

The
UKRAINIAN
QUARTERLY



Vol. X.—Number 4

Autumn, 1954

FIGHT WITH THE UKRAINIAN SPIRIT

"Few more explosive issues exist in the whole domain of Soviet affairs than the question of Ukrainian independence... Yet there are few major aspects of the Soviet Problem on which Americans are so poorly informed and so desperately need information."

HARRY SCHWARTZ, N. Y. *Times*. Book Reviews, Sept. 13, 1953.

UKRAINE UNDER THE SOVIETS

by Prof. CLARENCE A. MANNING
of Columbia University

Bookman Ass. Publ. New York, 1953. \$3.50

A book written by an acknowledged expert on Eastern European peoples using the first hand materials of recent refugee Scholars from Soviet Ukraine.

Orders to:

THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY

302-304 West 13th Street

New York 14, N. Y.

UKRAINIAN INSURGENT' ARMY IN FIGHT FOR FREEDOM

224 pages

\$3.25

Contains articles, short stories, as well as their arts, written and drawn by the UPA members in the Ukraine, from 1942 to 1952.

Orders: THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY
302-304 West 13th Street
New York 14, New York

SHORT PUBLICATIONS ON UKRAINE

by NICHOLAS D. CHUBATY

Ukraine Between Poland and Russia	\$.50
Modern Ukrainian Nationalist Movement50
Ukrainian and Russian Conceptions of the History of Eastern Europe ..	.50
700th Anniversary of the City of Lviv50
Russian Church Policy in Ukraine30
Ukraine and the Western World30
Modern Ukrainian Historiography30

Mail orders to:

NICHOLAS D. CHUBATY
302-304 West 13th Street
New York 14, N.Y.

Picture on the Cover: HRYHORIY KOSYNKA, prominent Ukrainian poet, shot down by Russian Red Fire Squad in Kiev, December, 1934.

THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY

VOL. X. — NUMBER 4.



Ukraine ethnographic territory

Boundaries of Soviet republics and satellites

AUTUMN 1954

\$ 1.25 A COPY

Published by UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA

EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE PUBLICATIONS
of the UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA:
LEV E. DOBRIANSKY, *chairman*; NICHOLAS D. CHUBATY, WALTER
DUSHNYK, HNAT BILYNSKY, LUKE MYSHUHA, MATTHEW
STAKHIV, ROMAN SMAL-STOCKI — *members*

Editor NICHOLAS D. CHUBATY
Associate Editor LEV E. DOBRIANSKY
Artistic Advisor SVIATOSLAV HORDYNSKY

Circulation Manager ELEANOR KULCHYCKY

Subscription: Yearly \$ 5.00; Single Copy \$ 1.25
Checks payable to: UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA

Editorial and Managing Office: THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY
302-304 West 13th Street, New York 14, N. Y.
Tel.: WAtkins 4-5618

Editor's Address: DR. NICHOLAS D. CHUBATY
250 Franklin Turnpike, Mahwah, New Jersey
Tel.: CRagmere 8-3767-M

CONTENTS

The Bolshevik Fight with the Ukrainian Spirit <i>Editorial</i>	309
The Case of the 28 <i>Sviatoslav Hordynsky</i>	315
The Muse in Prison <i>Yar Slavutych</i>	323
Changes in the Psychology of Soviet Ukrainians <i>V. Psycholoh</i>	328
Russification of the Soviet Educational System <i>Joseph S. Roucek</i>	339
The Real Alternative of Liberation in American Foreign Policy <i>Lev E. Dobriansky</i>	346
American Forced Repatriation <i>Julius Epstein</i>	354
Liberation and Selfdetermination <i>Kurt Glaser</i>	366
Peaceful Coexistence <i>Clarence A. Manning</i>	373
Past and Present of Kolyma's Mines <i>Petro Kolymsky</i>	380
BOOK REVIEWS	
Russland: Staatliche Einheit und Nationale Vielheit. Georg von Rauch Muenchen, 1954. <i>Nicholas Chubaty</i>	388
L'Ukraine en Droit International. Romain Yakemtchouk. Louvain, 1954 <i>V. J. Kaye-Kisilevsky</i>	390
The Dynamics of Soviet Society. W. W. Rostow. New York, 1953 <i>Nicholas M. Paley</i>	391
Civilization at Bay. V. L. Borin. London, 1951 <i>John Zadrozny</i>	393
A Geography of Europe. W. G. Hoffman. New York, 1953 <i>H. Kolody</i>	394
Yugoslavia, Tito's Promised Land. Alex N. Dragnich. New Brunswick, 1954 <i>Clarence A. Manning</i>	395
The Role of the Christians in the World for Peace. A Symposium. Washington D. C., 1953 <i>N. C.</i>	396
UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS	
<i>L. E. D.</i>	397

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

SVIATOSLAV HORDYNSKY, Ukrainian painter, poet, literary critic; artistic and literary adviser to this publication.

YAR SLAVUTYCH, Ukrainian poet and novelist; literary translator from English into Ukrainian. Emigrant from the Soviet Ukraine at present in this country.

V. PSYCHOLOH (*Pseudo*), educator and sociologist from Soviet Ukraine, former professor; now in this country.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK, professor and head of the department of sociology at the Bridgeport University, author of several works.

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY, Ph. D., professor of economics at Georgetown University and author. President of the *Ukrainian Congress Committee of America*.

JULIUS EPSTEIN, political researcher and journalist, American correspondent for "*Industriekurier*" in Duesseldorf, Germany, contributor to American magazines.

KURT GLASER, staff member of the "Governmental Affairs Institute," Washington, D. C., researcher on political science and government, author of "*Administrative Procedure*," "*Comparative Federal Constitutions*," "*Verwaltungstechnik*."

CLARENCE A. MANNING, professor of Russian and Ukrainian Languages and Literatures at Columbia University. Author of *The Story of Ukraine*, *Ukrainian Literature*, *Ukraine under the Soviets* and others.

PETRO KOLYMSKY (*pseudo*), agriculturist, emigrant from Soviet Ukraine, former inmate of Kolyma gold mines concentration camps, now in this country.

THE BOLSHEVIK FIGHT WITH THE UKRAINIAN SPIRIT

Editorial

1930 was a historical year in the national life of the whole of Ukraine, Eastern and Western, under the Soviets and under Poland. In Eastern Ukraine, under the Soviets, Russian Communism began a general attack upon all fields of Ukrainian national life: science, art, literature and most important, the Ukrainian peasant class, the base of the movement for Ukrainian independence. The attack rushed on as a flood. The All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was first communized and then russianized. It even lost its name "*All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences*" and received the territorial title of "*Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR*" as a sign, that an Academy in Ukraine had to be necessarily nationally Ukrainian.

During the trial of the *Alliance for the Liberation of Ukraine* in 1930 there sat as defendant the President of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Serhiy Efremov, and dozens of Ukrainian intellectuals. The President of the Academy of Sciences was condemned to several years in a concentration camp and disappeared from the Ukrainian horizon along with some dozens of academicians, older and younger scholars, especially scholars in the fields of Ukrainian literature and history. The patriarch of Ukrainian historiography, Professor Mykhaylo Hrushevsky, was forced to retire, and at the same time the Historical Section of the Academy of Sciences was abolished. Shortly thereafter the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR underwent a continuing policy of russification, which has now gone so far that the president of the highest scientific institution in the Soviet Ukrainian Republic is Palladin, a Russian, who does not even know the Ukrainian language.

The attack on Ukrainian culture constantly grew more fierce. In 1933, when the artificial famine caused the death of about six million Ukrainian peasants, two outstanding Ukrainian Communists, Mykola Skrypnyk, Commissar of Education, and Mykola Khvylovy, the most outstanding Ukrainian Communist writer, committed suicide.

1930 also marked the assault of Poland upon the cultural life of Western Ukraine. After a savage pacification of the Western Ukrainian villages, similar to the wild military raids of reactionary periods, Poland launched a general assault upon Ukrainian schools, educational

institutions and the scientific centre of Western Ukraine, the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv. It was forbidden to use in the press and publications the name "Ukrainian" in reference to Western Ukraine and its population.

Whatever direction the Ukrainian people looked toward, whether to the east or the west, they saw everywhere the ruin and annihilation of Ukrainian cultural life. During these unfavorable times, the beginning of 1934, the incredible and unintelligible news spread through Lviv, the capital of Western Ukraine, that Antin Krushelnytsky, a known Ukrainian writer and a former leader of the socialist trend, had decided to go to Soviet Ukraine along with his entire family, his wife, four sons, a daughter and a grandchild.

It is true that Antin Krushelnytsky had in the last years shown signs of being a Communist "fellow-traveler" and had even published for Soviet money a pro-Communist journal of literature and social problems, entitled *The New Ways*. However every clear-thinking person asked himself how, when the old Communist M. Skrypnyk, the friend of Lenin and co-founder of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and so a man far removed from the spirit of Ukrainian independence and nationalism, could not stand the Ukrainian reality of the day and had been forced to commit suicide, Antin Krushelnytsky and his family could live in that atmosphere.

They were advocates of Ukrainian independence and nationally Ukrainians after the Western Ukrainian fashion. There is no doubt that the Polish assault on the entire Ukrainian life in Western Ukraine had so beclouded their critical judgement that despite the warnings of all their friends and acquaintances, including the writer of these lines, the Krushelnytsky family went to the east. They burned all their bridges behind them, for in this case Soviet policy insisted that they renounce their previous Polish citizenship and formally become Soviet subjects.

Meanwhile there remained in Lviv for three months only the wife of the older son, Ivan Krushelnytsky. She was a teacher of music, and wished to finish a contract which she had with the Ukrainian Musical Institute in Lviv. She was so decided to go to the east that she sent under the care of her mother-in-law her two year old child in the hope that in three months she would join her husband, child, and her husband's family. She never did so. Two months after the departure of the Krushelnytsky family for Ukraine, news reached Lviv by radio Kiev that the writer Antin Krushelnytsky and his two sons, Ivan and Taras, had been arrested in Kiev. In December, the press of Kiev and Moscow and the *Moscow Daily News*, an English-language paper published in Moscow, announced the shooting of Ivan Antonovych Krushelnytsky and

MOSCOW DAILY NEWS December 18, 1934.

Direct suggestion of the... eral manager of Ringling Brothers. [] from the embankment, states the agency.

SENTENCES OF THE MILITARY COLLEGIUM OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE USSR PRONOUNCED IN KIEV AGAINST WHITEGUARD TERRORISTS

On Dec. 13-15 of this year the traveling session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, presided over by V. V. Ulrich, with N. M. Rychkov and A. D. Goryachev as members of the Collegium, heard in the city of Kiev the cases of 1) A. V. Krushelnitski, 2) Y. A. Bachinski, 3) I. A. Krushelnitski, 4) T. A. Krushelnitski, 5) R. P. Skazinski, 6) M. M. Lebedinets, 7) R. I. Shevchenko, 8) A. Y. Karabut, 9) P. J. Sidorov, 10) V. A. Misik, 11) V. I. Levitski, 12) A. I. Skripa-Kozlovskaya, 13) G. M. Kosynka-Strelets, 14) D. N. Falkovski, 15) M. G. Oksamit, 16) A. G. Shecherbin, 17) I. P. Tereshchenko, 18) K. S. Burevoi, 19) L. B. Kovalev, 20) P. F. Gelmer-Didushok, 21) A. F. Vlyzko, 22) A. I. Finitiski, 23) Y. K. Dmitriev, 24) A. A. Bogdanovich, 25) P. I. Butuzov, 26) I. M. Butuzov, 27) V. V. Piatnitsa, 28) Y. P. Blacbenko, 29) I. K. Stupin, 30) D. J. Polevoi, 31) I. O. Khoptyar, 32) P. N. Boretski, 33) L. I. Lukyanov, 34) G. N. Protzenko, 35) K. I. Pivnenko, 36) S. Y. Matyash, 37) A. K. Lyashenko, charged with preparing terrorist acts against workers of the Soviet power.

The trial revealed that the majority of the accused had arrived in the USSR through Poland and some through Rumania with the object of committing a series of terrorist acts on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.

At the time of their arrest the majority of the accused were found to be in possession of revolvers and hand grenades.

Guided by the decree of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of Dec. 1 of this year and by articles 54-8 and 54-11 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR, the traveling session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR

SENTENCED:

- 1. Roman Fedorovich SKAZINSKI
2. Ivan Antonovich KRUSHELNITSKI
3. Taras Antonovich KRUSHELNITSKI
4. Mikhail Moiseyevich LEBEDINETS
5. Roman Ilyich SHEVCHENKO
6. Anatoli Yuryevich KARABUT
7. Petr Josefovich SIDOROV
8. Grigori Mikhailovich KOSYNKA-STRELETS
9. Dmitri Nikanorovich FALKOVSKI
10. Mikhail Gavrilovich OKSAMIT
11. Alexander Gavrilovich SHECHERBIN
12. Ivan Petrovich TERESHCHENKO
13. Konstantin Stepanovich BUREVOI
14. Alexei Fedorovich VLYZKO
15. Yevgeni Kuzmich DMITRIEV
16. Adam Adamovich BOGDANOVICH
17. Porfiri Ivanovich BUTUZOV
18. Ivan Moiseyevich BUTYZOV
19. Vladimir Vasilevich PYATNITSA
20. Yakov Pavlovich BLACHENKO
21. Dominik Josefovich POLEVOI
22. Ivan Onufrovich KHOPTYAR
23. Petr Nikolayevich BORETSKI
24. Leonid Ivanovich LUKYANOV
25. Konstantin Ivanovich PIVNENKO
26. Gavriil Nikitich PROTSENKO
27. Sergei Yakovlevich MATYASH
28. Alexander Korneyevich LYASHCHENKO

TO BE SHOT

Their property to be confiscated. THE SENTENCES HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT

The cases of Anton Vladislavovich Krushelnitski, Yulian Alexandrovich Bachinski, Vasili Alexandrovich Misik, Vasili Ivanovich Levitski, Anna Ivanovna Skripa-Kozlovskaya, Lesko Borisovich Kovalev, Petr Fedorovich Gelmer Didushok, Alexander Ivanovich Finitiski and Herbert Karlovich Stupin have been returned by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, owing to new evidence, for further investigation

Московские газеты «Советская Россия», «Московские Ведомости», «Красная Звезда», «Известия», «Правда», «Трудовые Известия», «Коммунист», «Красная Голландия», «Красная Италия», «Красная Франция», «Красная Англия», «Красная Япония», «Красная Австралия», «Красная Африка», «Красная Азия», «Красная Америка», «Красная Европа», «Красная Азия», «Красная Африка», «Красная Америка», «Красная Европа».

Official pronouncement of the death sentence imposed on 28 Ukrainian writers and journalists in the "Moscow Daily News," Dec. 18, 1934.

Taras Antonovych Krushelnytsky. A Special Military Tribunal sent from Moscow had postponed the case of the father, Antin Krushelnytsky. The half-crazed father later perished in a concentration camp. His wife, seeing the tragedy caused by her husband, became insane. The two-year-old child of the executed Ivan Krushelnytsky was kept in the Soviet Union as a hostage, for the wife of Ivan remained in Lviv. The spiritual tragedy of the mother can be well imagined. It was only through the intervention of the wife of the already deceased Josef Pilsudski, who made use of her old acquaintance with one of the Communists of Polish birth, that after long negotiations the wife of Ivan Krushelnytsky received her child back.

Antin Krushelnytsky was not alone in the prisoner's bench when he appeared before the Military Tribunal. With him at the same time was the former leader of the Western Ukrainian Social Democrats, — Julian Bachynsky, a former ambassador of the Ukrainian National Republic in Washington and the author of the works *Ukraine Irredenta* and the *Ukrainian Emigration in the USA*. The former ambassador of democratic Ukraine in Washington seeing the unfavorable attitude of America toward the liberation of Ukraine, had lost faith in the Western democratic world and had gone some time previously to Soviet Ukraine. With these two was Petro Didushok, a former officer of the Ukrainian Republican Army, also of Western Ukrainian origin. The two old writers and the Ukrainian army officer were only part of those facing the Military Tribunal. They were with many friends. The group included 34 Ukrainians of the younger generation, born in both Eastern and Western Ukraine, poets and writers. Of the 37 accused, the Moscow Tribunal condemned 28 to death and they were shot by a Soviet firing squad. Among these was the sweet poet of Western Ukraine, Roman Skazynsky, a mild and kindly soul, and such great poets and writers of Ukraine as Hryhoriy Kosynka, Kost Bureviy, Oleksa Vlyzko and more than a dozen other prominent figures in Ukrainian literature. The verdict of the Moscow Tribunal in Kiev on December 15, 1934 in fact doomed to death the entire Ukrainian literary talent which preserved the Ukrainian national spirit and the dignity of the individual man.

From that time until the present day, 20 years later, there has been conducted a systematic attack upon the spirit of the Ukrainian people, upon the spirit of Free Ukraine, and an attempted liquidation of the entire Ukrainian culture. There could not exist after 1934 within the borders of Soviet Ukraine any truthful Ukrainian historical writing, even if it was partial to Communism, if it was not in the service of the Russian Imperial idea and did not drag into the mire all those Ukrainian heroes who had fought for the liberating of Ukraine from the domi-

nation of Moscow. Ukrainian history was now ordered to prove the thesis of the benevolent results of the rule of Moscow over Ukraine and the services of the "older Russian brother" to Ukraine.

After 1934 no Ukrainian literature could exist, if it stood for the independence of the Ukrainian spirit, and its traditional union with Western Europe; every history of the so-called Ukrainian literature had to deny all facts and speak of its dependence upon the influences received from Russian literature and the favorable results exerted upon Ukrainian literature by the literature of the "older brother," Russian literature.

After 1934 no Ukrainian art, painting, sculpture, theatre or film production could exist, if it did not reflect the assumed influences and essential similarities with Russian art, even when it was almost entirely contradictory to the best known facts and studies of art authorities. After 1934 the demand was not made in Ukraine that Ukrainian culture should be "national in form and socialist in content," according to the Communist doctrine of the Soviet Union. Ukrainian culture had to be "Ukraino-russified in form and Russian-imperial in content."

It is well known that Moscow has laid and is still laying great stress upon its struggle against the spirit of free Ukraine, which is so basically different from the spirit of the Russian people. Even now, when under the unconquerable force of the dynamics of Ukrainian patriotism the so-called "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism," it has made certain concessions to Ukrainian statehood (the membership of Ukraine in the United Nations, a special Ukrainian flag and a special Ukrainian national anthem), it is relentless in its drive to destroy Ukrainian culture.

On the occasion of the celebration of the three hundredth anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav, the Central Committee of the Communist Party issued its well known theses, which have become a dogma in Soviet reality, from which no scholar, writer or journalist dares to depart. These theses definitely falsify Ukrainian history, trace the origin of the Ukrainian people to the 14th and 15th centuries and steal the oldest period of Ukrainian history — the period of Kievan Rus' for the then non-existing Russian people. The Pereyaslav Theses of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR likewise smear all those who fought for the liberation of Ukraine, and deny the independence of Ukrainian literature, and emphasize the close relationship of the spirit of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, when the opposite is true. The spirit of Ukraine is the descendant of the free spirit of the Black Sea Hellas, the free spirit of the democratic Kievan Rus', the free spirit of the Kozak Order, while the spirit of the Russian people is the descendant of the spirit of the Suzdal Prince Andri Bogolyubsky and the founders

of the wide Eurasian Moscovite Empire, the spirit of the Moscow tsar Vasily III Ivanovich, the spirit of tsar Ivan the Terrible, of Peter I, and Nicholas I, the spirit of Lenin and Stalin. What relationship and similarity is there between these two spirits?

So it is not strange that even at a time when the Moscow Communist ruling class has been compelled to make concessions to Ukraine in the political field, it has not let up in its attack on the culture of the Ukrainian people. The russification of Ukraine, even after the release of the Moscow Governor-General to Ukraine L. Melnikov, continued further.

The school statistics of Ukraine for 1954 show that at the present time in the UkSSR, i.e. the political state of the Ukrainian people (1954), only 36.8% of the higher schools of Ukraine demand from candidates in the entrance examinations a knowledge of the Ukrainian language and literature, along with a knowledge of the Russian language and literature; 26.4% demand the Ukrainian language without literature but with a knowledge of the Russian language and literature; and 36.8% do not demand either the Ukrainian language or literature. In the entrance examinations to the middle schools, the so-called technicums, only 55.5% demand a knowledge of the Ukrainian language and literature along with the same knowledge of the Russian language and literature; 6.8% demand a knowledge of the Russian language and literature and only a knowledge of the Ukrainian language; and 37.7% in the Ukrainian Republic (!) demand neither the Ukrainian language nor literature but insist upon a knowledge of the Russian. (*Vpered*, No. 10, October, 1954).

Why is this? The Russian Communist gang in the Kremlin realizes well the danger and the dynamics of the power of the Ukrainian spirit. After 1930 — 220 Ukrainian writers were imprisoned and perished; among them 17 were shot down.

It has allowed the printing of quite a number of Ukrainian books, as is announced by the Third Congress of the Soviet Writers of Ukraine held in Kiev in October, 1954. Moscow has granted these writers a good living but as is declared again by the speeches at this same Third Congress of the Soviet Writers of Ukraine, the most dangerous enemy of Ukrainian literature is that same Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism and the spiritual union with the West. "Ukrainian literature" according to the President of that Congress, Oleksander Korniychuk, "has grown up and matured in the struggle against the bourgeois influences of a decadent cosmopolitanism and that most savage foe of the Ukrainian people — bourgeois nationalism," i.e. in the struggle against the Western European and American influences and against the Ukrainian independent patriotism, in the semantics of the Western world. But the spirit of Free Ukraine is still undying.

THE CASE OF THE "28"

By SVIATOSLAV HORDYNSKY

December 1934 brought to all parts of the Soviet Union an increase of terror. On December 1, Sergey Kirov, the Secretary of the Communist Party and member of the Politburo, was assassinated by Leonid Nikolayev, possibly at the order of Stalin himself, for he was regarded as Stalin's rival in the ruling of the Soviet empire. This was a purely Russian internal affair, but the Central Committee utilized this occasion to introduce important changes in the Soviet laws, which applied also to Ukraine. The most important changes were:

1. Investigations of terrorist organizations must be terminated in no more than 10 days.
2. Indictments must be handed to the accused one day before the court's session.
3. The case must be conducted in the absence of the accused.
4. No cassation of sentence or petition for mercy is admissible.
5. The death sentence shall be carried out immediately after the court's decision.

The first executions in Leningrad and Moscow started on December 6. Among those shot were also Ukrainians: On December 8, a White Ruthenian "terrorist organization" was exposed and most of its members shot. On December 18 the Moscow "Pravda" printed on its second page the following confused information after TASS:

Sentences of the Military Tribunal of the Supreme Court of the USSR in Kiev concerning the terrorists-white-guardists.

On December 13-15 the Traveling Session of the Military Tribunal of the Supreme Court of the USSR under the chairmanship of Comrade Ulrich V. V., and the members of the Tribunal Comrades Rychkov N. M. and Goryachev A. D. examined in Kiev the cases of (the names follow), accused of the organization and preparation of terrorist acts against the officials of the Soviet regime.

The court proved that the majority of the accused came to the USSR through Poland, some through Roumania, in order to prepare terrorist acts on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.

Most of the accused were found in possession of firearms and hand-grenades.

According to the decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the USSR of December 1, and articles 54-8 and 54-11 of the

Penal Code of the USSR, the Traveling Session of the Military Tribunal of the Supreme Court of the USSR

sentenced:

1. Skazynsky Roman, 2. Krushelnytsky Ivan, 3. Krushelnytsky Taras, 4. Lebedynets Michael, 5. Shevchenko Roman, 6. Karabut Anatol, 7. Sydorov Peter, 8. Kosynka-Strilets Hryhory, 9. Falkivsky Dmytro, 10. Oksamyt Michael, 11. Shcherbyna Alexander, 12. Tereshchenko Ivan, 13. Bureviy Kost, 14. Vlyzko Oleksa, 15. Dmytriv Eugene, 16. Bohdanovych Adam, 17. Butuzov Porfir, 18. Butuzov Ivan, 19. Pyatnytsya Volodymyr, 20. Blonchenko Yakiv, 21. Polevy Dominik, 22. Khoptar Ivan, 23. Boretsky Peter, 24. Lukiyany Leonid, 25. Pivnenko Konstantyn, 26. Prochenko Gabriel, 27. Matiyash Serhiy, 28. Lashko Alexander
to be executed by the firing squad.

The property of all is to be confiscated. The sentences have been already carried out.

The Military Tribunal decided to refer for further investigation the cases of: Krushelnytsky Antin, Bachinsky Julian, Misik Vasili, Levitski Vasili, Skripa-Kozlovska Anna, Kovalev Lev, Helmar-Didushok Peter, Finitsky Alexander, Stupin Herbert.

All these victims belonged to the Ukrainian intellectual circles. Among them were several writers of the younger generation, whose liquidation was a great loss to Ukrainian literature. In order to understand just why these persons were liquidated, it is necessary to go back several years and consider the preceding events that formed a part of the mortal struggle between Ukraine and Moscow.

2.

