cause.

Ukraine became the scene of one more military campaign in April 1920, and in 1921 by the Treaty of Riga Byelorussia and Ukraine were partitioned between Poland and Russia. In Turkestan widespread Moslem resistance continued in the form of a guerrilla movement known as the Basmachi. This movement was not suppressed until the end of 1922. The Baltic states and Finland survived because Britain could dominate the Baltic Sea. Poland and Rumania acquired territories with Ukrainian and Byelorussian subjects because both were backed by the military power of France. The Bolsheviks reasserted the might of Russia, speaking in the name not of the Czar, but of the proletariat. And thus the Russian empire remained.

H. Seton-Watson's extremely important aspect of the Soviet policy is the reorganization of boundaries, especially in Turkestan. The clear purpose of this policy was to destroy any feeling of a common Turkestani, or Turkic, or Persian nationality or culture. It was to manufacture a number of different nations which could be kept apart from one another, played off against one another and linked individually with the Russian nation.

In the 1930's collectivization of agriculture and the forced development of industry placed terrible burdens on all the citizens of the Soviet Union. It was especially severe in Ukraine and in the Kozak steppe. The Ukrainians, who lacked the tradition of the village communes, which was strong among Russians, opposed this policy. The result was a man-made famine in Ukraine and

the Kuban region claiming the lives of several million peasants. The bitterness caused by economic hardship stimulated anti-Russian nationalism and the Communist parties of the republics were heavily purged. The most important case was in Ukraine, and here the author describes the trial against the members of the League for the Liberation of Ukraine.

After the Second World War Russians were extremely suspicious of "bourgeois nationalism" among the non-Russians. Here the author describes what for Russians are the greatest sins—nationalism and cosmopolitanism—and what are the greatest virtues—patriotism and internationalism.

"Internationalism, which is in the Soviet view fully compatible with patriotism, requires constant emphasis on solidarity between one's own people and the Russian people, indeed servility towards the Russian people and the Russian culture."

These principles were even extended into the past. The conquests of the Czars were praised by Soviet Russians for two main reasons: they "accelerated social development of these nations" and they brought them "into contact with the superior culture of the Russian people."

The relationship between Russians and non-Russians in the Soviet Union is regulated by the Soviet constitution; it is a mistake to describe it as federal. The 15 S.S.R.s are not coordinated with the central government but subordinated to it. In Ukraine it seems that the most important posts are held by Ukrainians. But this cannot be very easily determined from a study of the names of the officials. Even bearers of distinctly Ukrainian names may be Russians in speech and outlook.

The development of education has been designed to serve not the individual culture of the non-Russian peoples, but the Communist culture with strong elements of Russification. The author criticizes a parallel which is sometimes made between the Soviet Union and the United States:

"The United States from its inception had a legal and cultural framework into which the immigrants were fitted and the immigrants had left their homelands to arrive in America. But in the Soviet Union the non-Russian peoples are living in compact communities in their traditional homelands. They may be acquiring a new loyalty to the Soviet Union in place of their previous rancorous submission to the Russian conqueror (though this is by no means sure) but they will hardly cease to be Uzbeks or Ukrainians, as the people of Detroit have ceased to be Poles or Italians." The author ends the part on Soviet republics with a very important question. Soviet education has created a new intelligentsia. The Soviet leaders rely on it, but, to say the least, they are uncertain. Has the Soviet regime found a new formula for curing the new intelligentsia of nationalism? In 1956 it was shown that Communism has no miraculous cure. "In view of the past experience of all colonial empires, and the role played by the intelligentsia in so many countries of Asia and Africa in the last decades, it would be astounding if the intelligentsia of the non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union were not affected by nationalism, did not cherish the hope that one day they may achieve independence."

In the second part of his book the author deals with the Soviet satellites. In economic plans the satellites were designed to produce in all the main branches of industry and to become separately dependent on the Soviet Union. The political system of the European satellites was closely copied from that of the Soviet Union.

However, we cannot agree with the author as regards the early history of Ukraine and of the Byelorussian state. For him Kiev is the beginning of the Russian as well as of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian states. Neither can we agree with the author about the time of the formation of the Ukrainian nation. For him "the Ukrainian nation was formed during the 19th century." "From the little dialects a literary Ukrainian language was formed. The man who contributed the most to this end was the great poet Taras Shevchenko." But in another place the author writes about the "revolution under the great leader Bohdan Khmelnytsky, which took place in the midst of the 17th century." The author often underlines the difference between Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Muscovites in language, tradition, outlook, culture, etc. The sole fact that the early name of Ukraine was *Rus'*, however, does not mean that the Ukrainian nation had not yet been formed in the time of *Rus'*. Neither Great Britain, nor Germany, nor France, had the same names in their early history as they have today.

Apart from these few incorrect statements, the whole book gives such a good description of the political, economic, social and cultural situation in the Soviet Union and the satellites, the relationship between Russians and non-Russians, the growth of the Russian and the Soviet Russian empire, and the internal forces which some day will shatter and destroy this empire, that we can only welcome wholeheartedly the book of this outstanding scholar and his profound understanding of the situation behind the Iron Curtain.

SLAVA STETZKO

THE POLITICS OF TOTALITARIANISM. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1934 to the present. By John A. Armstrong. New York, Random House, 1961, pp. xvi + 458.