The most important fact was that after a long fight for independence, Ukraine became an occupied country. The Russians were well aware of this and made no secret of it. Lenin in 1919 wrote (*Works*, vol. 24, p. 257) that "now, when we occupied Ukraine... we have sources of grain and provisions, we have now the possibility of obtaining fuel from the Donets Basin..." And Stalin, writing about the "civil war" outlined the fact that "already at the start of the October Revolution the geographic frontiers between revolution and counter-revolution were fixed. Russia... with its national homogeneous population, became the base of the revolution. The borderland, especially the southern, peopled by the Kozaks, Tatars, Bashkirs, Kirghiz — in the East, and the Ukrainians, Chechens, Ingush and others in the South — became the base of the counter-revolution. (Stalin's article in the *Revolutionary Front*, No. 1.) Thus he strove to justify the occupation of these countries by the Russians — the bearers of communist enlightenment into the anti-communist lands.¹

¹ This Russian passion to enlighten other peoples is an old one. F. I. Tyutchev, eminent Russian poet of the Pushkin epoch, wrote in 1831 a poem to justify the

After the military conquest of Ukraine by the Soviet Russians the shooting war changed into a cold war on the cultural front, which at the moment was the most important. In 1924, Mykola Khvylovy, a party member, called for an independent development of Ukrainian culture in free competition with the Russian, and in consequence coined the slogan "Away from Moscow." He recommended the orientation of the Ukrainian culture toward Western Europe with its cult of individuality and the "searching spirit of Faust." Stalin himself rose against this "Faustian Europe," and sharply reprimanded Khvylovy for such heresies. But the ideas which Khvylovy expressed in his masterful pamphlets caused a great uproar among the Ukrainian intellectuals, and this movement known under the name of the "Literary Discussion" became a historic event. What is more, this event proved that there were basic differences between the Russian and Ukrainian communists. In the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Ukrainians held numerically the third place after Russians and Jews — this is why there never existed in Ukraine such a thing as the Ukrainian Communist Party — only the "Communist Party of Ukraine." But even that limited number of Ukrainian communists raised hopes in Moscow for the ultimate solving of the acute national problem of Ukraine. Now the most talented and influential among them proved to be disloyal to Moscow.

Nor was Khvylovy alone; similar ideas were expressed by M. Shumsky, the Commissar of Education in 1924, and by the Academician M. Volobuyev, an economist, who in his famous article "On the Problem of Ukrainian Economy," printed in the Party organ *The Bolshevik of Ukraine* in 1928, clearly demonstrated the colonial exploitation of Ukraine by Russia. Another Ukrainian minister, Mykola Skrypnyk, one of the rare Ukrainian communists of the old guard and a friend of Lenin, tried to emancipate this Soviet Russia colony by means available and still legal at the time. He managed to develop Ukrainian schools and press on the Ukrainian ethnographic territories within the boundaries of the Russian SSR, and as the Minister of Education was regarded by the Ukrainians as the promotor of science, art and literature. But both Khvylovy and Skrypnyk were broken by the force of the evergrowing Soviet Russian imperialism, and both ended by suicide in 1934.

Russian massacre of the Poles in the newly conquered Warsaw. There we read: "We will buy by this bloody price Russia's integrity and peace. . . The sternness of this salutary example has the one aim to preserve the unity of the state. We wanted to unite the related race under the Russian banner and to lead it to the great deeds of enlightenment. . ." This poem was recently re-printed in New York by the East European Fund. . .

The Russian grip on Ukraine became tighter toward the end of the twenties. Till that time Moscow had not dared to engage in an all out assault on the Ukrainian national culture. But now the Soviet Russians temporarily gave up the idea of world revolution, and instead turned all their resources toward the "building of socialism in one country," which meant the internal unification of the new Russian empire, now called the USSR. The greatest obstacles to this end were the national movements of the freedom-loving peoples, especially the largest of them — the Ukrainians.

Stalin's new drive was ushered in by big political trials, such as that of the Alliance for the Liberation of Ukraine (SVU in 1929) composed mostly of the elite of the older generation of Ukrainian intellectuals. The aim of such trials was to show that the Ukrainian intellectual circles were traitors and enemies of the Ukrainian working class. On the other hand, the intensified collectivisation in 1929 had the aim of weakening the Ukrainian peasant class — the arch-enemy of the Soviet Russian regime in Ukraine. The result of this drive was the great famine of 1932-33 with its millions of victims.

Simultaneously the Soviet Russian regime did everything to harness the intellectual forces in Ukraine to serve its own ends. The tone of the literary magazines became one of constant abuse and persecution of the authors suspected of disloyalty to the regime, and especially the literary criticism became nothing more than denunciation. This was the period of Pavel Postyshev, the Soviet Russian ruler of Ukraine, who publicly declared that "the Ukrainian writers speak of literature, but think of tommyguns." One by one the better known names in art and literature disappeared, their works were removed from the bookstores and libraries, and the pages with their writings were torn out from magazines, reviews, and collective volumes of literary works. At the same time all Soviet publications began to overflow with praises of the "great Soviet humanism. . ."

The liquidation of the 28 was but one of the links in this chain of events which aimed to weaken and break the independent Ukrainian culture by the physical liquidation of its creators. This event is unusual only because the sentences and executions were made public, and that among the victims were four West Ukrainians, who had only recently come to the East in order to work in the cultural field. Their crime was that they had come to Soviet Ukraine with the outmoded conception of the early twenties and become disillusioned when they saw that even true Ukrainian communists had no place in the Soviet system and were driven to suicide.

3.

Except for the news that was printed in the report of the trial we know nothing more about the case. We particularly do not know how much truth there was in the accusation that the sentenced were members of a terrorist group, which had as its aim the assassination of Soviet functionaries, and that they were found in possession of arms. The one certain fact is that among the liquidated were persons not convenient to the Russian occupational regime in Ukraine. The three Russians who comprised the Tribunal of the Supreme Court were furnished a perfect opportunity to get rid of a group of Ukrainian intellectuals who were exponents of a certain complex of thoughts and ideas hostile to the Soviet Russian regime. It will suffice to take a closer look at the activities of some of the accused to prove the above statement.

For example OLEKSA VLYZKO, 26 when executed, was already a recognized poet of the younger generation. He introduced into Ukrainian poetry new rhythms and new poetic images, fresh, powerful and elementary, which caused certain of his critics to exclaim with enthusiasm: "Vlyzko — Schiller! Vlyzko — Pushkin!" Strange as it may seem, this promising young man was both deaf and dumb, and we are tempted to see in his poetical world of vivid intonations, and the new and unforgettable images and unexpected rhymes which he created, a spiritual compensation for his physical handicaps. He wrote beautiful lyrics and is also regarded as the best Ukrainian poet of the sea. He introduced into Ukrainian poetry, previously concerned to that time mostly with peasant motifs,


the dynamic atmosphere of the Black Sea ports, especially Odesa, and in his neo-Romantic style with frequent excursions into futurism he appeared as an entirely new psychological type of the young Ukrainian generation with a broad and refreshingly sound outlook on life. Sometime in 1929 he wrote a poem entitled "Ballad about the Shortsighted Eldorado." Here a Spanish *hidalgo* assembles a group of men and promises to lead them to Eldorado. After many hardships they finally reach a plantation, and here the *hidalgo* stops them with the words: "Stop!



Dr. Bruzko

Oleksa Vlyzko,
poet — executed.

"This is your Eldorado! Each of you is a slave! He who tries to escape will be killed!" The censor passed this poem, and it was some time before the Soviets realized its allusion to the newly introduced collectivization. The collective farms, in reality state plantations with forced labor, could be compared with no great strain on the imagination to the *hidalgo's* Eldorado. This poem was written in the so-called Aesopian style which is particularly well understood by the Ukrainian reader. But such a thing written by an author who stood very close to the Komsomol, — was a major crime.



Kost Bureviy,
poet and novelist of the Ukrainian
Revolution — executed.

Another writer among the executed, perhaps the most mature politically, was KOST BUREVIY. During the Tsarist regime he was imprisoned and exiled three times. Once he managed to escape even from the Yenisey region in Siberia. During the revolution he became a member of the Central Committee of the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, and was one of the organizers of the Volga Uprising, one of the rare rebellions that the Russians staged against the Bolshevik regime. Later he settled in Moscow, where he wrote on literature, painting and the theater. He organized a Ukrainian theater in Moscow and collaborated with Les' Kurbas and his well known theater in Kharkiv — the *Berezil*. He was a con-

tributor to the "*Literary Bazaar*," the leading Ukrainian literary magazine edited by Khvylovy.

He was well known also under another name — Eduard Strikha. In Kharkiv, the futurist M. Semenko edited a literary magazine "The New Generation," where he attempted to unite futurism with communism (this did not help him with the Soviet authorities and he was liquidated). Under the pseudonym Eduard Strikha (Thatch) Bureviy sent Semenko his "parodeses" — poems written in ultra-modernist style, deriding everything, including the "modern" proletarian style. The unsuspecting Semenko accepted and published these poems, hailing Strikha as the representative of a fine European school, which creates masterpieces.

Later this mystification was disclosed and Bureviiy was compelled to make a public confession. He did this in an original way by writing a critical article directed against himself. It was printed in the official party organ *Criticism* under the title "Self-execution." But his mockery of the proletarian style could never be forgotten. His writings which could not have been printed under the Soviets were preserved by his family and are now in the USA.

GREGOR KOSYNKA was a literary representative of that Ukrainian peasant class, which was the active force of the Ukrainian national movement. In his impressionistic short stories he treated the revolutionary movements of the Ukrainian village, the peasant insurgents, who stood firmly against all foreign occupants as the elementary force which was the mortal and organic enemy of the Bolshevik regime (See picture on the cover). His counterpart was the poet — DMYTRO FALKIVSKY, the son of a brickmaker. He fought in the Soviet Army, but soon became disillusioned, and made no secret of this disillusionment in his pessimistic poems. For this he was often attacked by the communist critics, and daubed as "one who stood on the other side of the epoch."



Dmytro Falkivsky,
poet of Ukrainian workers — executed.

The case of IVAN KRUSHELNYTSKY may be considered as instructive. A West Ukrainian, he was educated in Vienna. He was acquainted with the noted Austrian poet, Hugo von Hofmannsthal, whose works he translated into Ukrainian and under whose influence he wrote rather sentimental poems. Later Krushelnytsky returned to Lviv, then under Poland, and contributed to the literary magazine *New Ways* edited by his father Anthony. This magazine was often regarded as pro-Soviet, although there were no communists on its staff. The true communist press ridiculed it. The fact was that the Krushelnytskys were misled by the cultural achievements in the Soviet Ukraine which the Ukrainian national forces had managed to attain in the twenties. Their tragic mistake lay in the fact that these forces had been already exposed and were in the stage of complete liquidation, but in spite of that they still hoped that some

kind of Ukrainian cultural activity would be possible. With this illusion the entire Krushelnytsky family arrived in East Ukraine in 1934, only to be caught up and carried along with the wave of general liquidation. Ivan and his brother Taras were executed, their father Anthony and their sister were exiled to the Solovki Islands near the Arctic Circle, where they soon perished. It is difficult to believe that the Krushelnytskys belonged to a terrorist group and possessed firearms and hand-grenades — they were simply the type of those European intellectuals that had no place in the drab Soviet life, and were therefore troublesome to the regime.

**

At the close of the twenties, Kossior, the chairman of the Communist Party of Ukraine,² officially declared that "Ukrainian culture was developing with an elementary force, and there exists the danger that it will separate itself from the Communist Party." He termed "Khvylovism" an "organized foe of the Soviet regime, that should be destroyed." A new slogan was coined: "Bridle the Ukrainian element"; this could not be achieved without the liquidation of the independent minded Ukrainian intellectuals. The case of the 28 was only one of the many that literally annihilated an entire Ukrainian intellectual generation, with its most prominent talents in all cultural fields, leaving a void for the new "Soviet man" whom Moscow tried and is still desperately trying to develop.

² Kossior was of Polish origin. Only recently the first Ukrainian ever to occupy this position, M. Kirichenko, was elected as the chairman of the Communist Party of Ukraine.

HUMOR IN GEOGRAPHY

Those Russians of hungry Ukraine.

"Maxim Gorky, the Russian author, addressed an appeal to me and the American people for aid in the stupendous famine among Russian people in the Ukraine."

[H. HOOVER: *The Memoirs*, Vol. I, p. 23].

It seems that Ukrainians in Ukraine were well nourished...

UNITED EUROPE PUT IN ACTION

"The Ukrainians are very closely related to the neighboring peoples of Eastern Galicia, the Bucovina and Ruthenia . . .

The Ukrainian republic then continued as a Soviet republic under Russian influence until it joined the Union in 1924 as the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic."

[A. M. HYAMSON: *A dictionary of international affairs*,
Washington, 1947, p. 331].

THE MUSE IN PRISON

Translated and assembled by YAR SLAVUTYCH

The first six poems are by six outstanding Ukrainian poets destroyed by the Russian communists in translation from Ukrainian by Yar Slavutych. The neoclassicists M. Zerov, P. Fylypovych and M. Dray-Khmara were deported to the Russian concentration camps in the thirties and disappeared without a trace. The impressionist Y. Pluzhnyk died in a Solovky concentration camp in 1936, and the symbolist V. Svidzinsky was burned alive in 1941. O. Vlyzko, a neo-romanticist, was shot in 1934. These six poems are taken from the book *The Muse in Prison* (eleven sketches and twenty-two translations) by Yar Slavutych, author of a review *Modern Ukrainian Poetry*, Philadelphia, 1950. Yar Slavutych is a graduate student of the University of Pennsylvania. The seventh poem *Ninth Symphony* by O. Vlyzko was translated by Mira Hordynsky. (*Editor*).

TO KYIV (KIEV)

MYKOLA ZEROV (1890-193?)

Be welcome, dreaming by a golden dome
Upon blue hills! It's time a dream to meet.
A younger realm, not thou, thy kingdom's feat
Now claims as splendor of the ancient home.

Thy days of glory pass as if pale foam,
And copper bells weep loud as their peals meet,
Because a happy trice will not repeat,
While Ukraine's freedom lives in catacomb.

Stop here, strange wanderer! Upon the rock
Behold the sculpture of the church baroque,
The wonder white of Shedel's colonnades.

Life still abides upon this pensive mount
That spreads its mass of green, and like to blades
In the bright sun, the azure gleams around.

* * *

PAVLO FYLYPOVYCH (1891-193?)

The shadows trembled, and the clouds met evening.
I passed on horseback fields and house and light.
Into the fold the shepherd's herd was streaming,
But I refused to stay here for the night.

Where is my love and her vivacious singing?
For all my thoughts had something else in view:
A chilly ocean turbulently swinging
In grayish distance 'neath a boundless blue.

Then sorrow fell as my unwieldy mantle,
When I had stayed my horse upon the way.
No raven took Prometheus to dismantle.
The darksome night ate out the heart of day.

* * *

MYKHAYLO DRAY-KHMARA (1889-193?)

To view this night, to be with you,
refreshing cool and quiet fields,
and hear how earth beneath the dew
in its despair to anguish yields.

How dead all is! A fragile ice
untimely hides the heart's desire;
and like hot pearls from starry skies
fall down the Perseids' tears of fire.

* *
 *

YEVHEN PLUZHNYK (1898-1936)

Dreams from my heart have I torn:
Branches enfeeble the root.
'Tis not enough to be born —
Life must be well understood!

Possibly, poets are those
Who became gray in their youth.
Dreams, o my fancies of loss,
Dreams, o my visions of truth.

* *
 *

WOLODYMYR SVIDZINSKY (1885-1941)

I sent in flight my reedy arrow
With its well tarréd end.
It sang above the lofty bushes
And met the flowers' blend.

But there the brainless cattle grazéd,
One creature, lazy meat,
Did trample down my lovely arrow
With sharp and cloven feet.

Alas! How zealously I handled
The stalk beloved by light!
With what rejoicing to the sunbeams
I sped my singing flight!

O dusky tar! My righteous anger
Boils up with every spark.
Why did I dip this child of summer
In your base pot so dark?

SAILORS

OLEKSA VLYZKO (1908-1934)

Strongly steeled by the winds and hot weather,
 Sailing over the ocean and fear,
 We know never a gate or a tether,
 But the alien sphere.

We hurl hearts at the storm with sheer courage,
 We have spat in Beelzebub's face
 And compute by the miles and the tonnage
 Our perpetual race.

Our protection — the sharpened stiletto.
 And our likeness sea-flowering storms.
 All our hearts live in port near the meadow
 Where the anthracite swarms.

NINTH SYMPHONY

OLEKSA VLYZKO

(Translated by MIRA HORDYNSKA)

O give me fire! — Give superhuman love!
 Let eager blood boil in my youthful breast!
 I take you, O my thorny world, into
 My longing ardent arms!

A glowing bird,
 A flaming bird of fire, my heart flies through
 The worlds — it spreads its wings, gigantic, vast
 Humanity to cover. — Come, come all
 Into their shelter. — If no paradise
 The hell of young embraces you will find,
 All human, strong, consuming evil cruel
 To barren ash. — The brutal, vicious heart
 That bears its fangs, and drinks its brother's blood
 Will fall and will not rise, no, nevermore.
 No resurrection will there be for such,

And never will he rise who once will fall
Into the blazing, bottomless abyss,
The crater — fiery as a human heart.

O give me fire and superhuman flight!
A love — a wordless love, not uttered by
The lips of eunuchs — lips defiled of those
Who hide behind a mask, lest others see
The poisoned, fetid pit acrawl with maggots —
The filth preserved by generations vile
Of imbeciles, degenerates, and perverts.
Together with their haughty mansions grand,
And rotting sores beneath the cloth of gold! . .

O give me fire! — Give superhuman love!
Alive for living, for the corpses — dead.
A buoyant, burning, all-absorbing love.
A love enchanted for all living things,
To love at once the earth, the beast and man.
Live in the sun, and in the sun to breathe,
And with my sweat to fashion out bright joy
For sons, for grand sons out, for descendants far
Of days to come . . .

O give me fire and love!
Let eager blood boil in my youthful breast!

I take you, O my thorny world, into
My ardent arms! — I cradle you in flames.
With love I cover you. — Send forth your light,
To heal the weak and blind — to blind all those
Who lurk for ill in shadows! . .
O give me love. — Give fire!!!



CHANGES IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOVIET UKRAINIANS

By V. PSYCHOLOH

The lands in the Soviet Union and the peoples living on them are now in the fourth decade of an experiment which in its cruelty has no precedents in the history of humanity. This aims to create a "Communist" society and, along with this, a fundamental change in the human psychology by rooting out from its psychology individualism, and replacing it with collectivism.

The beautiful slogan of the Bolsheviki of "retraining the human personality" aims to root out from a man's psychology all individual aspirations and to subordinate his conduct and activity to the demands of the new Communist society.

In the interests of this new Moloch — Communist society — a son must kill his mother (the *Mother* of Khvylovy) and a mother dooms her one 5 year old child to death, because it is not better than the other children in the orphanage (Dasha in Gladkov's *Cement*).

These indications of the new morality in literature lead to the denunciation of parents by their children in Communist reality (Pavlyk Morozov) and to the murder of one's best friend to show one's devotion to the party. But these slogans and methods of building the new Communist society have not given the desired results, although the outcomes of these experiments have been carefully hidden from the eyes of the free world by the iron curtain.

THE PEASANT OPPOSITION TO COMMUNISM

After the fall of tsarism in 1917, the peoples of Russia made an effort to create a democratic system and the enslaved nations separated and formed their own independent states. The Communist Party had no chance to win by opposing this effort, for the population opposed both individual and collective tyranny. Knowing this the Bolshevik demagogues seized the factories and broke up the Russian Constituent Assembly.

The peoples of the old tsarist Russia, with a few exceptions were against the Communist ideas and were in fact hostile to them.

Only part of the workers, who were cosmopolitan in thought, sympathized with the Communists ("the proletariat has no country")

was then the Communist slogan) as did the propagandized army units believing in the promises of the Communists to secure a quick ending of the war. Before the Revolution of 1917, the Communist centres were chiefly factories and plants in the industrial centres of tsarist Russia, and during World War I, they were organized in the army. With the aid of these centres, the Communist Party controlled tsarist Russia as it now controls the whole world. The majority of the intelligentsia and the masses of the peasantry were very far from the Communist ideal and their intentions except for individual persons.

The strongest opposition to Communism was that of the peasantry of Ukraine, which had suffered national oppression in the Russian Empire as well as social oppression. This is explained by the fact that peasant society is one of those types which are guided in their conduct and political convictions and actions by tradition. It regards the voice of tradition as that of the generations which for centuries have formulated those traditions as a norm of conduct for the coming generations. Traditions have a deep influence on the content of the subconscious part of human psychology and this is the basis of man's everyday conduct. This part of a man's psychology changes very slowly and with great difficulty. Traditions have a deciding influence on the formation of the ideology of this society and this in its turn influences the conduct of a person and the organization of social life.

The ideology of the Ukrainian peasant under the pre-Communist slavery was the ideology of the land-holding individualist, for whom the ideas of collectivism were alien, incomprehensible and hostile. The Ukrainian peasants, as the majority of the peasants of Western Europe, were different from those of the Russian peasants who, even before the Revolution had become accustomed to a common (*obshchina*) land holding and so for them the ideas of collectivization were not so strange as for the Ukrainian peasants, whose ideal was the individual farm on which they could carry on their own work. The Communist government was faced with a very complicated task in liquidating the Ukrainian peasantry as a special group alien to Communism.

The forcible collectivization, deportations and famine (1932-3) which destroyed some 6 million people came. By these methods the Communist "workers' and peasants'" government killed the hostile individualism in the psychology of the Ukrainian peasants and forced on them state collectivism. As a result of these "Stalinist efforts" many villages in Ukraine were left without inhabitants and in many others the population was reduced 50-75%. A brilliant proof of this "rich and cultured" life (the party slogan of the day) was that in 1941, when it was time to put in school the children born in 1932-3, even in the

capital of Ukraine there were only 2-3 children in the first class (the yearly norm was 30-40) and the children of 4-5 grades had to be brought together to have a group of 10-15. The government often tried to make up for this lack of children in Ukraine by moving in peasants from Russia and in southern Ukraine, Uzbeks.

Those peasants who succeeded in remaining alive after the famine and the operations of the NKVD, apparently changed into apathetic robots who hid their hate for their oppressors and silently obeyed the orders of their Communist overseers.

Under the Communist pressure people learned to conceal their thoughts and became cautious in speaking. They developed a kind of conditioned reflex and some, who have reached the free world, have not been able to overcome this. The instinct of self-preservation was sharpened in an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion. The interest in collective farming has not taken hold but there has appeared an ostentatious interest in the government.

The peasants had also their so-called home gardens (about 0.5-1.2 acres) near their houses and they gave to this all their free time, and satisfied their agricultural inclinations and their individualism. This plot was the only source of existence for them and their families, for the collective farm had such high norms of delivering grain to the state in comparison with the harvests produced by the kolhosps. These plots caught the attention of the "all-seeing" eye of the Communist government and soon after the famine of 1933, the party resolved to cut the size of these home gardens. No garden could exceed one tenth of an acre. The "separated" parts of these gardens remained overgrown with weeds and the peasants under pain of punishment and exile had no right to use them. There were left some poor individual farms whose owners lived basically from the gardens around their houses. But the careful eye of the "father of peoples" looked into these dull corners. By another decree these individual farmers were moved into villages and given the worst plots and ruined huts.

It might seem that the Communist leaders had obtained their goal; millions of peasants were destroyed and the living turned into obedient proletarians.

Under these new "socialist" conditions the life of the peasants was terribly simplified and their standard of living very low. Permanent famine, abuse and terror on one hand, and the absence of religious influence on the other often ruined the moral basis of the village but not so much as in the cities. That was well shown by the first period of the German invasion when the village began to develop and flower, but this period did not last long. So we may assume that the psychology

of the peasants and their individual desires have not been basically altered, although under the conditions of Communist reality they have been hidden deeply under the muck of the new "socialist" ideology. If traditional conditions changed, there would come a restoration of the traditional individualistic psychology, although it would take a long time to cure the psychological traumas.

THE RESISTANCE OF THE UKRAINIAN INTELLIGENTSIA

The second social group which the Communists needed for building the state and the psychology of which had to be changed was the intelligentsia.

The intelligentsia as a mass did not have traditions by which it ruled its daily life as did the peasants. But many of the representatives of the intelligentsia had already cosmopolitan views which were the best soil for the implanting of Communism. Yet the larger part of the Ukrainian intelligentsia were also russified and were thus alienated from the national feelings of the Ukrainian people. But the intelligentsia could be critical of the demagogic promises of the Communist party. This critical attitude toward Communism was the reason why many of the representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia took a reserved position or became active fighters against Communism. Only isolated members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia became active fighters for Communism.

In the first years of their rule the Communists tolerated the intelligentsia of the pre-revolutionary period. They were, however, at the time hurriedly preparing their own new cadres and gave liberal access to the higher schools to workers and the poorer peasants. Later they abolished these privileges.

After preparing the new cadres, the Communist government began a purge of the old intelligentsia and removed from work those representatives of it which it did not wish and sent them later to concentration camps or shot them for sabotage, espionage or counter-revolution. In the national republics of the union as Ukraine, Byelorussia and Georgia, they destroyed the intelligentsia as "bourgeois nationalists." To ruin the solidarity of this intelligentsia, the leaders of the professional groups compelled their members to slander the repressed members of the same group. That is the way red professional groups hold their members!