This volume, Part III of a study of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was prepared under the general sponsorship of the Research Program on the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It is a thoroughly adequate and well-documented study and deserves serious attention by all students of the subject. At the same time the value of the work can only be fully appreciated if the reader pays strict attention to the limitations which Prof. Armstrong has set for himself. The author states that his theme is "the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, not Soviet society as a whole. In my opinion, the history of the Party comprises (though it is not confined to) all the topics, aside from the purely legal, which we customarily treat under the rubric of political history. But because the Soviet system is totalitarian, the examination of the ruling Party tends to embrace the entire history of the U.S.S.R. The problem in treating the CPSU is, then, primarily one of focus and emphasis. Like Alan Bullock, I believe that the essence of totalitarianism, Nazi or Soviet, is political power. Consequently, I have dealt in detail with other Soviet institutions — particularly the army and the police — insofar as they have constituted power factors." (p. xi f.). Then he goes on to explain the criteria which he uses in discussing the personality of the various rivals, the scope of his comments on ideology, culture, economics, world events and the relations of the CPSU with other Communist Parties. He admits frankly that with the general Communist refusal to treat historical truth as the world has known it, there have to be some inferences drawn and there is a thread of his personal views, but all these

points make for a readable, if somewhat difficult, volume and do give a very good idea of the situation.

These self-imposed limitations affect to a degree his treatment of the non-Russian enslaved nations, especially the Ukrainians. Unlike many authors, he does not attempt to deny their existence or to lump them with the Russians, but he is primarily interested in the appearance of Ukrainian influences *within* the Communist Party and he tends to avoid any opinion as to whether the purging of the Ukrainian intellectuals was due to the existence of anti-Soviet, as distinct from anti-Russian, influences, while noting that Skrypnyk had tried to create before his suicide a non-Russian Ukrainian Marxist culture. He notes too that the rise of Russian patriotism in its pure form was repugnant to the other nationalities, especially the Ukrainians, and stresses the methods taken to control these in contrast to the treatment of the smaller Finnic tribes. He notes the severity of the purge in the "Ezhovshchyna" (p. 83 ff.) and accordingly accepts and discusses the mass graves in Vynnytsia (p. 65 ff.). So too with his discussion of World War II, when he describes the formation of the Communist guerrillas but passes over in relative silence the Ukrainian patriotic forces fighting against them. Speaking of the raid of Kovpak and the others into Western Ukraine, he notes (p. 165) that "There they came into contact with Ukrainian nationalist forces. The latter reacted by forming their own partisan movement: but to some extent this development also suited the Communist purpose of disrupting normal life in the West Ukraine" (p. 165). We could cite other passages typical of Stalin's dislike for Ukrainians and the different treatment accorded them under Khrushchev, when by different methods he is trying to yoke them to the Russian chariot wheels and use them for forming a single Soviet people which, of course, is to speak only Russian.

He stresses the fact that Stalin was trying in his own way to establish stable conditions in society after 1934 through an enforced rigidity applied ruthlessly. He suspects that Stalin died some time earlier than was announced. His description of the maneuvers by which Khrushchev came into supreme control is as lucid as it can be under the cloud of mystery that surrounds the operations of the Kremlin. He stresses the fact that Khrushchev had the support of the territorial Communist machinery even more than of the control apparatus. This was undoubtedly true, for unlike Stalin who was trained in the ways of subterranean intrigue, Khrushchev was relatively extroverted and delighted in meeting people in all parts of the Soviet Union and abroad. Yet we may well doubt that it was the desire of the territorial machinery to secure their own places that influenced or assisted the desire of Khrushchev to get ahead (p. 279). We may well doubt, too, that the efforts of the successful Khrushchev to turn back the educational clock "may represent the last efforts of the old-time Party 'boss' to turn back the tide which has been bringing an elite of training to the commanding posts in the increasingly complex technological society of the Soviet Union" (p. 333).

The period covered by the book ends in September, 1960, and since then much has happened with the atomic testing, Khrushchev's stressing of peaceful coexistence and support of "wars of liberation," etc. In some respects developments may have invalidated some of Prof. Armstrong's theories but by no means all and the volume with its careful documentation, so far as it can be done, remains an unrivalled source of information. We must remember that Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin's perversions of history does not mean that the histories of the Communist Party prepared under Khrushchev will not be

slanted in praise of him as there are already signs of happening. The same psychological dilemma of the right to punish without cause persons outside the Party but not in the Party remains and there is no guarantee that the anti-party leaders may not in the future meet the same fate as those who opposed Stalin and were degraded downward until they could be removed with immunity.

Yet these are only slight blemishes in the book which deserves serious consideration from all students and we can be grateful to Prof. Armstrong for preparing it.

Columbia University

CLARENCE A. MANNING

THE SWORD DOES NOT JEST. The Life of Charles XII, King of Sweden, 1697-1717. By Frans G. Bengtsson. New York, St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1960, XIII + 499 pp. and a map of the campaigns of Charles XII.

This is a very interesting and lively book which can be read with pleasure and satisfaction by the average reader to the very end. What is in it for the serious and inquiring student? He can find many fine historical accounts, facts, explanations and footnotes.

With all its remarkable completeness we find that this biographical study by Frans G. Bengtsson has its own story. The author has tried to push aside many facts or—if they managed to persist—to minimize them.

Which years of the King's military life were important and decisive? The author has avoided a reply and instead resorted to a historical recital with his own selection of sources, ignoring those he apparently did not like. Therefore, we have a more or less one-sided story.

Here we will discuss chiefly a period of 6 to 8 years in the life of Charles XII, the King of Sweden: 1703-1717.

What is of interest to us in this "Life" are the facts testifying exactly opposite to the legend of Charles XII as a genius. For example, he had a poor administration and a not very good transportation service. We find in the book that all the losses in the Baltic countries through the years 1703-1704 were incurred as a result of this faulty administration and of ignorance of the enemy. Probably there were similar reasons as well for the unsuccessful military operations in Ukraine against the Czar.

The same can be said about the King's march from the north to Ukraine and the events on the Desna River. On page 304 the author notes that "reports now came in . . . filled the King's cup of bitterness to the brim . . . reports about Lowenhaupt's position had been miserably wrong."