By mass repressions in the intelligentsia they gradually spread *he psychosis of fear*. This division by fear and by suspicion divided society and the Communist leaders into two hostile camps. The open armed struggle with Communism which existed at the beginning of the

Revolution was replaced by a hidden political struggle, a social war between unequal forces; on the one side the Communist leaders with the state machinery and the modern weapons of the million man army of the ChK-GPU-NKVD-MVD and on the other the unarmed, many millions of the population with millions of secret collaborators of the ChK-GPU-NKVD-MVD in it (the so-called seksots). This struggle which had been going on for 36 years, has resulted in the loss of millions either shot, sent to concentration camps to die slowly or exiled to distant parts of the Union. Whole national republics and districts have disappeared. These tyrannical methods have taken from many their manhood, many have become from them psychological or physical invalids but a small part has remained for further struggle.

To locate these "hidden enemies" the Communist dictatorship runs the so-called purges and applies refined methods of investigation, using reports (denunciations) and various hints. The purges the Communists apply periodically during the entire period of their existence both on themselves and the recruits, their allies, the Communist states as Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, etc. The "revolutions" in the purges are equivalent to a death sentence for the victim, his family and close friends.

As a result of the internal economic policy of the Communist government there has been formed a society of a robber type, based upon the mass exploitation of the entire population by a small part of its political leaders. This type of society is of a very low social structure, very similar to the period of slavery in the history of civilization, and not the "highest form of society" as the official Soviet historiographers claim.

There has been developed in the land a general criminality which along with the threats to the existence of the individual is typical of the so-called "Communist" society. In this society people have become distrustful, moody and suspicious with a dual psychological life; one public aspect for the people, and another at home, by themselves or with close members of their family. In time they have learned to apply the tyranny to their own conditions. This adaptation to the conditions of the surroundings a characteristic sign of a living organism has given them the chance to remain alive and to protect the lives of their family. The Communist dictatorship has created in these people a type of conditioned reflexes which have been developed as a form of self-preservation; they control the action of the Soviet individual.

The impulses of humanity and heroism under these conditions of tyranny are stifled by the impulses of egoism, cruelty and cowardice. This has been shown in groups waiting for articles of prime necessity

as bread, textiles and clothes. Quarrels over these are common, and the physically stronger use their force very widely to throw out the old, the sick and the children. Often in such lines some are killed and people reach the shops over the dead bodies.

The standard of social life under such conditions has become very low. *The mass hunger*, which has become a permanent feature under Soviet conditions, and also the terror reduce the individual differences between people and the cultured individuals descend to the level of the uncultured mass. This could be seen in the bread lines during the famine in Ukraine, where the intelligent and unintelligent people stood in line: representatives of all classes were among those dead and starving to death. The starving were all deaf to the pleas of those condemned to die by famine and even children dying of hunger were left to the protection of the state. The cases of cannibalism which occurred during the famine speak of the growing savagery of the population.

The Communist dictators are trying to turn free independent people into obedient, unfree automata whom they group in artificial groups and collectives to control them better. In a group, an individual loses more rapidly his independence and self-control and gives vent to his instincts which reduce the intellectual level and the ethical criterion of the entire group. In the cities such groups have been formed in the places of work and the dwelling cooperatives. The leader of such a group is usually a Communist who has many secret informers among the members of the group. When we take into account the *residential conditions* of many persons in the cities of the Soviet Union, where one family has only one room with a common kitchen for 3-4 families, it is clear that the eye and ear of the NKVD reach into every apartment and every family.

It is not strange that in the first period of the creation of this Communist society, many workers and officials were released from work and expelled from professional unions because they expressed at home their anger at the unendurable conditions of existence. This *release automatically* brought with it loss of food cards and eviction from their dwellings, both equivalent to death by starvation. Often those released were imprisoned and their children were left orphaned and later filled the ranks of the criminal classes, for no one cared about their fate. Even when the released were not imprisoned, their lives became unendurable; their friends refused to meet them and if they met accidentally, they did not recognize them. Practically such a person was made an outlaw in the Communist paradise. Beside the hungry existence, these people were deprived of sleep, for each night they expected arrest. Such an existence created deep psychological traumas

which for some are incurable. The author experienced such a release in 1933 and his nightmares still follow him. The overcrowding of dwellings and the lack of underwear and soap favor the development of many parasites which spread epidemic diseases.

These social conditions undoubtedly have their influence on the psychology of the city dwellers who are in a state of oppression and psychological isolation, for mutual suspicion is everywhere. This psychological isolation and oppression cause psychoneuroses and suicides; although the Soviet press does not report suicides, the population learns of them in other ways. They became very common and so did insanity during the famine and the height of the repressions.

These methods of changing the human psychology have been applied to the adult section of the population who have assimilated them or if they proved unyielding have perished.

COMMUNISM AND THE UKRAINIAN YOUTH

Quite different methods have been applied to children and the young, for the ruling part of the Communist party is interested in getting the children to accept the Communist ideology. They understand that the impressions of childhood have a great influence on the formation of a person's psychology and as a result on his whole later life. Childhood impressions are the basis on which the future years of life are built, for the early childhood experiences remain always in the psychological areas and influence all the phases of the life of the individual. As we know, in their early years children accept the ideology of their parents who are their first authorities but later their authority is the school and teacher.

Going further, the Communist government tried at once to reprepare the teachers by compelling them first to learn the Communist creed in the form of dialectic materialism and the history of the Communist Party. While every family has its own ideology in accordance with their social status, the Soviet school and the teachers are the bearers of the state Communist ideology. Here has been the tragedy of many Soviet teachers, for whatever may have been their own ideologies, they must teach the children the Communist ideology or they face arrest and imprisonment.

Many teachers have taught their children religiously the spirit of comradeship and true heroism in aiding a person, when he is in a hard situation. These teachers have always gained authority over their students and then the students have accepted the Communist ideology as an official part of the teaching and their souls have been refreshed by

true humanism. Under the conditions of the hard Soviet reality the students had a wide use for these humane efforts.

Usually the ideology of the family and the school under Soviet conditions are diametrically opposed; in such cases there can be *conflict between parents and children*. Sometimes the children, under the influence of the Comsomol and Pioneer organizations and not aware of what they were doing, have denounced their parents and so become the cause of their ruin. The parents, therefore, under the conditions of the Communist dictatorship have to act very cautiously and in accordance with the Communist creed. When the school teaches children the Communist faith, the parents often have to discover the essence of this faith. Often life itself ruins the child's illusion formed under the influence of the school propaganda because of living a cold and hungry existence and that is cruel reality. This is especially true of the village children where the relation of the children and the parents in the constant struggle for a piece of bread is much greater than in the city.

In the villages the children start early for the struggle with life by helping their parents in the daily work and the securing of food; they pick up the ears of grain left in the field after the collection of the harvest, find the ploughed out potato in the ploughed fields in winter. They do this secretly so as not to harm their parents, for the collection of these scraps is forbidden by the government for they are socialist property, and imprisonment is the punishment for taking them. Arrests and exile of the families of their parents and neighbors very early show the children the true life and they early become cautious, self-contained and silent, much older than their years.

The Communist propaganda fills the entire system of Soviet education, beginning with the kindergartens and ending with the universities. It fills all textbooks. Let us take as an example, the *Grammar of the Russian Language* (*Grammar of the Russian Language*. Part I. Phonetics and Morphology, edited by Acad. L. V. Sherba. Uch. Pedgiz. Moscow, 1952) which is being imported into the USA for the training of Russian children born in America. Most of the examples are of a military nature. One will find here about bold airmen who bomb and destroy the enemy and despatchers who break up enemy trains. How many examples are there of frontier guards with their faithful dogs who catch capitalistic spies! It is not strange that the Soviet children from their earliest youth learn to see in everyone a spy and an enemy of the fatherland. From their earliest years Communist education teaches the children distrust and suspicion of every one. On the other hand, the school every day and hour tells the children of the wise, good and keen great "leaders,"

"fathers of the people," who worry over them and with love give them a happy childhood.

This propaganda is especially strong on such holidays as May first and November 7 (the anniversary of the Communist Revolution), when the children in the schools and especially in the kindergartens receive presents in the name of their leaders. The great demonstrations at these holidays, in which the children are compelled to take part, aim to give them confidence in the unbreakable power of the Communist government. This is particularly true of the city children for whom these days are real holidays, full of music and all kinds of carnival amusements. There can be no doubt that these holidays leave a proper impression on the children's minds. But the daily stern living teaches them something else. They are very often hungry and half naked (especially in the villages) and hear at home as a fairy tale stories of their grandmothers about the life which they do not know and which was before the Communist paradise.

In the city schools the children meet the children of the Communist aristocracy who are not limited in clothing, food or treats. This is the reason why in the children's souls there grow up feelings of injustice and images of the child's belief. So from their early years the children begin to live that double psychological life which is so typical of Communist society. This is the tragedy of the child's soul in the children of the Communist regime who grow up in an atmosphere of slander and terror; this tragedy leaves traumas in their psychology for their entire life. Many are broken in early childhood and this prevents their adaptation. Hunger, a bitter life in the over-crowded homes of the cities and terror ruin the moral bases of the children's souls and make them psychological cripples. The separation of the parents from the family because they must work 10-12 hours a day to get food, makes the city children fall under the influence of the street and the homeless children who draw them into criminal pursuits.

COMMUNISM AND MILITARY SERVICE

The organization where the formation of the Communist ideology is developed by still more radical methods than in the schools is the army, although military training is not confined to it.

In the lands of the Communist dictatorship training begins in the kindergartens and ends in the universities. Military training is compulsory for all and the Soviet state is a military camp, but without arms, for the state does not trust arms in the hands of its population. The soldiers in this state have greater privileges than the citizens. First, they

have the privilege of being served out of turn. When we remember that in the Communist-dominated lands the individual spends half of his time in lines, the value of this privilege is clear. Secondly, the army is clothed and shod and does not go barefoot till frost, as do the village youth. Thirdly, the army eats every day and several times a day and does not go hungry, as the rest of the population. All these factors make the youth, especially in the villages, look forward to military service.

The basic subject of military training is political literacy, by which the bases of the Lenin-Stalinist ideology are drilled into the heads of the young men. The army, an artificially organized group of people is united by the authority of the military command. The efforts of this are directed to turning the soldier into an automaton, which obeys without question the orders of the command. The prestige of the army commander paralyzes the capacity for a criticism of the orders and compels respect for the command. To keep the army in this condition, the Communist leaders choose and train carefully the officers' corps. Almost all the officers of the former tsarist army who organized the Red Army were later shot for "conspiracy" against the government or discharged from the army. The new officers' corps has been selected mainly from the working class which is more devoted to the government and from similarly trained peasant youth. This officers' corps has been placed by the government in an especially privileged position; they live, compared with the rest of the people, in better houses, receive good pay and good living and feel themselves the ruling class. The entire army is on the whole isolated from the population in special army cities. No one receives leave during army service and letter writing can not replace a living contact with the family and other people, for, the strict censorship makes the letters full of patriotic spirit and complete solidarity with the government. The man called to the army for two or three years is exposed only to Communist influence, and remembering that this is at the age of 18-19, we can see that his stay in the army under the best conditions can influence his psychology. Besides, the institution of the political worker and the collaborators of the NKVD-MVD sees to the purity of the ideology of the officers and soldiers. The mere shadow of suspicion of disloyalty leads to discharge or punishment. This takes place very rapidly without fanfare. The cases are mentioned only in special circumstances where it will help the government. These methods of training cause the soldiers of the Soviet army to lose their individuality and to accept the Marxist ideology at least externally.

But although modern propaganda stifles the psychology of the soldier, it cannot change it basically, for the processes of psychological

change are slow and its chief factor — the subconscious — the basis of the psychological life; the part formed by preceding generations and often during the “happy” childhood, remains unchanged. This subconscious part of the psychology contains elements of desire for freedom and independence which urge a revolt against Communist tyranny. So, all that the soldier acquires during his army training, is quickly shattered against the living reality which he meets when he leaves the army. This was well shown in World War II when millions of Red soldiers refused to fight for the Communist dictatorship and surrendered or deserted.

Let us mention the facts of the refusal of the Red soldiers to fire on the strikers of East Germany; let us mention the 20,000 deserters, who fled west from the Red Army between 1945 and 1948. This is a form of protest against Communist tyranny and an aspiration for freedom. Had it not been for the cruelty and stupidity of the Nazis, even the brotherly help of the allies would not have saved Stalin and the Communist leaders from the people’s wrath.

CONCLUSION

During the entire period of its political control, the Communist Party has been trying to change the psychology of the population, to root out all its individualistic bents and to imprint in their place collectivistic principles. With this purpose they have changed the external surroundings by socializing the material means of daily living, all houses, food products, factories and plants have become the property of the state.

But the bitterness of daily life because of the inability of the Communist government to give a sufficient quantity of articles for daily living, causes the development of “underground” private capital in the form of private trade, often of a speculative character (black markets) which despite the repressions, the state cannot liquidate.

The despotic methods of the government cause a protest of the population, which constantly puts forth popular heroes who try to overthrow the despotic government (UPA, ROA).

The unjust laws, in many cases, the total absence of laws and the replacing of them with the autocratic whims of the Communist leaders have a negative effect upon the moral bases of Communist society and degrade the Soviet institutions. The Communist dictatorship has only in part succeeded in changing the conscious part of human psychology and has created a series of Soviet conditioned reflexes. The subconscious part of the psychology, the instinctive impulses, which are the bases of the daily life of a person, have remained unchanged.

RUSSIFICATION OF THE SOVIET EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

By JOSEPH S. ROUCEK
University of Bridgeport

THE YOKE OF RUSSIANIZATION. The non-Russian peoples in the Soviet Union are now being subjected to the most intensive Russification campaign in Soviet history.¹

The campaign is being pressed on three fronts: (1) in the schools, (2) in literature and (3) in the re-writing of the history of these peoples. While still preserving the external formula of cultural autonomy for each major group, the present drive seeks to make certain that the Russian language and culture will obtain an ever-stronger hold on these peoples. In addition, every historical source that might give rise to separatist or nationalist aspirations is being fought vigorously.

NON-RUSSIAN SCHOOLS IN TSARIST RUSSIA. The Tsarist Empire was composed of many independent national units, united under the Tsar. The Emperor was officially King of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, Grand Duke of Courland, King of Georgia, Khan of Tartary, etc. — a formula which clearly showed the composite character of the Empire. The whole system maintained by the central and local authorities was in Russia. The Tsarist system treated two other East-Slav nations — Ukrainians and White Ruthenians — only as branches of the Russian nation; they were culturally oppressed and not allowed to found public or private schools using their own language. Only non-Slav nations with some limitations were free to use their languages and even establish private schools in their mother tongue. Russian was the official language throughout the Empire.

After the 1905 Revolution, the non-Russian nationals demanded schools in their native languages, but the government refused to make any important concessions.

¹ The "Russification" process in the satellite nations is treated only incidentally in this article. For some information on this type of imperialistic policy, see: Michael Padev, "The Great Liquidation: Satellite Culture," *New York Times Magazine*, February 10, 1952, pp. 7ff.; Hugh Seton-Watson, "Eastern Europe since Stalin," *Problems of Communism*, III, 2 (March-April, 1954), 10-17; Joseph S. Roucek, "Recent University Trends in Sovietized Poland," *College and University*, XXIX, 1 (October, 1953), pp. 53-64.

SOVIET NATIONALITY POLICY

The Soviet government issued a declaration of rights of nationalities, on November 3, 1917, and proclaimed the equality of all races, creeds and languages. The Third Congress of Soviets declared in January 1918 that "the Russian Soviet Republic is instituted on the basis of a free union of free nations as federation of Soviet national Republics." One by one independent Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaidzhan, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became members of the USSR; some territories were given the full status of a Union Republic. In all the 16 Union Republics, the national language of the people began to be used as the official medium in governmental offices and in instruction. Only in 1930 the Russian language was made compulsory as a school subject throughout the Union.

On April 27, 1927, the Moscow Commissariat of Public Instruction issued the guiding principles of national education. All tribal and national groups were divided into 4 categories: (1) the small and dispersed tribes which had no alphabets and no national cultures. The Russian Academy of Sciences appointed special Commissions to study their languages, to create alphabets and grammars and to write textbooks until that task was completed, these groups were taught through the medium of Russian. (2) Those small nationalities, also without an alphabet and national culture, but which lived in compact communities and used their native language in their daily life, used their mother tongue in the primary schools but were to use Russian in secondary and higher institutions. (3) The larger nationalities or communities of foreign nations with their own alphabets and intelligentsia, had their own primary and secondary schools, including technical schools; but for higher education they were to attend Russian or other Union Republic Universities. Special chairs of their languages were established in the adjacent Universities. (4) The large nationalities which inhabited compact territories and had their own culture and historical tradition. In the first decade of Soviet regime, these nations had the right to employ their own languages in all schools and offices.

Especially great changes have been noticeable in the predominantly Moslem Republics of Azerbaidzhan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirghizstan and Kazakhstan, and in the Tatar Autonomous Republics within the Russian S.F.S. Republic. The Moslems of the Russian Empire numbering about 30 million, used the Arabic script in their maktabas and medresses before the Revolution; but the script was not well adapted to the Turkish-Tatar language, which was agglutinative in structure and used vowels in a different way from Arabic. In 1922 the government started a movement for the adoption of a modified Latin alphabet

for all Turkish languages; since then illiteracy among the Moslem population has been gradually disappearing. The establishment of national universities, theatres and press led to a renaissance of several vernaculars.

However after 1930, behind this theoretical facade of "equality" and tolerance, the spokesmen of the "new" Pan-Slavism replaced the principles promising equality to all Slav peoples; and the Russians were proclaimed the leading nation of the Soviet Union. After World War II Pan-Russianism began first to impose Russian predominance and leadership on the Slav peoples of the Soviet Union and the satellite countries as well and gradually also on the Magyars, Romanians, and others. This new "Pan-Slav Russian patriotism" began about 1947, and hardly distinguishes between "Russian" and "Soviet."² All Slavic scholarship began to extol the Russian past; the multi-national and yet centralized Russian state was dated back for many centuries, with the Great Russians, owing to their cultural superiority, the leading element. Official Soviet scholarship tries to convince the people of the Asiatic part of the Soviet Union that the conquest of the colonial peoples by Tsarist Russia did positive good and the education of non-Russian peoples by the Russians created the condition for their liberation and progress.³ The right of national originality has been claimed for, and reserved to, the Russians alone; the other Slav nations, Poles and Ukrainians, have had to adapt themselves to Russian nationalism. Soviet patriotism, the most frequently used official term, has been gradually merged with "Pan-Slavism" and "Russianism," and "Slavophile Russianism."

THE PRIORITY OF THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE

There is scarcely any feature in the life of the nationalities of the Soviet Union which Communist propaganda has idealized throughout the world to such an extent as the freedom accorded the various languages. This propaganda has been rather successful among those who are ignorant of the peoples of Soviet nationalities and their political status. In spite of the existence of 16 constituent republics, the Russian language now is more than a *primus inter pares* language in a multi-national state. It is

² S. G. Kolesneko, *O sovyetskoy patriotizme (About Soviet Patriotism)*, Moscow: Gossud. izdat. polit. liter. 1947; P. Moskatov, *Geroichesky rabochy klass nashei rodiny (The Heroic Working Class of Our Fatherland)*, Moscow: Gossud. izdat. polit. liter. 1946; L. Mints, *Velikaya otechestvennaya voyna sovyetskogo soyuza (The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union)*, Moscow: Gossud. izdat. polit. liter. 1947).

³ M. V. Nechkina, "K voprosu o formule neimenshe zlo" (On the Question of the Lesser Evil), in *Voprosu Istorii*, No. 4 (1951), pp. 44, 48.

true that, constitutionally, the native language is the language of the school, and that the national language of the respective territorial units is the official language of the local governmental agencies, of the press, radio and theatre. But, as early as 1938, the Soviet regime started an intensive propaganda for the use of the Russian language, by proclaiming: "The Russian language has with full right been regarded as the dominant language; Lenin and Stalin wrote their incomparable works in Russian. The nationalities of the Soviet Union consider it necessary to respect the powerful Russian nation and to know its language, as this gives them the opportunity to share the civilization of the great Russian people."⁴ Parallel with this new policy, the Russian language has been made the principal subject on which the primary and secondary national schools were to concentrate. Beginning with the second grade of the primary schools in all national territorial units, the Russian language is compulsory.⁵

Under the new instructions issued in 1945-46, the Russian language (and mathematics) were made the principal subjects in the primary and secondary schools; in 1950, I. A. Kirov, Minister for Education, called on Soviet teachers to stress the mastery of the Russian language during 1950-51; he said that this was one of the lessons to be drawn from the recent pronouncements of Stalin on the subject of linguistics.⁶

The transfer from a rural primary school to the fifth grade of the incomplete secondary school is made when the scholar passes the final examination in Russian, oral and written. The same rule is applied in transferring a child from the 7-year school to the 8th grade of the complete secondary school. All candidates for admission to the higher institutions of learning, save those who graduate from secondary schools with gold and silver medals, have to pass university entrance examinations in Russian and Russian literature. The latest step has been the requirement that Russian culture and Russian achievements are to be regarded as the first and oldest in the world and that all other cultures are to be viewed only as derivatives of Russian; in the same way, in all courses in literature and history, it is prescribed that the instructors emphasize the national superiority, originality and greatness of Russian thinkers, writers and scholars, and the tremendous contribution of the Russian people to world culture.⁷

⁴ *Izvestiya*, April 14, 1938.

⁵ Y. N. Medinsky, *Public Education in the USSR* (Moscow: Foreign Language Publ. House, 1950), pp. 38-39.

⁶ *New York Times*, August 2, 1950, For a valuable treatment of this subject, see: C. C. Gecys, "Present Russian Nationalism," *Ukrainian Quarterly*, IX, 2 (Spring, 1953), pp. 141-155.

⁷ *Newsletter from Behind the Iron Curtain*, III, no. 113 (March, 1949), p. 115.

To provide a supervisory system of cultural integration throughout the Slavic world, a special Slav committee was formed in 1945 at the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., under the Presidency of the Academician N. S. Derzhavin, with a directive to unite all Russian specialists in Slav studies and to stimulate different kinds of research, and study of Slav history, law and languages. Slavic academies exist in every constituent republic of the USSR and in every satellite state, and control the groups which study Slavic history and economics, literature and art, and those dedicated to the genius of Slav artists (officially approved, of course). — All aim to make Russia the center of an "All-Slav" culture, and repeat endlessly that even in Tsarist days, when all the world regarded Russia as a backward nation, and well educated Russians despised Russia's own achievements, when the language of culture was French, and when all culture was foreign — even then there were gifted and honest Russian inventors who worked out for themselves all the vaunted discoveries of the West but were unable to make their voices heard.

Russian imperialism has revived the old notion that Moscow is "the third Rome," and that all the people of the USSR must look up to the Russians as such:⁸

"The Russian working class, the Russian people helped the backward peoples of our country to develop their own national State, economy, culture . . . By its self-confident struggle against the fascist pillagers, the Great Russian people in brotherly cooperation with all the peoples of the USSR saved the world from fascist enslavement . . . that is why the peoples of our country rally around the great Russian people. That is why the Russian people enjoy the special respect and sympathy of all advanced mankind . . . That is why the relationship to the Russian people is now the truest criterion for an evaluation of the real nature of the relations of one or another person to democracy, internationalism and Communism."

THE LITERARY FRONT

On the literary front, all writings — poems, novels, plays and the like — are being re-examined minutely for evidence of "bourgeois nationalism," that is, any evidence of local patriotism solely for a particular nation or areas. This phase began with the condemnation of V. Sosyura's poem, "Love Ukraine," but it has spread far beyond the borders of Ukraine, particularly to Central Asia. In Uzbekistan, for example, the poet

⁸ *Moskovski Bolshevik*, April 16, 1949.

Zulfia has been condemned for her "My Uzbekistan," which is condemned because it "describes Uzbekistan in a timeless manner, without regard to epoch, admires its narrow national traits and, voluntarily or involuntarily, opposes Uzbekistan to other Soviet Republics." The correct formula, writers are being told, in essence, is to express patriotism toward Soviet Ukraine, Soviet Uzbekistan or the like and to point out that the achievements of these peoples have been made possible by the "brotherly help" of the Great Russians, "the leading people of the Soviet Union."

THE FALSIFICATION OF HISTORY

On the "historical front," the re-writing of the entire history of the Tsarist conquest and annexation that brought many non-Russian peoples under Russian rule before 1917 is under way. Soon after World War II Soviet historians were told that the old approved formula that such conquest or annexation was a "lesser evil" that saved these peoples from conquest by the Turks or others was no longer valid since this implied that Russian rule might have been an evil in an absolute sense. In the last years they must go further and try to prove that Russian colonial conquest was an advantage for the conquered peoples. The Soviet historians must point out that when these minorities came under Russian rule they began to receive great advantages from the contacts with the "advanced" Russian people who helped civilize them, taught them how to advance economically, and brought them into contact with the highest Russian culture of the Communist Soviet Union. Only the abuses of Tsarist rule are to be considered as evil.

Commemorating the 300th anniversary of the Union of Ukraine with Russia under the Pereyaslav Treaty (1654), the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR issued a special historico-political Theses affirming what immense merits the Russian people had in supporting the Ukrainian people in their fight for liberation from Poland and the unification within the Russian State.⁹ The whole statement is a perversion and a falsification of East European History.

The significant point of the position of the Russians in the complex of nationalities, is that they are publicly credited with having played the leading role in the November revolution, the civil war, the economic reconstruction and the other successful Soviet endeavors. On May 25, 1945, Stalin himself, offered a toast to the Russian people as "the most outstanding nation of all the nations forming the Soviet Union" and as the one "which won in this war universal recognition as the leading force in

⁹ *Pravda*, Jan, 12, 1954.

the Soviet Union among all the peoples" of the country. For him, the Russian people had "a clear mind, staunch character, and patience," and he thanked them for the confidence they had shown the Soviet government during the trying years of 1941-1942.¹⁰

Parroting again this general thesis of the "superiority" of everything Russian, P. A. Sharyia, Chairman of the Credentials Commission of the Council of Nationalities, of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R stressed:¹¹


"The great Russian people — the elder brother in the equal family of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., occupies a special place in the Soviet companionship of peoples. The first among all the peoples of our country and of the entire world to have begun the great socialist revolution, it . . . is tirelessly rendering every aid to the formerly oppressed and backward peoples in the matter of quick economic, political and cultural development. . . Every race in the Soviet Union understands perfectly well that the main, decisive role in the achievement of victory over the enemy in the Great Patriotic War — in which the fate of the freedom and independence of all the people of the USSR was being decided — was played by the great Russian people. That is why the prestige of the Russian people is so immeasurably high among the other peoples; that is why the peoples of the U.S.S.R. bear toward it boundless confidence and a feeling of tremendous love and gratitude".

CONCLUSION

The educational Iron Curtain has been pulled down by the Moscow rulers not only to separate the nationalities of the Soviet Union from the "outside world," but also from their history, from the heritage of their own culture and even from the bonds of their own national language — in order to strengthen the imperialistic efforts of the Kremlin to cement a truly monolithic state under the "supreme leadership" of the Russian people and the re-interpreted Russian history and culture. History teaches that such endeavors of oppressors rarely are successful. It is of supreme interest to the Western countries not only to combat lying propaganda about present-day conditions in Soviet Russia but also to keep alive the national spirit and the national consciousness of each non-Russian people in the Soviet Union.

¹⁰ *Bolshevik*, 1945, No. 10, pp. 1-2, and 1952, No. 8, p. 20.

¹¹ *Izvestiya*, March 15, 1946.



THE REAL ALTERNATIVE OF LIBERATION IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

One of the most serious misconceptions being harbored today is the false notion that the only alternative to "peaceful coexistence" is preventive war. Aside from the very valid consideration as to whether "peaceful coexistence" itself can insure peace, i.e. the prevention of a global conflict, it is evident to any careful and critical analyst that this misconception is a glaring product of the haphazard reasoning which accounts also for the pitiful lack of rational discrimination and distinction in regard to the many concepts employed in our characterization of foreign policy. The net result has been confusion, and the Administration in its indiscriminate use of the successive concepts of "mass retaliation", "peaceful coexistence" and now, in some quarters, "competitive coexistence" has contributed in the greatest measure to this unfortunate, beclouded condition. When one cuts sharply through these terminological innovations, the same essence of the containment policy, which ostensibly was repudiated in 1952, is found present.

In addition to preventive war, there is a real alternative to "peaceful coexistence" or any other verbal brand of containment, and this is the policy of liberation. The spirit of this policy remains as one enunciated by both President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles. "Our determination," declared the President, "must go beyond the negative concept of containment to the positive concept of expanding by peaceful means the areas of freedom. If this is not done, we will once again find ourselves at war. It must be done. It can be done."¹ The Secretary once rightly observed, "But liberation from the yoke of Moscow will not occur for a very long time, and courage in neighboring lands will not be sustained, unless the United States makes it publicly known that it wants and expects liberation to occur."² This spirit has not been present in the policy of the Administration since April, 1953, at which time a real reversion to the old containment policy took place but with new verbal embroidery. Thus in examining our current policy in the light of the liberation alternative, it is logically sound to refer to it as containment.

¹ New York Times, October 21, 1952.

² A Policy of Boldness, May, 1952.

THE CONCRETE MEANING OF LIBERATION

It is perhaps somewhat of an understatement to say that despite the extensive controversy that transpired two years ago on the liberation theme, much misunderstanding and confusion remains as to the nature of the liberation policy, even among those who profess it. If one carefully reflects on the logically determining aspects of this issue, he cannot but come to recognize the general supportable proposition that any political course on the part of our Government that is not a policy of liberation is essentially a policy of containment. In the complex of contemporary circumstances there is a discernible internal determinism which establishes the complete validity of this proposition and sets the groundwork for our free dynamic action that is something radically different from the drift of uncreative adaptation to altered conditions contrived by enemy initiative. Fundamental in this respect is the fact that the concept of liberation rests on the unqualified rejection of the expedient Soviet theory of coexistence which, significantly, has baited the frequent support of Kennanism and the many now who wishfully impute to its intermittent use the success of containment and transient diplomacy.

This sound rejection rests on three forms of evidence establishing the Russian Communist design for world conquest, namely, abundant theoretic expressions in Russian Communist works, an imposing record of imperialist conquest since 1920, and the vast operation of the world communist conspiracy directed by Moscow. It is also associated with a vivid awareness that the dynamics of historical movement disallow permanent statical relations and that for their control, they require more than what may prove to be the illusory deterrent of supposedly material power. The containment position depends exclusively on this power deterrent and the naive hope of institutional atrophy within the Red Empire. However, since 1950 it has borne an accruing disutility that with the passage of time can only result in unprecedented losses, not to exclude national disaster itself.

It is patently erroneous and misleading to identify the concept of liberation with the prosaic and hollow verbalism that we earnestly hope the captive nations will one day become free. Wishful verbalism of this sort can be found in abundance in the varied output of those who knowingly or unknowingly espouse different shades of containment. Such verbalisms become meaningless when sober consideration is given to the animus of liberation which in essence is practical, positive, initiative-bearing, realistic, moral and, above all, supremely deterrent against a third world war: in short, outstanding policy characteristics that are inevitably obscured by self-defeating avowals of containment no matter

how described. To repeat, any policy that is not essentially and functionally liberationist belongs by nature to the containment species and, consequently, will be found wanting in these preeminent qualities. A quick glance at the confusing and tortuous character of our current policy is sufficient to impress one with the truth of this observation.

The spirit of the liberation policy is thoroughly practical because it is unquestionably in our fundamental national interest to furnish concrete aid to the captive nations in the vast Russian Communist Empire. Practicable aid extended to Polish, Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Slovak, Hungarian and other national patriots is a strategically well-placed investment not only in the desired restoration of their national independence and freedom but also — in fact more so — in the very preservation of our own Nation. The full import of this will be appreciated when we shall consider the ultimate variables in the calculus of world conquest below.

Moreover, the liberation animus is positive in that it is oriented toward the strengthening of the forces of freedom everywhere which necessarily entails the expansion of the areas of freedom rather than their mere, negative conservation at the critical cost of the enslaved nations now undergoing genocidal consolidation. In its scale of values freedom precedes peace, for carried to its logical extent, peace can even be bought for total bondage. Where the world remains half free and half slave, the scaled precedence of peace to freedom, as fostered by communist slogans of peaceful co-existence, creates an illusion concocted to serve as the opiate of the still free nations. In the illusion of peace we have shamelessly acceded to the tyrannical expansion of the Russian Communist Empire far beyond the wildest dreams of the past Tsars of Muscovy. Many who have succumbed to this illusion overlook the elementary fact that war, essentially a conflict of relationships, commences in the souls of men only to culminate on the battlefields of the world. Our record so far in the contest for the souls of men everywhere points to this disastrous culmination. And the most glaring effect of the opiate of peace over freedom is the insidious sensation that short-run truces add up into a long-run peace.

These qualities in themselves certify to the striking initiative-bearing characteristic of the liberation policy. With the fixed objective of expanded freedom, the imaginative employment of numerous, diverse means and a deep certitude of spirit, we can keep the unalterably self-dedicated enemy on a continuous defensive which alone is capable of exhausting the sources of Moscow's imperialist rule. The policy is realistic in that it is founded on a plain recognition of the mortal enemy and, with principled determination and courage, is formulated accordingly. In its full realism, without being emotionally crusading or sentimental in

character, liberation postulates a moral commitment toward the captive nations, and this essential morality of the liberation idea is a primary fact. It is this fact that fundamentally distinguishes it from any form of containment policy which, by reasoned analysis, can only show for itself the tenuous basis of comparative technologic power. In the maze of his countless confused speculations and errors Mr. Kennan at least strikes upon this truth when, in behalf of containment, he admits that "I see the most serious fault of our past policy formulation to lie in something that I might call the legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems."³

Logically and by written evidence, containment in whatever form is by nature amoral. It involves no moral commitment because it is not predicated, as Mr. Kennan and other containment theorists well confirm, on determining moral and political principles. Little wonder that the eminent Father Walsh of Georgetown University was quick to score the above and similar statements uttered by Kennan. For an American foreign policy formulated in divorce from the constant guidance of moral principles would enjoy no better rational criteria than those underlying the policy of the Soviet Union. Contrary to Kennan's further error, had our past policy formulation adhered closely to absolute moral and political criteria, the course of contemporary history since 1918, notably with the dissolution of the Russian Empire, in real possibilities would have been by far more favorable for us and the world. Fortunately, numerous current expressions of this moral commitment toward the captive nations may be found in statements by President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles, but these expressions will remain only verbalistic and hollow unless the commitment is functionalized by the only policy adaptable to it, namely the policy of liberation.

In the light of these outstanding qualities, how then can we define an American policy of liberation? Most succinctly, it is a policy girded to the concept of liberation which is a process of political warfare aimed at the defeat of the enemy and the independence of enslaved nations as a necessary and logical basis for European and Asiatic reconstruction along federative of free lines. Notwithstanding the misconception of many, liberation is not an end in itself, but a peaceable means to a double end, negative and positive in character. It engenders not only the fight against communism and its decisive defeat but also the positive fight for freedom and the independence of nations. It is the first vital link of a policy chain that makes for a rational, coherent and winning American foreign policy. As stated by the brilliant author of the most authoritative

³ American Diplomacy 1900-1950, p. 95.

book on the subject, "Liberation, independence, federation: the three are links in the same policy chain."⁴

THE LIBERATION CONCEPT IN OPERATIONAL STAGES

When thought through carefully and logically, liberation is an operational concept best fitted for the heavy requirements of the moment and of the desired future. In the present phase, that of the cold war, it provides the best possible insurance against the sudden outbreak of a hot war without appeasement, truce-like concessions and compromise of principle and national integrity. As an unfolding process of political warfare on the enemy's terrain, it affords us the only possible chance of curtailing the genocidal consolidation of the Russian Communist Empire which is the primary variable in the communist calculus of world conquest. The containment policy in effect today allows the formation of this essential variable which is being executed behind lavish communist professions of peaceful coexistence, wide communist participation in international conferences, and timed contributions to an apparent lessening of world tensions, all calculated to generate the illusion of a prolonged peace in order to gain the necessary time for this consolidation.

To contend, as some superficially do, that liberation entails the risk of a hot war is obviously an argument oblivious to the constant presence of this risk. Liberation alone can lessen this risk, for an enemy confronted by an increasing insecurity within his own domain is surely less apt to embark upon world conquest than without this circumstance. To hope, as many in vain do, that, somehow, something might occur in the unaided slave world to precipitate an internal collapse, like the lost hope of a convulsion upon Stalin's death, is plainly indicative of an inadequate understanding of the highly technologized techniques of oppressive communist rule. Pretty phrases of "cultural erosion," "territorial indigestion" and the like belong to diplomatic poetry, not to the field of real political action. To maintain, as several do in the very same breath, that the freedom of the enslaved nations cannot be attained without a hot war, arbitrarily rules out all hope founded on the liberating effects of a backed cacophony of unrest, dissension and calculated opposition reaching into all vulnerable strata of the empire. These planned effects counter the absurd argument of aimless uprisings, and constitute a real possibility which for its very existence in the coming short-run can only be nurtured by liberation.

For the requirements of the ever impending phase of a hot war it should be evident now that a policy of liberation places us in an in-

⁴ James Burnham, "Containment or Liberation," p. 229.

finitely more advantageous position than one of containment and its myopic wait-and-see attitude. Efficiently organized groups of national leadership, thriving in well supported underground networks with roots deeply implanted in the respective populace, cannot be expected to materialize with a narrow policy of containment no matter how extensive our intelligence and espionage activity may be. We are dealing with enslaved national bodies that in their present grave state of systematic genocide require our complete national effort which, again, can only be expressed through a policy of liberation. Their hope, their courage, their will to exist and fight can only be sustained by our effective moral commitment to the goals of their freedom and independence. Thus in the final, inexorable accounting, to the degree that we fail in the concrete preparation and support of these truly natural allies, to that degree and more, in the event of a showdown, we shall be forced to underwrite the undoubtedly heavy losses of open combat in grossly disproportionate amounts of American lives and treasure. The great irony and paradox of our current containment policy reside in the inescapable fact that as we timidly attempt, on the insular bases of brute material power and passive institutional example, to stave off a global conflict marked by vast devastation, we are inadvertently, by the very nature of our present historical dilemma, contributing to this horrible outcome.

Let us honestly face the cruel fact that this is the tremendous responsibility of decision now weighing upon the shoulders of our policy-makers whose anticipated pleadings of "we did our best in the cause of peace" could scarcely justify their failure to mold now the available alternative means to a swift, economical and certain victory in the case of a hot war. The simplistic notion that all that is required is the massive capacity to bomb out the enemy, is purely a product of vacuous thinking with a show of arrogance toward all the determining factors of geography, history, economics and sound psychological strategy. The detailed contents of these factors are certainly not the exclusive property of our policy-makers to warrant the self-legitimizing shroud of secret information upon which policy decisions are presumably formed. In substantial degree they are accessible to anyone given to painstaking research and study, and in many instances are more easily acquired through unofficial channels. Those familiar with these factors inevitably encounter the consummate conclusion that our ineptitude in the strategic utilization of these factors for the current historic struggle might well seal our doom. The plain truth is that despite our past military successes, we can lose: and the ultimate phase of reconstruction, for which the universal principles of liberation prepare us best, may not be of our making.

THE DUAL NATURE OF THE ENEMY

Scholars are well aware of the many myths circulating in this country on the subjects of communism and the Soviet Union. Those who are unwilling or impatient to study the genesis of Russian Communism, its genealogy and historical development to the present day, easily succumb to such myths as: (1) that Moscow-centered communism is not a Russian phenomenon and was initially imposed upon the Russian people; (2) that our enemy is merely ideologic communism, so to speak, born in a historical void; and (3) that any thought of dismembering the Soviet Union — the inner sphere of the Russian Communist Empire — would consolidate the Russian masses behind the Kremlin. To what extent these and similar myths are inspired by enemy agents and Russia First elements in this country is always a fitting question. Nevertheless, they are media of disinformation blurring the necessary distinctions of thought and fact that must be observed in any realistic program of successful, political action.

From a historico-sociological viewpoint one of the most ridiculous notions entertained is that the Bolshevik Revolution represents an institutional hiatus in the history of ethnic Russia. Fortunately, competent scholarship refutes this politically-inspired notion, and has increasingly shown the historic, autocratic Russian qualities of Muscovitic Communism. As the learned Father Walsh points out, "Psychologically, the Russian people — upon whom the Revolution is based and without whose acquiescence it could not have been launched or so long sustained — have always revealed qualities of frustrated mysticism which inclines them to constant acceptance of contradictions and paradoxes."⁵ One of the most outstanding Russian authorities, Nicolas Berdyaev, stresses that "However paradoxical it may sound, still Bolshevism is the third appearance of Russian autocratic imperialism; its first appearance being the Muscovite Tsardom and its second the Petrine Empire."⁶ Sooner or later, thoughtful Americans, whose minds have not been completely infected by the hatched notions of puny Russia First advocates, will come to understand the full import of the warning given by this venerable Russian Christian scholar: "It is particularly important for Western minds to understand the national roots of Russian Communism and the fact that it was Russian history which determined its limits and shaped its character. A knowledge of Marxism will not help in this."⁷

⁵ Total Empire: The Roots and Progress of World Communism, p. 44.

⁶ The Origin of Russian Communism, p. 120.

⁷ Ibid. p. 7.

Indeed, it is important for us to understand this in order to shape our policy accordingly. The enemy is dual in nature. In objective, experiential terms ideologic communism is bankrupt, but although, like the Muscovite and Petrine doctrines of the Third Rome and Pan-Slavism in the past, it serves the purpose of ideologic babbity in the empire, it functions also as a conspiratorial weapon in the free world, attracting dupes, opportunists and traitors. The real substance of the enemy is totalitarian Russian imperialism driven, as one scholar puts it, by the historic Messianic obsession of "Expansion, greatness of the state, ideas of grandeur, and Messianic ideas of world redemption or world domination."⁸ This drive expressed itself at the very inception of Russian Communism by the imperialist rape of independent Ukraine, White Ruthenia, Georgia, Poland, the Baltic countries, Hungary and the other nations.

THE RUSSIAN CALCULUS OF WORLD CONQUEST

History has cast our role as the savior of nations, more so those genocided behind the Iron Curtain than those threatened in the free world. The plan for their necessary salvation can only commence with the policy of liberation. Except in hollow word, we are today acquiescing to Russian genocidal consolidation and in reality abandoning the captive nations. With millions of beaten robots at its disposal, Moscow will have achieved its psychological basis of reasonable expectation of success in its calculus of world conquest. Given the initial advantage of attack and a sabotaging world conspiratorial network, it does not even have to regard the second essential variable, a quantitative superiority in arms, as a necessary requisite for such expectation; although with concentrated specialization, it may easily attain it both absolutely and relatively as we are forced to dissipate our resources in sideshows. The third basic variable, its fear of retaliation, will be inversely related to its estimated ability to create regionalized Pearl Harbors. Allowing the first and dangerously gambling through unprincipled containment on the second, we are contributing heavily to their lessened fear of the third variable.

Time definitely favors Moscow, not the free world. Behind the Iron Curtain are formidable allies which in a sense are more important than France and England. They are, step by step, vanishing under the brutal Communist force and our nebulous foreign policy providing to them no hope of liberation. Are we prepared to sacrifice them by a compromised policy? In two world wars England and France turned to us for their salvation. Whom can we turn to in the event of a third?

⁸ Dinko Tomasic, *The Impact of Russian Culture on Soviet Communism*, p. 75.

AMERICAN FORCED REPATRIATION

By JULIUS EPSTEIN

The forced repatriation of war prisoners and of the displaced persons to the Soviet Union was employed not only by the American occupational authorities in Germany and Austria but also by the British and French military governments; therefore the problem is not only the American issue which is the theme of the article by Julius Epstein.

Analogical agreements with the Soviet Union to that which America did in Yalta, it appears, same should be signed also by Britain. France was not a participant of the Yalta Conference but an analogical treaty on behalf of France was concluded by General De Gaulle the same year during his visit to Moscow. — *Editor.*

Never during his tenure as Secretary of State did Dean Acheson deliver a stronger speech — applauded by Democrats, Republicans and the whole community of the free world — than on October 24, 1952, when he discussed before Committee One of the United Nations General Assembly in New York the Korean issue, in particular, on the stumbling-block of the truce negotiations, the repatriation of the prisoners of war.

From the beginning of the truce negotiations, it was the unflinching conviction of the American Government as well as of the Governments of the other fifteen nations who participated in the Korean war against communist aggression, that it would constitute a crime against humanity to repatriate a single prisoner against his will. Dean Acheson's speech — delivered in the very presence of Andrei Y. Vishinsky — was the climax in this gigantic struggle on behalf of an ethical principle and the spirit and the letter of the Geneva Convention. Let us quote his own words:

“We now come to the origin of this repatriation question. As increasing numbers of prisoners came into United Nations hands, it began to be found out that more and more of these prisoners believed that, if they were returned to Communist hands, they would be executed or imprisoned or treated brutally in some way. They therefore took the position that they would not be exchanged and that, if an attempt was made to exchange them, they would resist by force. It was quite unthinkable to the United Nations Command that it should use force to drive into the hands of the Communists, people who would be resisting that effort by force.

“Finally, they (the representatives of the Communist group) say that the Geneva Convention and international practice require this forcible repatriation. We, on the other hand, have said that we have

lived up to the humanitarian principles of the Geneva Convention. We have said that we have abided by them and will abide by them, and that our position on repatriation is wholly consistent with that Convention."

After analyzing the Geneva Convention of 1949, and showing that there is nothing in the Convention "which would lead one to believe that a prisoner of war must be forced at the end of a bayonet, fighting, perhaps dying, to go back when he does not want to go," Acheson turned to the international practice as embodied in the last forty years' history.

In three simple sentences, Dean Acheson put the result of his thorough study at the beginning of his speech. He said:

"What was this international practice? It is just what I have said: If a prisoner believed that it was dangerous for him, that he might die if he were sent home, and if he claimed asylum, and if the detaining State thought that it was an honest, *bona fide* claim, the detaining State could grant asylum. That was the practice."

To illustrate the point, Acheson then quoted fifteen treaties entered into by the Bolsheviks, beginning with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of March 3, 1918 and ending with the Soviet Russian-Austrian Treaty of December 7, 1921, all of which contained almost identical clauses to the effect that no prisoner of war "must be delivered to his homeland against his will."

Dean Acheson did not stop with the Russian-Austrian treaty of 1921, but also referred to the Soviet practice during World War II, for instance to the Soviet ultimatum, addressed to the German commander at Stalingrad. In that ultimatum, the Soviet Government guaranteed to all who would surrender that, after the end of the war, they would be allowed to return to Germany or to any country where war prisoners might desire to go. Acheson further referred to a similar offer, made by the Soviets to German troops in Hungary. Then he said: "And this is very interesting: a Soviet Union publication refers to these episodes as expressing the highest act of humanitarianism. And I agree with that. That, indeed, is the international law, in relation to this subject."

How can we explain that the very same administration, whose Secretary of State so vigorously defended the time-honored principle of nonforcible repatriation, deliberately allowed to repatriate forcibly more than million Soviet prisoners of war and Russian civilian workers to their sure death by execution or deportation to Siberian slave labor camps? That is what we did in Germany after the end of hostilities on May 8, 1945.¹

¹ The figure of two million Soviet citizens forcibly repatriated by American military and civilian authorities in Germany is a very conservative one. It is based

The fact that we forcibly repatriated the two million peoples to our "ally" cannot, of course, justify the crime. When Mr. Acheson condemned forced repatriation, he did not distinguish between prisoners to be repatriated to an allied nation of the detaining State, and prisoners to be repatriated to an enemy nation. He simply — and very clearly — stated by implication that it is "wrong, improper, illegal and unnecessary to return prisoners by force." What was "wrong, improper, illegal and unnecessary" in the case of the Korean prisoners was certainly "wrong, improper, illegal and unnecessary" in the case of the Soviet prisoners in American custody in Germany.

To understand how it came about that we, who had fought World War I "to make the world safe for democracy" and World War II for the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations committed such a crime, Americans have to start at Yalta, where Alger Hiss served as confidential adviser to President Roosevelt, and Edward R. Stetinius, Jr., our Secretary of State, did not know what was going on.

There an "Agreement relating to prisoners of war and civilians liberated by forces operating under Soviet command and forces operating under United States of America command" was signed on February 11, 1945. The agreement bears the signatures of Major General John R. Deane for the United States and of Major General A. A. Gryzlov for the Soviet Union.

This agreement was only one of those secret Yalta agreements which have caused untold tragedies to the free world, including the cold war and the hot wars in Korea and Indo-China, already described as the two opening phases of World War III.

What does this Yalta agreement say on prisoners of war as far as repatriation is concerned?

Article 1 simply stipulates:

"All Soviet citizens liberated by the forces operating under United States Command and all United States citizens liberated by the forces operating under Soviet Command, will without delay after their liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained separately from them in camps or points of concentration until they have been handed over to the Soviet or United States authorities."

Another clause of Article 2 of the agreement reads:

"Soviet and United States repatriation representatives will have the right of immediate access into the camps and points of concentration

upon an estimate according to which some six million Soviet citizens fell under the authority of the Western Allies. One official American estimate was that more than seven million came under the West's authority. It is an established fact that *about a million tried to evade repatriation* of which more than half a million finally succeeded.

where their citizens are located and they will have the right to appoint the internal administration and set up the internal discipline and management in accordance with the military procedure and laws of their country."

It is noteworthy that this provision of the Yalta agreement on prisoners of war was immediately violated by the Soviets as were most of the political agreements at Yalta — for they refused to allow American missions behind the Soviet lines.

In spite of this flagrant violation of the military agreement, we did not abrogate it but continued to allow Soviet missions to enter freely all our camps where Soviet citizens were held.

Another clause of Article 2 of the agreement read:

"Hostile propaganda directed against the contracting parties or against any of the United Nations will not be permitted."