Lowenhaupt's position was important indeed because it was he who supplied the King's army with food and matériel. On pages 310-311 we have a description of Lowenhaupt's catastrophe at night near Propoisk after the battle with the Muscovites: "Men began plundering their own wagons and stealing the brandy, and there was every kind of disorder. Many units disintegrated and stragglers wandered in all directions, had halved the army." Under such conditions the King could only hope to regain strength and to win once he managed to reach Ukraine.

The author writes about Ukraine and its political sagacity on page 309. He remarks: "This Cossack country was governed, under Muscovite overlordship, by *Hetman* Ivan Stepanovich Mazepa, a practical old intriguer and a reputedly able man (though now infirm with age and slightly feeble-minded), who for

some time past had been carrying on secret negotiations with the Swedes . . ."

By way of contrast we can quote here from *A Short History of Russia* by R. D. Charques: "All Cossackdom was stirred, fired by the old dream of republican independence. The Cossacks of the Ukraine under their *Hetman* Mazepa were on the brink of joining hands (with others conquered) . . . domestic confusion gathered around Peter . . ." (p. III).

Charles XII did get to Ukraine, meeting Mazepa on the Desna River. Bengtsson says little about this important meeting of the two sovereigns, compared with the many interesting pages about the same days in the book by Martel and Borschak, *Vie de Mazepa*, Paris, 1931.

There was the news about Baturin. The author writes on p. 316 about the massacre and the fire in the *Hetman's* residence. Only four lines for all. In the book of Manning, p. 184, we are given many details about this typical example of Russian vengeance, such as the following: "Once the Russians were in control, a wild butchery commenced. Peter had given orders that even in case of surrender not a single person in the city should be left alive. Soldiers and civilians, men and women and children were massacred in cold blood, with troops taking care to ravish and rape and torture the young women. Nothing so thrilled Peter as the possibility of giving free rein to his vengeance and his lust for blood." (The reader might compare Peter with the present rulers of Russia in Hungary, Ukraine, Katyn, Vynnytsia, Nikolaevsk-on-Amur in 1920, etc.)

The time from November, 1708, to the battle of Poltava, July 8, 1709, was spent in evaluating problems. The author mentions them. The decisive battle of Poltava is described quite well. However, we miss the role played in it by the Ukrainian Kozaks under the *Hetman's* command.

It is strange how little the author should say about the death of *Hetman* Mazepa, when Alfred Jensen's excellent book *Mazepa* (Lund, 1909) notes the documented diary of Soldan, who was the King's deputy to the *Hetman* from the beginning to the very end. In *The Sword* there is no word about Soldan, no mention of the King's visits to Mazepa and of the long talks and the political and military discussions.

Nor is anything said about the election of Orlyk as *Hetman* and the signing of the special treaty. This document is kept in the Swedish Government Archives (as T. Westrin has mentioned).

The author says that Lieut. Colonel Baron C. A. Grothusen worked hard to supply the King with money for living expenses and diplomatic activities (p. 407). Nothing is said about how this money was obtained until the final pages where we find a few references to money-lenders—Armenians, Jews and others—who took the opportunity to reap a usurious interest rate. We know that a large sum at no interest came from Voynarovsky, who had received Mazepa's chest (see: A. Jensen, T. Westrin).

There are interesting pages about how Charles tried to inspire anti-Muscovite activities on the part of Turkey and the Crimean Khan. No mention is made of the near-capture of the Czar by the Kozaks.

Little is said about the unsuccessful campaign in Ukraine in 1711 organized by Orlyk, wherein the Ukrainians lost a chance to defeat the Czar.

From the book we gain a clear portrait of the noblest King of Sweden and his adversary, the future Emperor of the prison of peoples. We also understand why Lord Byron, Voltaire, Victor Hugo and many others should have written poems about Charles' ally, *Hetman* Mazepa of the Kozak country, Ukraine.

That the Russians won the battle of Poltava was a misfortune for the West and Ukraine, for it cleared the way for other major conquests. The victorious Russians proclaimed the very devout and educated Mazepa a traitor.

Brave men are never forgotten. They inspire us to the highest deeds. This book shows that King Charles XII and *Hetman* Mazepa were two such men.

JOHN V. SWEET

UKRAINIANS AND THE POLISH REVOLT OF 1863 (a contribution to the history of Ukrainian-Polish relations). By Wasyl Luciw, Ph.D., New Haven. Slavia. 1961, 66 pages

Ukrainians and the Polish Revolt of 1863 by Dr. Wasyl Luciw shows "how improper it was to approach a problem just to preserve good neighborly Polish-Ukrainian relations" (p. 36). Prior to the revolt of 1863, and later on as well, Polish intellectual circles persisted in their idea that the Ukrainian territories should be "a sort of *Lebensraum* for the Poles" (p. 37). The Polish intellectuals popularized by every means the idea of the creation of a state "from sea to sea," not restricted to themselves, but including foreigners as well. None of this could concur with the aspirations of the Ukrainians, struggling for their own independence. As a result, Ukrainian participation in the Polish revolt of 1863 was unorganized and passive, in spite of the fact that the two nations had a common enemy — the Czarist government of Russia. What active support the Ukrainians might have given Poland was to a great extent unwisely discouraged by the Poles themselves from the very beginning of the revolt.