It is of the utmost importance to notice that the Yalta agreement on prisoners of war does not contain any reference to "forced repatriation."

Not only that. On March 8, 1946 — the day of the release of the agreement to the press — the State Department also released a statement on the implementation of the Yalta agreement as envisioned by the Department which directly excluded forced repatriation of Soviet citizens "unless they so desire." The statement reads as follows:

"In the implementation of this agreement the United States Government is facilitating the repatriation to the Soviet Union of only those persons who were both citizens of and actually domiciled within the Soviet Union on September 1, 1939.

"The repatriation of Soviet citizens is not facilitated unless they so desire, with the exception of those who fall within the following categories:

1. Those who were captured in German uniforms.
2. Those who were members of the Soviet armed forces on or after June 22, 1941 and were not subsequently discharged therefrom;
3. Those who on the basis of reasonable evidence have been found to be collaborators with the enemy, having voluntarily rendered aid and comfort to the enemy."

According to this statement of implementation, issued by our State Department, no "Poles" and no citizens of the three Baltic States could have ever been forcibly "repatriated". The record shows that hundreds of thousands of former Polish and Baltic citizens were turned over to the Soviets!

We do not know yet whether the policy of the State Department, as embodied in the implementation statement, had been decided upon at the time of the conclusion of the Yalta agreement or later, in March, 1946, just to alleviate American public opinion. It is very likely that the latter assumption will be borne out by the evidence. There can be no doubt,

however, that the practice of forced repatriation as carried out by our military authorities in Germany, and — as we shall see — by UNRRA up to 1947 was in striking contrast to the State Department's policy of the implementation statement.

The fact is that Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) had recognized the principle of forcible repatriation as early as April 1945!

This can be gathered from an official, heretofore unpublished document, entitled "The recovery and repatriation of liberated Prisoners of war, Occupation Forces in Europe 1945-46," compiled and issued under the authority of the army's Chief Historian, Colonel Harold E. Potter, by the Chief Archivist Gillett Griswold, Frankfurt am Main (156 pages, typewritten).

This official army document proves beyond the shadow of any doubt that not only Supreme Headquarters but also the Joint Chiefs of Staff went in their interpretation of the Yalta agreement on prisoners of war far beyond what was necessary. On page 64 of that document, we find the following statement:

"The principle of forcible repatriation of Soviet citizens was recognized in Supreme Headquarters in April 1945. Although the Yalta Agreement did not contain any categorical statement that Soviet citizens should be repatriated regardless of their personal wishes, it was so interpreted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On instructions from the latter, Theater headquarters ordered repatriation regardless of the individual's desire with only two exceptions, namely, Soviet citizens captured while serving with the German armed forces and unwilling to resign their status as prisoners of war, and Soviet citizens known or suspected as war criminals."

The last sentence of this quotation offers a new and highly interesting puzzle. It is hard to understand how we could have found a single anti-communist Soviet soldier, serving with the Germans who was not unwilling to resign his status as prisoner of war, if such unwillingness could have saved his life. It is a safe bet that 100% of all Soviet prisoners in American hands, who had ever served with the Germans were "unwilling to resign their status of prisoners of war" and should therefore never have been forcibly repatriated. The question arises, why then were all of them and especially the Vlasov people — more than 900,000 — surrendered to Stalin to be hanged, shot or sent to Siberia?

The document shows also that the Seventh Army, under the command of General Patch, requested on August 25, 1945, special instructions from Theater headquarters on the use of troops to turn over unwilling repatriates to the Soviet authorities. Supreme Headquarters considered the matter as so important — notwithstanding its decision in favor

of forced repatriation of April, 1945 — that it was referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington. In the meantime, the Commander of the Seventh Army, General Patch, decided to suspend any use of force to effect repatriation of Soviet citizens. The Joint Chiefs of Staff took four months to answer the request. Its reply did not arrive until December 20, 1945.

In that reply, the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced categorically the policy of forcible repatriation and stated in their reply to Supreme Headquarters that Soviet citizens who had actually been within the Soviet Union on September 1, 1939, would be repatriated "without regard to their wishes and by force if necessary!" This order was signed: "By Command of General McNarney: L. S. Ostrander, Brigadier General, USA Adjutant General."

That meant, of course, that not only those were to be forcibly repatriated who were specifically selected for this treatment in the State Department's statement on implementation of the Yalta agreement, but also all those who were specifically excluded from forced repatriation by the words: "repatriation of Soviet citizens is not facilitated unless they so desire."

Today, we do not know how many hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens died as victims of General McNarney's order, which was issued in behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Another highly interesting — and still classified — document on the history of forced repatriation, now is in the custody of the Historical Records Section of the Army in Alexandria, Va. The document bears the file number 383.7-14.1 and the unmistakable title: "Forcible Repatriation of Displaced Soviet Citizens — Operation *Keelhaul*." I have reason to believe that this document, which was issued on September 1, 1948, contains the essence of the secret story of American-sponsored forced repatriation in Germany, although there are, of course, many more classified documents in the Army record files in Alexandria, Va. as well as in Kansas City, Mo. dealing with the subject. They all should be brought to light, in order to establish the full truth of and the responsibility for a crime which was properly called "an indelible blot on the West's tradition of ready asylum for political exiles." (George Fischer, *Soviet Opposition to Stalin, a case study in World War II*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1952, pages 119).

Today, we are addressing the peoples of the Soviet Union and the satellite countries as our best and "secret" allies. But we have never purged ourselves of a crime we committed when we surrendered millions of their brethren to the firing squads, gallows and slave labor camps within the communist orbit. How can we expect them to believe

in the seriousness of our present declarations, conveyed by our "Voice of America," by "Radio Free Europe" and by "Radio of Liberation?" The least they can rightfully expect from us is that we frankly admit our guilt, no matter how great it is, and that we investigate the crime and expose those who were primarily responsible for it. As long as we have not done this, we shall not be able to remove the dark cloud of suspicion which still hovers over our relations to our "secret allies."

The story of the forced repatriation of millions of Soviet citizens is not only the story of a crime, almost unparalleled in modern military history, it is also to a very high degree the story of an unbelievable confusion, stupidity and deceit.

What went on in the heads of those responsible, who decided as late as April 1945, to drop tens of thousands of leaflets at the western front, inviting Soviet troops, fighting with the Germans in the West, to surrender to the Americans and promising them (!) "speedy return to their Russian fatherland?"

There is evidence that we dropped other leaflets and broadcast speeches addressed to the Soviet anti-communists in which we invited them to surrender to the Americans and in which we officially promised them that they would never be repatriated.

This all went on at the very same time in different sectors of the West front. The result of such contradictions and such a complete lack of propaganda policy was the fact that nobody knew whether there was a policy at all and what it was. Neither friend nor foe could be sure of the fate the surrendering Soviet citizens had to expect from the American High Command.

A considerable part of the blame for the utmost confusion and inconsistency of our psychological warfare belongs to our *Psychological Warfare Division*, chief of which was Brigadier General Robert A. McClure; Deputy Chief was C. D. Jackson.

Complete lack of understanding was also shown by the West — Americans and British alike — when we stubbornly refused to accept the surrender of the Vlasov soldiers in Czechoslovakia. There is no doubt that General Patton, Commander of the American Third Army in Czechoslovakia, originally wanted to accept the surrender of the anti-Stalinist Vlasov people as he had wanted to liberate Prague. Orders, issued by his superiors, prevented both!

After V-E Day, forced repatriation began on a large scale and lasted for more than two years. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers tried to escape the ordeal and many thousands committed suicide rather than be forcibly repatriated.

Most of the anti-Stalinist former Red Army soldiers were captured in the South of Europe and sent to Linz in Austria (Soviet zone) to be handed over to the Soviets. Once, more than a thousand jumped out of the windows of a train when it passed over a bridge near the Austrian border. They all died. The train had hardly arrived at Linz, when another wave of suicides occurred. The prisoners jumped by the hundreds into the Drava River.

What happened at Linz repeated itself at seven other rallying points at Dachau, Passau, Kempten, Plattling, Bad Eibling, St. Veit and Marburg.

All these forced repatriation operations — "*Keelhaul*" was the official American code name — resulted in mass suicides. Most frequently by hangings. Many American witnesses reported that the prisoners crowded into churches when the Soviet authorities arrived. The Americans saw many times how the Soviets dragged the "liberated" prisoners out, clubbed them mercilessly and carted them off. We shall never know how many died, even before they reached the Soviet frontier.

But the tragedy of forced repatriation was by no means limited to Europe. Thousands of Soviet prisoners were taken to Britain and forced to board British vessels to be sent to Odesa. Another wave of suicides was the result of those transports. In one case, it was reliably reported, it took the Soviets in Odesa three days to get the prisoners ashore.

The same tragedy repeated itself in the United States. Many of the Soviet citizens, "liberated" after D-Day in Normandy were brought to the U.S., most of them to camps in Idaho. Almost nobody wanted to return, but our authorities forced them in a most brutal way to board Soviet ships at Seattle and Portland. There were, however, 118 Soviet prisoners who could not be forced to board the Soviet vessels. They were sent to a camp in New Jersey. Ultimately, they too were handed over to Stalin. Before this could be done, we had to force them with tear gas to leave the barracks. Many committed suicide.

According to the best statistics available, far more than two million Ukrainians, Russians and people of other nations were returned in this manner. Many of them were civilians who had been forcibly brought to Hitler-Germany to work there in labor battalions and who nevertheless wanted to stay.

The crime of forced repatriation was committed not only by our military authorities who got their orders from Washington. Its perpetration was continued by UNRRA.

As a letter from Senator Herbert Lehman to me dated March 12, 1954 shows, the first Director General of UNRRA either never knew what his subordinates in Germany — among them many hundreds, if

not thousands of communists and fellow travelers — did, or he must have completely forgotten it. Senator Lehman, in his letter, asserts that neither he nor his successor La Guardia ever allowed forced repatriation.

How does this jibe with the still secret Order 199 which — according to Eugene Lyons — “not only instructed DP camp officials to effect ‘speedy return’ of Soviet nationals to their homeland in accordance with the Yalta agreement, but outlined pressure and hinted at punishments toward that end.”?

If UNRRA’s policy was, as Senator Lehman points out, against any forced repatriation, then this policy was gravely violated by the subordinates. The American people have the right to know who the violators were and why they have never been prosecuted for their dereliction of duty which resulted in the death of untold Soviet anti-communists. There can be no doubt that the notorious Order 199 was issued with the knowledge and approval of UNRRA’s Director General LaGuardia and almost no official voices were ever raised in protest to that practice at that time.

In spite of the fact that we had just taught the world at Nuremberg that a crime against humanity can never be justified by any reference to “superior orders” — we obviously accepted it as perfectly all right that our own soldiers committed most brutal acts if they did it only in pursuance of “superior orders.” Thus, we became guilty of using a moral with a double bottom, one for the German war criminals and another one for our own purposes.

To give one example of the reports appearing in American newspapers, a report by Kathleen McLaughlin in the New York Times of January 20, 1946 may be quoted:

“Ten renegade Russian soldiers, in a frenzy of terror over their impending repatriation to their homeland, committed suicide today during a riot in the Dachau prison camp.***

“Twenty-one others were hospitalized, suffering from deep gashes that they had inflicted on themselves, apparently with razor blades, but no further deaths had been reported up to a late hour tonight. Many suffered cracked heads from the nightsticks wielded by 500 American and Polish guards who were attempting to bring the situation under control.***

“The practical certainty of the fate they would face on arrival in the Soviet area precipitated the disorder, which had its prelude Thursday in the resistance offered by the inmates in one of the barracks when ordered to line up to enter the trains waiting on the track inside the former concentration camp. Even though threatened with rifles and carbines, they refused to leave the shelter, begging GI guards to shoot them rather than carry out the extradition order. ***

“Authorities in headquarters of the United States Third Army at Bad Toelz stated in reporting the riot that every possible precaution had been taken to deliver the prisoners in accordance with the Yalta terms.”

At that time, the Yalta agreement on repatriation was still top secret. Therefore, the people, enforcing the return of the anti-Stalinist prisoners of war did not know, that that agreement did not contain any reference whatsoever to "forced repatriation." They probably did not know the fact, that it was the Joint Chiefs of Staff who went far beyond this agreement in its interpretation as in favor of forced repatriation. They did not know — what we know today, thanks to the official army document quoted above, that the Joint Chiefs alone were responsible for the policy of forced repatriation — nor could the American people know.

On March 6, 1946, the New York Times carried a story, written by Sam Pope Brewer, dated Rome, March 5. Since this is a highly interesting report, the following parts may be quoted:

"Many thousands of persons hostile to the present regime in the Soviet Union are being forcibly sent there by the Americans and the British under the Yalta agreement, Eugene Cardinal Tisserant asserted today, and he said the Catholic Church constantly received appeals from 'displaced persons' terrified of being sent back to territory now controlled by Russia, though they cannot be classified as traitors.

"The Cardinal gave the writer the permission to quote him, saying 'It will compromise me, but the world must know of these things.'

"When told that the United States Department had denied that any agreement made at Yalta provided for the return of Ruthenians, Ukrainians or others unwilling to return to the Soviet Union, Cardinal Tisserant said:

"I have seen what I was told was a true copy of that agreement made at Yalta. I cannot disclose the identity of the person who showed it to me, but I have every reason to believe him. The agreement provided for the return of persons who left Soviet territory since 1929, but refugees tell me that they are being sent back at the whim of military authorities."

Two days later, on March 8, 1946, the State Department released the text of the Yalta agreement, probably induced to do so by Cardinal Tisserant's protest.

While the agreement does not have any reference to the year of 1929, the State Department's release on implementation of the agreement says that only those persons would be repatriated "who were both citizens of and actually domiciled within the Soviet Union on September 1, 1939." This stipulation did not cover the Western and Carpathian-Ukrainians (called sometimes Ruthenians), but it certainly covered the Ukrainians who inhabited the Soviet Ukraine on September 1, 1939. Any statement to the contrary, made by the State Department, was not correct.

Probably the most shocking act of forced repatriation took place at Plattling, Germany, on February 24, 1946. On that day, the American army handed over more than 4,000 former members of the anti-communist

Vlasov army. Every one of these 4,000 men knew he would be shot, hanged, or, at best, sent to Siberia should the Soviets ever lay hands on him. The American military authorities — as can be well documented — knew it too.

To give an impression of what happened at Plattling on February 24, 1946, suffice it to quote from just two sources. George Fischer, the Harvard authority on the subject writes in his excellent study, already quoted, "*Soviet Opposition to Stalin*" on page 117:

"It was at Plattling that the last lingering Soviet opposition hopes were extinguished by an abrupt and bitter stroke. Here on a Sunday in February, 1946, the bulk of some three thousand ex-Soviet veterans (there were more than 4,000 ex-Soviets at Plattling, as records, appearing after publication of Fischer's book show) of the KONR (General Vlasov's army) were turned over to Soviet authorities by the U. S. camp administration. The blow fell at six in the morning, completely by surprise, the prisoners having been previously assured by U. S. officers on the spot that no forced repatriation was contemplated. It was accompanied by considerable violence on the part of the American troops."

Jurgen Thorwald, a German writer of great stature, who had at his disposal thousands of documents and who had the opportunity to talk to hundreds of survivors of the great tragedy, described, even more vividly, what happened at Plattling.

Thorwald also relates a conversation between the German General von Koestring and an unknown American Colonel who interrogated him. In this conversation the old German General, who had been a liaison officer between the German High Command and General Vlassov, dealt with the great betrayal of the anti-Stalinists in Germany. Von Koestring told the American Colonel:

"We Germans surely have — through stupidity, inefficiency and ignorance — destroyed the greatest capital which has ever existed in the world in the fight against Bolshevism. You will not understand me now, if I tell you that you have destroyed this capital during the last weeks for the second time. Not only in the materialistic sense, but also in the souls of those who had put all their hopes into your help and understanding — after they had been betrayed by Germany. It may well be that you will desperately call in the very near future for what you have now destroyed."

These are the facts.

There should be a complete investigation of forced repatriation in Germany as carried out by our military and civilian authorities. Since only Congress can do that — because Congress alone may unlock the secret files in the Pentagon and elsewhere — Congress must do it.

It is our duty, prescribed by the ethical principles which we profess, to purge ourselves of a crime which an outstanding American scholar has called an "indelible blot" on our honor.

PAST AND FUTURE

Forced repatriation is not only a matter of the past. It is very much alive to-day in Germany as well as in Austria, where many thousands of Ukrainians, Russians and many other former Soviet subjects are in hiding, afraid that they still may be forcibly repatriated or that the Soviets may make reprisals on their relatives.

The Berlin conference of February 1954 increased the anxiety of those Displaced Persons who once fought against Bolshevism and who are now living a miserable life in Western Europe.

In Berlin the American Delegation under the leadership of John Foster Dulles approved paragraph 5 of article 16 of the Austrian Draft Treaty. This provision — an old Soviet proposal, never before accepted by the Allies — establishes the moral pressure of repatriation. Its approval by the Americans won the consent of the British and the French. The Allies approved it, hoping that this approval might induce the Soviets to sign the Austrian Treaty. Since the Soviets did not sign the Treaty, the provision did not become valid. The credit for that goes to the Soviets, but it is highly significant that we were ready to agree to the ominous paragraph 5 of article 16, which reads as follows:

"No relief shall be given by Austria to persons who refuse to return to their native countries, if these persons fought on the side of the enemies of the Allied and Associated Powers, or voluntarily collaborated with the enemies of these Powers, or engaged in hostile activities against their countries of origin, as well as against any of the United Nations, or are members of organizations and groups which encourage Displaced Persons not to return to their countries of origin."

The enormity of the danger which lies in the American approval of that old Soviet proposal can only be judged correctly if we confront this provision with the reality of 1954. Today we are engaged in a cold war against the Soviet Union. We are successfully cooperating with many former Soviet citizens who fall into the category described in paragraph 5 of article 16 of the Austrian Draft Treaty. Those people are working for our government in the U. S. as well as in Europe. They are contributing to our Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and they are instrumental in the work of the American government sponsored "Radio Liberation." In Berlin we were ready to forsake them and to force the Austrian government to deny them any relief should they "refuse to return to their native countries." And that happened not in 1945 or 1949 but in 1954, after we had just fought successfully for the principle of non-forcible repatriation of the Korean prisoners of war. We should not repeat America's greatest mistake of current century.

LIBERATION AND SELFDETERMINATION

By KURT GLASER

Americans in charge of radio output to Communist-controlled areas, faced with criticism, have tended to take refuge in reaction analyses, associational correlations and other devices offered by psychologists to improve the technical quality of propaganda. Recently, however, there has been increasing awareness of a simple fact: good communication begins with having something to say.

The "campaign of truth," however well staged, has limited appeal. It does not offer the victims of the Soviet power machine concrete hope for their personal futures. Representatives of the enslaved peoples, and Americans who are not content to leave them enslaved, call for greater positive content in American propaganda.

Positive propaganda implies concrete policy. The only meaningful statement which Americans can make to enslaved peoples are statements of American aims concerning their homeland. And if exiles are brought to the microphone, American endorsement of their statements is at least implied.

We can no longer choose whether or not to have a policy concerning nations now governed by the Communists. *We have chosen*: by beaming our broadcasts to enslaved nations over the heads of the puppet governments and by encouraging the political activity of anti-Communist exiles, we have committed ourselves to the need for policy. The only choice left is whether that policy shall be coherent, consistent and in accord with American interests or the confused result of conflicting special-interest pressures.

Enslaved peoples have troubles beyond the mere fact of Communist control. All too often, political and economic struggles made their countries vulnerable to Communism in the first place. Effective policy — and hence effective propaganda — must therefore go beyond the simple proposition of throwing out the present Bolshevik dictatorship. It must say something about the national aspirations of enslaved peoples.

Here, however, policy makers must overcome the existing disunity of anti-Communist forces. Many people feel that conflicts within and among the enslaved nations cannot be settled before liberation and that it is futile to try. Those who hold this opinion, but who nevertheless

realize the need for concrete form and meaning in American policy, have sought agreement on certain basic principles. While these principles may not apply themselves automatically after liberation, it is hoped that they will provide at least a basis for mediation or adjudication.

A doctrine accepted generally by those who think seriously about the problems of liberation is that of national self-determination on the basis of equality of large and small nations. This concept has the following to commend it:

(a) It expresses the moral foundation of American political tradition;

(b) It recognizes the national communities *as political realities* which, in the present stage of human society, are stronger and more permanent than any government;

(c) It mobilizes, within each enslaved nation, powerful emotional forces of identification and loyalty, needed to give strength and cohesion to the anti-Communist movement;

(d) It is accepted by almost all political exiles and Americans with origins in the enslaved countries, however much they may disagree on other matters.

One reason why few object to self-determination is that, unless further defined, it may be stretched to mean very different things. A Great Russian imperialist, for example, may argue that Ukrainians are Russians and that the "Russian people" as a unit should exercise self-determination. Ergo: it is wrong for the United States to support Ukrainian independence. Conversely, the principle could be applied to isolated settlements so as to justify German ex-slaves in Hungary and Rumania. When coupled with the concept of "no-predetermination," self-determination may degenerate into a slogan for postponing rather than facing vital national issues. In this case, our mental processes dictate an unconscious presumption in favor of maintaining the *status quo*. Unless the question of the Russian Imperium is brought out in the open and subjected to a clear decision, policy will automatically become directed to liberating the Soviet Union as a unit and *then* deciding whether the non-Russian peoples are to be assisted toward independence.

Since the middle of the nineteenth century, self-determination as a moral and ideological force has led to the establishment of national states. This fact suggests that the principle commits the United States to encouraging nationalist ideologies as an antidote to Communism. But is the national state the only proper expression of self-determination? Granted that the majority of Ukrainians want an independent Ukraine, it is equally obvious that very few Czechs advocate a national state of "Czechia". Some Czechs wish to perpetuate a unitary "Czechoslovakia,"

while other propose to federate with the Sudeten Germans, the Slovaks and other peoples of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. Either solution involves the self-determination of several nationalities.

Self-determination can lead to quite different results when exercised by different nations. It often affects the welfare of neighboring nations, national minorities and the population of mixed border areas. Thus, a liberation policy, to have meaning as propaganda and as a basis for post-liberation planning, must undertake to state *how* self-determination is to be applied in specific areas. Since we cannot consult the public in Communist-occupied countries, Americans must accept the unpleasant task of passing judgment up on the arguments and proposals of the various exile groups and on the personalities and motives of the exiles themselves. Whatever decision is made will provoke bitter criticism.

Even those agencies which proclaim most loudly that they do not judge or predetermine do so nevertheless when they select certain exiles and reject others for employment in their radio stations and research projects. The exile with a well-paid professional job has money and time for politics and propaganda, whereas his confrere who drives a taxi or washes dishes is practically excluded from these activities. Every personnel decision involving an exile is in fact a choice affecting the shape of post-liberation Europe. Either we choose deliberately and with thought for the future, or we pick exiles with nice manners, who speak good English and "know the right people," and accept uncritically whatever policies they choose to serve up.

There is of course a danger that the attempt to apply self-determination to specific problems may degenerate into mere expediency which renders the principle itself meaningless. To avoid this contingency, it is necessary to examine the concept for its moral essence.

Civilization is by nature complex, and complex ideas are hard to explain. Mental laziness leads us to refer to the sum total of civilized values by the shorthand symbol "anti-Communism". This sloppiness of thought permits even convinced collectivists to call themselves "anti-Communists." Such concentration on what we are fighting *against* rather than *for* is not only bad propaganda: it deadens the philosophical processes which are the beginning of effective statesmanship.

In spite of its diversity in ideas, customs, languages and interests, Western civilization stands or falls on one central doctrine: the absolute value of human personality. Agnostic and atheistic humanists have secularized the idea of personality as an ultimate value in itself. Such philosophies are, however, derivative and truncated. Because they cannot explain *why* the individual is valuable, they are ineffective against the more consistent Marxist materialism. In the main body of Western

thought, each personality is valuable *because* individually created by a loving God, to Whom each of us is responsible for what he does with his life.

The Free Society is based upon a central religious idea. Once human personality is accepted as of a supernatural value, the social problem is that of arranging the natural world so that human beings enjoy their God-given rights to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." Some institutions, such as the family and the Church, have a sacramental foundation. Others, such as the state, may and should support religious value, but are essentially secular in themselves.

Free government is based upon the self-determination of the individual within a divinely determined moral order. The tribe, the city-state, the medieval Empires and the modern nation-state are secular institutions. If they achieve moral worth as values and symbols, it is because they serve the development and expression of the human personalities which compose them.

In pre-Christian Europe, the only forms of social organization higher than the family were the clan and the tribe. The emperors and kings of the Middle Ages converted the Germanic, Slavic and other peoples of Central Europe and organized them into dynastic monarchies. The local lords often shifted allegiance from one monarch to another, so that boundaries were in a constant state of flux. Nobles and knights felt no repugnance against monarchs of other language or tribal origin, and they were equally ready to fight against their closer ethnic relatives.

Nations as we know them today did not appear until early modern times. Only after the French Revolution did the idea take hold that each nation should have its own independent state. Since Central and Eastern Europe had been settled and organized on a tribal and dynastic basis, modern nationalism provoked a century of conflict culminating in two world wars.

Today, the nations of Europe have become genuine social organisms which express the personalities of their members. Since most Europeans are nationally conscious and treasure their national languages, cultures and traditions, the liberation of Central and Eastern Europe means the liberation of nations. The nations have a positive and important value for American policy, but this value is not necessarily absolute or eternal.

The "life, liberty and happiness" which the enslaved peoples of Europe seek are importantly but not entirely related to their national communities. Cultural and civic interests are national: Europeans want to use their own languages and follow their own customs at home, in the school and church, and in community life. They want to be fully qualified citizens and not members of "minorities" subjected to dis-

crimination or forced assimilation. In short, they want to be themselves. These objections can best be realized through self-government of national communities.

But Europeans also want a higher standard of living: greater quantity and variety of food, better housing and clothing and wider cultural opportunities. They want to use their skills and resources to best advantage through access to raw materials and markets. They want to share in the life of the larger European community, they do not like to feel "isolated" or "provincial". Finally, they want military and political security against possible future aggression.

Whether both types of objectives can be fulfilled by national states depends on the facts in the individual case. To establish an independent state which is politically and economically viable, a nation must inhabit a compact and well defined territory. It must be large enough to function as a unit in the modern economic and military world, and it must come to terms with other ethnic groups within its borders. If such states are to enjoy peace over the years, they should not contain irridentist areas the people of which desire annexation to other state. Nor can border problems be solved successfully by expelling or forcibly resettling populations.

The Ukraine presents clearly the conditions for a successful national state. Experience indicates that the Ukrainian people cannot enjoy free development as a nation under political union with Russia. Geography as well as history tell us that the Ukraine is more than adequate as a political, economic and military unit. While there are areas of mixed population and divergent economic orientation along its borders, the Ukraine does not present any specially difficult boundary problems.

In the Danube Valley of Central Europe the situation is quite different. Here, the multi-national Austro-Hungarian Empire had been an efficient economic and military unit. A certain German predominance remained as a relic from dynastic times, but the Austrian Government had made noteworthy strides toward assuring the rights of nationalities in the Austrian half of the Empire.

When Austria-Hungary was carved up in the name of "self-determination," the successor national states of Austria and Hungary were too small to exist as economic units. They fell into a perpetual depression from which they never recovered. Masaryk and Benes knew that an independent "Czechia" would be an absurdity, and so they persuaded the Slovaks and forced the Sudeten Germans to join the new multi-national state of Czecho-Slovakia. The Prague Government tried to administer this artificial structure as though it were a Czech national

state, with the result that Czecho-Slovakia fell to pieces when subjected to external pressure.

The nationalities of the Danube Valley are settled in such irregular patterns and so intermixed that national-state boundaries, however they are drawn, are certain to cause conflict. Any division into national states with resulting "minorities" would deny large population groups their rights of self-determination. Economically, the valley cannot prosper unless it is unified.¹ Czech and Hungarian farmers and miners are natural suppliers and customers for the factory workers of Vienna. The consumer-goods industries of German Bohemia need Austrian and Hungarian markets. Politically, only a consolidated Danube state would be strong enough to prevent eventual domination of the valley by the Reich or to support a free Ukraine against a possible aggressive move by Russia.

An institute to study problems of Danubian Federation is already functioning in Salzburg with Austrian, Czech, Hungarian, Slovak and Sudeten German support. Major attention is given to assuring equal rights to all nationalities regardless of national boundaries (e.g. Czechs in Vienna and Bratislava, Slovaks in Central Hungary, Germans in Prague and Brno). Federationists feel that with advance agreement on this point, the boundaries themselves will dwindle in importance. Conversely, if discussions of ethnic and federal relations were to be postponed as in 1918 until after the liberation of national states, boundary and minority disputes might so poison the atmosphere that federation would be difficult or impossible.

It is argued that what exiles and Americans say and do may be of little importance: that after liberation, "home grown" political leadership will make its own decisions. Actually, political exiles (for instance Lenin, Masaryk, Benes, Sforza) often have been successful in assuming or returning to power. It is quite conceivable that after a Soviet collapse an American military government may have to call the shots in any case.

Self-determination cannot be exercised until after political discussion, and today such discussion is possible only in the free world. There is much opposition to Communism and Russian imperialism behind the iron curtain, but it is largely inarticulate. Although the enslaved peoples will ultimately have to make their own decisions, American and other free radio stations have an important role in preparing them

¹For a detailed study of the growth of productivity and consumption in Austria-Hungary before 1918 and economic decline in the successor states after that date, see Frederick Hertz, *The Economic Problem of the Danubian States*. London, 1947, Gollancz, 223 pp.

for doing so. It is essential that public opinion be molded in such a way that the forces of freedom all pull in the same direction.

Since states are means for achieving the Free Society rather than ends in themselves, Americans must be discriminating in drawing upon nationalism as an ideology to set off against Communist propaganda. Nationalism is, no doubt, an explosive force, but will it explode in the right direction? It was, for instance, Czech nationalism, expressed in the desire to outmaneuver the Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans at all costs which led President Benes and his London exile government to sell out Czecho-Slovakia to Soviet Russia. Both German and Polish nationalisms were at fault in the dispute which set off World War II, and only Polish-German cooperation can secure unity of free forces today and peace in Northeastern Europe tomorrow.

In policy planning for Central and Eastern Europe, and in the selection of exiles to speak over American radio stations, encouragement should be given to that type of nationalism which seeks free development of national character and culture, and which recognizes the equal rights of other nations. The kind of nationalism which demands expansion of territory and power at the expense of others should be just as strongly discouraged.

Liberation is much more than merely driving out the present Communist dictators. It is the creation of a moral order without which true freedom is impossible. The specific measures required for this objective may be quite different in various areas — here a national state, there a federation and perhaps somewhere else an international district.

Americans are not infallible, but if we want to win this fight, we must accept the task of leadership which has been thrust upon us. To give American policy and propaganda positive content, we should take the initiative. We should sit down with our exile and expellee friends and work out provisional solutions to Central and Eastern problems which seem fairest to all concerned, and then bend our efforts to securing maximum support for this program.



PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

Peaceful coexistence is the undeniable goal of all the nations of the Western world. It has a perfectly definite meaning to the minds of the American people and we can best illustrate this in the case of our relations with Canada for more than a century and a quarter.

The American and the Western European is apt to believe that peaceful coexistence would be assured, if something of the same system that prevails along the Canadian-United States border could be applied to the far-flung frontiers of the USSR, even if stricter controls as passports and visas were required. They imagine that closer acquaintance with the outside world would free the Soviet authorities of their fear of strangers, of their abnormal desire for secrecy, of their harping on the dangers of espionage.

As for Communism, they now regard it as a dangerous phenomenon and according to their inclinations and presuppositions, they look at it in one of two ways. One part thinks of it as a movement, misguided but basically idealistic, for raising the well-being of the underdeveloped peoples, even though experience has shown that the system results in slavery. To such people social reforms are the answer.

Another group are inclined to see it as a widespread and insidious conspiracy to get control of the entire world for Moscow. This group does not exclude of necessity many who desire peaceful coexistence with the USSR and they dwell upon the necessity of protecting the free world against Communist infiltration. They urge counter-measures often with more zeal than reason and are often accused of being willing to destroy freedom in their anti-Communist drive.

Neither side has yet sought to find a true intellectual answer to the Communist menace and its system of subversion, infiltration and occupation. Neither side has so far drawn the full conclusions from the fact that Communism has overrun under certain conditions lands which have been inferior in military power but superior culturally and economically. At the same time, it is to be noted that up to the present time Communism has not taken any areas which could not be reached by land through the Soviet Union and its satellites. Even the islands off the Siberian coast were graciously handed over by the Allies to the Soviets at the expense of a conquered Japan. This proposes an interesting ques-

tion. What is the essence of this phenomenon? What is the reason that is behind it? Above all, what is the real connection between the USSR and Communism that makes peaceful coexistence, so obvious in other cases in Europe and America so difficult to achieve here.

The Ukrainian Democratic Republic was the first victim of Russian Communist aggression in 1918. Ukraine's case is very instructive in the problem of peaceful coexistence with Red Moscow. Within two weeks after the Bolshevik seizure of Leningrad, the Ukrainian Central Rada, perhaps acting more wisely than it knew, issued the Third Universal on November 20, 1917, setting up the Ukrainian Republic, an independent state, even though it looked forward to some sort of a federation with similar states to be erected within the Russian Empire and so this Universal was not perhaps a full declaration of complete independence.

On December 17, 1917, the Soviet of People's Commissars of the Russian Soviet Republic unequivocally accepted "clearly and without reservation" the independence of the Ukrainian National Republic. The Soviets were then in their infancy and the Ukrainian National Republic was on the verge of actual recognition by the Western powers, if it had not been already recognized. In the same note, the Soviets presented to Ukraine an ultimatum on the ground that the Ukrainian Central Rada, by refusing to recognize the Soviet type of government and by disarming Soviet soldiers on Ukrainian territory, had shown that it could not be accepted as an "empowered representative of the laboring and exploited masses of Ukraine." It demanded that the Ukrainian National Government should not allow any military units to pass through its territory without the permission of the Soviet military commander, etc. If this ultimatum was not accepted, the Soviets would declare war in 48 hours — and did. In addition, after the initial declaration, they set up on the north-eastern corner of Ukrainian soil, out of Ukrainian and still more Russian Communists a pseudo-Ukrainian Soviet government which as an "independent" state with Russian armies fought against the Ukrainian National Republic, and after many vicissitudes and changes became on the complete occupation of the country, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. During four years it existed as apparently independent Communist-Ukrainian Republic and only in 1923 it was included into Soviet Union. In February and March, 1918 Leon Trotsky, the Commissar of War and an ardent believer in "world revolution" refused to sign the treaty made there with Germany because the German Empire was not a state organized on behalf of the "laboring and exploited masses" of Germany. When the German commanders, unimpressed by this, resumed their advance, Lenin, the ardent disciple of internationalism, forced the Council of Commissars to agree to sign the peace treaty.

In 1924, a handful of Estonian Communists (so-called), most of whom were Russians from the Soviet Union, tried to seize the radio station in Tallinn, proclaimed an Estonian Soviet Republic and asked for assistance. Fortunately for the Estonians at the time, they eliminated the menace before the Soviet army crossed the frontier and precipitated hostilities.

No one can say what would have happened, had one of those Western states with a large proletariat adopted Communism in 1918 and claimed an independent place in the Third Communist International. It did not happen and the Third International established by Lenin was able to sit in Moscow under conditions where only Lenin and his associates possessed any real power and resources.

After the full assumption of power by Stalin and especially after the adoption of the Stalin Constitution in 1936, Stalin's idea of building socialism and communism in one country was adopted. It was not a limitation of Trotsky's "world revolution" but merely a new method of openly declaring the superiority of Moscow and building it up internally side by side with the continuance of its clandestine disruptive and revolutionary work abroad. Litvinov promised President Roosevelt in 1933 on American recognition of the Soviet Union to stop Communist subversive activity in the USA, but at the same time Stalin refused to bind the Communist Party to observe that restriction. At the very moment when the Constitution of the USSR and the universal policy of the government treat the two organizations, the Soviet Government and the Communist Party as one and the same, abroad the Soviet Government refused to be responsible for the activity of the Communist Party. This combination is called in their language "peaceful coexistence" which does not exclude anything but armed aggression, until the moment arrives for the latter.

The earth as we know it is divided into separate states. There is hardly an area of dry land which is not included within the boundaries of one or another government. These boundaries have been fixed by geographical conditions, traditions and by formal treaties. Some have been formed by aggressive war and have found international approval despite the objection of the inhabitants thus rudely transferred without consultation. The disputes over these boundaries that have constantly arisen have been and can be settled by arbitration commissions, treaties, the League of Nations, the International Court and the United Nations. This is because they rest upon a tangible basis.

From the first appearance of Communist Government in Leningrad and its ultimatum to the neighboring state — the Ukrainian National Republic, the Russian Socialist Republic, the Soviet Union and the Com-

munist Party have basically denied this reality of states with fixed geographic boundaries. For it they had substituted the theory of the solidarity of classes and the class struggle. Under this the laboring men in Moscow, New York and Canton have more in common than the laborer in New York and his employer. In the same way, the lawyers, the bankers, the professors of all countries, not to speak of the nobles, the aristocrats and the capitalistic rich are all worldwide classes. The boundaries of the countries are of inferior value.

This to the normal method of human thinking would be obvious enough, but the Soviet ideology goes even further and regards the proletariat as the only representative of any nation and the Communist Party as the only representative of the laboring masses. The party members are bound by strict discipline to obey the will of the masters of the party in Moscow. Still more, the facts published by the Communists in the early days of their domination have made it clear that very few of the original Communists in the Russian Empire, who instigated the city mob to take over the government, were themselves of laboring or peasant origin. Lenin himself was of a family of the despised intelligentsia. Krasin was a prominent engineer. Chicherin was a Russian aristocrat of high rank, Pyatakoff was a Kievan banker-millionaire. They drew their early funds from more or less sympathetic and anti-governmental merchants, bankers and wealthy idealists. Still, they had no scruples about presenting themselves as the only spokesmen for the masses of the workers who did not know, according to them, what they desired. That definition of the Communist Party as the spokesman for the people is written in the Stalin Constitution exactly as it was in the ultimatum to Ukraine in 1917.

This has been markedly true in the United States. The danger of Communism and the drift toward Communism was more quickly rejected by the great masses of the labor unions and their leaders than it was in other classes of society. We may go further and say that the cure has in many cases been slower, as the nature of the work has become more skilled and technical and has required perhaps greater individual intelligence on the part of the individual. This does not mean that these labor unions are satisfied with conditions; they have rejected the Communist solution and their leaders well know from observation in the satellite states that it has been those union leaders, who most fully voiced the real desires of the workers, who have been among the first to be liquidated wherever Communism has won even a temporary triumph.

It has been much harder to arouse the intellectuals and the idealists who for some decades lived in their own ivory tower, saw the good points of the Communist ideology and resolved to act upon them with the

inevitable consequence that they became enmeshed in work which can only be described as treasonable in the most narrow sense of the word.

What is that Communist theory then that has replaced the theory of the geographic state? It is the horizontal organization of society without regard for national boundaries and the destruction of all classes of people except Communists who are above or considered above the level of the laboring class or its conscious leaders. The only way in theory for a non-laborer to continue to live is to be coopted into the chosen body of the Communist Party and become a minor cog in the distribution of the orders of the Central Committee in Moscow.

No Communist in any official work on the subject has ever denied this theory of the horizontal division of society. It is inherent in the slogan, "Workers of the World, Unite." It is inherent in the Soviet statement that Socialist justice extends to all whom it can reach. It is inherent in the Communist indifference to any agreements which are not made with Communists and those agreements can be changed at the will of the Central Committee without right of questioning by other Communists.

From the very beginning the Russian Communists realized that they had to take account of space and that they had to distribute their orders and commands through Communists in given areas. They had to establish geographic branches of the Communist Party, if they were not to fall into hopeless confusion. They had to have Communist units grouped through centres in various parts of the former Russian Empire. They realized that it would be impossible to have a single unit deal with all the working painters or tractor workers in the Russian Empire through a painter or a tractor worker organization, far less to extend that throughout the world which they claimed. They had to have a unit in Ukraine, in France, in Germany, in the United States with subdivisions along the old or new geographic lines. But that did not seem to them an argument against their theory. It was something not that called them to the value of geographic organization but something that could be cloaked in various ways and serve to deceive the rest of the world that was founded on a geographic basis.

This question whether the world is to be organized as in the past, with recognizable geographical state boundaries or a class government including in theory all members of a certain class in the entire world, is the fundamental problem that is offered by the Soviet Union. If statesmen thought over this in beginning, they are now trying to avoid it by subterfuges of various kinds.

Western and American statesmen have had so far but one answer to the problem. They have stood solidly for the principles of the geographic state and they have tried to treat the USSR publicly as if it were a normal

state with the normal internal and external affairs of a state. They have not formally interfered to condemn the USSR publicly for its murders and concentration camps within its own borders, or for physical extermination of nations subjugated by Moscow. They have tried faintly to protest forced labor but they have not directly challenged the state for doing it, for they still look upon the USSR as a geographic state.

On the other hand, they have made public the fact that in the United States at least the Communist Party is a foreign agent and have tried to convict individual Communists of individual or joint crimes against the established government of the USA. No one has yet been able to devise any other tactics that are consonant with the spirit of Western Christian civilization. That has long outgrown the feeling of guilt by association. The spirit of traditional legality has been so inbred that no one in 1917-1918 believed that this theory of Lenin could endure, for it ran counter to all that the civilized world believes.

Yet after thirty seven years that system has hardly allowed a year to pass without working ceaselessly in one of the five continents to bring more and more people under its control abroad and to perpetrate more and more genocide at home. It has not ceased to spread its destructive influence at the expense of the ancient peoples that have been included by force or guile within its borders. It has not hesitated to apply the lessons that it learned in Ukraine to its mastery of the satellite states, and the countries of Asia. And it still talks of peaceful coexistence and threatens Europe and the United States, if they seek to unite against it in any way or in any form on the ground that the capitalistic war mongers are planning aggression against peace-loving peoples with popular Communist governments.

The West has hopes that through "containment" or the "development of strength," through some of the old and well-tried methods, the Communist Soviet Union may be brought to the point where it will cease its support of the Communist movement abroad. It expected it at the death of Lenin. It hoped for it at the death of Stalin. In the meanwhile there has been Communist China, Communist North Korea, the French defeat in Indo-China and Communist Vietminh renewed and increased tension in Africa. There has been the incident in Guatemala, etc., etc.

No one has yet found the key to handle that horizontal organization which stretches from the Moscow centre throughout the world and to handle it as it is, an open and definite part of the Communist-USSR complex. The world is clinging to the idea that somehow Communism can be abstracted from Moscow and the power of the USSR or that conditions can be created which will force the USSR to give up its efforts to continue its outside machinations. The democratic world hates to draw

one of the obvious conclusions, that it must oppose to the horizontal Communist world Community directed by the Moscow local ardent patriotisms and support those people, as the Ukrainians, struggling to maintain their position within that prison of nations that was once the Russian Empire and is now the Russian-dominated USSR. Moscow must be held responsible for the actions of its agents and citizens abroad, Soviet or non-Soviet. The world hates to restrict the embassies of the USSR as the embassies of the United States and other countries are restricted in the USSR and its satellites.

We are witnessing to-day in the cold war a revival under modern conditions of those oppressive forces that created on dynastic or other lines the great multilingual empires of the past with the claims of their rulers to be the masters by the grace of Allah or of some other deity. They disappeared but left their slaves intact. To-day the curious mixture of Russian messianic claims, modern liberal thought and Marxian materialism has produced a theory and a state that is working on new lines. To meet that requires new thought as well as new methods of **armed** warfare.

Communism to-day cannot merely be restricted by social reforms. It is more than a conspiracy. It must be met by a new national liberation idea which will allow the geographic state to meet on equal terms the horizontal. The democratic world has to incend a world crusade to liberate all nations from under the Red Moscow domination behind the iron curtain and the restoration of those real national independent states as Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, Rumania and especially the Ukrainian National Republic, the first victim of the Bolshevik attempt to remodel human nature and communal life and political conceptions of independence. Whatever the means finally selected, the removal of the Moscow agents in the area outside the iron curtain and the removal of Moscow from all areas within the iron curtain that are not Russian, are part of one and the same process and no cure can be successful until the two problems are regarded by statesmen, national leaders and the public as one. Then and only then will there be a true peaceful coexistence of all humanity.



PAST AND PRESENT OF KOLYMA'S MINES

By PETRO KOLYMSKY

This article is a continuation of the memoirs by the inmate of the Kolyma concentration camps, published in previous issues. (Editor).

Berzin, a Lett by nationality, and one of the former chiefs of the Kremlin security guard, was appointed in 1929 representative of the NKVD in the Kolyma district. Under his direction, the first geological surveys, after the discovery of the gold-bearing strata and the first washing, plants were built by the hands of the first prisoners in Kolyma. The city of Magadan and the automobile road from Magadan to the Adanski gold fields were built. Each year more and more prisoners were sent to Kolyma and set to mining gold. At the end of the Berzin administration, Kolyma held the first place in the production of gold.

Taking advantage of the relatively "liberal policies" of the NKVD up to the period of Yezhov, Berzin introduced the method of paying for work in the Kolyma camps, and though it was forced labor this gave the prisoners real incentive. At a time when the workers and members of the kolhosps in freedom were ragged and hungry, the prisoners in Kolyma were fully assured of clothing and food. Each prisoner could buy in the camp stores an unlimited amount of articles of primary importance when in freedom people had cards by which they could secure only 200-500 grams of bread. The prisoner, who was an average worker, made 1500-1800 rubles a month in summer and 1000-1200 rubles a month in winter.

Both summer and winter all the prisoners had a healthy appearance and were able to do the extremely heavy work of gold mining. The amount of the work of each prisoner during the Berzin period was three or four times that of the prisoner in 1938-9. The mortality was quite insignificant. All who finished their term in Kolyma up to 1937, had earned good money and upon their release, took it home with them.

THE REPLACEMENT OF BERZIN BY GARANIN

In the period of uncertainty, when in the entire USSR the leaders were falling from the Communist Olympus into the abyss, Berzin, the boss of Kolyma, fell headlong from the heights of the NKVD ladder. In November, 1937, he was arrested and proclaimed an "enemy of the peo-

ple." He was accused of being the organizer of an anti-Communist party among the prisoners in Kolyma, so as to tear Kolyma from the Soviet Union and give it to Japan. He was accused of spying for Japan. He was also condemned for bettering the working conditions of the prisoners in the concentration camps in Kolyma as compared to the workmen in freedom.

The arrival of Garanin, the new boss of Kolyma, was marked by an incredibly savage terror against all the prisoners. Without exception, all prisoners who had been condemned for political reasons, were given new terms of imprisonment. They were charged with the crime of forming counter-revolutionary organizations so as to tear Kolyma from the Soviet Union, though they were under the constant supervision of the NKVD. The prisoners were accused of sabotage, diversion and economic counter-revolution as a result of which, Kolyma had not completed its planned quota for the production of gold. The more fortunate received additional terms of imprisonment, up to 10 years each, and many fell into the prison of the Serpantinna. In the second half of 1937, prisoners who had been condemned for political activity were not released from the camps, even though they had completed their terms. In Khatynakh, I met a man of 69, a former prominent SR and a responsible deputy of the old, pre-revolutionary Petersburg, who had been in prison since 1922. In September, 1939, he received an additional five year prison term and he did not expect to live to see the end of this term.

THE KOLYMA PRISON SERPANTINNA

Berzin was accused of Trotskism and like the prominent Trotskists in Kolyma, he was thrown at Khatynakh into the Serpantinna prison. Almost no one left this alive. Tortures were inflicted upon the prisoners along with the breaking of their arms and legs. The victims were seated in wooden boxes with sharp nails sticking out of all sides and kept there for days at a time. Bound prisoners were roasted in a fire. Without exception, all were savagely beaten. As a rule, prisoners incriminated themselves so as to avoid the serious physical tortures before being shot.

To deaden the groans and curses of the men under torture, the investigators of the NKVD sang various songs over loud speakers. From those who had survived and worked with us, we could learn nothing of the institution which imposed death sentences upon its victims. According to the testimony of prisoners who had served their sentences, the shootings in the Serpantinna went on often all day and night in a deep mountain ravine. Three heavy tractors of the NKVD stood by and the sound of their motors deadened the sound of the shots. In 1938, there

passed through the Serpantinna tens of thousands of prisoners, who had come to Kolyma with fixed prison terms and had not completed them. Perhaps of the thousands, one or two remained alive and were sent back to the camps but the others were annihilated.

THE FALL OF GARANIN

In spite of the severe isolation of the convicts from the outside world, all the changes which took place among the heads of the USSR, came to us prisoners, even if belated. On January 27, 1938, when we were at the station "March 8," we knew of the fall of N. Yezhov and his replacement by L. Beria. With this change was connected the relaxation of the conditions of life for the prisoners, which I mentioned in the previous article.

Garanin was appointed at the end of 1937, when the importance of N. Yezhov was at its height and so it was very natural that the new Narkom L. Beria deposed Garanin as an appointee of Yezhov. After a year and a half of his rule in Kolyma, Garanin had killed by cold and hunger about 250,000 men, who actually had been arrested without being guilty and sent to Kolyma. During the winter of 1937-1938 and half of the winter of 1938-1939 great masses froze at Kolyma. Very many of these died. Even a slight freezing produced an army of over 60,000 invalids among the prisoners.

In the spring of 1939, Garanin was arrested and proclaimed "an enemy of the people" and a Japanese spy. Everything that he had done at Kolyma with the knowledge of N. Yezhov and J. Stalin was ascribed to him as his own crime. The catastrophic fall in the productivity of the work of the prisoners in the camps of Kolyma was caused by hunger, which prevailed under the regime of Garanin. The incredible losses from sickness and the high mortality of the prisoners, up to 500,000-600,000 were replaced by new prisoners, but they could not maintain the level of gold-production of the earlier years under Berzin. In 1938 there was much less gold secured than in 1937, although the total number of prisoners was three times greater than in the preceding years.