Dr. W. Luciw's book deserves to be called a worthy contribution to the understanding of Ukrainian-Polish relations in the nineteenth century. The book is supplemented by reproductions of two Polish proclamations issued in 1861 and 1863 and by an English translation of the so-called "Gold Act" of 1863, which explains the goals of the Polish insurgents. Of special interest to researchers in the subject are three excerpts from the chauvinistic *Moskovskie vedomosti* (1861) reproduced in the original. This periodical, which expressed the views of the Russian Czarist government, for obviously imperialistic reasons denied the existence of the Ukrainian nation, ridiculed the Ukrainian language and accused all Ukrainian intellectuals, in particular the historian M. Kostomarov, of pro-Polish activity against Russia. Thus W. Luciw's work also contributes to the understanding of Ukrainian-Russian relations within the Czarist empire.

The book under review has three pages of selected bibliography concerning the subject and reproduces photographs of Polish revolutionaries, Margrave Alexander Wielopolski, Taras Shevchenko, Ukrainian *chlopomany*, and M. N. Muraviev-Vilensky, the commander of the Russian armies which crushed the revolt with notorious brutality.

University of Alberta

YAR SLAVUTYCH

COMMUNISM: ITS FAITH AND FALLACIES. By James D. Bales. Baker Book House, Grand Rapids, 6, Mich., 1962. \$3.95. Pages 214.

The subtitle of this little work, "An Exposition and Criticism," characterizes rather well the aim of the author, a Professor of Christian Doctrine at Harding College in Searcy, Arkansas (known, according to the Preface written

by Hollington K. Tong of Taipei, as "a great authority on communism," and "well-known among Chinese students of communism."

Academically speaking, Prof. Bales tells us nothing new, but what he does present to us reads well, covering the eternally discussed topics running from "What is Communism," "The Importance of Understanding the Philosophy of Communism," and running through "Atheism Versus Theism," "Dialectical and Historical Materialism," "The Dialectic and Conduct," "The Dialectic is not the Key to Reality," "The Communist Concept of Class and Class Struggle," "The Communist Doctrine of Revolution," "The Communist Attitude toward Religion," "The Communist Doctrine of Morality," and "The Communist Party."

The whole work is liberally sprinkled with numerous footnotes. But here the author shows a definite weakness, since he cites numerous references to current periodicals or newspapers, and often misses penetrating works on the specific points he handles. (One wonders, for instance, that there are no references to *The Ukrainian Quarterly*).

Then the author is a Professor of the Bible, and one would expect that he would be primarily interested in the ideological aspects of communism. From that point of view, he could have strengthened his work by relating the ideological claims to the practice of communism. In this respect, for instance, the educational system (and the theory) are given only two short paragraphs (pages 172-173). The communist theories of propaganda are noted only in passing in relation to "anti-religious propaganda" (p. 170).

All in all, the work can be criticized for its many deficiencies, but it can scarcely be ignored. It is intellectually honest and sincere and for the non-specialist it will open vistas of generally known but useful knowledge. But for the specialist, the book seems to be shadow-boxing but not delivering the full punch; the chances are that, like Cole Porter's "first sniff of cocaine," the specialist will be bored by it, since the author renders the actual verdict in too small a bulk in relation to the mass of carefully detailed material on every point that he handles.

University of Bridgeport

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

RUSSIA AND THE SOVIET UNION. A MODERN HISTORY. By Warren Walsh, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1958, pp. XV, 640, XXIII).

This is a well composed textbook of Russian history for students. In his preface the author confesses that any errors are due only to his ignorance. Perhaps the following will prove helpful in the preparation of a new edition of this work.

The map of Kievan Rus in the 12th-13th centuries incorrectly shows the southeastern boundaries of Galicia, to which belonged the territory of the later Moldavia; the principality of Turov in the basin of the Pripet River (Polisia) is included in the Kievan one, while to the Pereyaslav principality are annexed parts of the Chernihiv one, on the middle of the Desna as well as on the upper Oka Rivers. Why did the author use the term "Polovosti" (Cumans [Polovtsi]?) on the map on p. 49 along the return route of Batu Khan from Hungary to Sarai? On the map, p. 70, the Lithuanian-Muscovite boundary about 1500 is not correct: Chernihiv and Starodub with their regions belonged to Lithuania, while the basin of the upper Donets River belonged to Muscovy.

The author makes two mistakes in his explanation of the text of Englishman Sir Jerome Horsey on the cruel destruction of Novgorod and the murder of its population by the Muscovites by order of Czar Ivan the Terrible in 1570 (p. 75). Walsh explains the term "wear" erroneously by "were"; it should be "weir" (dam). The name of the river "Volca" has been explained by Walsh as "Volga," but Novgorod is situated upon the Volkhov River, connecting Lake Ilmen with Lake Ladoga.

During the reign of Catherine II Russia won control of the northern Black Sea coast not only from the River Bug, as Walsh writes (p. 156), but from the Dniester River (compare his map, p. 129) almost to the Caucasus. On the map "Expansion of the Russian Empire — 16th to 20th centuries" (p. 279), Estonia and Livonia, annexed by Peter I during the Great Northern War (1700-21), are included in the partition of Poland. In connection with the *Reichstadt* Agreement of July 1876 between Austria and Russia, Walsh writes (p. 277) "that Russia was to take Bessarabia," forgetting that this province had already been annexed by Russia in 1812 (compare map, p. 279), and in the negotiation of 1876 the above named powers talked of the strip along the Danube River from the Prut River to the Black Sea containing the towns Izmil and Kilia.

Erroneously Walsh writes (p. 277) that "Austria also supported the (Serbian) revolts (in Herzegovina and Bosnia against the Turks) because it wanted an excuse for intervention." Austria was always the enemy of Serbian national revolutionary movements because it had Serbian subjects in Banat (South Hungary), Slovenia and Dalmatia; the Serbians hated the Austrian-Hungarian yoke no less than the Turkish one.

To be taken for slips of the tongue are the appellations: *chinovik* (pp. 237-8) instead of *chinovnik*, and "Carpatho-Rumania" (p. 273) instead of "Carpatho-Ruthenia" (Carpatho-Ukraine), as well as the name "Rotislav" (p. 274) instead of Rostislav Fadayev.

In Russian *mir* has, besides the meanings "peace," "world" and "universe" (p. 593) the meaning of "people," whence: *mirskoy* means "mundane" (man), "secular," "lay;" therefore, the village community *mir* means the common people. *Volya* means "freedom," "liberty," and the further meaning, "the will," is an extension of the first one, because the free man (or people) has his own will. Hence it would be better to translate *narodnaya volya* (p. 263) by *the freedom (liberty) of the people* than *the will of the people*. Moreover, Walsh (p. 249) translates the party *Zemlya i Volya* as *Land and Liberty*.

In his narration on the Balkan Wars in 1912-13 (pp. 355-6) Walsh writes that after the second Balkan War (Summer, 1913) "Serbia . . . set out to conquer Albania." Indeed, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece had occupied and divided Albania among themselves during the first Balkan War (fall and winter, 1912-13); then Serbia conquered the middle part of Albania with the port of Durazzo on the Adriatic Sea coast. But Austria demanded independence for Albania, which the great European powers had approved at the London Ambassadors' Conference (spring, 1913). Then Serbia and Greece demanded that Bulgaria give them parts of Macedonia as recompense for the parts lost in Albania, but Bulgaria refused to yield up its territory with its Bulgarian population. Therefore Greece, Serbia and Montenegro declared war against Bulgaria. Bulgaria was defeated, and Turkey used this opportunity to retake from Bulgaria Thrace with Adrianople up to the Maritsa River, while Rumania occupied the Bulgarian town of Silistria with its region.

Walsh has a mistaken idea about the genesis and growth of Ukrainian nationalism (pp. 402-4). He writes quite erroneously that "the new Ukrainian nobility created by Catherine and her successors became quite generally and thoroughly Polonized." This nobility was never Polonized. This nobility saved the Ukrainian Kozak traditions; most of them were loyal to Czarist Russia: however, a few of them dreamed about the restoration of the autonomy or independence of Ukraine. But all of them—those who were loyal to Russia as well as those who dreamed about a free Ukraine—all hated the Poles and Poland, and they never "had romantic dreams of a Polish restoration."

The Austrian government never protected the Ukrainian nationalists, although Lviv, the capital of Galicia, was a center of Ukrainian national life. Since 1848 the provincial administration of Galicia had been in Polish hands. The second Polish governor of Galicia, Count Agenor Gołuchowski, persuaded the Austrian government to refuse the demands of the Galician Ruthenians, as the Ukrainians in Austria were then called officially; their political representation, the "Principal Ruthenian Council" in Lviv, demanded that the Vienna government form an autonomous province, "Russinenland," out of Galicia, Bukovina and Carpathian Ruthenia (now Carpatho-Ukraine). In 1848 they formed one battalion of volunteers to defeat the Hungarian rebels and wished to enlarge it to one corps. Afraid of the Ruthenian irredentists, however, the Austrian government refused to fulfill the Ruthenian demands.

But in the Austrian constitutional empire it was possible to publish in the Ukrainian language, and this opportunity was exploited by the Ukrainians in Russia, where publications in the Ukrainian language had been forbidden by the minister of the interior, P. A. Valuyev, in 1863 and by Czar Alexander II in 1876. A few intellectuals and landowners of Eastern Ukraine founded in Lviv in 1873 a Literary Shevchenko Society, renamed in 1893 the Shevchenko Scientific Society. Under the influence of Shevchenko's poems all people accepted the terms "Ukraine" and "Ukrainian" as succinct underlining of their nationality as different from the Muscovite-Russian one.

The word "Ukraina" originally did not mean either "at the border" or "the southern border lands" (p. 591). In the *Kievan Chronicle* of the 12th century and in the Galician-Volhynian one of the 13th century, as well as in the Ukrainian Kozak songs (*dumy*), this word meant "country," "region," "district." In the same meaning the term "Ukraine" was used in Polish sources of the middle of the 16th century, but later the Poles explained it as a "land at the border" because in the Polish language the prepositional phrase *u kraju* means "at the end;" on the contrary, in Old Russian and Ukrainian the similar prepositional phrase *u kraju* means "in the country."

As a concession of the Austrian state government, as well as of the Polish provincial one in Galicia, the Galician Ukrainians acquired a chair of East European history in the Ukrainian language at the Austrian State University in Lviv, where the Polish language was mostly used in lecturing. They asked the Kievan historian Volodymyr Antonovych to recommend a scholar for this chair, and he named his student, Michael Hrushevsky. Hrushevsky was never an Austrophile. In the summer of 1914 he hastened to leave Austria for Russia in order to escape Austrian arrest; but in Kiev he was arrested by the Czarist police and kept in confinement in Kazan until the Russian Revolution. Walsh, ignoring these facts, writes: "The Austrians found a scholar-politician who would work with them."

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

“NIK NEEDLED NIXON INTO ‘DEBATE’,” a serial. *Milwaukee Sentinel*, Wisconsin, April 11, 1962.

This newspaper organ, as well as others in the nation, has carried a serialized account of former Vice-President Nixon's new book, *My Six Great Crises*. It appears that all have dipped into the syndication to come up with Nixon's observations on the seemingly mysterious Captive Nations Week Resolution. Significantly, all feature this remarkable episode in contemporary history, despite the ignorance that prevails in this country about the Resolution's essence and importance in the cold war.