When Garanin was arrested, it was clear to us that the cause of his arrest and shooting was not the death of the hundreds of thousands of innocent men during these one and a half years, but the drop in the gold production. The liquidation of Garanin unquestionably was a factor in the alleviation of the fate of hundreds of thousands of prisoners, although the regime as a whole underwent almost no changes in the camps in Kolyma.

About 200,000 prisoners under Garanin received supplemental terms of prison in Kolyma, each of 10 years. No one gave any indication whether these new terms imposed by Garanin would remain in force or be annulled. Just as the first accusations and condemnations, so the second sets were the product of the diseased imagination of the NKVD. In both cases, the absolute majority of the prisoners had never belonged to any anti-governmental parties or organizations, had committed no crime against the people and the state. They were people who had accepted loyally the decrees of the government and considered it their duty to fulfill them. As for the usual group of prisoners, who were transferred to the category of political prisoners and received new terms of imprisonment, most were petty criminals and murderers, who had no interest in political affairs.

FREE TO-DAY, ARRESTED AGAIN TO-MORROW

The second time I fell into the punishment section of Nizhny Khatynakh, there was in the same brigade with me, a prisoner by the name of Evert. As a free man, he had worked as a miner in the Donbas. In 1935, he was arrested and sent for three years to Kolyma. He was accused of counter-revolutionary propaganda and like the other prisoners with short terms of imprisonment, he received under Garanin another 10 years in the Kolyma prison.

In July, 1939, Evert completed his first term. He was called to the central office and informed that he had completed the legal term of imprisonment and was free. Evert then replied that he had been given a supplemental term of 10 years. He received the answer that the second term given him in the camp had not been confirmed.

During my imprisonment in Kolyma, I knew only this one case (Evert) when the supplemental term of imprisonment was cancelled. So, we must admit that the Garanin sentences had been annulled, although the heads of the camps did not inform the prisoners of this fact.

The people, freed from imprisonment in the Kolyma conditions, were only formally counted as free. They actually continued to live the life of prisoners. When any one was released, he was told that there was a long waiting list for the steamship and so he would have to work "as a free laborer" for one or one and a half years. These "free laborers" lived in the camps but were not guarded. They went to work with the prisoners. Many quickly found themselves again behind the barbed wire as prisoners. Evert, as a trained miner, on his release obtained the post of a foreman. He no longer worked with a wheelbarrow but he was with us in the mine. Three weeks after his release, he was again arrested and

placed in the isolation ward. He was accused of poor work while a prisoner and of stating among the prisoners that he had not dug gold in Kolyma and would not look for it. He was condemned by a show court in our camp. The regional procurator of the Far Eastern Country asked for 10 more years of imprisonment. At the end, the accused was given the opportunity to speak. He began by saying that his grandfather, father, all his brothers and he himself had been working miners; that he, Evert, with arms in his hands had fought for communism; for this he had been given the order of the Red Banner. That as a workman, when he was free, he had committed no crime against the state and the people and had been the victim of slander and lies of hostile elements, to which the NKVD had listened and as a result of this, he considered and considers himself innocent and has no reason to confess his crimes in the Kolyma concentration camp. He demanded from the court either the death penalty, to stop further sufferings, or freedom.

The court acquitted Evert and he again became a foreman. This shows that the chief object of the NKVD was to hold people as long as possible in the cold Kolyma wilderness, where free people refused to go for any money. However, there are two ways to do this: 1) After release make them wait for years for transportation from Kolyma and 2) give the prisoners new additional terms. When Evert was released for the first time in July, 1939, I thought that he would leave for home. I wrote my wife Evert's home address in Stalino-Donbas and told her to go to Stalino and he would tell her about the prison life in Kolyma. When I was free and home with my family, in May, 1941, I wrote a letter to Evert's wife in Stalino and she answered that he had not returned home and she did not know when he would come. From the time of his second release in August, 1939 to May, 1941, it was one year and 9 months and his turn had not yet come to depart. In a month the war began and there is no doubt he did not return before the end of the war.

THE COMPOSITION OF THE PRISONERS IN THE CAMP OF NOVY KHATYNAKH

The second All-Union census of the population of the USSR was made twice. The first in January, 1937, I was in freedom with my family. The second time in 1939, I was in Kolyma in the concentration camp of Novy Khatynakh. The census was taken by the prisoners in our camp and so we all knew the figures. The census of the prisoners in the camp of Novy Khatynakh showed that 87% had received higher technical education. They were people of intellect, but fate had assigned them to pushing a wheelbarrow and using a pick and shovel, while the uneducated

ran the camps. Most of the prisoners with higher education were the products of the Soviet period. They had received state scholarships during their studies and had prepared themselves for independent technical work. The money and time spent on their education had been wasted. These people were ill-adapted to perform the extraordinarily heavy work and most of them lived on punishment fare. Evenings after their work, they wandered around the refuse pit and picked up the leavings from the prisoners' kitchen. They were first candidates for the fatal swellings.

Unlike the former years, there were in all the camps and especially in those in Kolyma, a goodly percentage of Communists among the prisoners. According to the data of the census of 1939, there were 34% of former members of the Party in the camp of Nizhny Khatynakh. More than two-thirds of these had taken active part in 1917-1920 on the side of Communism. The majority had high decorations of one of several orders but this had not saved them from the prison which they had introduced. Up to the day of their arrest, they had been condemning and sending to prison camps totally innocent people, peasants, intelligentsia and workmen. When they supported the general trend of Stalin, the terror in the country and the opening of prison camps, not one of them supposed that the time would come when he himself would fall prisoner into such a camp.

Their appearance and conversation revealed the national composition of the prisoners. The most common form of speech in the camps of Kolyma was Ukrainian. Of other nationalities, there was a large number of Caucasians and peoples of Central Asia. The data of the prisoners' census in 1939, in the camp of Nizny Khatynakh, shows the quantitative composition of the different peoples in the camp. According to the census there were 39% of Ukrainians, 17% of Caucasians, 23% of the peoples of Central Asia and the rest were Russians and of other nationalities.

LINKS WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD

In the camps in Khatynakh, the prisoners had the right to carry on unlimited correspondence with their relatives and to write requests for a review of their cases. However, it was impossible to secure even a scrap of paper and an envelope, so the prisoners could write only one letter every six months. Paper was not sold or given away in the camp office or in the prisoners' store. To communicate with one's family, the prisoners had to use paper bags or tear off scraps from paper packages. As a result, many prisoners lost contact with their families.

Quite a few prisoners, when they found a scrap of paper for the first letter, asked their families to send them in each letter an addressed

envelope and a sheet of paper for an answer. I did this and my family sent me always in each letter an addressed envelope and paper and so I maintained a regular contact with them.

To get the scrap of paper sent, it was necessary to give to the criminal or murderer, who brought the letter, a day's supply of bread for each sheet of paper and envelope. Otherwise, he took the paper from the letter addressed to me and sold it to other prisoners.

When I reached Kolyma, I had a few rubles. To inform immediately my family of my arrival, I sent them a telegram saying: "I am in Kolyma, alive, well. Send packages, money."

The usual mail connections with the USSR were only from May to December, when airplanes flew between Vladivostok and Magadan. From the beginning of December to May, the Sea of Okhotsk was covered with thick ice and ships could move only with the aid of powerful ice-breakers. These were used for other cargoes but not for prisoners' mail.

Letters from home could be sent by airmail but prisoners were forbidden to use it.

From time to time my family sent me in winter telegrams with a prepaid answer and I replied briefly how I was.

In Kolyma we were forbidden to read newspapers and the free laborers who worked in the camp, did not have the right to throw away used newspapers, they had to be burnt. We were completely cut off from the outside world and could learn the news only from new prisoners. In August, 1939, in the camp of Nizhny Khatynakh, a loudspeaker was placed near the gate. But even after that we were forbidden to read newspapers.

THE POSSIBILITY OF ESCAPE FROM KOLYMA

In the camp Ledyana, I met Zelinsky, a captain of the Pacific Ocean commercial fleet. He was a comparatively young man, who had been several times in the western ports of America and had friends there. His wife lived in Vladivostok and wrote him that his friends from San Francisco often visited her. Zelinsky knew well the coast of the Chukotsk peninsula and proposed to me and two other prisoners in April, 1939 that we flee to Alaska.

We asked him how we could cross Bering Strait and he assured us that he knew well the Chukohi who would take us across. Our chief problem was to collect hard bread. This was a serious problem in the camp. A prisoner received only the food that he ate. Everything that he hid in his clothing or his bed disappeared without a trace the next day. It was at once stolen. In spite of these difficulties, with the aid of a physician,

we obtained one day biscuits instead of bread. We bought more from several prisoners and thus had 5 pounds of dry bread, which under prison conditions was a great treasure.

Only we four prisoners knew of our plans. One of us, as a result of carelessness or because of fear turned a provocateur. In a few days Capt. Zelinsky was transferred and three days after his transfer, I was taken to the punishment post in Nizhny Khatynakh. As I later learned, it was almost impossible to escape from Kolyma. The native population, which did not value gold, would give up their own children for 50-100 cubic centimetres of alcohol.

Making use of this weakness for alcohol among the native population, the NKVD announced that they would give 5 litres of alcohol for any prisoner caught. This was such a high reward that there was not a single native who would refuse this amount of alcohol and have mercy on a prisoner.

In September, 1939, I met a group of five men, former army officers between the ages of 25 and 35, who had been sent to Nizhny Khatynakh after an unsuccessful attempt. All were of the central command unit of the Kiev military district and in 1937 had been proclaimed "enemies of the people." Each had received 15 to 25 years of imprisonment. Actually this meant life imprisonment.

They chose the most favorable time for escape under the conditions of Kolyma — the second half of August. There was then no problem of food, for nature furnished plenty. The moss, woods and even the rocky peaks of the mountains had enough berries, mushrooms and cedar berries.

These five bold army officers wandered into the forest tundra for 21 days. The entire wooded area of Kolyma is covered with a layer of moss 2-3 metres deep, which thaws in August to quite a depth. This gives the moss an extraordinary springiness and it is very hard to walk on it. The first days they made only 6-7 miles. Their feet began to ache them. The next days they could go only 2.5-4 miles a day. The rocky summits of the mountains lacked the moss. So they were compelled to continue their way through the woody and mossy ground. They wandered three weeks in the woods. Their clothes were torn to ribbons in the thick growth; their bodies were scratched until they festered and finally they had to go out upon the automobile road and wait for a passing auto to take them back to the concentration camp. This ended the attempt of the five officers to escape. Almost no one, even the most desperate murderers and criminals ever fled from Kolyma. They had no hope for success. It was very easy to leave the boundaries of the Kolyma camps, but very difficult to find the desired haven.

BOOK REVIEWS

RUSSLAND: STAATLICHE EINHEIT UND NATIONALE VIELHEIT, by Georg von Rauch. Veröffentlichungen des Osteuropa-Institut, München, B. 5. Herausgeber: Hans Koch, p. 235.

On picking up this book of Georg von Rauch, every student of East European history, except the Russian imperialists who advocate a single, indivisible Russia, must do so with scepticism. This arises from the title and subtitle: *Russia: State Unity and National Diversity. Federalistic Forces and Ideas in Russian History*. In the title, subtitle and part one of the book, the author seems to set forth his credo on the East European and North Asiatic area: that this area forms a natural geographical unit which he calls Russia. In this area, which in his opinion, forms a single state unit (*Staatliche Einheit*), federalistic forces and ideas are operating which will finally be realized and then "Russia" will be quickly changed into a federal state.

This conception scientifically is completely incorrect, for Russia has never formed a single natural geographical and cultural unit. It is an artificial conglomerate of many independent peoples, which the principality of Moscow succeeded over centuries in absorbing by force into a single state organism dominated by the despotic rule of the Moscow centre and condemned to a natural dissolution, like all empires, at any moment, when the controlling forces of the Moscow centre weaken and will be no longer able to keep the conquered peoples under their control. Russia is not and never was a natural geographical "*Staatliche Einheit*." It was a conquering empire which arose on the political ruins of a number of fully developed nations that had absolutely no desire for unity or federalism with Moscow. In our opinion, in formulating this position, the author should rather have taken the title: *Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces in the Russian Empire*.

The introduction of the book will indeed awaken only the serious opposition of the East European scholar to the a priori conception of the author. Yet as he reads chapter after chapter, he will see that despite the original fallacy in the beginning, the book is very valuable. It is worked out with German meticulousness and with a full use of the Russian and non-Russian literature and, what is more important, this work of von Rauch is an useful handbook for information on all the details of the centripetal and the unifying forces of the Russian centre; also of those forces working for independence of conquered nations, which in 1917 a few months after the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, forced the dissolution of the Russian Empire into its national states which will certainly dissolve again at the first cataclysm that confronts the Soviet Union. This development is very natural in this Eurasian continent, for on the side of the centripetal forces there is only the brutal strength of the central authority and the weak bond of Russian culture and in part of the Russian Orthodox church; on the side of the centrifugal forces, are the ethnic diversity of the non-Russian peoples, their hatred for the Russian denationalizing centre, the old national traditions of the non-Russian peoples which have been destroyed by Moscow, and finally their economic interest in ceasing to be colonies of Moscow.

The interest of the author in this theme has great, practical significance for the German policy, as the author admits (p. 9). "The efforts of the Ukrainian plans to separate from Russia during the First and Second World Wars, were," so he writes, "without any doubt, dependent upon factors of a universal political development; the German eastern policy, which lacked a correct understanding of these connections, had to deal with these; the first time the needs of German military economic policy were placed first; the second time the basis was a conception which made impossible any building of a new order anywhere in the world."

This valuable acknowledgement of the author should have been the starting point of his synthetic ideas on the Eurasian area, which is the subject of his studies. In fact this double intervention of Germany in Ukraine in a single generation, prevented the Ukrainian people from freeing themselves to the injury not only of the Ukrainian people, but also of Germany itself, since this would have opened for friendly Germany great economic and cultural horizons through the disintegration of the Russian empire into national states. By its two interventions, Germany destroyed the sympathies which it had had in Ukraine. We believe that this was the final mistake of Hitler toward Ukraine and, we hope, will never be repeated.

In turning to a detailed review of the book of von Rauch, we must emphasize that the old Kievan Rus did not form an ethnic whole, as the author thinks. Its powers of cultural assimilation were too weak and superficial to create a single nation in this wide area. At the beginning of the XII century, Kievan Rus began to fall apart and out of these parts were developed four national groups, each on its own ethnic basis: Ukrainian (Kiev and Halych), Muscovite (Suzdal and Rostov), Byelorussia (Polotsk and the Kryvychi), and Novgorod and Pskov. In the XII century there was no federation of Kievan Rus and no desire to establish one. Structurally and culturally the liquidation of the special centre of republican Novgorod (different from Moscovia) was completely echoed in the cultural and structural annihilation of the Novgorod liberties.

There is no doubt that the author has been hampered by his absolutely unclear use of the term *Russland*, which he constantly employs in the mediaeval period of eastern Europe, for the Grand Principality of Moscow, modern Imperial Russia and for Kievan Rus as well. The conceptions, Muscovy and Rus, are perfectly clear to the peoples of eastern Europe, the Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Poles and their neighbors, but the conception *Russia* as used by the author for the entire area during a thousand year period in those terms is historically incorrect and confusing.

The Russian influences upon the author as to the medieval period leads him to such absurd ideas, now officially spread by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, that the Ukrainian and Byelorussian peoples first took their rise in the XV century as a result of the struggles between Muscovy, Lithuania and Poland; this is scientifically false. (p. 17).

There is likewise no scientific support for the author's views on the Pereyaslav union of Ukraine and the tsarate of Muscovy. The author again here accepts the purely Russian conception based on great power theories, that Hetman Khmelnytsky desired sincerely a union with Orthodox Moscow because it had the same faith and that he even tried to bring under the tsars domination Moldavia and Wallachia. This is a complete misunderstanding of the period. (p. 25).

The author sketches briefly, in only 48 pages, the medieval period of Eastern Europe and the times before the XIX century. This is unquestionably the weak side of the work. The modern period (handled in 180 pages) stands in great con-

trast to the first part. The author gives us an excellent survey of the two currents, which existed in the political thought of the Russian empire and in the state practice; the Russian centralizing and nationalistic course and the trend toward a federalistic state upon the multinational character of the Empire.

The author very solidly and faithfully presents the growth of the political aspirations of the non-Russian peoples, who impressed by the great strength of the Russian centre, first limited their demands to autonomy, later to federation, and then during the Great Russian Revolution and the disintegration of the Empire, raised the call for the independence of all peoples. The Russian Empire in 1918 was actually broken up into national states. This process has been described by the author very truly and with a full knowledge of the question. His basic study of the literature has given him the power to explain the process in all details, some of which are still very little known, and some of which appear for the first time in such a synthetic work as this.

The author has approached this process of the liberation of the non-Russian peoples of the tsarist empire not only with a modern comprehension but even with the sympathy of a true democrat. The handbook of von Rauch may be short, but it contains a solid mass of information on the centrifugal and centripetal forces which were at work in modern Russia, and are now active in the Soviet Union. We must gladly acknowledge that in regard to the XIX and XX centuries, we found almost no important mistakes in the book.

In summing up, the work of von Rauch shows the strong influence exerted upon the author by Prof. O. Hoetsch, the most authoritative German historian of eastern Europe between the two World Wars. Prof. Hoetsch was also an advocate of a federal reconstruction of the Russian Empire. In the latest period, where the author has had to work independently on the basis of his own studies and to express his own thoughts, he noticeably differs from the ideas of Hoetsch and sees the possibility of a transformation of the Soviet Union into a series of national states. Georg von Rauch's work is a valuable contribution to the modern East European history.

NICHOLAS CHUBATY

L'UKRAINE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL, par Romain Yakemtchouk, Licencié en Sciences politiques et diplomatiques, Membre-chercheur de l'Institut des Relations Internationales. Preface de M. Paul De VISSCHER, Professeur à la Faculté de Droit de l'Université de Louvain. CENTRE UKRAINIEN D'ETUDES EN BELGIQUE, Louvain, 1954. Pp. 56, 80.

Mr. Yakemtchouk has undoubtedly made a valuable contribution toward a better understanding of the complicated position which Ukraine occupies in the international set up. A guide of this kind will prove very helpful to political scientists as well as laymen interested in Ukrainian affairs.

If criticism could be raised, it would be that the study is too concentrated and compels the author to limit himself to the most essential documentary material. Probably this desire to save on space prompted him to omit the translation of English and German quotations into French, and this may prove a serious handicap to those not familiar with these languages.

The study is based mostly on material published by official Soviet sources and works of international authorities on political law, with an extensive use of relevant quotations. This renders the book, as Professor Paul de Visscher stressed

in his preface, "precise and objective at the same time." The task was not an easy one, the author points out, as Ukraine presents a "sui generis" case which has few equivalents. "From a strictly juridical point of view, the Ukrainian Republic is a "person," according to the Law of Nations, it is a "state" . . . a relatively "sovereign state" as she exercises the "jus tractandi," and possesses an internationally recognized treaty making power. "Thus — paradoxically — it is more sovereign in external matters than in its internal affairs." In fact, the "jus tractandi" is strictly controlled and limited. It is exercised when it is in the interests of the central government in Moscow to allow it. There is hardly any comparison between the sovereign rights of Ukraine and those exercised by the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, such as Canada, Australia, India and others, which enjoy full powers of "jus tractandi" as well as full control of their internal affairs.

Powers exercised by the Soviet federal state over the federated republics are practically all-embracing. The right to secede, although included in the constitution of 1936 and contained in the amendment of 1944, is problematical to say the least, as well as Article 13 of the 1936 constitution, which affirms that the union of the member-republics was by free consent. Article 14 of the same constitution specifies the "powers of which the Federal State disposes" in relation to its federal republics. They embrace the matters of (1) *Security*: conclusion and ratification of treaties with other states; decisions about war and peace; admission to the Union of new republics; organization of the defence of the Union and command over all armed forces; guarding the security of the State. (2) *Economy*: planning of the national economy of the Union; acceptance of the budget of the Union; external trade, as based on the monopoly of the State; banking, the establishment of such industrial and agricultural enterprises, as concern the whole Union; transport; the monetary system and credits; state assurance undertakings, loans, establishment of fundamental principles of tenure of land, possession of sub-soil riches, forests and waters; organization of uniform statistics of national economy. (3) *Social, cultural and juridical affairs*: establishment of fundamental principles in the field of public instruction and protection of public health; legislation concerning labor; fiscal and civil code; citizenship questions; definition of rights of foreigners; promulgation of federal acts concerning amnesty. (4) *All matters pertaining to the execution and changes of the Constitution*: control of the execution of the Constitution of the Union, measures assuring the conformity of the Constitution of the federated republics with the constitution of the Union; approval of modification of frontiers of the federated republics; approval of the formation of new territories and regions as well as new autonomous republics within the federated republics.

"As can be seen, — remarks the author, — this enumeration includes almost all important domains of the political life of a State." Very few sovereign rights remain to the federated republics.

The study is a welcome addition to informatory publications on Ukrainian affairs in the French language.

University of Ottawa.

V. J. KAYE-KISILEVSKY

W. W. ROSTOW, *THE DYNAMICS OF SOVIET SOCIETY*, W. W. Norton and Company. New York, 1953, pp. 259.

The Dynamics of Soviet Society was written in collaboration with Alfred Levin, and with the assistance of others at the Center for International Studies of

the Massachusetts Institute of Technology as an outgrowth of a series of experimental investigations carried out in that institution. The purpose of this experiment, as it is stated in the Foreword, was "to attempt to pull together, in the compass of one short volume, what modern Russian studies could contribute in answer to two fundamental questions: (1) What determines the policy of the Soviet state, at home and abroad (2) What are the prospects for change in Soviet society?" Thus, instead of writing a political textbook, the authors of this volume rather tried to focus existing knowledge about the Soviet Union around these grave, important and very timely questions on which American foreign policy must be based and to contribute in a limited way to the study of Soviet society and to the clarification of certain issues basic to the making of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. In order to elaborate these problems, and to bring them together into a unified analysis, the authors of this essay organized their material into three rather voluminous parts. The first examines the evolution of Soviet rule, i.e., the series of steps which led to one-man dictatorship, centralization of power, bureaucracy of administration, the changing course of the organization and policies of the regime, the changing elements of Soviet life and culture, and the course of Soviet foreign policy. The second part evaluates the cohesive forces, instability, and tensions in contemporary Soviet society. The third part reviews the events from the Party Congress of October 1952 to May 15, 1953 and examines the operational behavior of Soviet leaders after the death of Stalin, clearly shows that the present work is a study of analytic history, a study which tends to bring together the various social sciences around a single dynamic problem, the problem of change over a period of time.

Basically this is a history of communism and it retells the facts which we have known so well for more than thirty years, in a new form and version. The very approach to the subject matter and the dynamic force with which it analyzes the core of the communist structure, i.e., the treacherous behavior of the Soviet leaders, make this one of the few books on Soviet Union that really explains what is happening there. *The Dynamics of Soviet Society* could have even been one of the most potential political weapons of this controversial issue had it not been for too many "lapses" which cannot be overlooked, since the present essay was designed primarily "to assist the makers of American policy" (p.3). One of the major lapses of the book is the author's general policy toward the national groups of the USSR. The words Russia and Russian are too often applied to non-Moscovite territories and their characteristics and too often dominate the political scene with a taste of the old imperialistic force of the past. In the 259 pages of text the Ukraine and Ukrainian(s) are mentioned only 16 times! Such historical facts as the proclamation of Ukrainian Independence and the recognition of the Ukrainian State are overlooked. The Ukrainian question is entirely omitted from the chapter dedicated on the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Almost nothing is said about the tragic Ukrainian losses which were the result of collectivization and the political purges. The attacks on the churches are bypassed with a few phrases and one very general statement that "churches were closed on a large scale and substantial number of priests were sent to forced labor camps." There are several others pertaining to the Ukrainian question but they are mentioned sporadically and treated rather locally as matter of geographical necessity.

Another weakness of the book is the bibliography. In a note to "A Select Bibliography" the authors of this essay state that "in some areas (that of nationalities, for instance), adequate works in English are as yet nonexistent." And,

as one could expect, the seven-page list of bibliographical items does not contain a single Ukrainian name, periodical or source. It is indeed very strange that of the hundreds of books published in English on Ukraine on both continents in the last three decades not even one of them was found to be "adequate" by Mr. Rostow and his assistants. One may wonder, therefore, what renders an adequate book "adequate." As long as the experts on Soviet affairs live in their preferred and secluded past, we doubt that their books will accomplish their mission.

Beloit College

NICHOLAS M. PALEY

CIVILIZATION AT BAY. By V. L. Borin. London: The Forty-Five Press, 1951. 193 p. Five shillings.

The book is a condemnation of both private-enterprise monopolistic capitalism and Soviet totalitarianism. Borin believes that both are repressive of further social progress, although private-enterprise capitalism is a little better than Soviet "state capitalism." Mankind is thus in a dilemma, because both alternatives, represented by the U. S. and the USSR do not offer desirable political-economic systems for future development. One desirable thing about private-enterprise capitalism, he says, is that it provides political freedom for the individual; however, it contains a serious limitation in its "monopolistic" feature. The bad things about the "Socialisms" are the creation of large masses of propertyless workers, and the lack of individual freedom. Borin then suggests ways of solving this dilemma. First, he rejects the "welfare state" and the "nationalization of property" because these are ways of "proletarianizing Mankind." The way out of the dilemma, says Borin, is not by creating more proletarians, but by "liquidating the proletarians as a class." This could be done peacefully by gradually establishing communal ownership of enterprise by selling shares to reliable workers actually engaged in industry. Since such workers would become part-owners of the industries employing them, they would cease being proletarians.