The parts quoted from Nixon's book are highly revealing. Here are some of them. “Just when I was being greeted at the airport, Khrushchev was lambasting the U.S. generally and me personally for the Captive Nations Resolution passed by Congress a week before. The Resolution called for prayers for those behind the Iron Curtain.” Strange, indeed, is this interpretation by our former Vice-President. No doubt, Khrushchev had to find a personalized butt for his frenzied attack, but in fact Nixon had absolutely nothing to do with the Resolution. This should be evident from his understanding of the Resolution as given here—after three years of domestic education! If he had ever bothered to read the Resolution, he'd have found that its scope goes far beyond prayers which are implied but not expressly stated.

To continue with the revealing quotes, one comes across this: “Just as soon as we sat down, he (Khrushchev) started in on what was to be the major Soviet irritant throughout my tour. It was the Captive Nations Resolution, passed by Congress on July 6, calling on the President to issue a proclamation designating the third week in July as Captive Nations Week, during which free people would rededicate themselves and pray for the liberation of ‘enslaved peoples’ behind the Iron Curtain.” Imagine “the major Soviet irritant” throughout Nixon's tour! Yet, as the facts clearly show, Nixon never understood, nor does he now, why this was so. It is abundantly clear that with his large entourage of “experts,” he didn't know how to cope with this unexpected eruption. But he is not alone in this. Those in the present Administration haven't the faintest conception of what the Resolution is really about.

But let's examine a few more of Nixon's observations. “Speaking in a high-pitched voice and pounding the table frequently, Khrushchev declared that the Soviet government regarded the Resolution as a very serious ‘provocation’.” Nixon gives no indication of understanding why Khrushchev regarded this as such. Instead, quite superficially, he says, “I felt he was going through an act—that he was using the Resolution as a pretext for taking the offensive against me, and that had it not been for this Resolution, he would have found some other excuse for doing so.” This whitewash type of explanation can be applied

to anything. It certainly substantiates further the complete lack of understanding shown by our former Vice-President.

"We went round and round," writes Nixon, "until I reminded the premier of the American expression, 'We have beaten this horse to death; let's change to another.' But Khrushchev shouted, 'This Resolution stinks!,' pounding the table. Then he emphasized what he meant in some earthy four-letter words, so beyond the pale of diplomacy that his interpreter blushed and hesitated before finally translating his words." Again, one need ask why? Just to embarrass Nixon? Nonsense. The answer is that the Resolution struck at the heart of Khrushchev's ersatz Soviet state and for the first time officially recognized the over a dozen captive non-Russian nations in the U.S.S.R. What almost paralyzes Khrushchev is the haunting thought that the West will act on this recognition by implementing the Resolution and reducing Soviet Russia—not the Soviet Union which exceeds Soviet Russia—to size. That this will come in time, there can be no doubt. It surely will not be because of the Nixons.

"CHAMPION THE RIGHTS OF SUBJUGATED PEOPLES," observations.
Christopher News Notes, New York, April 1962.

Among the "Seven Ways to Overcome Communism" is to "Champion the Rights of Subjugated Peoples. Do for Them What You Would Want Them to Do for You if You Were under Communist Rule." Over a million copies of this valuable brochure are circulated in this country and abroad. Father James Keller, the brilliant director of The Christophers, has successfully conveyed his powerful and inspiring messages to untold millions over the years.

In this one he points out that "Nearly one billion human beings—more than one third of the people of the earth—are dominated by Communist regimes, imposed by force." His forthright and lucid message continues: "We must live up to our grave responsibility—in every way possible—to assist this great multitude to achieve self-determination."

With Captive Nations Week 1962 approaching this July, Americans may well take heed of Father Keller's further observation: "The fact that this is a glaring weak spot in their set-up was proven by how upset they became when the U.S. Congress passed the Captive Nations Resolution in 1959."

"FLAGS OF THE CAPTIVE NATIONS," a pamphlet by Robert E. Ramsey. The American Legion, Denver, Colorado, 1962.

At the 43rd National Convention of the American Legion the flags of 13 captive non-Russian nations were carried in the traditional parade by men from the Lowry Air Force Base. The person responsible for this unprecedented event is Robert E. Ramsey. Mr. Ramsey is a member of the Americanism Committee in the Denver Post of the American Legion.

Photographs of the event are most impressive. But in this pamphlet the author undertakes a great public service by displaying each of the flags with a concise description of the country involved. The countries represented are Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Cossackia, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania and Ukraine. Regarding the last the writer says, "I write with mixed emotions on this the last captive nation

to be spoken of in this booklet. It has been my privilege to meet with and speak to many Ukrainians." Shevchenko, the poet laureate of Ukraine, is appropriately quoted.

The pamphlet ends with the complete text of the Captive Nations Week Resolution, now Public Law 86-90. The author quite graciously acknowledges the authorship of the Resolution by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky of Georgetown University and chairman of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America. Sources for the article include the Ukrainian Congress Committee, the Assembly of Captive European Nations, and others.

Priced at 25 cents per copy, this unique pamphlet can be obtained by writing the author at P.O. Box 3772, Chaffee Station, Denver 21, Colorado. Its usefulness during Captive Nations Week is obvious.

"AMONG THE ORGANIZATIONS," a report. *Freedom's Facts*, All-American Conference to Combat Communism, Washington, D.C., April 1962.

This highly important organ reports regularly on the activities of organizations belonging to the Conference. In this issue the visit of the chairman of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America to Taiwan is concisely reported. Among other things the audience given Dr. Dobriansky by President Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China is noted.

As the report describes it, "At the conference the two men discussed Soviet imperialism and colonialism and efforts of the peoples of the free world ultimately to effect the liberation of the Captive Nations." The conference also dealt specifically with the many captive non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union.

"THE WEAK POINTS," an article by Andre Francois-Poncet. *Le Figaro*, Paris, France, February 5, 1962.