His criticisms of the Soviet economy are competent and show evidence of careful study. However, some of his ideas about "capitalism" are unpolished. One major shortcoming of the book, and of the whole approach that this kind of book represents, is that he treats abstractions as if they were real. Although we may think of "civilization," or "private capitalism," or "state capitalism" in the abstract they do not actually exist as single things. Rather, many unique civilizations and economic systems exist. The private capitalist cultures in the various parts of the world differ greatly among themselves. The cultural understandings and work practices among workers in the U. S., England, or France are not identical. Furthermore, the state capitalism of the Soviet sphere is not one uniform thing in actual practise. Although the Russians have tried to standardize the cultures, as well as the political and economic organization of their empire, there is by no means actual standardization. Communist Ukraine, for example, is still Ukrainian by culture, and the countless subtle understandings differ from those of the Russians, the Poles, the Chinese, and others in the Communist totalitarian sphere. There is serious doubt that any universal plan, such as the one suggested by Borin, which is intended for uniform application to all the various cultures of the world, can be made to work. It would be more efficacious for each nationality to develop its own political and economic system which would best suit its own unique ethos. Another shortcoming is Borin's idea that his plan would be the final salvation of Mankind; he does not allow for any limitations in it.

University of Wisconsin.

JOHN ZADROZNY.

A GEOGRAPHY OF EUROPE, Edited by W. G. Hoffman. New York, The Ronald Company, 1953.

In recent years several books on the geography of Europe have been published. This last book, mentioned above and edited by W. G. Hoffman is the collective work of several authors.

There is a section on Eastern Europe and the historical survey of the geography of this part of the European continent. The geographical survey is the work of the young American geographer, Theodore Shabad, who published in 1951 the well-known *Geography of the USSR*.

The previous works which treated Eastern Europe geographically were based fundamentally upon the Russian tendentious sources and did not analyze them or consider them in the light of modern studies. Some geographers as Prof. G. B. Cressey of Syracuse University accepted the Soviet propagandist material for truth (*The basis of the Soviet strength*) or emphasized the previous assumptions and wrote in the volume *Asia's Lands and Peoples* (1952) about the Baltic peoples, the Ukrainians and the White Ruthenians. In accepting the Soviet "Eurasian scheme," this author blindly copied the Russian models. Another well-known author, G. D. Hubbard, a Professor of Harvard University (*Geography of Europe*, 1952) considered the Ukrainian language as a Russian dialect (sic!) and the Ukrainians as the "fringe of Muscovites." (!) Miror again started with the Russian positions knowingly and regarded the USSR (on the old pattern) as a compact Russia.

Shabad, who was the first in the United States to give a survey of the geography and economics of the USSR by Republics, bases his section dealing with Eastern Europe (and not Russia, as the older geographers did) not only on original material but often on his own analysis.

The section written by Mr. Shabad, does not go into special questions but treats them briefly, although — as his previous work shows — he is acquainted with them. In the same way he mentions such an important problem as the complete liquidation of the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the subjection of the Georgian and Estonian Orthodox Churches to the Russian Orthodox Church, the tool of Russian imperialism. He touches also the problem of the russification of the non-Russian peoples, including genocide practices.

Yet the method of Shabad is correct, for such a great expanse as the USSR cannot be considered as a whole and an analysis of the different national republics throws a completely different light upon the present conditions in the Soviet Union. If we merely compare the census of 1926 and 1939, we will see a definite trend of the Kremlin policy, based upon the weakening and annihilation of the non-Russian peoples and the strengthening of the Russian element on the territory of the entire USSR. This resulted in the liquidation not only of the Volga Germans, the Karachayi, the Balkavtsy, the Ingush, the Chechens and the Kalmyks but in the reduction by 10-20% of the Ukrainian, White Ruthenian and Kazakh population, which the author does not mention. As a result of the famine produced by Moscow in Ukraine in 1932-33, the Ukrainian people suffered millions of losses. This is shown by the statistics on the younger generation in Ukraine in 1926 and 1939.

1926 — 8-11 years old — 2,157,605 12-14 years old: — 2,290,553.

1939 — 8-11 years old — 844,141 12-14 years old: — 2,307,899.

The survey of the historical geography of Eastern Europe by W. G. East, Professor of London University and author of a *Historical Geography of Europe*,

and co-author of *"The Spirit and Purpose of Geography,"* etc. is very poor. The author is not acquainted with this part of Europe and so repeats the outmoded and unscientific statements. For example, he says: "The Eastern (or Russian) variety (sic!) includes Great Russian, White Russian and Little Russian. . . Little Russian has held the status of a literary language since 1905 (sic!). . . White Russian. . . has little ground for separate status apart from Great Russian," etc.

The author of this section does not know that the formation of the modern Ukrainian nation goes to the prehistoric times, further back than 1905. Russian scholars, Rostovtsev and Klyuchevsky, knew that the tribal group of the Antae Ukrainian ancestors was a separate group, but Mr. East does not know this.

The position of Ukraine between the West and the East allowed it to form a trading centre in Kiev of colossal proportions which was influenced by Scandinavia, Byzantium, Western Europe and the Arab world. Kievan Rus' of that time, as an independent great power, thanks to this, was able to dominate all the East Slavic and the Ugro-Finnic tribes of the present White Ruthenia and Russia. For a thousand years Ukraine was an individual separate national and cultural realm in Eastern Europe. The assertion of Mr. East seems very strange that Ukrainian literature began only in 1905 and that the White Ruthenia simply does not exist.

H. KOLODY

ALEX N. DRAGNICH, *YUGOSLAVIA, TITO'S PROMISED LAND*. New Brunswick, N. J. Rutgers University Press, 1954, pp. xii+337.

This is an excellent, scholarly and well-balanced book on Yugoslavia under Communism and it points out very well the inconsistencies of the regime, its failure to solve its vital problems, and its possibilities for the future. For our present purposes, the volume needs to be considered from two points of view.

The first is from the standpoint of Yugoslavia. The introduction on the history of Yugoslavia between the wars (pp. 1-44) is an excellent summary but it may be a little too brief for the average American reader. However the author, especially in his treatment of the peasant economy before World War II, has brought out well the relative cheapness of food at that time and has had a feeling for the mentality of the Serb and Montenegrin peasant. He might have gone further in his analysis of the reaction of the Serb, Croat and Slovene mentalities toward Communism as an outgrowth of their earlier differences and unconsciously he raises the possibility that Tito himself may have carried into his Communism some traces of his older mentality, even while he attacks both Serbs and Croats with equal fury.

The second point is more instructive here. How far can we equate the revolt of Tito against the Cominform with the Ukrainian Communist opposition of Skrypnyk, Khvylovy, etc.? Here we have some interesting parallels and contrasts.

The policy of Tito throws a certain light upon that of Skrypnyk in his attitude toward Ukrainian culture. It goes far to explain the latter's actions in working for Ukrainian cultural development and at the same time forcing unqualified Communists into the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and allowing the attacks on Prof. Hrushevsky and the other leading scholars. The motives seem the same, although everything said indicates that Tito has a far more narrow vision than Skrypnyk or perhaps we should confine this to cultural affairs, which the author scarcely touches.

The position of Khvylovy and his friends apparently finds no echo. Khvylovy in the Literary Discussion sought to combine Communism and the best of European

thought in his "Away from Moscow." Prof. Dragnich gives no hint as to the existence of such a spirit of cultural independence and revolt in Yugoslavia. Almost his sole reference is to Ivo Andrich who must be compared to the men like Korneychuk who fit in more or less quietly to the new regime.

This emphasizes the special character of the Ukrainian Renaissance of the 20's, which had a firm basis in the Western orientation of the Ukrainian writers and the important influences of the Ukrainian National Republic. The outpouring of the Ukrainian genius during the years of relative calm with its cultural as well as political and economic opposition to Moscow was a far broader phenomenon than was Tito's revolt against the Cominform.

This must be remembered when we compare the Ukrainian movement and Tito or Tito and Mao in China. Each case has produced its own facet of the national coloring and we can regret that Prof. Dragnich did not go further in showing the impact of Titoism on the cultural life of the Yugoslavs.

However, it is an interesting and careful book and throws much light upon the futility of the efforts to separate national Communism from Russian Communism at the present day. The volume demands the careful attention of all who are interested in the psychology of Communism and the way to save free men and peoples from absorption in the totalitarian flood.

CLARENCE A. MANNING

Columbia University

THE ROLE OF THE CHRISTIANS IN THE WORLD FOR PEACE. A Symposium of the Catholic Association for International Peace. Washington, 1953.

Several nationally known figures as John C. H. Wu, the late Senator Brian McMahon, and Msgrs. E. Swanstrom, Ph. Hannan, J. O'Grady and others took part in this Symposium. Other serious speakers as Rev. W. J. Gibbons and Rev. J. J. Considine contributed to its success.

The Symposium dealt with such subjects as the General World Situation, Relief and Migration, Food for the Free World versus Communism, Public Opinion and the World Order. The lectures were followed by discussions.

The Symposium touched almost all the important questions of the present time and brought out the Catholic attitude toward them. The publication shows the wide interest of American Catholics in the most pressing problems of the time and proposes for them solutions in the spirit of the declarations of the Holy See.

N. C.



UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE COMMUNIST AGGRESSION AGAINST POLAND, HUNGARY, CZECHO-SLOVAKIA, BULGARIA, RUMANIA, LITHUANIA, LATVIA, ESTONIA, EAST GERMANY, RUSSIA AND THE NON-RUSSIAN NATIONS OF THE U.S.S.R., 2nd interim report, Select Committee on Communism Aggression, House of Representatives, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session. Gov't. Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1954.

The title of this excellent report indicates the scope and breadth of the vitally important work undertaken by the Select House Committee on Communist Aggression under the able chairmanship of the Honorable Charles J. Kersten. Most observers are reaching a common agreement on the significance of this work. In fact, they all appear to agree that this committee is without an equal in the work of exposing the real nature of Russian Communism. It is monumental in many respects, notably in that of furnishing basic source material in the continuous study of Russian communist aggression, genocide and imperialist expansion. The evidence accumulated over the span of two years from persons who witnessed and experienced Russian Communism directly, is tremendous and clinching.

This report summarizes some of the evidence relating to all the captive nations in the Communist Empire, not only the so-called satellite nations. In treating of the non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union it serves to correct the deficiency of knowledge on the part of many Americans with regard to Ukraine, Byelorussia, Armenia, Georgia, Cossackia and others. As such its work is innovating and substantially contributive. Study groups and educational institutions throughout the land cannot afford to overlook this brilliant report, and less so the forthcoming printed hearings of this committee which by all means must be continued in the Congress.

PEREJASLAV 1654-1954. Die Politischen Begriffe der Partner von Perejaslav by Hedwig Fleischhaker. Der Vertrag von Perejaslav im Widerstreit der Meinungen, by Oskar Eugen Günther. Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas. Vol. II, No. 3. Munich.

The historical review "Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas" published since 1953 by the "Osteuropa Institut" in Munich and edited by Prof. Hans Koch, a prominent expert on East European history, rendered a good service to Germany and the Western World by sacrificing a part of this issue to the important event of the Pereyaslav Treaty. The 300th anniversary of this event, so widely celebrated in the Soviet Union, disclosed to the world at least one truth about the real national character of the Soviet Union, Russia and Ukraine. The Treaty of Pereyaslav three hundred years ago dealt with two independent nations — the despotic Tsarist Muscovy and democratic Kozak Republic of Ukraine. The partners of this covenant were deeply different in their political structure. They possessed different

attitudes toward the future of the political union which was to be created in this Ukrainian regimental town.

This is the topic of a very elaborate article by Hedwig Fleischhaker. The author analyzes the political viewpoints and ideas of the democratic Ukrainian partner and of the despotic Tsarist Muscovy. Kozak elite, although educated on the free Polish ideology, refused to accept the superiority of noblesse as was accepted in Poland and therefore created new Ukrainian democratic attitude toward the new Ukrainian state structure.

Such ideology was entirely strange to the Moscovite Tsarist regime; they knew only the autocrat and the servile subjects. The Orthodoxy mentioned so often in Pereyaslav should have been on common Moscovite-Ukrainian ground, but it was not strong enough to sustain the differences which predicted the future — inevitable conflicts. This very delicate problem was elaborated by Hedwig Fleischhaker successfully.

It is no wonder that the surface words in the Pereyaslav agreement often so deeply different from the facts and their real meaning and provide the opportunity for several historians employing even the same sources to draw different conclusions concerning the nature of the Pereyaslav Treaty. This is the topic of Günther's work. What was the Pereyaslav Treaty? A military alliance of two independent states, a personal or a real union, a protectorate or vassal dependency of Ukraine from Muscovy, or perhaps an incorporation of an autonomous Ukraine into the Moscovite Tsardom? This is the rainbow of scholarly conclusions made by different researchers — Ukrainians and Russians as well.

Both treaties published in this issue of the "Jahrbücher für Geschichte Ost-europas" are based on wide historical literature. Copious bibliography of Günther's work will be helpful to the future researchers of this event which bound the fate of Ukraine with Russia for three centuries.

EAST AND WEST PRAISE THE QUEEN OF HEAVEN, by John La Farge S.J.
"America," Nov. 13, 1954.

Father John La Farge, the veteran of Catholic journalism in this country relates in the November 13th issue of "America" on the National Eucharistic Marian Congress of the Oriental Rites held in Philadelphia, Oct. 22-24 under the auspices of the Most. Rev. Constantine Bohachevsky, Apostolic Exarch for the Ukrainian Catholics in the USA and the Most Rev. John F. O'Hara, Archbishop of Philadelphia. Three cardinals, 7 archbishops, 18 bishops and 200 priests celebrated services during three days. Over 25 thousand faithful, mostly American Ukrainians, participated in the Congress.

The most important event was the simultaneous celebration of the Holy Mass in all Catholic Oriental Rites in the Convention Hall of Philadelphia, a skillful arrangement prepared by the auxiliary bishop of the Ukrainian Exarchate, Most Rev. Ambrose Senyshyn. Priests of several eastern nationalities celebrated the Holy Mass witnessing the solidarity of Eastern Rite Catholics, of which the majority are in Ukraine and Rumania, and at present suffer bloody persecutions. The churches are in catacombs at present times.

DO EUROPEANS REALLY HATE US?, by James Burnham. *This Week Magazine*, August 29, 1954, New York.

The eminent author of "Containment or Liberation?" and numerous other important works on Communism paints an interesting picture of the attitudes and

feelings of the average European toward the United States. This picture of warmth and friendliness is based on the experiences of the writer and his family over a period of six months in the villages and towns of six West European countries. In contrast to the usual superficial picture of European politicians and intellectuals in their neutralism or anti-Americanism, it is one of the common folk, the basic, hard-working stratum of European society, with even a love for America and its greatness. With a knowledge of some degree of social stratification in European society it is not difficult for one to understand as to why such a discrepancy of behavior should exist. It is encouraging that it does in a sense, namely that the so-called intellectual and political opinion in Europe does not really reflect the feelings of the underlying population. We are far from being alone in the present struggle against a mortal enemy of Western civilization. With these and millions behind the Iron Curtain we stand in the great majority dedicated to the cause of freedom.

UKRAINIAN UNIVERSITY — OUTPOST OF FREEDOM, by William Mahoney. The Stars and Stripes, European edition, September 27, 1954.

This is a very well written article on the development of the Free Ukrainian University, truly an outpost of freedom, since its establishment in January, 1921 in Vienna. The writer traces its re-locations to Prague and Munich where it now exists under the distinguished rectorship of Dr. John Mirtschuk. He vividly describes its function in the cause of truth and freedom, especially as concerns knowledge and understanding of the first victims of Russian Communist imperialism, the non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union.

MAY YOU PROSPER UKRAINA!, by N. A. Muravyova. Soviet Woman, May, 1954, Moscow.

Several articles in this issue of a blatant propaganda organ are devoted to the imaginary happiness of the Ukrainian people and nation under the all-providing stewardship of the Great Russian people, "the big brother." In this one, written by the Deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R., the overworked theme of the "great brotherly friendship" between the enslaved Ukrainian nation and its captor, Russia, is sounded over and over again, significantly much in the same way as is done by numerous Russian emigre groups professing anti-communism. Prepared for the occasion of the 300th anniversary celebration of the Pereyaslav Treaty, which was nothing more than a military alliance between Ukraine and Russia that the latter violated to further its imperialistic ambitions, it advances such fabrications as these: "The people of the Ukraine have achieved their happiness in the family of the Soviet Union's Socialist nations. They have won their freedom, independence, sovereign statehood, the great right to determine their own destinies, not in strife with other peoples, but with their assistance, through joint struggle against imperialist yoke." One need only view this in terms of the Russian Communist invasion of Independent Ukraine in 1919 to write it off as a patent lie.

MVD MAN'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, by Charles W. Thayer. Life, July 5, 1954, New York.

The experiences of the MVD Colonel Grigori S. Burlutski, as portrayed by this former American Consul General in Munich, form an exciting story of his escape from Russian Communism.

According to his testimony before the Kersten Committee on Communist Aggression, Colonel Burlutski accurately presented himself as a Cossack national, yet the writer paints him as a Russian. In this testimony he related in detail the genocidal programs of Moscow, especially as applied to the Chechen-Ingush republic in which the colonel himself was engaged. This article treats of this experience in an adequate and descriptive manner. Illuminating, too, is the colonel's observation on the continued existence of underground resistance activity in the Baltic areas and in Ukraine. There is still to be furnished even an iota of evidence concerning any such activity in Russia itself. As an indication of the economic colonialism pursued by Moscow with reference to the non-Russian areas, it is edifying to note that the colonel was always able to purchase meat, butter, fats, sugar and white bread in Moscow, but had not the same success elsewhere in Turkestan and the Caucasus even at speculator's prices.

RED ARISTOCRACY, by Alan Set. *American Mercury*, August 1954, New York.

This article can be taken as an example of gross over-simplification and misrepresentation of the basic facts determining the political complex of the Soviet Union and its so-called satellites. One familiar with the current range of writers in the field may offer the conjecture that the very name of the author is a pseudonym. This seems to be the present technique of those who seek to avoid direct criticism of their disinforming and in many cases dishonest journalism. Certainly the reading public is placed at a disadvantage by such articles and the periodical itself fails to advance the public interest by uncritically accepting and publishing such fourth-rate material.

First the author creates the false impression that all the people in the Soviet Union are Russians, for, quite simply, the Soviet Union is Russia, according to him. Thus in the very first sentence we are told that "forty-five million men, women and children — this is the price in human lives Russia has had to pay for its Communist Revolution." This is about the most factually meaningless and deceptive observation that one can possibly make. Against the background of the non-Russian revolution for independence in 1917-20 and over thirty years of Russian Communist genocide in Ukraine and elsewhere, it is safe to say that about three-quarters of this price was sustained by the non-Russian peoples fighting for their independence and national survival. It had nothing to do with the Communist Revolution which was a typical Russian revolution supported by the Russian masses at the time in their search for land, bread and peace. It had no support from the non-Russian nations whose problems were entirely different.

With this false start the article builds up with additional falsities that render it virtually worthless as a medium of correctly understanding the current situation in the Russian Communist Empire. It even ends on a patently false note, for in fantastic outline we are told that "On the top — 3 or 4 men in the Kremlin with 300,000 squires of the elite ready to die for the immense privileges they have, and supported by a meekly satisfied bureaucracy of some 13,000,000. At the bottom — 200,000,000 Russian slaves plus 100,000,000 European slaves. This is the "paradise for which 45,000,000 people had to give their lives." Briefly, there are in fact only about 100 million Russians, a fact which is sufficient to cast the light of fantasy in which this article exists.



Publications Received

- Taking Root in Canada*, by Gus Romaniuk. Riverton, Canada, 1954.
Treaty of Pereyaslav, by Alexander Ohloblyn. New York, 1954.
A Story of American Opportunity, by Hugh Roy Cullen. New York, 1954.
Livre Blanc sur La Detention Politique en Tunisie. Bruxelles, 1954.
Rome, Constantinople et Moscou au Temps de L'Union de Brest, by Oskar Halecki.
Martyrs and Fighters—The Epic of Warsaw Ghetto, by Philip Friedman. N. Y.
Academic Freedom under the Soviet Regime, A Symposium. New York, 1954.
Istoria Ukrainy 1917-1923, by Dmytro Doroshenko. Bulava Publ., N. Y., 1954.
Iskry Viry, by Alexander Neprytsky Granovsky. New York, 1953.
Peresliduvannya Ukrainskoi i Biloruskoi Cerkvy Rosiyskymy Caryamy. Munich.
Chronicle of the Shevchenko Scient. Soc. No. 77. Paris-New York, 1954.
The Annals of the Ukr. Academy of Arts and Sciences in U.S. Vol. III, No. 2, 3.
East and West. No. 1, 2, 1954. London.
Textes Legislatifs Etrangers. Vol. IV. No. 1, 2, 1954. Bruxelles.
Documentation Juridique Etrangere. Vol. VI, No. 8, 9, 10, 1954. Bruxelles.
Lviv, 700-Anniversary. Ed. by Bohdan Romanenchuk. Kyiv Publ., Phila., 1954.
Zernovye Kultury USSR, by A. Archymovich. Munich, 1954.
Transportnoe Znachenye Hydrotekhnicheskikh Sooruzheniy USSR, by Lebed-Yakovliv. Munich, 1954.
Uslavya Proyehayemosti Gruntovykh Dorob USSR. Fedorovskiy. Munich, 1954.
Teofil Kostruba, by Alexander Moch. Toronto, 1954.
American Historical Review. October, 1954. New York.
The Catholic Historical Review. October, 1954. Washington, D.C.
Jahrbuecher fuer Geschichte Osteuropas. Vol. II, No. 3. Muenchen, 1954.
Political Science Quarterly. December, 1954. New York.
Review of Politics. No. 3, 4, 1954. Notre Dame.
Journal of Central European Affairs. October, 1954. Boulder, Col.
The Russian Review. October, 1954. Hannover, N. H.
Archivo Espanol de Arte. No. 105, 106. Madrid, 1954.
The Armenian Review. Summer, Autumn, 1954. Boston.
Italian Affairs. September,-November, 1954. Roma.
Ucrania Libre. Vol. IV, No. 5. Buenos Aires.
Liste Mensuelle D'Articles Selectionnes. Geneve, September, 1954.
Bulletin of Shevchenko Scientific Society in Canada. Toronto, 1954.
Euntes Docete. Vol. VII, No. 2. Roma, 1954.
Contemporary Issues. No. 20, October-November, 1954. London.
Korean Survey. October, November, December, 1954. Washington, D.C.
Kultura. No. 9, 10, 11, 12, 1954. Paris.
Hrvatska Revija. Vol. IV, No. 3. Buenos Aires, 1954.
Biharsky Osvedomiteln Bulletin. April-May-June, 1954. Sao Paulo, Brasil.
Plastovy Sblakh. No. 7, 1954. Munich.
Logos. Vol. V, No. 3. Meadowvale, 1954.
Kyiv. No. 4, 5, 1954. Philadelphia.
Ukrainsky Hospodarnyk. Vol. 1, No. 2, 3. New York, 1954.
Holos Spasytela. No. 11-12, 1954. Yorkton.
Porohy. June-July, 1954. Buenos Aires.
Vyzvolny Sblakh. No. 9, 10, 11, 1954. London.
Vistnyk. No. 10, 11, 1954. New York, 1954.
Do Zbroi. September, 1954. Munich.

UKRAINIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA

(in Ukrainian)

In three volumes, 1230 pages with many illustrations, diagrams,
geographical maps and colored pictures.

The price of three volumes:

Half-linen covers	\$45.00
Linen covers	\$48.60
Plastic covers	\$49.50
Half-leather covers	\$51.00
Leather covers	\$63.00

Mail your orders and checks to:

"MOLODE ZYTTYA"

12001 Lumpkin Avenue

Detroit 12, Mich.

UKRAINE

In Vergangenheit Und Gegenwart

A quarterly publication in the German language
on Ukrainian affairs and German-Ukrainian relations.

A cultural, economic and political journal.

Published Quarterly.—Price \$2.00 per year.

"UKRAINA"

Rumfordstrasse, 19

MUNICH, GERMANY

UCRANIA LIBRE

(FREE UKRAINE)

A quarterly publication in the Spanish language on Ukrainian affairs
and Ukrainian relations with the peoples of the Spanish speaking world.

A cultural, economic and political journal.

UCRANIA LIBRE

DEFENDS the right of the Ukrainian people and other enslaved peoples
in the Soviet Union to independent Governments;

PRESENTS information on contemporary events in Ukraine and the Eastern
European countries, as well as on Ukrainian culture, religion and
economic affairs in the past and present;

HELPS better mutual relations between democratic World and demo-
cratic Ukraine.

Published Quarterly. Price \$2.00 Per Year.

Publisher's Address:

UCRANIA LIBRE

Soler 5039

Buenos Aires, Argentina