Soviet Russian imperialism and colonialism is the target of this important and striking article in France's outstanding newspaper organ. Written by a prominent public figure in France and also a distinguished member of the French Academy, the article minces no words about Moscow's weak points. The points center on the imperio-colonialism of Russian Moscow since 1918.

The writer recalls that at the beginning of 1918, Ukraine, the Baltic States, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Finland proclaimed their independence. He then asks, "With the exception of Finland, what happened to these independent states?" His answer to the reader is clear and unequivocal. "Being the heir and continuator of the old regime, Russian communism is imperialistic outside and a Russifier inside."

Ukraine is mentioned as the main source of opposition to Soviet Russia. The author cites the harsh treatment to which its people and particularly the intelligentsia have been subjected. However, as he shows, their resistance is unbreakable. Speaking of Khrushchev and the captive nations in the U.S.S.R., the writer concludes: "We complain about our weaknesses: the U.S.S.R. has its own. Khrushchev knows it better than anyone else. The least allusion to the captive nations, their aspirations to independence and the right of self-determination evoke in him veritable crises of rage . . ."

Academician Francois-Poncet deserves great praise for this incisive and penetrating article. At the present time the intellectuals and leaders of France

seem, on the whole, to have an appreciative understanding of the Russian empire in the guise of the Soviet Union than what prevails in the United States among our intellectuals and government leaders.

"TARAS SHEVCHENKO," an article. *The Stamp Magazine*, London, England, January 1962.

"Don't be surprised if among the forthcoming U.S.A. stamps announced, there is a 'Champion' for Taras Shevchenko," so this article begins. The writer evidently followed carefully the campaign started by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America for the issuance of a Champion of Liberty stamp in honor of Ukraine's poet laureate. He speaks of it putting "a bite on PGM Summerfield for such a label."

There is no question but that had there been no presidential election in 1960 and a subsequent change in Administration, a Shevchenko "Champion" would have been issued in 1961. However, the objective is not lost. With a new group in, it takes time to lay the groundwork anew. As a matter of fact, with the Shevchenko monument to be erected in the not too distant future, a stamp issued in Shevchenko's honor then would have far greater meaning and import.

This one-column article gives a short biographical account of Shevchenko. It is noteworthy that the article with its interesting insights and data has been published only recently.

"SCHERER SAYS OFFICIALS ARE 'SOFT' ON THE REDS," an article. Associated Press, *The Evening Star*, Washington, D.C., February 24, 1962.

Since the release of the congressional series titled *The Crimes of Khrushchev*, in September, 1959, the nomer Hangman or Murderer of Ukraine has stuck rather well to Khrushchev. Frequently, this proper characterization of Khrushchev is expressed in writings and in the public forum.

Note is taken here of an address delivered by Representative Scherer, ranking Republican member of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Referring to a number of persons in the present Administration, the legislator states: "In fact, they have a phobia that they can reform and make good little boys out of the murderer of the Ukraine, the butcher of Hungary, the enslavers of Tibet and the masters of 800 million captive people now behind the Iron Curtain."

Especially in periods of quasi-appeasement such proper nomers should be constantly used. Their value rests in the antidote they provide to the tranquilizers being fed to the American public. Believers in the notion that we can do business with Khrushchev are simply turning the foreign policy clock back to 1951. Laos and other fringe disasters in the offing are just the initial fruits of our current policy of patched-up containment.

"SOME FORGOTTEN FACTS," an article. *Intelligence Digest*, London, England, February 1962.

Edited by Kenneth de Courcy, this periodical devotes a substantial section of the February issue to the past crimes of imperio-colonial Moscow. Ap-

propriate to the tune of the moment, it calls for a necessary recital of some forgotten but essential facts about Moscow's record. Without such a recital many would be completely swept off their feet by the momentary tunes of peaceful coexistence and "you can do business with Khrushchev."

Three overall facts are recounted: collectivization, mass deportations, and acts against Jews. A fourth most heinous crime is unfortunately overlooked, namely genocide. However, under each of the three, events and data are neatly and systematically assembled. The reader cannot but be impressed by the excellent summary given here.

Showing that collectivization cannot be divorced from Moscow's nationality policy, the article emphasizes that "In the Ukraine, collectivisation had the harshest consequences." As to mass deportations, it states that by the end of 1932, an estimated 2,400,000 persons were deported from the Ukraine." Other nationals are treated in detail, too. Referring to the testimony of Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky of Georgetown University, the article includes the liquidation of the Ingrian nation in 1921-23. The acts against the Jews are also cogently itemized.

EDITOR SAYS REDS FEAR REVOLT OF CAPTIVE NATIONS," a report. *The Register*, Denver, Colorado, March 4, 1962.

This widely read Catholic newspaper reports parts of an address given by Mr. Walter Dushnyck before a freedom rally in Chicago, Illinois. The rally was sponsored jointly by the League of Americans of Ukrainian descent and the Association of Ukrainian-American Social Organizations of Illinois. Mr. Dushnyck is managing editor of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*.

"The Ukrainian nation," Dushnyck is quoted as saying, "has never accepted the Communist rule imposed by the Kremlin." Comparisons with the quest for independence and freedom in Africa and Asia, are made in terms of the historic drives found in Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and other captive nations in the U.S.S.R. Reference is also made to the murders of Bandera and Rebet, two Ukrainian nationalist leaders, as "the best evidence that Moscow is afraid of the Ukrainian liberation movement."

"CONFESSOR OF THE FAITH," an editorial. *America*, New York, March 3, 1962.

Metropolitan Joseph Slipy of the Ukrainian Catholic Church is the subject of this exceptionally well-written editorial. The 70th birthday of this suffering prelate was hailed this past February 17. Since 1946 the Metropolitan has been a prisoner in Siberia.

The lengthy editorial highlights the life of Metropolitan Slipy. It describes how the prelate was arrested in April, 1945, and then, a year later, sentenced to imprisonment on trumped-up charges. The Metropolitan is fittingly lauded for his refusal to consent to the official apostasy which then took place with a small group of renegade priests embracing Orthodoxy under pressure from Moscow.

Frankness and integrity mark the editor's observations when it is said that "Even in the best of circumstances, the Latin West always had difficulty

understanding the Ukrainians. Yet, notwithstanding certain rebuffs from Latin Catholics, the Ukrainians remained loyal to the See of Rome." The strides of progress made by Ukrainian Catholics since World War II are noted.

"CAPTIVE NATIONS — MOSCOW'S ACHILLES HEEL," an interview. *The Ukrainian Review*, London, England, Winter 1961.

Readers of this factually packed journal in England have the opportunity of assessing the validity of Secretary of State Rusk's attitude toward Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia as "traditional parts of the Soviet Union." The interview with Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky over the Manion Forum Broadcast last November is carried in full.

The reaction to the Secretary's blunders was rather surprising in the United States and Canada. Mr. Rusk was compelled to write a redressed letter to the Chairman of the House Rules Committee at the end of the year. It will be interesting to observe the reaction in England.

"DENVER UKRAINIAN CATHOLICS MARK ARCHBISHOP'S BIRTHDAY," a news account. *Rocky Mountain News*, Denver, Colorado, February 24, 1962.

Beside a photo of Archbishop Slipy, a vivid account of the celebration scheduled by Denver's Ukrainian Catholic Church members on the occasion of the Metropolitan's 70th birthday is given. In this western section of the country it is noteworthy to observe the activities of Americans of Ukrainian extraction.

The *News* presents the essentials of Archbishop Slipy's imprisonment in 1946. It states that "his church was denounced by the Russians as a 'reactionary tool of fascism and the Vatican, and pressure was applied to have the church join the Russian Orthodox Church.'" Accounts of this factual sort cannot but have an enlightening effect on American readers who are still somewhat vague in their thinking about "Russia and Russians."

"REPORT," proceedings of the Anti-Communism Strategy Seminar. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1962.

This 132-page brochure contains lectures on the cold war which every analyst should delve into. The publication is being distributed widely in this country and abroad. In many instances it has already served the purpose of basic reference material at several educational institutions.

The lectures cover a broad range of cold war subjects. "Communist Tactics in the Cold War" is given by Colonel William R. Kintner. A "History of Communist Aggression" is presented by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky of Georgetown University. Dr. Stefan T. Possony deals with "Communist Vulnerabilities" and Frank R. Barnett covers the field of "American Strategy." Other subjects include communist grand strategy, the economic threat, and the psycho-political threat. For cold war study groups this work is rapidly becoming a must.

"UKRAINIAN RESISTANCE," an editorial. *The Register*, Denver, Colorado, March 4, 1962.

"One of the lamentable weaknesses in our waging of cold warfare," begins this editorial, "is our lack of understanding of the power of nationalities, not only behind the Iron Curtain but behind actual Soviet boundaries." How true! The editorial then goes on to dwell chiefly upon the resistance of the Ukrainian nation against the imperio-colonial yoke of Moscow.

The editor's observation that *The Ukrainian Quarterly* contains some of the "most potent ideas that can be used against our enemy" is deeply appreciated by this organ. Its comment on the undertaking by 14 Ukrainian Bishops of the free world to bring to the attention of the United Nations the wrongs heaped upon Ukraine will surely inspire the effort further.

"THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN EAST GERMANY TODAY," an article by Walter Dushnyck. *The Catholic World*, New York, April 1962.

East Germany is a captive nation and its liberation would have a tremendous impact upon the destiny of all other captive nations. Working toward justice and freedom is, of course, the Catholic Church in East Germany. However, as the writer lucidly shows, the Church is severely restricted in its operations.

The article treats in a methodic way the attempts made by the puppet regime to destroy the Church. Publications are prohibited, priests are maligned as "reactionaries"; in short, Russian practices are employed.

L. E. D

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- Religion in the Soviet Union.* By Walter Kolarz, St. Martin's Press. New York, 1962, pp. 518.
- Russia Under Khrushchev.* By Alexander Werth. Hill and Wang. New York, 1962, pp. 352.
- Communism: Its Faith and Fallacies.* By James D. Bales. Baker Book House, Grand Rapids, Mich., 1962, pp. 214.
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- Woman and Child in the Modern System of Slavery — U.S.S.R.* By Martha Chyz, Suzero-Toronto & Dobrus-New York, 1962, pp. 176.
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- Le Colosse Aux Pieds D'Argile.* By Marie Kerhuel. Editions Subervie Rodez, Paris, 1961, pp. 382.
- Readings in Soviet Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice.* By Arthur E. Adams. D.C. Heath and Company. Boston, p. 420.
- Le Probleme Ukrainien et Simon Petlura: Le Feu at la Cendre.* By Alain Desroches. Nouvelles Editions Latines Paris, 1962, p. 220.
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- FOREWORD ----- by *Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky,*
Georgetown University;
- CHAPTER I: ----- "TARAS SHEVCHENKO"
by Dr. Clarence A. Manning, Columbia University;
- CHAPTER II: ----- "BARD OF UKRAINE"
by Prof. D. Doroshenko, University of Prague;
- CHAPTER III: ---- "TARAS SHEVCHENKO AND WEST EUROPEAN
LITERATURE" — *by Dr. Juri J. Bojko, Free Ukrainian University;*
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- CHAPTER VI: ----- "SHEVCHENKO AND WOMEN"
by Dr. Luke Myshuha, author;
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